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adac72d5-ff74-4dc6-afdb-ca1522319e48 < All op-eds Japan Eyes More Nuclear Power for Energy Security Parul Bakshi This blog has been republished from the East Asia Forum with permission. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed Japan to reevaluate its energy strategy once again. A sharp rise in the price of LNG, a lack of energy alternatives to reduce reliance on Russian LNG imports and Tokyo’s commitment to phasing out Russian coal and oil imports — all while ensuring Japan’s energy security — are making this reevaluation difficult. Even measures such as wearing turtlenecks to reduce energy consumption have been suggested. The Japanese government is unsurprisingly using the uncertainty around energy security as a reason to proactively push its nuclear energy policy. The policy can be traced to former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s administration. In 2012, following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Abe put nuclear energy back on the table as a potential critical energy source for Japan. Nuclear power has been touted as an important pillar in enhancing Japan’s energy self-sufficiency . Its use is also proposed as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, meet decarbonisation targets and a valuable source of baseload electricity. Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been emphasising the importance of nuclear power, calling for accelerating nuclear energy use on several occasions in the past year . But the Kishida cabinet’s Green Transformation (GX) strategic plan is being criticised for merely restating Japan’s decade old energy policy goals while pledging to accelerate the previously promised trend of nuclear energy use over the next ten years. GX assumes that nuclear power will account for 20–22 per cent of Japan’s energy mix in 2030 — a target that the Japanese government proposed in its Basic Energy Plan in 2014. In 2022, though, nuclear power only accounted for around 8 per cent of electricity supply. Kishida’s government hopes to extend the operation of nuclear power plants beyond the current 60-year limit to achieve this target. While the government believes life extensions are considerably cheaper than building new plants, they still represent substantial capital investments. The International Energy Agency estimates that extending the operational life of one gigawatt of nuclear capacity for at least 10 years costs US$500 million to US$1 billion . Even though countries like the United States have extended the lifespan of their reactors, no reactor in the world has been in commercial operation for more than 60 years. Kishida’s cabinet also proposes replacing aging nuclear facilities with new technologies like light-water reactors, small nuclear reactors and nuclear fusion. While these technologies could be promising, their present commercial viability is questionable. Even if nuclear power supplies only 10 per cent of Japan’s electricity after 2050, more than 10 new reactors may have to be built. Reactor restarts also incur significant costs ranging from US$700 million to US$1 billion per unit, regardless of reactor size or age. From the 2011 financial year to March 2017, total restart costs were estimated to be 1900 billion yen (US$17 billion) for eight companies, according to a Japan Atomic Industrial Forum survey . Yet according to polling by Nikkei , 53 per cent of Japanese support restarting reactors so long as safety can be ensured — the first time a majority has favoured this in over a decade. But stringent safety regulations, Nuclear Regulation Authority inspections and citizens’ class action lawsuits against reactors have hindered the desired pace of a post-Fukushima return to nuclear power . These bottlenecks continue to exist, even while public opinion might be shifting. However, over 3000 public comments received were critical of the nuclear policy shift. As a result, Yasutoshi Nishimura, Japan’s Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry, has stated that the government’s plan would be explained clearly to deepen public understanding of it. In response to Kishida’s announcement to consider the construction of new nuclear power plants in Japan, former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi reiterated reasons why the policy could fail. Other than stressing safety and financial concerns, he emphasised the dangers of nuclear waste and the challenges in finding a disposal site . Previously, observers have highlighted the need for Japan to provide more clarity on its nuclear energy policy, especially regarding the fate of existing nuclear reactors. The steps the government is taking to promote nuclear energy show the direction Japan intends to take. But there continue to be questions about how the government’s goals related to nuclear energy will be achieved — especially around issues such as radioactive waste treatment, risk minimisation and commercial feasibility. Stable political leadership, consistent stakeholder engagement and appropriate legislation are required to make the government’s vision for nuclear energy to become a critical element in Japan’s energy mix a reality. But the government should be mindful of cost–benefit analyses and ensure the push for nuclear energy does not come at the cost of reversing the expansion of renewables. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

27bbe719-7484-45a9-82ac-e77b90010a68 < All op-eds Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Treesa Shaju This blog has been republished from 9DashLine with permission. Worsening climate vulnerabilities and more opportunities in terms of climate cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region have spurred a series of national, regional, and multilateral climate action initiatives in recent years, including the ASEAN Climate Change Strategic Action Plan (ACCSAP) 2023-2030 and Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP). Despite recognising the need for urgency in climate action, as well as the various approaches and strategies to tackling climate vulnerabilities, many of these initiatives do not go the extra mile to delineate the question(s) of differentiated vulnerabilities and capacities. At this point, there is a considerable gap in acknowledging, assessing, and tackling the intersectional aspects of these climate vulnerabilities. Defining intersectionality in the climate context Intersectionality entails recognising the complex interplay of discriminatory or oppressive conditions that individuals may encounter due to their intersecting identities. For instance, an indigenous queer woman may simultaneously experience discrimination rooted in her gender, sexuality, and indigenous heritage. In the realm of climate change-related discourse, structural inequity (mostly defined in terms of disparity in vulnerabilities, capacities, etc., that result from certain discriminatory practices by individuals, collectivities/societies, systems/institutions, and so on) has often been viewed through narrow lenses. For example, in recent times, initiatives such as the Gender Action Plan of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have acknowledged the gender-specific impacts of climate change but do not necessarily pay much attention to the intra-gender disparities in how climate change affects different groups. Such a unidimensional approach overlooks the concurrent influences of an individual’s intersecting identities. Conducting research and writing policy without acknowledging these intersecting dimensions risks decontextualising vulnerabilities/capacities and isolating climate actions and initiatives in a silo. Taking an intersectional approach to climate change recognises the interconnected and interwoven nature of social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural issues in the formulation of climate change policies and strategies. Intersectional climate vulnerabilities in the Indo-Pacific The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities, including ocean acidification, extreme weather events, rising sea levels, freshwater scarcity, infrastructural vulnerabilities and more. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Those disproportionately affected by climate change often possess multiple identities that are discriminated against in the region. These discriminatory practices are based on income/resources, education/knowledge, gender, ethnicity, religion, disability, and more. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Climate vulnerabilities are additionally underpinned by gender-based or influenced differentiations about land ownership, labour and resource distribution, and decision-making power. Women are often more dependent on natural resources, through gender-segregated tasks such as collecting water and firewood and small-scale sustenance farming. Experts have also linked the impact of climate change-induced water and food shortages with a rise in domestic violence against women . Additionally, LGBTQIA+ individuals and individuals with disabilities are particularly vulnerable, facing an elevated risk of marginalisation and violence, often experiencing neglect in disaster situations and subsequent responses. An intersectional approach to climate action and cooperation could address these disparities. Climate action in the Indo-Pacific Within the Indo-Pacific, countries face differentiated impacts of climate change . For example, island nations face an existential risk from sea level rise, coastal inundation, saltwater intrusion, and other climate impacts. Similarly, countries with huge coastal cities and populations also face these risks. Many countries in the region are threatened by drought and desertification. The lack of climate resilience among populations and infrastructure would demand greater attention (policies, resources, etc.) from countries and regional and multilateral organisations alike. Climate cooperation initiatives in the Indo-Pacific are essential for addressing the urgent challenges of climate change and fostering resilience among the region’s diverse countries. A notable example is the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) , in which low-lying island nations collaborate to advocate for global climate action, emphasising the need for major emitters to reduce their emissions (especially in the Global North), mobilising finances for adaptation measures, and seeking loss and damage compensation. Similarly, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) promotes sustainable development and cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, including climate resilience efforts. Sector-specific initiatives also exist, such as the ASEAN Climate Resilience Network , which is targeted at agricultural adaptation (and exploring mitigation potential as a secondary priority) in the Southeast Asian region that is highly dependent on this sector for economic development. These initiatives, among others, underscore the importance of regional and multilateral cooperation to mitigate the impacts of climate change and build a sustainable future for the Indo-Pacific. Some of these initiatives are embracing more inclusive and responsive structures by integrating gender inclusivity into their frameworks. Locating gender in existing climate action and cooperation The Pacific Islands Forum, through the 66th session for the Commission for Status of Women (CSW66), mentions gender inclusion in terms of climate resilience in a broader sense while acknowledging gender-based violence in their societies. Centring women and girls in climate resilience efforts while seeking to intervene in violence against women and girls (VAWG), gender-based violence (GBV), and domestic violence (DV) can be understood as an intersectional approach to building climate resilience. Another initiative that opts for a partially intersectional lens is the Quad’s Guidelines for Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific. These guidelines mention the need for the inclusion of women and girls in decision-making and the advancement of gender equality in the context of HADR. Refreshingly, the guidelines have also introduced regulations to actively centre disabled individuals during crises. However, there is still less evidence of the use of fundamental transformative approaches that take the full spectrum view of intersectionality, such as a non-binary approach to gender, ethnicity, religion, class, and race, which continues to lead to an invisibilisation of various marginalised groups from the decision-making processes. Most multilateral climate policies in the region largely fail to acknowledge the significance of gender-responsive or gender-transformative climate action as a vital strategy (that leaves no one behind) to address climate change. Hence, a widely employed intersectional approach is still a way off in this context. This is hindering the comprehensive and effective mitigation of climate-related concerns, as it overlooks the unique vulnerabilities and perspectives of women and other marginalised groups. A more inclusive approach that acknowledges the integral role of gender equity and justice in fostering sustainable climate action is the need of the hour, as it ensures that the concerns and contributions of all individuals, regardless of gender, are taken into account in the pursuit of socio-ecological resilience and sustainability. The representation of women in formal climate change-related decision-making processes remains notably limited across the world, including in the Indo-Pacific. According to estimates , in Asia and the Pacific “only 7 per cent of all environment-related ministries (comprising agriculture, crude oil, climate change, energy, fisheries, irrigation, marine resources, mines, rural development, transportation, and others) have a female minister, compared to a global average of 12 per cent”. As a result, the valuable insights and multifaceted concerns of women are frequently marginalised during the formulation and implementation of climate change policies. Moreover, roles in disaster risk reduction (DRR) response efforts are also predominantly occupied by men, often confining their consultations primarily to male community leaders and constituents. This exclusionary pattern is in contrast with the reality that in most communities (especially indigenous communities ) women are knowledge custodians, expected to pass down their knowledge to future generations. The resulting lack of decision-making agency for women within climate action and cooperation inhibits indigenous and rural women from harnessing their knowledge to contribute to sustainability solutions. Integrating gender responsiveness and intersectionality into climate action in the Indo-Pacific Intersectionality in climate governance would signify an approach that recognises the complex interplay of social identities, vulnerabilities, and inequalities when addressing climate change impacts and policies. The approach would seek inclusivity by considering factors such as gender, disability, socioeconomic status, race, and ethnicity across the varying cultures of the Indo-Pacific. Such an approach would also require strong policies addressing poverty alleviation, caste or race-based discrimination, gender-based violence, and disability rights, among others. Intersectionality cannot be implemented in a vacuum. Several countries in the region, including Indonesia, have gradually begun to integrate intersectional approaches into their national climate policies. Indonesia’s commitment to disability rights and inclusion, exemplified in its National Action Plan for Climate Change Adaptation (RANAPI), serves as a model. It includes disabled-friendly infrastructure and involves disabled people’s organisations and civil society actors in policy development. Moreover, non-state initiatives, such as the Pacific Gender and Climate Change Toolkit , are examples of intersectional practices that prioritise equity, ensuring climate initiatives are responsive to the unique vulnerabilities and strengths of diverse communities. The benefits of adopting an intersectional approach in climate cooperation include enhanced equity, more effective adaptation strategies, reduced conflicts, and improved community resilience. In view of these benefits, there has clearly been a greater acknowledgement of the importance of embracing intersectionality in addressing climate change-related challenges among the various stakeholders of climate action across the Indo-Pacific region. It is crucial for stakeholders involved in climate governance to enhance the momentum through more sustained and institutional efforts towards designing and implementing context-specific and inclusive intersectional climate action in the region. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

ad962a86-2122-4a05-84f0-204f1a35af06 < All op-eds Mapping Timor-Leste in ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outreach: Challenge or an Opportunity? Mr Satria Rizaldi Alchatib Timor Leste’s formal admission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the 41st ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh last year as an observer came after a long wait. Since its independence in 2002, Timor Leste had nurtured aspirations for an ASEAN membership. After a long eleven-year journey of negotiations, in September 2022 the country was granted “in principle” approval to join ASEAN. More recently, at the 42nd ASEAN Summit in Indonesia, ASEAN even adopted a roadmap for Timor Leste to become a full member. Prospects seem bright for Timor Leste’s full membership in ASEAN by September 2023. In this long journey, Timor Leste has faced mixed reactions to its bid for membership ranging from strong support to outright rejection. While the majority of ASEAN member states have favoured Timor Leste’s accession, in the past Laos and Singapore have expressed strong apprehensions, owing to the stark economic gap between Timor Leste and other members. Accounting for the lowest GDP per capita in South-East Asia, Timor Leste is arguably economically the most fragile country in the region. Nevertheless, the country’s full membership holds great significance when ASEAN seeks to expand its regional influence. The crucial question, therefore, is: What does this mean for ASEAN regionalism? Indonesia has consistently supported Timor Leste’s efforts to gain full membership in the ASEAN. Coming from a difficult relationship after Timor-Leste's separation from Indonesia in 1999, Indonesia’s support indicates an intention to develop a friendlier regional ecosystem and to make ASEAN a more rule-based international order. The long-established interpersonal ties between President Jose Ramos Horta, with various prominent figures in Indonesia including reformist president Abdurrahman Wahid also have a role to play in this. Having Indonesia as a front supporter is crucial to strengthen Timor-Leste’s presence in the ASEAN. As Indonesia is the current ASEAN chair, Timor Leste has a golden opportunity to push its bid for membership and must work on building multi-track diplomatic channels with Indonesia that will allow the country to populate particularly in B to B and CSO settings and drive its membership agenda. As outlined by Indonesian president and ASEAN chair Joko Widodo, agenda settings under his leadership will have to revolve around the implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and the Five-Point Consensus , a written commitment to resolve the protracted situation in Myanmar. These are unequivocally the key deliverables in meeting the ASEAN’s long-term vision in Indo-Pacific. Through this firm standard, member-states are expected to deliver through cooperation and reduce tension in realizing what lies at the core of AOIP, namely maritime security and the blue economy. In helping ASEAN achieve the five-point consensus peace plan for Myanmar, Timor-Leste has shown a progressive move by articulating its support for the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. Before regaining his current presidency, President Ramos-Horta partnered with a former Indonesian ambassador to convene a Joint Declaration on the Crisis in Myanmar. This was an essential move in terms of aligning perception and closing the gap at the civil society level. More importantly, it was a progressive endeavor to reaffirm Timor-Leste’s identity as a part of the ASEAN family. Given, Timor Leste’s geo-strategic location on the southernmost edge of the Indonesian archipelago, northwest of Australia, it will be interesting to see how the country’s potential full membership inclusion will shape ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific outlook. However, Timor-Leste’s capacity to commit to the AOIP agenda will be limited. The document was a response to the emerging multilateral arrangements involving key regional players—such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) and AUKUS (Australia, US, and UK trilateral security pact)—through non-violent and non-militaristic development exercises to meet sub-regional priorities in maritime connectivity, economic security, and sustainable development goals (SDG’s). This is where it is difficult for Timor-Leste to maintain its relevance in the AOIP framework due to its slow-progressive economic development to achieve regional SDG metrics. Timor-Leste's accession to ASEAN is principally and inevitably correct. However, needless to say, ASEAN needs a better economic and security posture in these challenging times and Timor-Leste’s admission will not be enough. Nevertheless, Timor-Leste requires a status transition to a full member as it will contribute to a more positive tone of inclusivity in the region. To bolster its commitment, Timor-Leste should start highlighting its humanitarian contribution to the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management and be more vocal in its position on Myanmar. This would send a clear message about whether or not Dili is fully onboard with the rest of the ASEAN members. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

749f5a1c-ebaa-4a45-8f3f-43364e9e4ee6 < All op-eds India’s G20 Presidency and the Future of Indian Leadership in International Affairs Don McLain Gill As the initial phase of the G20 continues to unfold, India has been demonstrating its deep understanding of the transitions taking place in the international power structure. While multipolarity has increasingly become a buzzword among commentators of international politics. It is crucial to conceptually decipher what it practically means for India’s leadership and the future of international geopolitical affairs. The most prominent characteristic of multipolarity rests on the nature of the dispersion of power in the international system. Accordingly, the potential emergence of new poles will not only significantly reorient the way states engage, but also how key regional and international issues are perceived and prioritized. Consequently, shifts in the distribution of power will also create shocks within traditional sources of power given the fluctuations of state influence and what they entail for the shaping of international narratives. However, today’s transition towards multipolarity should not only be analyzed through the lens of material power. Rather, the dynamism of state perception towards the established order also presents itself as an equally crucial determinant of what to expect in the years to come, particularly in line with inter-state cooperation and competition. This year’s G20 comes at a time of critical traditional and non-traditional security challenges that continue to plague the international system, albeit in varying degrees. Consequently, the finance and foreign ministers meeting at the G20 witnessed stark disagreements and divergences, particularly in line with the war in Ukraine. While such disagreements were expected, given the presence of ministers from the Western states and Russia, such an occurrence also reflected the rigid and binary approaches of particular states towards international affairs. Hence, the adamant nature of engagement between both sides has resulted in the inability of all members to maximize the potential of such a crucial platform, which seeks to provide solutions and address multi-dimensional challenges that are impacting the world today. It is this worrying international trend that highlights the need for an equitable voice. On the day of the foreign ministers' meeting, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a bold and pressing statement by emphasising how no group in the international system can claim leadership by side-lining and overlooking the plight, vulnerabilities, and sensitivity of the developing world. It is this difficult nature of political polarization at the expense of the interests of the silent majority, that the Indian Prime Minister seeks to rectify. India, under the Modi Government, has illustrated its steadfast commitment to play a bigger and more proactive role in translating its rise into a practical form of leadership. Being the world’s largest democracy, whose external engagements revolve around the centrality of international law, India’s growing accumulation of robust material capabilities will be grounded on its willingness to work within the established rules-based order. However, as a rising great power, India’s leadership will also draw on its history, principles, and experiences as a civilizational state. Such attributes will not only supplement the established order, but also pragmatically reform it. On the same day, External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar echoed this by indicating how the United Nations has become increasingly unable to address and represent contemporary realities. India seeks to draw on its pluralistic, inclusive, and democratically driven national attributes to project a kind of leadership that understands the complex yet necessary balance between diversity, development, and security. Moreover, India continues to endeavour to contribute equitable solutions to the plight of the developing world, given the increasingly worrying tendencies of marginalizing it due to the polarising dynamics of international geopolitics. Accordingly, the past few years witnessed more active participation by India in various political, security, and economic centered multilateral institutions across the world – including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), The Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Quad, and the G7 – to contribute towards a sustainable international political-economic outlook that banks on a people-centric, democratically motivated, and equitable approach. Furthermore, India has also spearheaded key initiatives such as the recent Voice of Global South Summit to provide a necessary platform for developing states to shape international narratives beyond the traditional locus of power. In addition, the establishment of a Global South Centre of Excellence will be India’s proactive contribution towards cultivating an avenue for engagement not only between state leaders but also members of civil society and epistemic communities to collectively pave a way forward for sustainable development, security, and stability. Furthermore, the way India continues to deal with various international security issues has also garnered the support of states across the developing world. Therefore, such examples, including the ongoing G20 presidency, provide a window to the future of India’s increasing leadership role in the world. However, several external and internal factors may continue to challenge or delay India’s rise. From the unwillingness of traditional sources of power to compromise to the parallel rise of an assertive China. However, such challenges also provide an opportunity for New Delhi to pragmatically recalibrate its policies to better position itself at the forefront of international affairs at a time of great geopolitical turbulence. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

e1dc05d7-3948-4a86-b220-e490949df3a4 < All op-eds The Indo-Pacific – a European Perspective Dr. Christian Wagner The Indo-Pacific will be the main theatre in the emerging systemic rivalry between the United States and China. This has also initiated a fundamental change in Europe’s perception of the region. For a long time, Europe - i.e. the European Union (EU) and its member states - have seen the region mostly as an economic opportunity. Europe is among the largest investors in the region and one of its most important trading partners. Germany conducts more than 20 percent of its trade with countries of the Indo-Pacific. The EU as the largest trading bloc has an overarching interest in the Indo-Pacific which will be shaped by multilateralism and a rules-based order rather than by great power competition. The Indo-Pacific strategy of the EU that builds on similar documents from France, Germany, and the Netherlands signals a geopolitical and geo-economic shift towards the region. Traditionally, the EU has its strength in the field of soft power rather than in hard power. Accordingly, the priority areas are: sustainable and inclusive prosperity, green transition, ocean governance, digital governance and partnerships, connectivity, human security, but also security and defence. The EU also aims at a stronger security role, for instance by coordinating future European naval presence in the region. European naval powers like France and the United Kingdom have traditionally been present in the Indo-Pacific. The mission of the German frigate Bayern underlines Germany’s new commitment to contribute to security in the region. Moreover, the EU plans to expand its CRIMARIO project in the Western Indian Ocean to other parts of the Indo-Pacific. Europe’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific will also be an important test case for its ambitions for sovereignty and strategic autonomy and its quest to become a global power. Europe faces various challenges. A first challenge will be to increase Europe’s visibility in the region. Countries like France, which is a resident power in the region, will follow different approaches compared to Germany or the Netherlands. So Europe’s approach to the region will be a differentiated rather than a unified one. Second, Europe has to provide proper resources. The EU’s Global Gateway strategy aims to mobilise 300 billion Euros until 2027. This would allow the EU to offer viable alternatives for infrastructure projects. Third, Europe and its member states will have to adapt to the emerging architecture in the region. Many regional organisations have lost importance in recent years whereas mini-lateral formats like Quad have gained importance. This is a challenge for the EU and countries like Germany which have traditionally been strong protagonists of regional organisations. The new connectivity agreements with established partners like India and Japan underline Europe’s ambitions to become a stronger player in the region. Europe’s economic strength will be an important contribution to the future of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. One of the main challenges will be to find a common, coherent and sustained approach among its members. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

9558cc4a-95d7-45a6-ac8c-9de09784136c < All op-eds 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year Purvaja Modak This blog has been republished from the Centre for Social and Economic Progress with permission. Brazil has taken over the presidency of the G20 from India on December 1, 2023, ushering in a troika with three member countries from the Global South (India, Brazil and South Africa) that also comprise of the IBSA. India was preceded by Indonesia in 2022, and beginning a four-year effort to prioritise the needs of the Global South at a time when the world faces difficult challenges like climate change, geopolitical turmoil, inequality and indebtedness. While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. The onus is now on Brazil to take forward the global development agenda in 2024. The country has declared a three-point agenda, namely combating hunger, poverty and inequality; focusing on three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, social, and environmental); and the reform of global governance (G20 Brasil 2024). These topics have been chosen keeping the objective of reducing inequalities at the heart of the reform effort as is reflected in the motto of the Brazilian presidency, ‘Building a Just World and a Sustainable Planet’. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva declared these priorities at the Leader’s summit in India in September 2023 when he took over the reins of the G20 presidency from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. He emphasised the country’s commitment to the fight against food shortages and nutritional insecurity. To that end, Brazil has proposed to launch a taskforce called Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty during its 2024 presidency. The task force will work on issues like low-carbon agricultural research and farming insurance reforms, especially in food-insecure countries, with financing support from other nations. Brazil hopes to leverage its experience from its flagship programme, Brazil Without Hunger Plan (Plano Brasil Sem Fome)—an initiative led by its Ministry of Development and Social Assistance, Family and the Fight Against Hunger (Ministério do Desenvolvimento e Assistência Social, Família e Combate à Fome/MDS). By focusing on sustainable development, the country hopes to convince the G20 member countries to increase their financial contributions to tackle climate change and wishes to leverage its own green energy potential for the world to invest in. To achieve this, Brazil has proposed a taskforce called Global Mobilization against Climate Change. The taskforce will promote a high-level dialogue among governments, financial institutions, and international organisations to enhance global macroeconomic and financial alignment to implement the goals of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement (G20 Brasil 2024). By making the reform of global governance its third priority, Brazil hopes to encourage greater participation by emerging countries in the decisions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) needs to be revitalised and its paralysed dispute settlement mechanism needs to start working again by reinstating a fully functional Appellate Body. The membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) needs to be restructured to include more developing countries. The eagerness from various countries, to join the expanded BRICS is an indication of their wish to join a grouping from the Global South re-emphasises their call for the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions. Brazil can leave its imprint on the G20 by stirring discussions on the reform of the global governance architecture towards implementable consensus. Brazil also hopes to advance the Indian G20 presidency’s work in strengthening MDBs, by following through with the roadmap laid out in the G20 Independent Expert Group’s (IEG) two volume- report , led by Lawrence Summers and NK Singh, that was aimed at creating ‘bigger, better and bolder MDBs’. Some of the recommendations of the report were: scaling up financial capacity, boosting joint action on climate, enhancing country-level collaboration, strengthening co-financing, and deepening MDBs’ ambition to cooperate to boost private capital mobilisation (World Bank, 2023). There is action on this agenda item already. At the IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in Marrakesh, Morocco, in October 2023, 10 leading MDBs supported the IEG’s report’s recommendation to explore ways to expand their lending capacity with “ an additional headroom of $300-400 billion in the next decade ”(African Development Bank Group, 2023). In a first-time global leadership role of this stature, Brazil plans to execute its development mandate by convening over 100 working group and task force meetings and over 20 ministerial meetings that will culminate in the Leader’s summit on November 18-19, 2024 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The National Commission for the Coordination of the Presidency of the G20 by Brazil has been set up to coordinate and oversee the smooth functioning of the G20 presidency and it is being chaired by Mauro Vieira, Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Fernando Haddad, Brazil’s Minister of Finance (G20 Brasil 2024). Brazil has also introduced the G20 Social to increase participation of non-governmental stakeholders in G20’s activities and decision-making processes. The G20 Social comprises of 13 engagement groups of the G20, namely C20 (Civil society); T20 (Think tanks); Y20 (Youth); W20 (Women); L20 (Labour); U20 (Cities); B20 (Business); S20 (Science); Startup20 (Startups); P20 (Parliaments); SAI20 (Supreme audit institutions); J20 (Supreme courts) and O20 (Oceans) (G20 Brasil 2024). The clock is ticking, and the stage is set for Brazil to make its mark on the G20 process by delivering outcomes brought about by multilateral consensus. Supporters of global governance are rooting for Brazil’s success on its three-point development agenda, especially at a time when the world is facing a polycrisis and global negotiations and consensus building seem more far fetched than ever. Brazil is faced with an ambitious agenda, and there are several challenges in its path. Brazil will need to manage the intense geopolitical divisions that currently exist in the G20’s membership if it hopes to release joint statements and end the year with a comprehensive Leader’s Declaration, a feat that India succeeded in achieving, despite acute scepticism from critics. The Brazilian presidency will have to keep the Israel–Hamas war, Russia’s war in Ukraine, global sanctions and the ongoing frictions between the United States (US) and China at the centre stage and manage sensitivities as it leads the G20 discourse. Other than governmental negotiations, Brazil will have to use back-channel diplomacy through its groupings like the expanded BRICS grouping (that previously only included Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and through its strategic partnerships with neighbouring countries in South America. The BRICS now also includes Argentina, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It will have to revitalise the IBSA to enable policy coordination between India, Brazil and South Africa. President Lula has an important role to play in balancing the powerplays emanating from these geopolitical interlinkages and divisions. The next two years are a unique time for President Lula to exhibit to the world his leadership potential and Brazil’s ability to lead the global governance discourse. It is interesting to note that Brazil’s G20 summit will be held in the same month (November 2024) as the US elections. The summit will also overlap with COP29. Negotiations at COP29 will pave way for COP30 in 2025 in Belem, Brazil. Brazil will also chair the BRICS grouping in 2025. This will overlap with South Africa’s G20 presidency in 2025, giving the troika of developing countries yet another chance to advance discussions on climate action, sustainability and development. But what the troika needs is a serious infusion of well researched, action oriented and implementable policy ideas that can be tabled for the consideration of the G20 leaders. That is where global think tanks come in, sharing solutions to the world’s most complex problems through one of the G20’s official engagement groups, the Think20 network. The Think20 (T20), often referred to as the ‘ideas bank’ for the G20 is tasked with a crucial mandate this year under the Brazilian presidency, and that comes out clearly in its tag line for the year – ‘Let’s rethink the world’. The T20 Brazil process will fulfil its task through six task forces, whose recommendations, put forth in the form of policy briefs, will comprehensively address the three themes that President Lula has declared: 1) Fighting inequalities, poverty, and hunger; 2) Sustainable climate action and inclusive just energy transitions; 3) Reforming the international financial architecture; 4) Trade and investment for sustainable and inclusive growth; 5) Inclusive digital transformation; 6) Strengthening multilateralism and global governance. The T20 Brazil process will then put forward policy recommendations to G20 officials involved in the Sherpa and Finance tracks and to the G20 leaders, in the form of a final T20 communiqué and the recommendations of the six taskforces. With the support of the Think20 and a development mandate based on the needs of the Global South, Brazil will have to ensure that there is policy connectivity at the G20, for the group to be taken seriously and for its efforts to bear fruit. Having four emerging market economies as leaders of the G20 in a row, will surely make it easier. Else, as critics often say, the G20 will become a ‘talk shop’ or merely a global gathering of policymakers with no concrete or enforceable outcomes. The stage is set, and an ambitious task has been laid out for Brazil. While the priorities for the year were released in 2023 when Brazil officially took on from India, action on the ground will unfurl in 2024. The G20 foreign ministers will meet in Rio de Janeiro on February 21-22, 2024, followed by G20 finance ministers in Sao Paulo on February 28-29, 2024. The statements coming out of these two meetings will indicate whether Brazil will be able to bring back the concept of sustainable development to the centre stage of international discussions, especially since geopolitics, wars and regional powerplays have overtaken its mandate over the last few years. The stakes are high and now Brazil must lead the way in showing critics that the G20 is, not a talk shop and is in fact, the economic steering committee for the world, as it was intended to be at its inception. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

6aaed066-270b-4b36-b146-307e46178468 < All op-eds Fighting disinformation with media literacy in Southeast Asia Dr Benjamin Yew Hoong Loh In early May 2022, Ferdinand “BongBong” Marcos Junior won the Philippines presidential election with an overwhelming victory. This was a shocking result as his father was responsible for plunging the country into a deep recession over his family’s plundering of the state’s finances during his term that ended in 1986 through a people’s revolution. Images of his mother’s shoe collection became infamous to highlight the family’s reckless and unashamed use of public funds. The return to power of one of the Philippines most notorious families has been attributed by journalists and analysts to the power of disinformation campaigns perpetuated by politically-linked agents. The Marcos family employed an effective and organized disinformation campaign which “revised” its family’s history to highlight that the country was in a golden age rather than a corrupt authoritarian regime. Social media has emerged as the new political battleground in the last decade as it is ripe for manipulation through these special political agents, often referred to as online trolls or cybertroopers. The role of these clandestine agents is to influence and distort political discourses in online spaces such as social media, comment sections and forums. According to the Oxford Internet Institute , at least 81 countries employed some form of cybertroopers to engage in information warfare on social media. These cybertroopers employ a variety of strategies to sow discord in digital political discursive spaces. They often masquerade as regular people with specific viewpoints to either artificially inflate public support or distort and misrepresent opposing viewpoints. In most countries, cybertroopers are often deployed internally either by local governments or political parties with some cases involving bigger countries like China and Russia seeking to manipulate international discourse to promote the interests of their respective countries. While social media platforms have tried to stop this indirectly through banning of suspicious troll accounts and more recently with labeling of state-affiliated accounts on Twitter , these actions are only effective to a certain degree. Once disinformation gets distributed it can start radicalizing people to believe these points and they in turn become “political diehards”. This was a tactic that was incredibly successful in President Duterte’s presidential campaign where he successfully indoctrinated large swathes of the Philippines public to support his bid (who became known as Diehard Duterte Supporters ). The Marcos campaign clearly learned from this and directed much resources and efforts to replicate its success. In Malaysia, a similar strategy was also employed by disgraced former Prime Minister Najib Razak. After his government lost the general election in 2018, largely in part due to his involvement with the now infamous 1MDB case , which was seen as the main cause behind rising costs of living in the country. With a new government in place, Najib was expected to fade in popularity once his corruption trial began. But in early 2019, he launched a social media campaign called Malu Apa Bossku (loosely translated to mean “What is there to be ashamed about, my boss”). The campaign’s goal was to rehabilitate Najib’s image in the most obnoxious and downright hypocritical way possible: Reframe his image as a man of the people. The campaign likened him to working class urban Malay youths to highlight that he is down to earth, approachable, hardworking and a victim of slander from the government. The yearlong campaign successfully reclaimed his narrative and manipulated a large segment of Malaysians that has all but restored the political clout of a deposed leader. Even after being convicted of corruption and after failing his first appeal (a final appeal is still pending), his popularity is at an all time high. There is a strong likelihood that he would be running in the country’s next general election and there is even a chance he may stand as a prime minister candidate. After Bong Bong’s win, this is entirely possible and his political resurrection would be complete. Similar disinformation campaigns are happening across Southeast Asia as Thailand and Cambodia head to the polls this year too. How do we fight this? Relying on the government to do this is fundamentally problematic as the reason many disinformation campaigns are so successful is simply because of great distrust amongst disenfranchised citizens in government structures and institutions. Relying on them to verify fake news will only entrench political diehards in their positions. Public trust in state institutions and the media is at an all time low and so many measures that predicate this will likely fail with those radicalized by disinformation campaigns. Aside from online platforms having to step up their efforts to block, identify and isolate disinformation and its agents, individual media literacy development is another step that is needed. When large numbers of the public no longer trust information institutions, it is necessary to at least provide them with the tools and critical thinking skills to properly assess and evaluate their media bubbles. Even if the majority of individuals lack critical thinking skills to properly do so, minimal media literacy should be inculcated so that they would be able to understand that they are being manipulated by political agents. Governments and civil society need to push for more media literacy programs that instill the means, tools and practices to protect people from information warfare efforts and bring some much needed stability to whatever is left of the digital public sphere. Democracy is at stake and extreme political polarization will become the norm unless we can prepare people to understand how to consume and process information in a healthy and protected manner. Dr Benjamin YH Loh is a media scholar that employs digital ethnography to study online communities and the digital public sphere in Malaysia and the region. He focuses much of his work on the confluence between technology and society, with a particular focus on minority and marginalized communities. He is the co-editor of “Sabah from the Ground: The 2020 Elections and the Politics of Survival'' (SIRD/ISEAS, 2021) and publishes Op-Eds with Malaysiakini, SCMP and Nikkei Asia Review. He is currently a senior lecturer at the School of Media and Communication at Taylor’s University and an Associate with the Asia Centre. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

47254e4c-9749-4c87-92a5-3f2e7c17703a < All op-eds An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Abhivardhan Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming the Indo-Pacific region, with the potential to revolutionize industries, enhance healthcare, and improve the lives of billions of people. However, as AI becomes more powerful and pervasive, it is important to ensure that it is used safely and responsibly. In April 2021, the Quad launched the Critical and Emerging Technologies Working Group (CETWG) to promote cooperation on critical technologies, including AI. The CETWG has identified several priority areas for collaboration, which include Developing principles for responsible development and use of AI Sharing information and expertise on AI Safety. Promoting research and development in AI Safety. The Quad's work on AI Safety is a welcome development, but it is important to recognize that a comprehensive approach is needed to address the complex and interconnected challenges of AI safety that are emerging from limited geographies. Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. The Chinese Approach to AI Regulation The three Chinese regulations on artificial intelligence (AI) are characterized by a strong emphasis on government control and data ownership. This is reflected in the following key features of these regulations: Maximality : The Chinese government takes a maximalist approach to regulating AI, seeking to cover all aspects of AI development and deployment. This is evident in the comprehensive scope of the regulations, which address everything from data privacy to algorithm ethics. Micromanagement : The Chinese government adopts a micromanaged approach to regulating AI, seeking to control the details of how AI systems are developed, deployed, and used. This is evident in the specific requirements imposed on AI service providers, such as the need to obtain licenses and implement specific technical measures. Public ownership : The Chinese government asserts public ownership over data and algorithms, treating them as public resources that must be managed and controlled by the government. This is reflected in the requirement for AI service providers to register with the government and obtain licenses, as well as the government's right to access and control AI data. The Biden Administration’s Executive Order on AI The United States Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a comprehensive and forward-looking document that outlines several important principles and requirements for the responsible development and use of AI. Here is a summary of the features of this Executive Order: The Executive Order emphasizes the need for robust and reliable evaluations of AI systems, including post-deployment performance monitoring. This is an important step in ensuring that AI systems are safe and effective in real-world settings. The legal instrument also calls for the development of effective labeling and content provenance mechanisms to track and flag AI-generated content. This is important for transparency and accountability, that could help prevent the misuse of AI-generated content. The Executive Order provides a flexible and technology-conscious definition of AI, which helps capture the ever-evolving nature of AI technologies. The definitions of "synthetic content," "testbed," and "watermarking" provided in the Executive Order are clear and concise. These definitions are important to ensure a common understanding of these key terms in the context of AI systems. The European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act The legislation represents a comprehensive pan-European regulatory framework for artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Key features of the Act include the classification of AI into risk-based levels, with stringent regulations applied to high-risk AI systems. The European Commission has adopted a horizontal approach with a proportionate risk-based methodology, choosing Option 3+ over Option 4, aligning with the need for a balanced regulatory environment conducive to AI innovation. The Act emphasizes the importance of human oversight, quality risk assessments for AI companies, and robust data governance practices. It addresses the intricate challenges associated with developing, testing, and monitoring high-risk AI systems, setting forth detailed criteria & procedures for compliance, and aims to ensure ethical and safe AI development, safeguarding fundamental rights and aligning with the unique requirements of the European AI landscape. The Indian AI Landscape India's rapidly evolving AI landscape presents opportunities and challenges that demand a thorough re-examination of the nation's regulatory capacity. The proliferation of AI applications across industries necessitates transparent, safe, and standardized regulations. AI technology use across various sectors raises concerns regarding transparency, safety, data processing, privacy, and consent. These challenges require attention and sector-specific standardization to drive policy interventions and innovations globally. India needs to reinvent its regulatory capacity and intelligence streams to enable technology-neutral regulation and governance of AI technologies. Transparency and safety in AI applications pose a primary concern for emerging markets. Many AI use cases lack transparency in commercial viability and safety, particularly in data processing, privacy, consent, and dark patterns. Sector-specific standardization for algorithmic activities and operations is absent, hindering regulatory interventions and innovations globally. Enforcing existing sector-specific regulations, starting with data protection and processing, is the solution to pave the way for effective AI regulation. Despite legislative advancements in digital sovereignty, digital connectivity, drones, and data protection, the AI and Law discourse in India shows limited transformation. Discussions mainly revolve around data protection rights and the civil and criminal liability of digital intermediaries. The government's proposed frameworks to regulate the use and processing of personal and non-personal data, including the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 , and the proposed Digital India Act, reflect the Council of Ministers' commitment to these discussions. However, the focus on AI regulation remains limited, even in frameworks like the one proposed for the National Data Management Office (NDMO) . The absence of self-regulatory Explainable AI or Responsible AI guidelines from key AI and tech market players across places also underscores the need for a comprehensive and distinctive approach to AI regulation that aligns with India's unique requirements and standards. A recently proposed Artificial Intelligence (Development & Regulation) Bill was suggested in line with such requirements poignant for the development of the Indo-Pacific as an AI hub for the Global South and Democratic Asia. Establishing a comprehensive Indo-Pacific perspective on AI safety requires collective effort. A shared understanding of AI risks and opportunities must be cultivated through open dialogue and collaboration across the region. Guiding principles, anchored in human dignity and rights, are essential for steering responsible AI development. The Chinese regulatory approach emphasizes government control and public ownership of data,contrasting with the Biden Administration's focus on robust evaluations and transparency. The European Union's AI Act introduces risk-based classification and emphasizes human oversight. India, amid a rapidly evolving AI landscape, requires focused regulatory re-evaluation. The proposed Artificial Intelligence Bill reflects private initiatives to position India as an AI hub. By synthesizing these diverse approaches, the Indo-Pacific region can collectively navigate AI challenges, ensuring ethical integration. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

02b9323d-d013-4da1-b1d8-3e08e63ed478 < All op-eds The Assertiveness of Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping Jay Maniyar The President of the Peoples’ Republic of China, PRC, is the incredibly powerful, assertive, uncompromising, and permanent Xi Jinping. China’s foreign policy has witnessed a noticeable climbing nationalist fervour since President Xi came to power. Across the board, there has been a remarkable shift in the way China sees the world. Inferring from the Indian foreign policy doyen, J. N. Dixit, it is understood that an assertive Chinese foreign policy stems from a historically nationalist mind-set of the Chinese peoples as a whole. On the face of it, the principles laid out by China are well-attuned to a peace-abiding, genuinely-intentioned, and internationally-responsible nation-state. Characteristic Chinese foreign policy ticks off all the boxes as far as what it seeks to achieve in Asia and the world is concerned. Maintaining world peace, friendly relations with neighbouring countries, a lasting cooperation policy with all countries, and an openness policy aimed at welcoming the world to China are all part of Beijing’s foreign policy agenda . These are an honest indication of a rising power that will perform much convincingly in seeking to establish its reign worldwide. Openness, in particular, is being innovatively handled through strategies such as ‘dual circulation’. However, President Xi does appear to be interpreting, at times, that these guidelines will be interpreted to what he perceives to be in pure Chinese interests. Jagannath Panda describes this ‘new era’ foreign policy as evolving from being focussed on Asia to competing on the global stage with the United States of America (US). From an economic perspective, Chinese foreign policy remains rabidly attuned to achieving maximum economic gains in any geography and this is even made apparent by China-led multilateralism through institutions such as Boao Forum and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China remains geared for resource hunts anywhere in the Indo-Pacific region, while it actively ‘debt trap’s countries through a vehement economic agenda of profiteering coupled with perennial entrapment. Sri Lanka, for example, has been most afflicted by this Chinese approach and finds itself continually subordinated to Chinese Indian Ocean interests. The Indian Ocean is also subject to a Chinese foreign policy that aims to establish maritime supremacy through Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), encircle its contemporary in India through a ‘String of Pearls’, and apply the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) paradigm to a large area in the western Indo-Pacific region. The latter aims to ascertain Chinese influence in Asia by tying down unsuspecting countries through joint infrastructural interests, ample connectivity initiatives, and several growth zones. Some of the manifest points of Xi’s foreign policy include: 1. There is, now, a newfound keenness on the resolution of all matters pertaining to territorial acquisition, tantamount to the use of force by Beijing wherever, whenever, and howsoever mandated by the ruling state. This is exemplified by how, at one end, China irks its neighbours through state-endorsed armed entities such as its maritime mafia and their relatively low-intensity transgressions, to threatening countries such as Japan with nuclear obliteration over Tokyo's interference in the Taiwan matter. 2. China exhibits a certain boldness in military actions and activity across the entire stretch of the Indo-Pacific region: The following data gives a brief idea about Chinese military assertiveness at the expense of noble ideals furthered in the foreign policy agenda: I. The Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) has engaged in vilification across borders, such as in Ladakh (India). The Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is rapidly modernizing and bulking its inventory to achieve blue-water status on an urgent basis. The Peoples' Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) routinely violates Japanese airspace in a show of territorial aggression. These are just a few examples. II. Chinese island-building takes place through extensive land reclamation in the South China Sea and military assets such as surface-to-air missiles are deployed in this strategically-challenging environment (for China, itself, and the world) III. Chinese military basing (Djibouti, East Africa), naval deployments (nuclear-capable submarines in the Indian Ocean), and intelligence-gathering missions (Bay of Bengal) are coupled with benevolent ventures such as anti-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa. 3. Since a while now, China has conveyed, more often than not, a tendency to want to unilaterally shape the regional and global status-quo entirely in Beijing’s favour. This is evinced from China’s outright rejection of the Indo-Pacific idea, its disregard for India’s Indian Ocean necessitation, and its desire to establish control over the South and East China Seas as also many other waters. A Rising Assertiveness in Plenty of Foreign Policy Avenues China’s growing foreign policy assertiveness is nothing but a crude display of firebrand realism in international relations. At present, no country epitomizes the realist diktat of the absolute centrality and primacy of a nation-nation-state as far as self-interest is concerned as does China. François Bougon says that Xi has even sought to bring China out of its ‘low profile’ abroad by tacitly encouraging young Chinese nationalists to mock and deride enemies such as Japan and the US. The Chinese self-impression, officially called Face (or mianzi , in Mandarin), is being increasingly threatened by its radical foreign policy. A time may come when China could prove to be too difficult to handle. Chinese diplomacy, too, has gained a ferocity unlike any other phase in contemporary history. Since diplomacy is linked to the conduct of foreign policy, The pursuit of a so-called Wolf Warrior diplomacy has made a particular impression of the way the world sees China and has made the country more aggressive in the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. Utilization of technology-oriented mechanisms such as informationization, targeted cyber espionage, and many others are integral to the Chinese agenda. Countries across Asia remain committed to the ‘One China policy even in the wake of Chinese excesses and its hardening national commitment concerning Taiwan. Any challenge presented to the contrary is met with disdain by Beijing and accompanied by impromptu reprimand and rebuke. Conclusion – Chinese Foreign Policy, a Rising Concern for the World If not moderated wherever required and not brought to a screeching halt if necessary, China’s foreign policy bears the potential to alter regional and global dynamics entirely on its own. Led by Xi Jinping’s authoritarian control, China’s power projection is scaling unprecedented heights in the modern era. However, tackling China to the point of overpowering it, at least, considerably is proving to be a taxing and time-consuming endeavour of herculean proportions. How the machinations and manipulations of Chinese foreign policy are effectively dealt with, remains to be seen. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Dr. Sinderpal Singh Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at the Nanyang Technological University. He was formerly also a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University Singapore. issinderpal@ntu.edu.sgUniversity of Singapore. < Back Dr. Sinderpal Singh Sinderpal Singh is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research interests include the international relations of South Asia with a special focus on Indian foreign policy as well as the geo-politics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Before joining RSIS, Sinderpal was a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, and a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore. He has published articles in journals such as Asia Policy, Asian Security and Pacific Affairs; his single-authored book is entitled India in South Asia: Domestic Identity Politics and Foreign Policy from Nehru to the BJP (Routledge 2013; paperback version, 2015). He has also contributed book chapters on aspects of India’s Northeast, specifically in relation to India-ASEAN land connectivity and India’s broader ‘Look East Policy’. He is Associate Editor of the journal South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, published on behalf of the South Asian Studies Association of Australia (first published in 1971). He received his PhD from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, his MA from the Australian National University, and his BA from the National University of Singapore. issinderpal@ntu.edu.sg

fed3b486-2980-4a95-b805-abf32e80586a < All op-eds Do Maritime Policies Matter to Those Living at Sea? Dr. Vilashini Somiah In the study of Maritime Southeast Asia, scholars would unpack the historical and contemporary importance of water bodies from historical, sociological, cultural, political, and economic perspectives. Often these discourses and debates lead back to the issue of fluidity and porousness of seas and oceans throughout this uniquely archipelagic maritime region that is Indonesia, The Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore (ASEAN observer Timor-Leste should also be mentioned here). In policy studies, this is often equated with the current narratives of security, defense, territorial disputes and a list of potential crises, threats and criminal activities (human smuggling, trafficking, violent extremism, piracy, illegal fishing, and environmental devastations). Within the Indo-Pacific, maritime borders, diplomacy, and sea mobility is commonly associated with the Asian superpowers, specifically China , India , Australia, Japan , and at times ASEAN, and their individual and collective influences on the issue. There have been some challenges identified by policy experts in the development of maritime policies, namely the issue of differing mechanics of security, which are influenced by a nation's military practices, human and financial resources, and also one’s geographical terrain; this can result in different security, mobility and migratory outcomes overall. The maritime nations of ASEAN , for example, (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, The Philippines, Brunei, and land-locked members with considerable coastal areas like Vietnam and Myanmar) have each approached shared maritime concerns differently despite sharing intimate and interwoven maritime history, heritage, and borders with each other. As their maritime problems continue to expand and intensify with time, experts have recommended stronger and more direct communication between nation-states through the formation of regional councils, customizable security and economic frameworks, and the expansion of partnerships with other experienced maritime countries within the Indo Pacific like India and China, and with time the EU, The US and NATO. But for those who research the area from the ground up, these policies have been equated with rigid and sometimes archaic ways of understanding water bodies, which fail to capture very important nuances of identity, belonging, and the pre-territorial and pre-boundary movements of littoral (to mean along the shore of part of seas or lakes) communities. Communities living in the coast also feel that such land-centric policies for development and strategic ties continue to perpetuate their littoral way of life as being dangerous and threatening. The bottom line is that while governments continue to work on securing and strengthening their maritime issues, they also enable an old (and problematic) narrative of littoral communities and spaces only existing as problems to be solved. Borneo for example (also my area of research), is the largest island in Asia and the third largest in the world, and its political division between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei means that international, regional, and local maritime laws have been in place to ensure economic trading of goods and produce, and maritime boundaries are secured and protected. However, while international sea laws are in place to help foster more efficient diplomatic ties between neighbouring nation-states of these maritime spaces, local laws enacted can sometimes be in contradiction to them. An example of this is The Malaysian Territorial Sea Act 2012 (TSA), which sets out 12 nautical miles as the breadth of the territorial sea throughout Malaysia. The history leading to the enactment of the TSA is long and complicated but it is generally a response to international laws such as the (Alteration of Boundaries) Order in Council, 1954 (vis-à-vis the Colonial Boundaries Act, 1895), which determines the boundaries of a British colony and the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982 , a multilateral treaty governing the world's oceans. However, in the case of Sabah and Sarawak, the territory for the exploitation or exploration of the territorial sea is limited to only 3 nautical miles , which has been greatly contested by local activists and politicians and accused of being unconstitutional . The arguments made by those protesting the change have accused the Malaysian government of wanting to have complete control over the state’s rights to fisheries, marine, and mineral resources. The Malaysian government, however, has responded by explaining that while international law limits the Malaysian territorial waters to 12 nautical miles (22km) from the coast, the TSA had always limited the states’ waters to 3 nautical miles (5.5km) from the coast. Before 1963, Sabah and Sarawak, as independent nations, had sovereignty over waters up to the full 12 nautical miles from their shores, but this had to change as they became states under the federation of Malaysia. Regardless of ongoing debates, for those living on the coast, contradictory or overlapping international and domestic policy quandaries such as the above mentioned only translate to further inconveniences in their daily lives at sea, which eventually impact their access to work, social connectivity, and native practices. From this other social problems often ensues: specific to Malaysia, the rigid governing of water boundaries has also led to modern day migratory issues of epic proportions, mirroring the displacement of migrants and refugees coming from countries like Ukraine, Syria, Sub-Saharan Africa and Myanmar. Littoral communities from east Sabah in Malaysia, southern Philippines and eastern Kalimantan of Indonesia see their maritime movement between these nation states as fluid and natural. Non-legally recognised movements are considered illicit and in many cases, criminal, and when arrested they are eventually deported. For the children of these people, they are deemed stateless and undocumented. Further complicating this is the villainizing of local littoral populations who share similar cultural and ethnic identities to these nearby migrants , all of whom are often deemed as dangerous by authorities. While many littoral communities have expressed wanting to respect national laws and international boundaries, it becomes clear to many maritime communities that these policies have given very little consideration to their immediate needs and difficulties in place of the protection of sovereign borders. It cannot be denied that securing maritime borders are in fact important to national security and will continue to be the focus of countries in the Indo-Pacific, especially that of developing nations. However, it is important to recognise that for littoral communities, it is easy to understand how International maritime treaties and cooperation seem to have overlooked their everyday practices and relationships with their sacred water bodies. Their retaliation towards this comes in the form of a rejection of these maritime conventions; these communities are only concerned with their daily survival and will utilise their maritime space for the movements of goods, peoples and ideas indefinitely. Solving this quandary will require littoral and maritime communities to be invited to contribute to the building of more effective policies. With a potential shift on civil engagement, newer maritime laws and policies, both domestic and international, can not only help ensure security and economic stability, but also more important concerns in the 21st century such as Covid-19 healthcare and recovery , climate change and gender equality . Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. 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LAUNCH EVENT Event title: IPC Online Launch Date: 10th February 2022 Time: Washington D.C.: 0730 - 0900 hrs New Delhi: 1800 - 1930 hrs Singapore: 2030 - 2200 hrs WATCH VIDEO EVENT DETAILS SPECIAL ADDRESS Ambassador Kelly Keiderling Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Dept of State. KEYNOTE ADDRESS Prof. C. Raja Mohan Visiting Research Professor, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore INTRODUCTIONS TO THE CIRCLE Sushant Singh Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research Dr. Happymon Jacob Associate Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Founder, CSDR, New Delhi PANEL DISCUSSION: FRAMING THE INDO-PACIFIC: PATHWAYS TO THE FUTURE MODERATOR Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (Retd) PANELLISTS Ankit Panda Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr. Sana Hashmi Visiting Fellow, Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation Manoj Kewalramani Fellow - China Studies, Takshashila Institution, Bangalore. Dr. Kittipos Phuttivanich Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Ramkhamhaeng University, Thailand.