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  • Great Powers and the Importance of Listening in International Politics

    55e04a4e-7f53-4839-abde-ec9c51ecf354 < All op-eds Great Powers and the Importance of Listening in International Politics Dr. Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad In today’s world where scary dragons, eagles, bears, and elephants (and sometimes octopuses) regularly appear in magazine covers or articles’ illustrations when they discuss international politics, it might be helpful to for us to look back at old fables to get some critical lessons that we might miss. In my case, I would suggest we look at the old stories from Indonesian and the larger Malayan societies that revolved around “Sang Kancil.” While more research needs to be done to see the connection between the traditional fable of  kancil  and the geopolitical location of Southeast Asia, which throughout history continue to be the location where great empires compete for influence, I contend that the stories might teach us one or two pearls of wisdom on geopolitics.  Rather than a mighty eagle, dragon, bear, or elephant, the main protagonist of the Malayan fable universe is “Sang Kancil” (“The Mousedeer”). A small, not-so-powerful, but kind and intelligent dweller of the forest. Through his wit, the tiny  kancil  defeated the powerful tiger to save the strong but naïve buffalo. He also tricked a group of hungry crocodiles into allowing him to cross the river. In another story, he stopped an invasion by an army of elephants. Kancil’s rare defeat came from creatures smaller and weaker than the mousedeer. He was outsmarted by the snails, whom he deemed as having no leverage against him.  The stories often reminded the audience that great powers might give us some leverage, but they could also be the cause of our downfall. Power is dangerous, even for our protagonist, because it makes us unable to understand the situation better by leading us to not listen to others. This might be an essential lesson for us all, including the Great Powers. Shadows of the Perceived Enemy One of the common mistakes of the Great Powers blinded by their desire to contain their rivals is their inability to understand the complex relationships between them and others. They see the world in the shadow of their perceived enemy, not the reality itself. This led to the failure to comprehend appropriately the motivations and behaviors of non-Great Powers, which were reduced into their relationship with the enemy. This approach is not going to work in Southeast Asia or the larger Indo-Pacific, a region that is marked by fluid relationships. This fluidity is often misunderstood as inconsistency, but we better understand it as the natural consequence of the multidimensionality of relationships in the region. Many Southeast Asian countries do not see their hard stance on the South China Sea against China as something that is contradictory to their increasing economic cooperation with Beijing. Indonesia is showing off its resolute position on the Natuna Sea and at the same time inviting Beijing to invest more and more in the country. Other ASEAN members also do the same with different degrees and contexts.   Rather than a single chessboard in which China and US are competing for supremacy, Southeast Asia is a region in which people play multiple board games with different rules at the same time. Mixing the rules of different board games would not bring victory. All players need to patiently identify the situation in each game and then act based on the specific context. I argued that even ASEAN regionalism is actually a “compartmentalized regionalism,” which I define as “a political project to reorganize a particular regional space along defined economic and political lines, which actually consists of multiple and separated/compartmentalized patterns of arrangements of the regional space(s) but combined and identified as a single project.” (Choiruzzad, 2017). ASEAN-China survey in 2020 , which asked 1000 respondents with different backgrounds (including policymakers, academics, business sector, civil society, and students) from 10 ASEAN countries, found that ASEAN people see China (and the US) in a nuanced manner. They did worry about China’s assertive behavior in the region, but at the same time also saw it as an essential partner to help solve the challenges faced by the region (Foreign Policy Community Indonesia, 2020). This led ASEAN countries to use the “a la carte” approach in their relationship with Great Powers such as China or US. Their position depends on the specific issue and context. They see that it is possible to see “China as a security actor” as different from “China as an economic actor.” In the case of COVID-19, China is also increasingly seen as a “public health actor,” which is crucial to provide ASEAN countries access to vaccines. Unfortunately, both US and China seem to be increasingly forgetting this multidimensionality and are attempting to mix different issues together in the New Cold War chessboard. Infrastructure development or investments, direly needed by ASEAN countries, were increasingly turned into instruments to extract loyalties (David Shambaugh, 2018; Mobley, 2019). If not managed well, initiatives to create connectivity can turn into disconnection.  The Importance of Listening Literature on international politics often suggests actors take the initiative, ranging from showing our intention through the material display of power, making demands, giving stick and carrot, setting the stage, to developing attraction. After all, power is often understood as the ability to influence others. This often makes us oblivious to the importance of listening in international politics. Kancil was victorious not only because of his wit but also his willingness to listen to others, weak or strong. When he feels he is smart enough and thus unwilling to listen to smaller creatures such as snails, he is defeated.  The willingness of Great Powers to listen and understand the concerns and conditions of Southeast Asian countries, as well as the larger Indo-Pacific region, is not only important for these less powerful countries. Power is contextual, and without proper understanding of the context, the materially more powerful entities were often failed to achieve their ambition.  The history of Southeast Asia is full of this lesson. In the 13th century, the powerful Yuan Dynasty invaded Java to punish Kartanegara, the King of Singasari. It ends with a disaster for the 30,000-strong expedition, which was destroyed by the newly established Kingdom of Majapahit. While Yuan Dynasty’s military was clearly stronger, it was not familiar with the tropical climate and terrain and, more significantly, with the politics in the island.  A more contemporary example is the US initiative during the Cold War to establish the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). In September 1954, then-Secretary of the State John Foster Dulles gathered US allies in Manila and established SEATO to contain communist influence in the region. While Southeast Asia was in the name, most of the members were from outside the region. A year later, the Asian African Conference was held in Bandung, declaring the defiant mood of Asian African countries which resisted being pulled into Great Power politics. SEATO did not work effectively both for the US and for Southeast Asian countries.  In contrast to SEATO, ASEAN, which was established by five Southeast Asian countries without much interference from the US, was not only successful in helping its members to navigate the Cold War but also beneficial for the Great Powers. For the US, the relatively stable and peaceful Southeast Asia, which focuses on economic development, enabled the US to develop the US-Japan-Southeast Asia triangular trade system. Originally designed to avoid Japan’s dependency on China for its post-war economic development, the triangular trade system would also be crucial to integrate China into the global economy following US-China rapprochement in the 1980s as part of US strategy in the Cold War (Shiraishi, 2019, pp. 12–13). ASEAN was also crucial in managing the conflict in Indochina and also stabilizing the regional order following the end of the conflict, including by integrating Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam into ASEAN after the end of the Cold War.  For Japan, a stable and peaceful Southeast Asia is a significant factor in its economic success by providing a market and enabling the creation of region-wide production networks. Of course, the development of these production networks also benefited Southeast Asian countries, who enjoyed economic growth due to the supply of capital from Japan (and the US) and the diffusion of production and process technology, although at the pace controlled by the parent companies in Japan. Later, when the US-China relationship was revived, Chinese business, which has a strong and longstanding connection Southeast Asian economy, quickly joined the party. It is not a surprise that ASEAN economic integration project in the 1990s has been largely driven by the private sector, especially by the activities of Japanese Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and overseas Chinese business, while states play a rather reactive role (Stubbs, 1995). After the 1997/1998 Asian Crisis, Japan and China became increasingly entrenched in the region, and they committed to further supporting the region’s integration. Japan even helped to establish and sustain ERIA (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia), a think tank that is very influential in shaping the blueprint for ASEAN economic integration.  At least in the last decade of the 20th century and the early years of the 21st century, the US, China, and Japan had increasingly accepted the centrality of ASEAN as a mutually acceptable way to engage the region without provoking external and internal resistance. ASEAN was increasingly becoming “the node in the cluster of networks,” which places it as a central hub in the regional architecture (Caballero-Anthony, 2014). ASEAN’s weakness turned into its strength because the Great Powers are less suspicious towards ASEAN, thus making ASEAN acceptable to be the central actor in the region (Stubbs, 2014).  Unfortunately, now this material weakness had returned to be a contextual weakness again. Afraid that they could not count on ASEAN to keep their rivals in check, Great Powers started to rethink their acceptance of ASEAN centrality. The mutual acceptance of ASEAN centrality is now fading away with the increasingly aggressive China and US actions (Acharya, 2017, pp. 275–277). The Great Powers are starting to not be listening again. History teaches us that when Great Powers are unable to listen, the story will not end well for them and for the others.    In this context, listening to the voices from inside the region (Southeast Asia as well as the newly emerging Indo-Pacific region) is a crucial first step that is important to understand the region beyond the shadow of the New Cold War. Only by understanding the multidimensionality of the region and the fluidity of international relations within it the Great Powers can secure their interests and, at the same time, secure the stability and prosperity of the region known as one of the global engines of growth. In this context, the establishment of meaningful engagement through multiple channels is crucial. Indo-Pacific Circle, hopefully, could be one of the important channels to create this meaningful and empathic engagement. Let us listen to each other.  References Acharya, A. (2017). The myth of ASEAN centrality? Contemporary Southeast Asia , 39 (2), 273–279. Caballero-Anthony, M. (2014). Understanding ASEAN’s Centrality: Bases and Prospects in an Evolving Regional Architecture. Pacific Review , 27 (4), 563–584. Choiruzzad, S. A. B. (2017). ASEAN as ‘Compartmentalized Regionalism.’ Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional , 19 (1), 44–57. https://doi.org/10.7454/global.v19i1.136 David Shambaugh. (2018). U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coexistence? International Security , 42 (4), 85–127. Foreign Policy Community Indonesia. (2020). ASEAN China Survey 2020: Assessing the Present and Envisioning the Future of ASEAN-China Relations . FPCI. Lowy Institute. (2021). Covid Performance Index . Lowyinstitute.Org. https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/covid-performance/#rankings Mobley, T. (2019). The Belt and Road Initiative: Insights from China’s Backyard. Strategic Studies Quarterly , 13 (3), 52–72. https://doi.org/10.1101/843326 Shiraishi, T. (2019). Emerging States and Economies in Asia: A Historical and Comparative Perspective. In T. Shiraishi & T. Sonobe (Eds.), Emerging States and Economies: Their Origins, Drivers, and Challenges Ahead (pp. 1–29). Springer Open. Stubbs, R. (1995). Asia-Pacific Regionalization and The Global Economy: A Third Form of Capitalism? Asian Survey , 35 (9), 785–797. Stubbs, R. (2014). ASEAN’s Leadership in East Asian Region-Building: Strength in Weakness. Pacific Review , 27 (4), 523–541. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

  • DR GAURAV SAINI | IP Circle

    < Back DR GAURAV SAINI EXECUTIVE EDITOR gauravsaini@csdronline.com Dr. Saini holds a PhD in International Politics from the Centre for International Politics, Organization, and Disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. His doctoral thesis titled “India’s Strategic Culture: A study of Indian thinking on China, 1998-2014” focuses on contemporary Indian strategic thought with a particular emphasis on China. His research interests include foreign policy, strategic culture, defense industry, regionalism, and conflict resolution. Currently, he is an Emerging Quad Think Tank Leader, a part of the U.S. State Department’s Leaders Lead on Demand program. The program brings together 20 thought leaders (5 from each of the 4 Quad countries) to work together on various aspects of the Quad in the Indo Pacific region. At CSDR, he is responsible for product design and partnerships. gauravsaini@csdronline.com 123-456-7890

  • This is a Title 02 | IP Circle

    < Back This is a Title 02 This is placeholder text. To change this content, double-click on the element and click Change Content. This is placeholder text. To change this content, double-click on the element and click Change Content. Want to view and manage all your collections? Click on the Content Manager button in the Add panel on the left. Here, you can make changes to your content, add new fields, create dynamic pages and more. You can create as many collections as you need. Your collection is already set up for you with fields and content. Add your own, or import content from a CSV file. Add fields for any type of content you want to display, such as rich text, images, videos and more. You can also collect and store information from your site visitors using input elements like custom forms and fields. Be sure to click Sync after making changes in a collection, so visitors can see your newest content on your live site. Preview your site to check that all your elements are displaying content from the right collection fields. Previous Next

  • Dr Kaustav Padmapati

    < Back Dr Kaustav Padmapati Dr. Kaustav Padmapati is currently working as an Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science, Royal School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Assam Royal Global University, Guwahati, Assam. He teaches Political Science and International Relations at graduate and undergraduate level. He was also a guest faculty at Centre for South East Asian Study, Gauhati University. Previously, he also worked as Programme Officer at the Foreign Policy Division of Ananta Aspen Centre in New Delhi. Dr. Kaustav is a recipient of the Fulbright Nehru Doctoral Fellowship and was associated with the Center for Asian Studies, School of International Service, American University, Washington DC, USA as Visiting Fulbright Research Scholar and Adjunct Faculty. Kaustav holds a PhD. and M.Phil. in American Studies from the Center for Canadian, US & Latin American Studies, SIS, JNU, New Delhi. His research areas include China, Taiwan, East Asia, and Southeast Asia, ASEAN, US Foreign Policy, International relations, gender and alternative sexuality. Publications

  • Genevieve Bridget May

    < Back Genevieve Bridget May Genevieve Donnellon-May is a geopolitical and global strategy advisor interested in regional resource conflict and environmental governance in Asia and Africa. At present, she is a researcher for the Oxford Global Society, a Research Associate at the Asia Society Policy Institute and an Analyst (Asia-Pacific) for the Red Line Podcast. She has held positions as the 2022 Young Australians in International Affairs Climate Fellow as well as at the Institute of Water Policy, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, and the Asian Institute for Policy Studies, South Korea. She is a recipient of the New Colombo Plan Scholarship (2018), the Melbourne Global Scholars Award (2017), and the Chinese Government Scholarship (2014). Genevieve frequently contributes to leading newspapers, journals, and other media on transboundary water governance in Asia. These include AsiaGlobal Online, Asia Sentinel, Asia Times, ASPI Strategist, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Cambridge China Review, East Asia Forum, Indian Strategic Studies, New Straits Times, RSIS Commentary, South China Morning Post, Straits Times, The Diplomat, ThePrint India, ThinkChina, Today Online, and the Wilson Center’s New Security Beat. She holds a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) and a Diploma in Languages (French) from the University of Melbourne as well as a Master of Science in Water Science, Policy and Management from the University of Oxford. Publications

  • Nitin Pai

    Mr Nitin Pai is co-founder and director of the Takshashila Institution, an independent centre for research and education in public policy based in Bangalore. His research includes cyber and space power, Indo-Pacific geopolitics, and defence economics. < Back Nitin Pai Nitin Pai is co-founder and director of the Takshashila Institution, an independent centre for research and education in public policy. His current research includes information warfare and the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. He teaches international relations, public policy and ethical reasoning at Takshashila Institution’s graduate programmes. Nitin is currently a columnist with Mint, Sakal and ThePrint. His book "Nitopadesha - Moral Tales for Good Citizens" is currently under publication. He is the co-editor of "India's Marathon: Reshaping the Post-Pandemic World Order" published in 2020. He is currently a member of the Chief Minister of Karnataka's Vision Group on Higher Education. Earlier in his career Nitin worked on satellite design, undersea cable projects and RF communications before joining the Singapore government, where he spent more than a decade as a policymaker in the technology sector. He was a gold medalist from the National University of Singapore’s LKY School of Public Policy, an undergraduate scholar at Nanyang Technological University (NTU), and an alum of National College, Bangalore. His writings are available at https://www.nitinpai.in

  • Mr Nahian Reza Sabriet

    < Back Mr Nahian Reza Sabriet Nahian Reza Sabriet is Research Officer at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). He has finished his regular undergraduate and post-graduate courses from the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka. Publications

  • What do the Midterm Results mean for the US Foreign Policy?

    c29090aa-4dad-42f3-b07e-ef8ab9654604 < All op-eds What do the Midterm Results mean for the US Foreign Policy? Anurag Mishra & Paras Ratna A peculiar feature of American democracy is that it has an election every two years. The midterm elections replace a proportion of the senate members and return some representatives to the House. The constitutional exercise, however, does not have the thunder of a presidential election as it produces little change in the government's policies and shifts no ground in the White House. Given that, foreign policy has little effect on either informing the voters and swinging their choices on the ballot or determining the course of the foreign policy works of the presidential administration either. But the 2022 midterms were considered crucial because they happened under the pall of a European war, an aggressive China, and closer home, galloping inflation. As the Republican Party grapples with its rather abysmal midterm performance, the results sure will impact the domestic and foreign policy front. Despite the odds being heavily favoured for the Republicans to take over Congress, it was projected that the Reds would be gaining a sizeable majority in the House and pipping the Democrats in the Senate. But once all the races were called, the Republicans had to settle for far less than they expected. Although the midterm results defied the expectations of the GOP, they have managed to wrestle back the House of Representatives, leading to a divided Congress as the Democratic Party has retained its majority in the Senate. As the dust of the electoral contest settles down, the article examines the implication of a divided Congress on the Biden administration’s foreign policy initiatives. Blue, Red, and the Purple Patch: Bipartisanism in the US Foreign Policy under Biden It is being argued that the US foreign policy will largely demonstrate relative uniformity/stability amidst an otherwise polarised Congress. There seems to be a consensus between the republicans and democrats regarding the challenges confronting the US primacy in international politics, making it (the foreign policy) the purple patch as the red and blue of American politics seems to be broadly converging. According to the Pew Research survey, both republicans ( 83% ) and democrats ( 68% ) have a negative view of China, signifying a consensus on the China policy. In one of the rare displays of bipartisanship, the American senate approved a competition bill targeting China’s manufacturing last year. The bill attempts to achieve this objective by incentivizing manufacturing in the US and targeting China’s economic/trade malpractices. Other than boosting manufacturing of high-end products like semiconductors, mandating local procurement of materials like steel for infra projects funded by the federal government, and boosting scientific research, it attempts to target China’s trade malpractices by building a coalition with like-minded countries like Japan, and Australia in stopping imports of goods from China that are deemed to violate the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). The bill further envisages an independent task force to study China’s market manipulation. The bill's passage by 68-32 brings the bipartisan consensus on America’s China policy to the fore. Another important test case of bipartisanship for the Biden administration’s foreign policy will be the US aid to Ukraine in the wake of the Russian invasion. Post GOP’s control of the house, there are speculations about the return of America's first conservatives adversely impacting the US assistance to Ukraine; statements by GOP leaders like Kevin McCarthy , the republican leader and contender for the speaker of the House have added fuel to this speculation. He noted that Republicans wouldn’t support a ‘blank cheque’ for Ukraine. However, there is much more than what meets the eye. GOP leaders like Mitch McConnell and Richard Shelby have strongly argued for US assistance to Ukraine. As of today, Ukraine is the highest recipient of US Aid; this is the first time since the Truman administration’s Marshall plan that any European country has come to occupy the spot. Reportedly, a total of USD 5O billion worth of aid ranging from humanitarian to the military was provided by the US to Ukraine. Ukraine tops the tally for US military assistance; the table below shows the same. Source: CFR, 2022 This shows that American aid to Ukraine enjoys bipartisan support in the house. Recently, a letter signed by thirty ‘ progressive ’ democrats asking President Biden to negotiate with Russia was withdrawn after all-around criticism. These suggest that notwithstanding occasional statements and posturing, the US support to Ukraine in terms of military and humanitarian aid is poised to be steady. This is also evident from the mood of everyday Americans; according to a survey by the Gallup poll, close to 66% of Americans support the Ukrainian resistance against Russia, even at the cost of prolonged war. Indo-Pacific Policy is another significant theatre of the US foreign policy that deserves examination in the wake of midterm results. It is being argued that the GOP’s control of the house could result in a tick in defence spending esp. Domestic defence spending/manufacturing; would be reassuring for US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Speaking of allies, the senate committee on foreign relations’ approval of the Taiwan policy Act aimed at strengthening the US-Taiwan bilateral ties by bolstering the defence of Taiwan and pledging a commitment of USD 6.5 billion for modernising the Taiwanese military too points to growing convergence on tough US against Chinese aggression. Interestingly, this act was introduced by the GOP leader Michael McCaul alongside 35 other republicans. Therefore, GOP’s control over the house could see a more resolute US foreign policy posturing in the Indo-Pacific, entailing siding/arming allies and partners. Next, speaking of trade, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) unveiled by the Biden administration in the wake of the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is viewed as a significant initiative of economic statecraft on the part of the US. Here, it is expected that the GOP could support trade liberalisation arrangements as lower tariff rates for the US goods could benefit farmers-a traditional vote bank of the GOP. This would also help in countering China in overall global trade. It is worth noting that notwithstanding the negativity surrounding trade agreements, the US-Mexico-Canada ( USMC ) free trade agreement received substantial bipartisan support. The inclusion of activistic provisions like stringent labor laws etc., in IPEF is somewhat similar to USMC, which received bipartisan support. Conclusion The semblance of convergence, i.e., the purple patch in an otherwise polarised US politics, suggests that while political parties have their respective interests, the state has its reason. Here, the US state has reason to resist the challenge to its fading unipolar moment from China. The initiatives like the China competitiveness bill and Taiwan policy act, alongside attempts to forge defence partnerships with partners around the Indo-Pacific region, could be interpreted as an attempt to balance China without containment . Given the integration of China into today’s economy, it is a herculean task for a declining hegemon (the US) to outrightly contain China, as, unlike the cold war era, the world today is characterised more by dense economic interaction rather than ideological camps. This has prompted the US, its allies, and its partners to re-think globalisation, especially in the post-covid world. Therefore, we are witnessing the rush to secure supply chains and bring back manufacturing increasingly characterising the US foreign policy- be it Blue or Red. Thus, the competitiveness bill shows a form of economic balancing against China. Next, talks about domestic defence expenditure could be interpreted as a means to balance China’s aggressive intent in the Indo-Pacific. Next, initiatives like the Taiwan policy Act aimed at modernising Taiwan’s defence, followed by attempts to deepen defence cooperation with countries like India, could be interpreted as a means to balance China’s rise by equipping regional powers. Quad- a consortium of four democracies could also be viewed as a balancing instrument against the increasingly assertive China. Thus, the convergence of GOP and democrats in the realm of foreign policy is indicative of the reasons for the US state that transcends party-wise compartmentalization. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

  • Dr Shelly Johny V.

    < Back Dr Shelly Johny V. Shelly Johny V. is an Associate Professor of Political Science, St. Aloysius College, Kerala. He is also an Honorary Senior Fellow of West Asian and Security Studies, at the Centre for Public Policy Research. He has formerly been an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, and a Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. He holds a PhD in West Asian Studies, from Jawaharlal Nehru University. His research interests include maritime security in the Arabian and Red Seas/ Indian Ocean history, contemporary West Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and political Islam. He has numerous publications on West Asian affairs, for multiple journals and online media outlets, including the Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, the Air Power Journal, and Social Orbit. Publications The Afghan Taliban and other Jihadi Movements in Afghanistan https://www.cppr.in/articles/the-afghan-taliban-and-other-jihadi-movements-in-afghanistan Increasing threats of a regional conflict between Iran and Israel https://www.cppr.in/articles/conflict-between-iran-and-israel New dispensations in Israel and Iran amid ongoing rivalry: https://www.cppr.in/articles/new-dispensations-in-israel-and-iran-amid-ongoing-rivalry

  • Ms Shruti Pandalai

    < Back Ms Shruti Pandalai Shruti Pandalai is a Fellow at the Centre for Military Affairs/ Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Her research focuses on India’s foreign and security policy, India and evolving geopolitics in the Indo Pacific, China’s sharp power and influence operations, and strategic narratives on the India-China boundary dispute. She holds an MA in International Studies and Diplomacy from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. Her upcoming publications include ‘India’s Stakes in The Indo Pacific: The Way Forward’, for Routledge India, and ‘Strategic Narratives from India’s Frontiers: What Arunachal thinks of the Boundary Dispute with China’, for MP-IDSA. Publications Blame Games Amidst A Protracted Deadlock—No Thaw In India, China Ties: https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publications/details/china-india-brief-191#.YXjM8aLh6Hs.twitter Why AUKUS is Gaining Acceptance in the Indo Pacific: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/australia-submarine-accepted-aukus-asia-indo-pacific-alliance-china-2206681 Chinese Checkers: Driving Alignments in the Indo-Pacific: https://www.idsa.in/idsanews/chinese-checkers-driving-alignments-in-the-indo-pacific

  • RIVA GANGULY DAS | IP Circle

    < Back RIVA GANGULY DAS EDITOR- FOREIGN POLICY riva@csdronline.com Ambassador Das joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1986. She has served as High Commissioner to Bangladesh and Ambassador to Romania, Albania and Moldova and has served as Consul General in Shanghai and New York. She has also done postings in Spain and The Netherlands and has served in various capacities at Headquarters dealing with Nepal, Public Diplomacy, Passport & Consular, and United Nations. She has also served as the Director at the United Nations Economic and Social Affairs Division and participated in environmental negotiations, particularly climate change. She was also the Alternate Permanent Representative of India to the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at The Hague. She has also served as Director General, Indian Council for Cultural Relations. Before her retirement she was Secretary (East) in the Ministry of External Affairs. riva@csdronline.com 123-456-7890

  • Dr Niloy Ranjan Biswas

    < Back Dr Niloy Ranjan Biswas Dr. Niloy Ranjan Biswas is an Associate Professor of the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka. He has undertaken his studies at the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh, The George Washington University, Washington DC, USA, and City, University of London, London, UK. In 2016, he completed his Ph.D. in International Politics from City, University of London. He was a recipient of the Fulbright Fellowship (2010-12) to pursue the second Master’s degree in Security Policy Studies at The George Washington University, Washington DC. In 2017, he successfully completed the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)-Resolve Fellowship to conduct post-doctoral research on community policing and its challenges in preventing violent extremism. In 2020, Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group (CRG) offered him a visiting research fellowship to conduct an empirical study on Rohingya refugees and international protection mechanisms. Dr. Biswas has several academic and policy publications to his credit. He has written extensively on regional cooperation in Indo-pacific, South and Southeast Asia, deradicalization and preventing violent extremism, refugees and forced migration, and South Asian regional contributions to United Nations peace support endeavours. His most recent articles are published in National Security (VIF), Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, International Peacekeeping (Taylor & Francis), Journal of International Peacekeeping (Brill), Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BISSS) Journal and Mirpur Papers (Defense Services Command and Staff College, Bangladesh). Dr. Biswas is an adjunct Associate Professor at the Bangladesh University of Professionals. He frequently visits Bangladesh Foreign Service Academy, Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations and Training (BIPSOT), National Defense College, Defense Services Command and Staff College, and Bangladesh Ansar & VDP Academy as a guest speaker and subject matter expert. Publications

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