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< Back Mr Gaurav Sen Gaurav Sen, is a PhD candidate at the Centre for African Studies. His PhD research includes India and China strategic competition in African east coast. He has done his master's in Politics with specialization in International Studies from SIS, JNU, New Delhi. He is currently working as a Research Associate at Centre for Air Power Studies where his research topic is based on Chinese A2/AD system and Balance of Power in Indo-Pacific. before this he was a research intern at MP-IDSA. Publications

< Back Dr Choong Pui Yee Choong Pui Yee is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Southeast Asian Studies at University of Malaysia. She teaches ASEAN regionalism and Politics and Governance of Southeast Asia. Her research interests include social movements, contentious politics, Malaysia's domestic politics, and security issues in Southeast Asia. Prior to her current position, has held a research position at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, and had served as a Senior Analyst and Coordinator of the History and Regional Studies Programme at Penang Institute, Malaysia. She has also served as the Head of Research of a think tank affiliated with a political party in Malaysia. Pui Yee has published several commentaries and book chapters on political issues in Malaysia. Besides that, she has also worked on several state government projects where she provided policy recommendations for the state government. Publications

< Back Dr Medha Bisht Medha Bisht is an Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi. She was formerly a Fellow at the South Asia Centre, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. She completed her PhD in Diplomatic Studies, at the Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Her articles on strategic thought, Indian foreign policy, Bhutan, and Women’s Movements, have appeared in journals such as the Hague Journal of Diplomacy, the Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, and Asian Affairs. Her most recent book is titled, ‘Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Philosophy of Strategy’, published by Routledge in 2019. Publications Taliban Talks to “International Community”: https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/taliban-talks-to-international-community-medhabhist-030921 Chinese Inroads into Bhutan: Diplomatic Gimmick or Strategic Reality?: https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChineseInroadsintoBhutan_mbisht_140812 Dams in Arunachal Pradesh: Between Development Debates and Strategic Dimensions: https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/DamsinArunachalPradesh_mbisht_010210

955d0334-27fe-4c38-940e-97ebbc3de35a < All op-eds Collective HADR Responses in the Indo-Pacific: Additional Mechanisms in the Making? Dr Lina Gong This blog originally appeared as an online publication for the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technical University, Singapore. It has been republished with the consent of both RSIS and the author, Dr Lina Gong. SYNOPSIS The emergence of new regional mechanisms such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad and the Lancang Mekong Cooperation offer additional mechanisms to strengthen collective response and complement the role of ASEAN in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Indo-Pacific. The respective designs of these new mechanisms nevertheless raise important questions over the extent to which they will contribute to deepening collective disaster response. COMMENTARY Natural hazards pose significant threats to the Indo-Pacific. In 2021, the region accounted for nearly half of disaster-induced fatalities and 23% of economic losses in the world. Climate change adds to the risks facing the region as climate extremes are projected to increase in frequency and severity. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has further strained personnel, resources and logistics in disaster responses. These trends highlight the need to strengthen regional militaries’ capacity for collective response in the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). Military involvement in disaster response is common in this region and foreign military assistance is requested when national military assets are inadequate. Success and Constraints of the ASEAN Model The ASEAN countries have built a multi-layered network to support collective response to disasters in the region. Established institutions and platforms contribute to better communication and coordination on HADR issues. Relying on its convenient location in the region and network of international liaison officers, the Changi Regional HADR Coordination Centre ( RHCC ) hosted by Singapore was launched in 2014 to enhance regional coordination in HADR. The RHCC shares information to facilitate informed deployment-related decision-making on the part of partner militaries and avoid duplication when a disaster strikes across the wider region. Platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)–Plus have facilitated multi-level engagement on HADR issues between ASEAN and its dialogue partners since the 1990s through regular meetings and workshops as well as joint training and exercises . These activities help connect focal points of contact from different countries and sectors, including military forces, government agencies, regional and international organisations, and humanitarian agencies, to foster a regional network of disaster relief. However, it is necessary to recognise the difficulty for ASEAN to go beyond a facilitative role. Currently, collective response takes the form of multiple bilateral responses, as seen during the Palu earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia in 2018. Eighteen countries deployed assets through direct coordination with the Indonesian military forces, while the RHCC Centre was not utilised. The same pattern was seen in military responses to COVID-19 in the region, with one military delivering critical medical supplies and vaccines to another bilaterally. It shows the ASEAN countries’ preference for dealing with military HADR interactions primarily by themselves with some engagement through regional mechanisms, an approach that ultimately limits the depth of HADR cooperation in the region. A more regionalised response to HADR under the ASEAN banner can contribute further to enhancing the speed and efficiency of coordination and deployment. The discussions for the establishment of an ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HADR since 2015 can be seen as a step in this direction. Quad and LMC as Alternatives: Potential and Uncertainty Although the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC) are relatively new and under-institutionalised mechanisms, compared with ASEAN, the two arrangements have the potential both in resources and capabilities to be more operational. The Quad, consisting of Australia, India, Japan and the United States, evolved from the core group of relief nations after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 and was revived by the participating countries in 2017. Motivated by the need to contain the growing influence of China, the revived Quad is now primarily a cooperative mechanism for traditional security concerns. However, all four countries are key HADR providers in the Indo-Pacific and have mature bilateral or trilateral military partnerships, which reduce common concerns in HADR operations, such as interoperability, communication and logistics at the country-to-country level. Interoperability between the United States and Australia as well as Japan is high due to their long-standing security alliances. Australia and Japan signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement in January 2022, which deepens bilateral security cooperation, including in HADR. Interoperability between the Indian military and the other three is increasing as Australia and Japan have been invited to join India’s Malabar naval exercise , which started in 1992 on a bilateral basis between India and the United States. As Australia, India and Japan are located in different subregions of the Indo-Pacific, and the United States has an extensive military presence across the region, logistics for collective responses under the Quad framework is not likely to face major constraints. However, the place of HADR on the Quad agenda is unclear. The Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement adopted in March 2021 pledged to respond to an array of global challenges, including HADR. However, it disappeared in the joint statement of September 2021. Following the unfolding crisis in Ukraine, the four leaders indicated an interest in establishing a regional mechanism for HADR . These changes possibly suggest that areas in direct competition with Beijing are viewed with higher urgency and importance, such as COVID-19 and emerging technologies. The wavering attitude to HADR raises uncertainty over the Quad’s sustained commitment and investment in collective response. In addition, despite the common goal, the calculations of the four countries on HADR deployment do not necessarily always converge as some may still prefer bilateral assistance over collective response under the Quad banner on some occasions. It remains to be seen how the HADR mechanism within the Quad will balance the diverging interests and concerns of the four participating countries. The LMC, which involves Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, was launched in 2016 in Sanya, China. Disaster response is not among its founding five priorities of connectivity, production capacity, cross-border economic cooperation, water resources, and agriculture and poverty reduction; however, it has appeared in recent declarations. The LMC is not designed as an HADR provider, evident in the fact that it did not provide emergency relief to the LMC counties hit by deadly floods in November 2020. Instead, China provided bilateral aid to the affected countries through its embassies. The declaration following the third LMC leaders’ meeting in August 2020 specified the emergencies for which humanitarian assistance will be provided, which include floods, droughts and landslides. As such, it can be assumed that HADR within the LMC context is broadly linked to water management. The declaration also pledged to strengthen “collective response” to future public health emergencies. The motivations for the LMC fundamentally differ from the two aforementioned platforms, yet HADR now makes it into the LMC’s declarations. First, the LMC is primarily intended to enhance socio-economic cooperation , even though political and security cooperation is one of the three pillars. Geographically, its focus is on the Mekong subregion. Second, China is obviously the most resourceful and capable provider due to its size and clout as an external partner for HADR efforts. The LMC region has been a priority area in China’s active diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a special fund for public health established in 2020 to support infectious disease control in the subregion. In the past two years, Beijing has deployed military medical teams and donated vaccines to its LMC counterparts through the Chinese Defence Ministry. These bilateral activities have been listed as examples of cooperation under LMC. They significantly outnumber the bilateral interactions between other LMC countries tracked by the LMC secretariat. The power imbalance between the LMC countries can be a double-edged sword for possible collective action under the LMC banner, and differentiating LMC responses from China’s own diplomatic offensive is crucial. Conclusion The proliferation of multilateral mechanisms can potentially benefit HADR by broadening the sources of personnel, capabilities and resources. However, ASEAN’s experience shows the difficulty in moving towards meaningful collective response in HADR in multilateral contexts. As the Quad and LMC were not revived/established for humanitarian purposes and do not have clearly defined arrangements for collective responses, their collective action in HADR, other than in the form of joint exercises, are likely to be ad hoc at best. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

< Back Dr Madhumati Deshpande Madhumati Deshpande is currently serving as Department Coordinator, and Assistant Professor, at the Department of International Studies, Political Science, and History, Christ University, Bangalore. She holds a PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and has formerly worked as an Editor at Springer Reference Works, New Delhi. She has also been a Graduate Assistant, at the Carter Center, Atlanta, in its Democracy Program. She has published research articles on Indian politics, influence of religion on foreign policy, India-Sri-Lanka relations, and maritime policies, among others. Publications Scrutinizing the Indo-China Issue with Dr Madhumati Deshpande https://www.thepolitindia.com/post/scrutinizing-the-indo-china-issue-with-dr-madhumati-deshpande

Dr. Happymon Jacob is the Founder and Honourary Director of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research. Dr Jacob is Associate Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). < Back Dr. Happymon Jacob Dr. Happymon Jacob is the Founder and Honourary Director of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research. Dr Jacob is Associate Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). Prior to joining JNU in 2008, he held teaching positions at the University of Jammu in J&K and Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi; and research positions at the Centre for Air Power Studies, Delhi Policy Group, and Observer Research Foundation. Dr Jacob is an elected member of the Pugwash Council since 2013. He is the author of Line on Fire: Ceasefire Violations and India-Pakistan Escalation Dynamics (Oxford University Press, 2019), and Line of Control: Traveling with the Indian and Pakistani Armies (Penguin Viking 2018). His concurrent engagements with the Indian media include a column with The Hindu and hosting of weekly video show on national security on The Wire.In.

< Back Dr Nanda Kishor Dr. Nanda Kishor M S is an Associate Professor at Department of Politics and International Studies, Pondicherry University and formerly Head, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations and Coordinator of Centre for Polish and Central European Studies, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Manipal. He holds an M.Phil. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Hyderabad Central University (HCU), Hyderabad, India and completed Postdoc at the University of Leiden, Netherlands, with ERASMUS MUNDUS Fellowship from the European Union. He has been teaching Geopolitics of West Asia, India’s Foreign Policy, Concept of War and Peace in Geopolitics, Terrorism and Asymmetric Conflicts. Dr. Kishor has been working on conflict resolution, West Asia (Middle East), refugees and international law. He was a recipient of the Short-Term Junior Research Fellowship from UNHCR, Brookings, Government of Finland and MCRG (Kolkata). He visited Hochschule University of Applied Sciences, Bremen, Germany, on a short-term fellowship by the DAAD sponsored program of HS Bremen in 2012. He was part of the International Visitor Leadership Programme (IVLP) by the United States during June-July 2013. He is a Senior Fellow at Defence Research and Studies (DRaS) in India, Non-Resident Fellow of Middle East Institute New Delhi, Advisor and Subject Expert for COVINTS, a Bangalore based Risk Analyst Company, Analyst at Islamic Theology of Counter-Terrorism (London), Visiting Fellow to AIDIA (Kathmandu), was Features Editor (Security Studies) of Science, Technology and Security forum (MARG-MAHE). He has several publications in journals and edited volumes. Publications

97074589-c679-483d-a375-6ee0ad46237d < All op-eds IMEC Roadblocks: India's 'Look West' Maritime Vision Hits a Snag Sanchari Ghosh On the sidelines of the G20 Summit in September 2023, India, Italy, France, Germany, the European Union, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia jointly signed a memorandum of understanding for the establishment of the India-Middle-East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which encompasses both railway and sea links . The strategic location of the Middle East at the crossroads of two continents - Asia and Europe, and India’s reliance on the Middle East for a substantial portion of its energy imports hold pivotal significance in India’s broader maritime diplomacy within the context of the Indo-Pacific. As the IMEC seeks to extend India's enduring connection with the Middle East, this article aims to contextualize it within the framework of India’s maritime diplomacy, especially the ‘Look West’ component of it. IMEC is a renewed attempt to reinvigorate the link that dates back to the days of the Indus Valley Civilization, which was further expanded during the Roman times when trade contracts were established between Kerala and shippers in Alexandria.India's engagement with the Arab Gulf countries had been expanding since the 1970s, well before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh launched India’s "Look West" policy in 2005. The post-Cold War dynamics, in which the Gulf States host India’s large diaspora and supply the bulk of India’s oil as well as the historical economic and cultural linkages led to this development. The ‘Look West’ intensified through its transformation into ‘Act West' with special impetus on maritime diplomacy Under Modi’s regime bringing India closer to Gulf countries and turning it into one of the most important dimensions of India’s Indian Ocean diplomacy, the Indian Navy has not only initiated a program for security collaboration with the Gulf States but has also strengthened its operational coordination with their navies through defense cooperation. The IMEC helps India overcome its barrier to establishing land connectivity with West Asia which has been disrupted due to perennially distraught relations with Pakistan. This proposed corridor would bypass this hindrance by linking ports on India’s west coast to those in the UAE and Saudi Arabia to further boost India’s maritime diplomacy with the West Asian region. Although this project matters to all the concerned countries as a counter arrangement to China’s Belt and Road Initiative that aims to position China as the centre of the global economy, it especially supplements India’s broader vision of the Indo-Pacific that prioritises the multilateral organisations like GCC as part of its ‘Look West’ maritime diplomacy. As the IMEC strategically connects India to the Middle East and Europe, creating a comprehensive trade and energy network, it not only enhances India's economic ties but also strengthens its geopolitical influence across the Indo-Pacific region. Given India’s apparent hesitancy to fully align with the West, as demonstrated by its reluctance to perceive the Quad as an explicitly anti-China alliance, its preference for an evasive balancing approach, and its endorsement of the BRICS expansion , it looks for opportunities to re-establish connections with non-Western nations. The IMEC seamlessly fits into this broader geopolitical strategy. It also indicates India’s keenness to integrate the Western Indian Ocean into a cohesive space. The Western Indian Ocean assumes critical importance in realizing an integrated Indo-Pacific vision as it serves as a key maritime crossroads connecting the Indian Ocean to the broader Pacific region. This maritime domain plays a pivotal role in facilitating trade, energy transit, and strategic connectivity, bridging continents and fostering economic interdependence. This vision was previously absent from India's policies and a transformative reimagination has already materialized with India's endorsement of U2I2 (a grouping of India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States) mirroring the Quad in the Western Indian Ocean. However, some serious drawbacks arising out of logistical limitations, the complex geopolitics of the West Asian region, and the recent intensification of the Israel-Hamas War undermine the strategic and economic potential of the IMEC. The proposed plan contains two corridors: the east corridor connecting India to the Arabian Gulf (primarily a maritime route) and the northern corridor connecting the Arabian Gulf to Europe (a combination of railway and sea link). The objective here is to boost road, rail, and maritime connectivity, facilitating increased movement of goods and services among South Asia, West Asia and Europe. However, the overall process may face challenges with prohibitively high loading and unloading costs. The transportation of goods originating from Europe to reach India, and vice versa, which would be unloaded at Israeli ports, entails the use of expensive rail routes. Moreover, this transportation process involves traversing numerous border crossings, thereby necessitating the resolution of tariff and transit expenses. These challenges arise from logistical complexities, raising questions about the overall feasibility of the initiative. Moreover, the internal political instability in West Asia, which is the only region in the world lacking an inclusive regional security system complicates matters. From the decade-long rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia to the new forms of religious extremist groups in the region, the complex geopolitics of West Asia deters India from choosing a definite path concerning its ‘Look West’ policy. Although Iran has made slow progress in fully operationalizing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) – a corridor connecting India to the Caspian Sea, Russia, and Northern Europe through Iran, it is expected that India and Iran will soon sign a deal on the Chabahar Port. However, the decades-long hostility between Iran and Israel compromises the chosen route of IMEC that passes through the Israeli port of Haifa. This situation raises questions in Tehran. Consequently, India may find itself in a dilemma, whether to proceed with signing a deal on the Chabahar Port or move ahead with the IMEC. These problems have been compounded due to the intensification of the Israel-Hamas war which has created an obstacle for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to participate in the IMEC project alongside Israel. The success of the entire project hinges on the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, an extension of the Abraham Accords that led Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE to officially recognize Israel in August 2020. However, the Israeli bombardment of Gaza has halted the progression of this normalization process. Even if the war subsides , it would have a long-term impact on IMEC. Thus, the kind of diplomatic cooperation that IMEC warrants is questionable and is way more complicated now. India has long pursued proactive maritime diplomacy in the Indian Ocean to counter Chinese assertiveness. However, India's stance on West Asia is influenced by the region's internal dynamics, over which it has limited control. Despite the historical foundations of India's relations with the Arab Gulf countries, the intricacies of West Asia present challenges for its 'Look West' strategy. The success or failure of IMEC in the coming days hinges on how its member nations, including India, address these challenges. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

d6bbd321-6548-4d54-a89f-44f0aa4ae061 < All op-eds Russian Military offensive: The Revisionist Agenda and the Ripple Effects Dr. Nansi Paulraj Russian Military offensive: The Revisionist Agenda and the Ripple Effects Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, termed Special Military Operations (Invasion) started on 24th February 2022. The reason for this is to protect its Russian ethnic minorities, and halt the entry of Ukraine into NATO. In effect, Russia does not recognize Ukraine as an independent country and feels free to invade and bully it into submission. This war is costing massive loss of innocent lives and damage to infrastructure, in addition to going against both the nature and ecology of the region. This aggression has shaken European security architecture, which has been crafted since the second World War. I further ague that it has indeed strengthened NATO and brought the US into firm leadership in this region. The West and its allies have since imposed heavy sanctions upon Russia. Many countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and West Asia who believe in a multipolar world order have not taken sides, even as they oppose the war. They believe that Russia supports their national interests and that Russian security interests should be considered in any negotiations. They oppose all wars, and treat Ukraine in that continuity. The Ukrainian crisis has adversely affected the global economy, it is contributing to a sharp rise in the global defense expenditure and worse, the ‘nuclear aspirants’ reviving nuclear option. The humanitarian situation in Ukraine is persistently deteriorating with the huge exodus of refugees to the bordering states is at an alarming scale. At this juncture, the international community is facing more daunting questions and formidable challenges. Do the claims and comparison that Russia reviving its old order and Vladimir Putin is emulating Peter the Great with the ideology of “gathering the Russian lands” and the reign of Catherine the Great of the 18th century with idealistic and cynical policy, who conquered and controlled their neighboring territories an accurate analysis? Unlike Catherine II, who turned Russia into a great power, does Putin have long term strategy and a primary goal of securing Russia’s sphere of influence in the Eurasian space and holding back its drift over to the NATO. Is Russia trying to reassert its place in the new world order? Is Ukraine a pawn of the great power competition? These questions are conjectures. The post-Cold War optimistic security agreements from Atlantic to Urals are dilapidated. In this space, the US is trying to establish its primacy as the principal institution of reassurance of security in Europe. The competition between ‘Democracy’ and ‘Sovereign Democracy’ is playing with innocent lives. India’s strategic neutrality is becoming a major concern for US global primacy and its grand scheme of things in the Indo Pacific - but there seems no option for India. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

adac72d5-ff74-4dc6-afdb-ca1522319e48 < All op-eds Japan Eyes More Nuclear Power for Energy Security Parul Bakshi This blog has been republished from the East Asia Forum with permission. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed Japan to reevaluate its energy strategy once again. A sharp rise in the price of LNG, a lack of energy alternatives to reduce reliance on Russian LNG imports and Tokyo’s commitment to phasing out Russian coal and oil imports — all while ensuring Japan’s energy security — are making this reevaluation difficult. Even measures such as wearing turtlenecks to reduce energy consumption have been suggested. The Japanese government is unsurprisingly using the uncertainty around energy security as a reason to proactively push its nuclear energy policy. The policy can be traced to former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s administration. In 2012, following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Abe put nuclear energy back on the table as a potential critical energy source for Japan. Nuclear power has been touted as an important pillar in enhancing Japan’s energy self-sufficiency . Its use is also proposed as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, meet decarbonisation targets and a valuable source of baseload electricity. Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been emphasising the importance of nuclear power, calling for accelerating nuclear energy use on several occasions in the past year . But the Kishida cabinet’s Green Transformation (GX) strategic plan is being criticised for merely restating Japan’s decade old energy policy goals while pledging to accelerate the previously promised trend of nuclear energy use over the next ten years. GX assumes that nuclear power will account for 20–22 per cent of Japan’s energy mix in 2030 — a target that the Japanese government proposed in its Basic Energy Plan in 2014. In 2022, though, nuclear power only accounted for around 8 per cent of electricity supply. Kishida’s government hopes to extend the operation of nuclear power plants beyond the current 60-year limit to achieve this target. While the government believes life extensions are considerably cheaper than building new plants, they still represent substantial capital investments. The International Energy Agency estimates that extending the operational life of one gigawatt of nuclear capacity for at least 10 years costs US$500 million to US$1 billion . Even though countries like the United States have extended the lifespan of their reactors, no reactor in the world has been in commercial operation for more than 60 years. Kishida’s cabinet also proposes replacing aging nuclear facilities with new technologies like light-water reactors, small nuclear reactors and nuclear fusion. While these technologies could be promising, their present commercial viability is questionable. Even if nuclear power supplies only 10 per cent of Japan’s electricity after 2050, more than 10 new reactors may have to be built. Reactor restarts also incur significant costs ranging from US$700 million to US$1 billion per unit, regardless of reactor size or age. From the 2011 financial year to March 2017, total restart costs were estimated to be 1900 billion yen (US$17 billion) for eight companies, according to a Japan Atomic Industrial Forum survey . Yet according to polling by Nikkei , 53 per cent of Japanese support restarting reactors so long as safety can be ensured — the first time a majority has favoured this in over a decade. But stringent safety regulations, Nuclear Regulation Authority inspections and citizens’ class action lawsuits against reactors have hindered the desired pace of a post-Fukushima return to nuclear power . These bottlenecks continue to exist, even while public opinion might be shifting. However, over 3000 public comments received were critical of the nuclear policy shift. As a result, Yasutoshi Nishimura, Japan’s Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry, has stated that the government’s plan would be explained clearly to deepen public understanding of it. In response to Kishida’s announcement to consider the construction of new nuclear power plants in Japan, former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi reiterated reasons why the policy could fail. Other than stressing safety and financial concerns, he emphasised the dangers of nuclear waste and the challenges in finding a disposal site . Previously, observers have highlighted the need for Japan to provide more clarity on its nuclear energy policy, especially regarding the fate of existing nuclear reactors. The steps the government is taking to promote nuclear energy show the direction Japan intends to take. But there continue to be questions about how the government’s goals related to nuclear energy will be achieved — especially around issues such as radioactive waste treatment, risk minimisation and commercial feasibility. Stable political leadership, consistent stakeholder engagement and appropriate legislation are required to make the government’s vision for nuclear energy to become a critical element in Japan’s energy mix a reality. But the government should be mindful of cost–benefit analyses and ensure the push for nuclear energy does not come at the cost of reversing the expansion of renewables. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

27bbe719-7484-45a9-82ac-e77b90010a68 < All op-eds Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Treesa Shaju This blog has been republished from 9DashLine with permission. Worsening climate vulnerabilities and more opportunities in terms of climate cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region have spurred a series of national, regional, and multilateral climate action initiatives in recent years, including the ASEAN Climate Change Strategic Action Plan (ACCSAP) 2023-2030 and Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP). Despite recognising the need for urgency in climate action, as well as the various approaches and strategies to tackling climate vulnerabilities, many of these initiatives do not go the extra mile to delineate the question(s) of differentiated vulnerabilities and capacities. At this point, there is a considerable gap in acknowledging, assessing, and tackling the intersectional aspects of these climate vulnerabilities. Defining intersectionality in the climate context Intersectionality entails recognising the complex interplay of discriminatory or oppressive conditions that individuals may encounter due to their intersecting identities. For instance, an indigenous queer woman may simultaneously experience discrimination rooted in her gender, sexuality, and indigenous heritage. In the realm of climate change-related discourse, structural inequity (mostly defined in terms of disparity in vulnerabilities, capacities, etc., that result from certain discriminatory practices by individuals, collectivities/societies, systems/institutions, and so on) has often been viewed through narrow lenses. For example, in recent times, initiatives such as the Gender Action Plan of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have acknowledged the gender-specific impacts of climate change but do not necessarily pay much attention to the intra-gender disparities in how climate change affects different groups. Such a unidimensional approach overlooks the concurrent influences of an individual’s intersecting identities. Conducting research and writing policy without acknowledging these intersecting dimensions risks decontextualising vulnerabilities/capacities and isolating climate actions and initiatives in a silo. Taking an intersectional approach to climate change recognises the interconnected and interwoven nature of social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural issues in the formulation of climate change policies and strategies. Intersectional climate vulnerabilities in the Indo-Pacific The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities, including ocean acidification, extreme weather events, rising sea levels, freshwater scarcity, infrastructural vulnerabilities and more. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Those disproportionately affected by climate change often possess multiple identities that are discriminated against in the region. These discriminatory practices are based on income/resources, education/knowledge, gender, ethnicity, religion, disability, and more. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Climate vulnerabilities are additionally underpinned by gender-based or influenced differentiations about land ownership, labour and resource distribution, and decision-making power. Women are often more dependent on natural resources, through gender-segregated tasks such as collecting water and firewood and small-scale sustenance farming. Experts have also linked the impact of climate change-induced water and food shortages with a rise in domestic violence against women . Additionally, LGBTQIA+ individuals and individuals with disabilities are particularly vulnerable, facing an elevated risk of marginalisation and violence, often experiencing neglect in disaster situations and subsequent responses. An intersectional approach to climate action and cooperation could address these disparities. Climate action in the Indo-Pacific Within the Indo-Pacific, countries face differentiated impacts of climate change . For example, island nations face an existential risk from sea level rise, coastal inundation, saltwater intrusion, and other climate impacts. Similarly, countries with huge coastal cities and populations also face these risks. Many countries in the region are threatened by drought and desertification. The lack of climate resilience among populations and infrastructure would demand greater attention (policies, resources, etc.) from countries and regional and multilateral organisations alike. Climate cooperation initiatives in the Indo-Pacific are essential for addressing the urgent challenges of climate change and fostering resilience among the region’s diverse countries. A notable example is the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) , in which low-lying island nations collaborate to advocate for global climate action, emphasising the need for major emitters to reduce their emissions (especially in the Global North), mobilising finances for adaptation measures, and seeking loss and damage compensation. Similarly, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) promotes sustainable development and cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, including climate resilience efforts. Sector-specific initiatives also exist, such as the ASEAN Climate Resilience Network , which is targeted at agricultural adaptation (and exploring mitigation potential as a secondary priority) in the Southeast Asian region that is highly dependent on this sector for economic development. These initiatives, among others, underscore the importance of regional and multilateral cooperation to mitigate the impacts of climate change and build a sustainable future for the Indo-Pacific. Some of these initiatives are embracing more inclusive and responsive structures by integrating gender inclusivity into their frameworks. Locating gender in existing climate action and cooperation The Pacific Islands Forum, through the 66th session for the Commission for Status of Women (CSW66), mentions gender inclusion in terms of climate resilience in a broader sense while acknowledging gender-based violence in their societies. Centring women and girls in climate resilience efforts while seeking to intervene in violence against women and girls (VAWG), gender-based violence (GBV), and domestic violence (DV) can be understood as an intersectional approach to building climate resilience. Another initiative that opts for a partially intersectional lens is the Quad’s Guidelines for Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific. These guidelines mention the need for the inclusion of women and girls in decision-making and the advancement of gender equality in the context of HADR. Refreshingly, the guidelines have also introduced regulations to actively centre disabled individuals during crises. However, there is still less evidence of the use of fundamental transformative approaches that take the full spectrum view of intersectionality, such as a non-binary approach to gender, ethnicity, religion, class, and race, which continues to lead to an invisibilisation of various marginalised groups from the decision-making processes. Most multilateral climate policies in the region largely fail to acknowledge the significance of gender-responsive or gender-transformative climate action as a vital strategy (that leaves no one behind) to address climate change. Hence, a widely employed intersectional approach is still a way off in this context. This is hindering the comprehensive and effective mitigation of climate-related concerns, as it overlooks the unique vulnerabilities and perspectives of women and other marginalised groups. A more inclusive approach that acknowledges the integral role of gender equity and justice in fostering sustainable climate action is the need of the hour, as it ensures that the concerns and contributions of all individuals, regardless of gender, are taken into account in the pursuit of socio-ecological resilience and sustainability. The representation of women in formal climate change-related decision-making processes remains notably limited across the world, including in the Indo-Pacific. According to estimates , in Asia and the Pacific “only 7 per cent of all environment-related ministries (comprising agriculture, crude oil, climate change, energy, fisheries, irrigation, marine resources, mines, rural development, transportation, and others) have a female minister, compared to a global average of 12 per cent”. As a result, the valuable insights and multifaceted concerns of women are frequently marginalised during the formulation and implementation of climate change policies. Moreover, roles in disaster risk reduction (DRR) response efforts are also predominantly occupied by men, often confining their consultations primarily to male community leaders and constituents. This exclusionary pattern is in contrast with the reality that in most communities (especially indigenous communities ) women are knowledge custodians, expected to pass down their knowledge to future generations. The resulting lack of decision-making agency for women within climate action and cooperation inhibits indigenous and rural women from harnessing their knowledge to contribute to sustainability solutions. Integrating gender responsiveness and intersectionality into climate action in the Indo-Pacific Intersectionality in climate governance would signify an approach that recognises the complex interplay of social identities, vulnerabilities, and inequalities when addressing climate change impacts and policies. The approach would seek inclusivity by considering factors such as gender, disability, socioeconomic status, race, and ethnicity across the varying cultures of the Indo-Pacific. Such an approach would also require strong policies addressing poverty alleviation, caste or race-based discrimination, gender-based violence, and disability rights, among others. Intersectionality cannot be implemented in a vacuum. Several countries in the region, including Indonesia, have gradually begun to integrate intersectional approaches into their national climate policies. Indonesia’s commitment to disability rights and inclusion, exemplified in its National Action Plan for Climate Change Adaptation (RANAPI), serves as a model. It includes disabled-friendly infrastructure and involves disabled people’s organisations and civil society actors in policy development. Moreover, non-state initiatives, such as the Pacific Gender and Climate Change Toolkit , are examples of intersectional practices that prioritise equity, ensuring climate initiatives are responsive to the unique vulnerabilities and strengths of diverse communities. The benefits of adopting an intersectional approach in climate cooperation include enhanced equity, more effective adaptation strategies, reduced conflicts, and improved community resilience. In view of these benefits, there has clearly been a greater acknowledgement of the importance of embracing intersectionality in addressing climate change-related challenges among the various stakeholders of climate action across the Indo-Pacific region. It is crucial for stakeholders involved in climate governance to enhance the momentum through more sustained and institutional efforts towards designing and implementing context-specific and inclusive intersectional climate action in the region. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

ad962a86-2122-4a05-84f0-204f1a35af06 < All op-eds Mapping Timor-Leste in ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outreach: Challenge or an Opportunity? Mr Satria Rizaldi Alchatib Timor Leste’s formal admission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the 41st ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh last year as an observer came after a long wait. Since its independence in 2002, Timor Leste had nurtured aspirations for an ASEAN membership. After a long eleven-year journey of negotiations, in September 2022 the country was granted “in principle” approval to join ASEAN. More recently, at the 42nd ASEAN Summit in Indonesia, ASEAN even adopted a roadmap for Timor Leste to become a full member. Prospects seem bright for Timor Leste’s full membership in ASEAN by September 2023. In this long journey, Timor Leste has faced mixed reactions to its bid for membership ranging from strong support to outright rejection. While the majority of ASEAN member states have favoured Timor Leste’s accession, in the past Laos and Singapore have expressed strong apprehensions, owing to the stark economic gap between Timor Leste and other members. Accounting for the lowest GDP per capita in South-East Asia, Timor Leste is arguably economically the most fragile country in the region. Nevertheless, the country’s full membership holds great significance when ASEAN seeks to expand its regional influence. The crucial question, therefore, is: What does this mean for ASEAN regionalism? Indonesia has consistently supported Timor Leste’s efforts to gain full membership in the ASEAN. Coming from a difficult relationship after Timor-Leste's separation from Indonesia in 1999, Indonesia’s support indicates an intention to develop a friendlier regional ecosystem and to make ASEAN a more rule-based international order. The long-established interpersonal ties between President Jose Ramos Horta, with various prominent figures in Indonesia including reformist president Abdurrahman Wahid also have a role to play in this. Having Indonesia as a front supporter is crucial to strengthen Timor-Leste’s presence in the ASEAN. As Indonesia is the current ASEAN chair, Timor Leste has a golden opportunity to push its bid for membership and must work on building multi-track diplomatic channels with Indonesia that will allow the country to populate particularly in B to B and CSO settings and drive its membership agenda. As outlined by Indonesian president and ASEAN chair Joko Widodo, agenda settings under his leadership will have to revolve around the implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and the Five-Point Consensus , a written commitment to resolve the protracted situation in Myanmar. These are unequivocally the key deliverables in meeting the ASEAN’s long-term vision in Indo-Pacific. Through this firm standard, member-states are expected to deliver through cooperation and reduce tension in realizing what lies at the core of AOIP, namely maritime security and the blue economy. In helping ASEAN achieve the five-point consensus peace plan for Myanmar, Timor-Leste has shown a progressive move by articulating its support for the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. Before regaining his current presidency, President Ramos-Horta partnered with a former Indonesian ambassador to convene a Joint Declaration on the Crisis in Myanmar. This was an essential move in terms of aligning perception and closing the gap at the civil society level. More importantly, it was a progressive endeavor to reaffirm Timor-Leste’s identity as a part of the ASEAN family. Given, Timor Leste’s geo-strategic location on the southernmost edge of the Indonesian archipelago, northwest of Australia, it will be interesting to see how the country’s potential full membership inclusion will shape ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific outlook. However, Timor-Leste’s capacity to commit to the AOIP agenda will be limited. The document was a response to the emerging multilateral arrangements involving key regional players—such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) and AUKUS (Australia, US, and UK trilateral security pact)—through non-violent and non-militaristic development exercises to meet sub-regional priorities in maritime connectivity, economic security, and sustainable development goals (SDG’s). This is where it is difficult for Timor-Leste to maintain its relevance in the AOIP framework due to its slow-progressive economic development to achieve regional SDG metrics. Timor-Leste's accession to ASEAN is principally and inevitably correct. However, needless to say, ASEAN needs a better economic and security posture in these challenging times and Timor-Leste’s admission will not be enough. Nevertheless, Timor-Leste requires a status transition to a full member as it will contribute to a more positive tone of inclusivity in the region. To bolster its commitment, Timor-Leste should start highlighting its humanitarian contribution to the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management and be more vocal in its position on Myanmar. This would send a clear message about whether or not Dili is fully onboard with the rest of the ASEAN members. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More