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e86a2b53-a61e-48bd-9aad-9fd36b432865 < All op-eds China’s hostage diplomacy against India Dr. Sriparna Pathak As China’s economic and political clout increases at the international stage amidst a raging pandemic with origins in China, the various tools China uses in conducting international relations keeps constantly expanding. Hitherto unheard forms of conducting foreign relations like ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ and ‘weaponisation of trade’ have come to occupy centre stage of Chinese foreign policy. Outlining six diplomatic highlights for China in 2021, Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng spoke of Xi Jinping’s proposal of a Global Development Initiative at the UN, the extension of China- Russia friendship treaty, the virtual meeting between Xi and Biden, Meng Wanzhou’s return home, completion of the China-Laos railway and China’s vaccine diplomacy. Meng’s return home is tied to China’s hostage diplomacy as in its response to Meng’s arrest in Canada, China arrested two Canadian citizens- Michael Kovrig and Michale Spavor in 2018 on charges of espionage. Kovrig is a former diplomat while Spavor is a businessman. Even though charges of espionage were levied against the Canadian citizens, the two were released as soon as Meng’s release was secured! The espionage charges magically disappeared, making China’s motives behind taking the two Canadian citizens clear! China has often taken foreigners as hostages to use them as bargaining chips! Despite article 34 of the 1949 Geneva Convention stating that taking hostages is prohibited, China has often engaged in taking hostages to further its political goals. The latest case of taking hostages by China is that of the abduction of 17-year-old Miran Taron from the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Taron’s friend Hohny Yaiying who managed to escape informed authorities that Taron was abducted by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Taron and Yaiying are local hunters from Arunachal Pradesh’s Zido village and the abduction took place near where the Brahmaputra River, (known as Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet) enters India in Arunachal Pradesh. In September 2020, the PLA had kidnapped five boys from Arunachal Pradesh and had released them after about a week. Further back in May, a 21 year old man was abducted by the PLA from the same area, and he was released after the Indian Army’s intervention. India-China relations have hit their lowest since 1962, as the PLA, disrespecting all agreements on border control and management infiltrated into Indian territory in 2020 and killed 20 Indian soldiers in the most barbaric ways possible using batons and barbed wires. Both sides have since stepped up monitoring the 3488 kilometres border. Since April 2020, the PLA has blocked Indian troops from reaching at least 10 patrolling points (PP) in eastern Ladakh, running from Depsang Plains in the north to the Pangong Tso in the south. There are at least 65 PPSs from the base of Karakoram to Chumar. The 14 rounds of talks between the two sides have yielded no breakthrough. In order to ensure that locals do not get caught in the crossfire, India’s Ministry of Defence issued orders asking grazers to restrict their cattle movements. Nevertheless, because there is no earmarked line going through forests, it is difficult for grazers and hunters to determine which area falls into the disputed category. It is not just Indian grazers who tread into disputed territory, Chinese grazers do the same! The only difference is that they do not get abducted by the Indian side. A three-member delegation to India’s defence minister Rajnath Singh in January this year, stated how the PLA uses Chinese nomads in Ladakh to transgress into Indian territory while India has restricted its own nomads to pasture lands, severely impacting the lives of the locals. While the playbook remains largely the same for recipients of China’s hostage diplomacy, in India’s case there is an added element of psychological warfare to it. Taking locals hostages sends the message to India that China is in control of the territory and the territory is beyond negotiations or formal diplomacy. In the 1962 debacle, China undertook brainwashing techniques of the 3962 prisoners of war (POWs) as part of what Beijing calls ‘imparting correct ideological education’ to help understand the ‘territorial issues along the China-India border’. China maintains its narrative that Indian POWs enjoyed ‘extra-standard humane treatment’. However, as stated by the POWs themselves, to break their morale, Indian officers were sent to solitary confinement for weeks. Chinese account of the camps in which the Indian POWs were kept does not mention these constant indoctrination sessions or the torture POWs were put through. In the case of the current standoff, a photo showing an Indian Army personnel overpowering another man is being shared with the claim that the Indian army holds more than 150 Chinese soldiers hostage in Arunachal Pradesh. The photo was shared with different claims in Hindi, both of which implied that it showed a scene from the recent face-off in Tawang. However, as revealed by fact checkers, the photograph is a still from a film titled LAC, which was made in 2020! While China actually takes Indian locals hostage, it puts out the false narrative about India taking hostages, using false imagery and narratives in the digital domain. As China’s economic and political clout keeps increasing at the international stage, it becomes pertinent for India to take cognisance of the myriad tools China uses to influence and impact Indian public opinion, psyche and morale. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

37f26546-d6a1-4293-8141-07ae02627bf6 < All op-eds The Quad and Aggressive Chinese Military Threat Dr. Ladhu Ram Choudhary The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, popularly known as the Quad is becoming more vibrant and vocal to achieve shared vision of liberal international order – nurturing democratic political governance, strengthening market driven economies, and cherishing societal pluralism and diversity. The 4th Quad Foreign Ministerial level meeting held on 10-11 February 2022 in Australia has reinforced this commitment for strengthening the rules-based international order through advancing bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region. The thrust of this meeting has been consolidating cooperation on “Covid-19 vaccination delivery, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief [HADR], maritime security, counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, countering disinformation, climate change, and critical and emerging technologies” as stated by the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, while departing for the meeting and trip to the Indo-Pacific region. Novelty in Agenda and Approach A cursory survey of previously held foreign ministerial level meetings indicates that the Quad partners have been constantly devising mechanism to addresses non-military security threats from a human security centric approach. In fact, the origin of the Quad is grounded in tackling the non-traditional security threats. They have been equipping and preparing the Quad partners and the weaker states of the Indo-Pacific region to combat against the emerging threats ranging from the 2004 tsunami to the Covid-19 pandemic. The first-ever Quad Foreign Ministerial level meeting was held in September 2019 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Though, they have not issued a joint statement, but the individual statements of ministers reflects similarity in content and intent – institutionalizing network of like-minded Indo-Pacific partners for building shared values of open, prosperous and inclusive region. The 2nd meeting of foreign ministers of the quad partners was held on 6 October 2020 in Tokyo to follow up the earlier discussions and to outline a coordinated response strategy to the challenges of the Covid-19 pandemics and its socio-economic and political fallouts. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ statement underlines that they have discussed issues of mutual interest pertaining to regional connectivity, HADR, maritime security, and counter terrorism. They have reiterated their commitment to uphold the centrality of the ASEAN for building free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. Similarly, during the 3rd Quad foreign ministerial level meeting held on 18 February 2021, the Ministers have reaffirmed the Quad’s motto “upholdong a rules-based international order, underpinned by respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, rule of law, transparency, freedom of navigation in the international seas and peaceful resolution of disputes”. The regular annual meetings of foreign ministerial level have naturally elevated and institutionalized the role of the Quad partners to deliberate over the long-term as well as immediate security and strategic concerns. It has also given prominence to issues of so-called “low politics”. The agenda also reflects concern of the Quad members towards real and substantial problems of the small islands and the ASEAN countries of the Indo-Pacific region. The focus on these issues is also vital to bolster collective persona to vast and diverse Indo-Pacific. In short, continuity of these dialogues is indicative of the seriousness of the superpower (the US) and major powers (Japan, India, Australia) to deliver their global responsibilities and duties towards the international community. Thus, the reprioritization of the issues and approach of the Quad is certainly novel and necessary to counter the unpredictable and uncertain threats. However, some of military security concerns demands immediate attention. Heart of the Problem The shifting balance of power certainly relocates the epicenter of global politics from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. The emerging great power rivalry between China and the US has been steering this churn since the global financial crisis of 2008. Despite this, the US-led Quad has remained relatively implicit and ambiguous to contain China, rather they focuses on engaging China to socialize and integrate into the rules-based liberal international order. On the contrary, China has been explicitly alleging that the Quad is creating ‘exclusive blocs’ as Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian states, “We oppose exclusive blocs to create bloc confrontation” that reinforce the Cold War mentality and wedges between regional countries. However, a reading of the agenda of the Quad meetings suggests they have refrained and reluctant to address collectively the military threats posed by China. Simply put, some of the pertinent traditional security questions remain either undercover or intentionally kept of out of the agenda. Consider the following: Have the Quad pondered on the issues of aggressive military Threats from China? Then, how would the Quad constrain and undermines the military power of China through the existing Indo-Pacific strategy? How would the US facilitate its key allies, namely Japan, India, and Australia to catch up with China’s growing military capabilities and strategies? Why these concerns are critical? First, the geographical proximity and historical legacies of Japan and India vis-à-vis China increases possibility of direct military threat from China. The ongoing border skirmishes between India and China are early symptoms and constantly haunt India in multiple ways. Strategically, it limits India’s alignment with the West and Indo-Pacific. Economically, it complicates India’s commitments to invest and aid the countries of the Indo-Pacific. Politically, it resurfaces the territorial insecurity and threat to India’s relatively peaceful borderlands. To counter this, India needs firm political support and high-end military wherewithal/technology from the US and others, at concessional rate, if not free. As Brahma Chellaney puts it “China’s military buildup against India surpasses Russia’s buildup against Ukraine”. Similarly, the growing Chinese aggressive military strategies underline Japan’s strategic autonomy and poses existential threats . But, the 4th Quad ministerial meeting remains mum on China’s aggressive military build-up. Second, China uses “salami-slicing” strategy to control the territories and islands of the neighboring countries. It is China’s subtle, patient, and gradual approach to alter the status quo of the contested maritime waters and disputed territories. Through using this strategy China has controlled and started administrating more than 80 archipelagos and islands in the South China Sea and beyond. The PLA aircrafts have violated airspace of multiple countries ranging from Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and India. In the Himalayan region, China has upped the ante using the “salami-slicing” to derail the border dispute settlement negotiations and alter the existing status. In recent past, Beijing has promulgated assertive and provocative “Land Border Law (LBL)” to legitimize its “salami-slicing” strategy. The LBL rejuvenates the “Civil-Military Integration (CMI)” to empower the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese paramilitary forces to prevent the development of connectivity and infrastructure. This would lead to precarious military tensions along the Himalayan borderlands – not limited to China-India, but also threatens Nepal and Bhutan. Third, on 4 February 2022 at the opening ceremony of the Olympic Winter Games, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated, “China has just entered the Year of the Tiger according to the lunar calendar. Tiger is a symbol of strength, courage and fearlessness”. This reflects the geo-psychology the Chinese leadership to transfer its Wolf-warrior diplomacy towards Tiger-warrior diplomacy. It would endanger the agency and sovereignty of the weak and small countries of the Indo-Pacific regions. As China’s shifting approach, not only dictates neighbours through its economic robustness, rather becoming a political and military dictator in the region. This makes India and other partners more vulnerable vis-à-vis China. Therefore, the US soft balancing strategy through the Quad against China reflects certain limitations and lacunas on traditional security front. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

f5ad96bb-70f4-44d1-a8a1-8d28c207a279 < All op-eds How Could Russia’s War in Ukraine Intensify the Geopolitical Tussle in Myanmar? Mr Angshuman Choudhury How Russia’s War in Ukraine could intensify the geopolitical tussle in Myanmar The Russia-Ukraine crisis has given a whole new context to global affairs. As one of the most polarising events of this century so far, it has widened latent geopolitical fissures and possibly created new ones. Its knockdown effects on foreign policy behaviour in both international and regional contexts should not be underestimated. In Myanmar, the crisis seems to be intensifying pre-existing competitive tendencies between China and Russia – two major powers invested in the country for their own unique reasons. Greater competition between both for influence in junta-ruled Myanmar could have second-order effects on how India and Japan – two Indo-Pacific powers with longstanding interests in Myanmar – approach the junta. In many ways, Myanmar’s case may be seen as a reflection of the Russia-Ukraine crisis’ repercussions on geopolitics in the broader Indo-Pacific region. The China-Russia jostle Two recent developments are indicative of what big power politics could look like as the Russia-Ukraine crisis drags on. First, a little more than a month after Russia launched a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese foreign ministry announced that U Wunna Maung Lwin, the foreign minister of Myanmar’s junta, would be visiting China to meet his counterpart, Wang Yi. The in-person meeting took place on 1 April in Huangshan City, located in Anhui Province. This was the first time Yi was meeting Lwin in an one-on-one official meeting since the 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar. In no less than clear terms, it signalled Beijing’s intent to fully embrace the military regime next door. Until this meeting – during which China extended a 650 million RMB grant to Myanmar – Beijing had refrained from fully embracing the junta. Second, on 28 April, the President of the Russian republic of Tatarstan, Rustam Nurgaliyevich Minnikhanov, arrived on a working visit to Myanmar to meet the junta leadership, including Commander-in-Chief, Min Aung Hlaing. He brought along a coterie of industrialists from the republic, which is one of the most developed regions in Russia. Following the visit, media reports indicated high interest within the Tatarstan government and business lobbies to invest in Myanmar, including in the automobile and energy sectors. The Russian truck giant, Kamaz, which was part of the visiting delegation, is reportedly seeking to finalise an agreement with the junta to begin manufacturing in Myanmar soon. Notably, Kamaz also builds trucks that are used to mount the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile system, which the Myanmar military ordered one month before the February 2021 coup. Last June, Myanmar’s coup leader visited the Kazan Helicopter production facility in the Tatar capital in a show of growing intimacy between Russia and the junta. The Russia-Myanmar affair It is clear that Russia, even as it faces gruelling Western sanctions and unprecedented global isolation, is rushing in to plug the holes and protect its friendships (and customer base). The Myanmar junta is a natural target in this regard, and for good reasons. The junta has expressed unflinching support for the Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine. More importantly, it had already positioned itself as an eager buyer of Russian arms – a conscious move by the Burmese Generals to offset their own dependencies on China. Even before the coup, the Myanmar military seemed to have developed a growing appetite for Russian military hardware. For Moscow, the Burmese military became an important customer in the face of declining arms sales to the ASEAN region due to Western sanctions on Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. That the Myanmar military placed big-ticket orders of Russian platforms – from radars and SAMs to Sukhoi-30MK fighter jets and air defence systems – after 2014 gave a boost to this relationship. In order to expand its sales, Moscow wanted to familiarise the Burmese to Russian military systems, which was one of the reasons why in 2020, it allowed India to transfer a retrofitted Soviet-era Kilo-class submarine to the Myanmar navy. Just a week before the coup last year, Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, toured Myanmar to sign an agreement for the supply of various weapons to the military. After the coup, there was a dramatic uptick in mutual visits – including the participation of the Russian deputy defence minister in the 76th Armed Forces Day parade in March 2021 and a week-long visit by coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing, to Russia three months later. A week before Hlaing’s Russia visit, a 20-member Russian delegation led by the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy made a secret visit to Myanmar, showing how dearly Moscow valued the Burmese defence client base. In comparison, there has been sparse bilateral activity between China and Myanmar on the military-to-military side in recent times, especially after the coup. The Chinese, who are still the biggest arms suppliers to the Myanmar military, have been less than comfortable with the junta’s spirited outreach to the Russians (who are now Myanmar’s second-largest arms supplier). But, it hasn’t given up on the Burmese generals yet. Exactly a year after the Soviet-era Indian submarine sale to Myanmar, China transferred its own Ming-class diesel electric submarine to Myanmar. In Beijing’s Indian Ocean blueprint, Myanmar is an indispensable element, and investing in the latter’s defence ecosystem is a time-tested way to maintain strategic influence. Shifting sands Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing Western sanctions, as is clear by now, has thrown its Defence Industrial Sector (DIS) into an abyss of stalled deadlines and spare parts shortage. As a recent report by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute notes, this problem very much extends to Southeast Asia, where Vietnam and Myanmar are the two largest buyers of Russian military hardware. It also notes that as the war drags on, China is likely to provide greater economic and military assistance to Russia. This would, in turn, boost its leverage over Moscow and the Chinese will be in a position to secure greater concessions from the Russians on a host of issues pertaining to its regional and global interests. In Myanmar’s context, this would essentially mean greater legroom for Beijing to impose itself on the junta and in the process, offset any relative advantage that the Russians might have acquired over the last few years. In a situation where the Russian DIS fails to deliver on its promised timelines for both new weapons and upgrade packages, the Chinese will be able to step in and compensate. The junta will have little choice but to acquiesce, given the multi-front war that it is currently fighting inside Myanmar and the constant supply of weapons that such a conflict demands. Secondarily, China will be in a stronger position to ensure that its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects are expedited and its existing assets in Myanmar protected with greater vigour by the junta. As China tightens its grip around the junta under the shadow of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, its regional competitors who had so far maintained a neutral posture on the Myanmar coup, such as India and Japan, could shift their own positions and start engaging closely with the coup regime. Both New Delhi and Tokyo remain highly concerned about growing Chinese influence in Myanmar, which is why they have refrained from sanctioning or isolating the junta. A closer China-junta relationship would make them more nervous than ever. India, particularly, could ramp up its own defence sales to the Burmese military to offset the Chinese clout. In any case, Myanmar has emerged as one of New Delhi’s biggest arms buyers in recent times. According to some reports , India has transferred military platforms to Myanmar even after the coup. Hence, any uptick of Indian weapons sales in the months to come would not be surprising. Over the next few months, there is little doubt that Russia will go out on its limbs to retain its goodwill with its existing clients, including the Myanmar military. There is little doubt that this will push the Chinese to expand their own pitch with the junta. If India and Japan, both partners in the IPR and the Quad, respond along an equivalent track by normalising ties with the authoritarian junta, that could further dilute the core of the Indo-Pacific narrative and split it along the middle. In that sense, Myanmar could become a litmus test for the Indo-Pacific alliance in the post-Ukraine context. More importantly, it would create a broader legitimise a brutal regime that is currently at war with its own citizens. * Angshuman Choudhury is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Policy Research Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Amba is a Program Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research. Amba holds a Master’s in International Studies from Symbiosis International University, Pune. < Back Associate Editor: Amba Wattal Amba Wattal is a Program Associate for Indo-Pacific Affairs at CSDR, where she manages a diverse array of activities and initiatives within the Indo-Pacific Circle- a platform committed to advancing indigenous knowledge production and exchange across the region. Amba holds a Master’s degree in International Studies from Symbiosis International University, Pune, a Master’s degree in English Literature from Delhi University, and a Postgraduate Diploma in Human Rights.

a925d3c7-14c1-4cc4-ba22-d05c56ab86bf < All op-eds Quad Needs a More Near-Term, Outcomes-Focussed Approach Manoj Kewalramani Ever since its revitalisation, the Quad grouping, comprising India, the US, Japan and Australia, has evolved an ambitious agenda. Over the past two years, the Quad has established six leader-level working groups , covering domains like the COVID-19 Response and Global Health Security, Climate, Critical and Emerging Technologies, Cyber, Space, and Infrastructure. These are long-term agenda items that have primarily focussed on establishing frameworks and standards, boosting sharing of information and best practices, identifying vulnerabilities and discussing pathways to address them. The two most visible products of the Quad’s engagement so far have been the COVID-19 vaccine partnership and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA). These also underscore a desire to be near-term outcomes-focussed, while working on longer term challenges. Importantly, all these initiatives reflect a strategic congruence among the four countries in terms of the desire to shape a “free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific” region, address current challenges and shape the global governance agenda in key domains that will underpin future prosperity. This sense of purpose, however, does not imply the absence of disagreement over certain specific interests. For instance, member states have had clear differences in terms of their approaches to Russia’s war against Ukraine or the political developments in Myanmar. Complex Dynamics Some analysts tend to view these differences as fundamental contradictions that strike at the heart of the grouping. Such a view, however, is based in an archaic approach to international relations. It does not account for the impact of three decades of economic globalisation after the end of the Cold War, which created a web of networks and dependencies that cannot be immediately abandoned or transformed. Neither does it account for the changes in the dispersion of power across different countries around the world. The world today is not unipolar and neither is it moving in the direction of bipolarity. What is emerging is an uneven multipolarity. This is characterised by significant absolute power differentials in terms of comprehensive national power among the different poles. But this gap is far narrower when one takes into account relative power dispersion across different factors that constitute comprehensive national power. Invariably, such a situation engenders complexity in terms of any group’s dynamics. Moreover, such an old-world perspective on geopolitics misunderstands the nature and purpose of the Quad. The Quad is characterised by strategic congruence, political fluidity and diversity in terms of the geographies, capacities and specific interests of each member. Each of these are strengths rather than weaknesses. A strategic congruence among member states allows for clear and common agenda Fluidity provides for flexibility to accommodate differing interests. It creates room for domestic political manoeuvrability for each member state. It does not entail rigid commitments without necessarily limiting the scope and depth of cooperation. Ensuring that this situation remains an asset requires continued and frank engagement. Diversity in capabilities, experiences and interests ensures an inclusive approach and one that can leverage each other’s strengths The last of these three is perhaps the most critical to the Quad’s future success. This was amply evident in conceptualisation and execution of the Quad’s Vaccine Partnership, which saw each member state bringing a unique set of capabilities to the table. That said, there is something to be said about the need for the Quad to focus on outcomes and deliverables. For instance, the vaccine partnership was first announced at the leaders’ virtual summit in March 2021. Then, during the first in-person meeting between the Quad leaders in September 2021 , they committed to donating more than 1.2 billion COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022. As of May 2022, however, merely 257 million doses had been provided by the group. This number has since grown to around 670 million , informed the Assistant Australian Foreign Minister Tim Watts in a recent conversation. Nevertheless, it still falls well short of the original commitment. This underscores the importance of an outcomes-focussed approach that balances and long- and short-term objectives. IPMDA & Maritime Governance This is more so the case with the Quad’s maritime security and governance agenda. While the IPMDA was announced earlier this year during the May 2022 leaders’ summit in Tokyo , the roadmap for its implementation is rather unclear. Announcing the IPMDA, the Quad leaders had said that the initiative would “innovate upon existing maritime domain awareness efforts”, rely on “a combination of Automatic Identification System and radio-frequency technologies,” provide a “common operating picture” integrating “three critical regions—the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region,” and extend “support for information-sharing across existing regional fusion centers.” They envisioned a five-year window of investment in the initiative. The IPMDA is a significant agreement. It has the potential to go beyond merely domain awareness to not only provide a much needed boost to maritime governance, resource conservation and law enforcement, but also deepen potential intelligence cooperation. It is little surprise then that Chinese analysts have described it as a “rare” Quad initiative that “has teeth,” while also seeking to discredit it as an anti-China measure. The challenge, however, is that it has been six months since the announcement of the IPMDA, and there has been little information regarding the progress made in terms of the technologies that will be used, the process for tracking small fishing vessels, the methodology for sharing the data gathered and the consultations with partners with regard to implementation. It is important that these questions are addressed at the earliest. This is because domain awareness is merely the beginning of what should be a multi-pronged agenda for the Quad’s maritime security and governance effort. Closer coast guard cooperation among the Quad countries, maritime law enforcement equipment development and training support for littorals in the Indian Ocean Region and the use of shiprider agreements to boost law enforcement capacities of countries in the region is the way forward. In addition, Quad countries should engage in more active maritime health diplomacy, leveraging the strengths of partner states in geographies that are of primary interest to each of them. Such an approach can allow for expanded presence for each of them, while leveraging each other’s capabilities and social capital. For instance, the navies of India and Australia could work together to engage in health outreach and humanitarian and disaster management efforts in the South Pacific and the Western Indian Ocean region. Some of these initiatives can be operationalised rather easily and quickly. Doing so is important to ensure that the Quad is not just addressing the long-term challenges that countries in the Indo-Pacific face but is also seen as addressing immediate needs while building goodwill. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

ab30ce32-de14-46ad-9be7-d2bd9b7917a9 < All op-eds ASEAN: The Missing Piece in US’ Indo Pacific Strategy Aakriti Sethi During the Bush and Obama administration, ASEAN’s role in America’s Asia policy was elevated as the White House began recognizing its wider importance within and beyond the region. Apart from its strategic location compelling larger global players to acknowledge the importance of Southeast Asia, the region’s geopolitical role has had the ability to oscillate views critical to US-China rivalry. Since the Trump Presidency, American perception on China witnessed a sharp shift as anti-China sentiments crystallized. President Trump’s decision to launch a refurbished Asia policy (i.e. the Indo Pacific strategy in 2017) with renewed focus on harnessing a “free and open” rules-based order and strengthening US economic and defense ties with various partners and allies of the region met with bipartisan support. Viewed as one of the many ways to counter China’s influence within the region, President Trump ushered in an era of maximum competition with China that has had a far-reaching impact. Other major countries like Japan, Australia and India who have been long-time supporters of the Indo Pacific rather than the Asia-Pacific, welcomed this shift in the US policy. Being wary of this power struggle, ASEAN has time and again emphasized its centrality for maintaining an “inclusive regional architecture” and collective leadership which has been supported by the US. ASEAN centrality has been an important pillar for maintaining the regional status quo as it provided a means to form consensus within the region. However, understanding ASEAN’s possible role within the Indo-Pacific has received limited attention from the US. Southeast Asia is a region of significance that holds great economic value (and potential), located in the midst of key sea lanes of communication, and is home to dynamic yet politically diverse countries. Even as US officials have reiterated that ASEAN is “literally at the center of the Indo-Pacific , and plays a central role in the Indo-Pacific vision," American interaction with the region has been inconsistent. Since the Obama administration, there has been a perception gap about Southeast Asia not being a region of focus for the White House. The recent US-ASEAN summit can be seen as President Biden’s attempt at launching a “new era in the relations…guided by the complementary objectives of the Indo Pacific Strategy." By inviting all the member states to Washington DC, avoiding bilateral meetings on the sideline of the summit and engaging with the ASEAN platform to propagate a cohesive US-ASEAN message, there was an attempt at showcasing that the Southeast Asian regional organization reigns at the top of Biden administration’s foreign policy priority list. The American intention to build confidence in the US-ASEAN partnership and countering the growing Chinese influence was evident as new initiatives worth 150 million dollars for infrastructure, maritime security and healthcare were committed by President Biden. Unlike many parts of the world, Southeast Asia was not quick to embrace the concept of the Indo-Pacific. It was only in 2019 when ASEAN released the ASEAN Outlook of the Indo Pacific that the organization attempted to hesitantly navigate the new geopolitically-loaded construct. The ambivalent position of the group on the Indo-Pacific strategy has been due to China’s sustained influence over the region and a lack of concordance within member states. For America, countering this regional skepticism has been a challenge for multiple reasons. Firstly, the checkered diplomatic engagement with the region has posed questions about the role Southeast Asia plays in America’s larger Asia policy. The bare-minimum personal engagement of top US officials with their counterparts in Southeast Asia amidst the pandemic restrained the reception of the Indo Pacific strategy in Southeast Asia. Secondly, a lack of America-led economic framework(s) has weakened the appeal of the Indo-Pacific as a concept in the region. Even though the Biden administration launched the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), it lacks an active trade and investment plan for the ASEAN countries. During the recent summit, countries like Vietnam and Singapore claimed that the US lacks a clear plan, even though they are keen on possible economic prospects. Thirdly, on Russia, diverging opinions betweem the US and ASEAN countries addresses their differences in world view and foreign policy approaches. The cautious response to the Ukraine war by ASEAN showcased their unwillingness to weaken their relationship with Russia as countries like Myanmar, Vietnam and Indonesia depend on latter for defense equipments and weapons. Due to this, Russia was not mentioned in this year’s US-ASEAN joint statement. And fourthly, as the Quad has become more relevant in America’s strategic ambitions, the relevance of ASEAN centrality has come into question. The rise of this mini-lateral in the US policy discourse has triggered concerns about the role ASEAN could play in the region as the great power struggle intensifies. Within the context of brewing tensions with China over the South China Sea dispute, the Quad’s position in the evolving regional security architecture has been a puzzle for ASEAN countries. The 2022 summit was successful in displaying that America is ready to start afresh with ASEAN after a stagnation in ties over the past few years. However, the relationship has reached a juncture, where expectations from both sides need to be reevaluated. America’s desire to witness an ASEAN that is less reliant on China can only happen if the White House is able to incorporate ASEAN in its wider economic strategy. At the same time, as the competition between US and China hardens, seeking greater areas of convergence (like climate change) that quells the fear of binary choices for Southeast Asian countries will be ASEAN’s main challenge. The charm of the Indo-Pacific strategy for ASEAN countries lies in its economic and humanitarian aspect, rather than its geopolitical goals. Therefore, America presenting a vision for the Indo-Pacific that would help in achieving mutual benefits beyond the idea of balancing China would help in fostering greater consensus with the Southeast Asian countries. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

< Back VAdm ANIL K CHAWLA EDITOR-MARITIME AFFAIRS akchawlanav@csdronline.com VAdm Anil K Chawla is the former Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval Command and a Distinguished Fellow at CSDR. He joined the National Defence Academy in Jan 1978. Commissioned in the Indian Navy on 01 Jan 1982, he specialized in Navigation and Direction in 1988 and subsequently navigated two of the Navy’s frontline frigates. On promotion to the rank of Vice Admiral, he took over as the Director General of Naval Operations on 31 Dec 2014. He took over as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval Command, Kochi on 31 Jul 18. Vice Admiral Chawla was conferred the Vishisht Seva Medal on 26 Jan 13 and the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal on 26 Jan 2015 for distinguished service. He was conferred with the honorary title of Aide-De-Camp to the President of India on 01 Dec 2019. He was awarded the Param Vishisht Medal for distinguished service of the highest order on 26 Jan 2020. akchawlanav@csdronline.com 123-456-7890

Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (Retd.), served as an Officer in the Indian Army, and retired as Northern Army Commander in 2016. He has vast experience in counter-insurgency and crisis-management at the strategic level. dhooda@csdronline.org < Back Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (Retd.) Lt. Gen. Hooda was commissioned into the 4th Battalion of the 4th Gorkha Rifles in 1976 and initially served in Nagaland during the peak of insurgency. As a Major General, he was responsible for counter-insurgency operations in Manipur and South Assam. From 2012 to 2016, Lt. Gen. Hooda was stationed in Jammu and Kashmir and retired as the Army Commander of Northern Command in 2016. During this time, he handled numerous strategic challenges that emerged on the borders with Pakistan and China. Lt. Gen. Hooda has been awarded the Vasishta Seva Medal (twice), the Ati Vasishta Seva Medal, the Uttam Yudh Seva Medal, and the Param Vishisht Seva Medal for his exemplary military service. In 2019 Lt. Gen. Hooda authored a comprehensive National Security Strategy document. He is one of India’s foremost commentators on India’s national security. dhooda@csdronline.org

Prof. Anne-Marie Brady teaches Political Science at the University of Canterbury, and is an expert on Chinese politics. A fluent Mandarin speaker, she is also a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington DC. anne-marie.brady@canterbury.ac.nz < Back Prof. Anne-Marie Brady Professor Anne-Marie Brady's groundbreaking, policy-relevant, research demonstrates the important role of the academic as "critic and conscience" in a modern democracy. Professor Brady is a specialist of Chinese politics (domestic politics and foreign policy), polar politics, China-Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy. She is a fluent Mandarin Chinese speaker. She is founding and executive editor of The Polar Journal (Taylor and Francis Publishers). She has published ten books and over fifty scholarly papers. She has written op eds for the New York Times, The Guardian, The Australian, Sydney Morning Herald, The Financial Times, among others. Professor Brady's recent books include Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), China's Thought Management (Routledge, 2012), The Emerging Politics of Antarctica (Routledge, 2013), China as a Polar Great Power (Cambridge University Press and Wilson Press, 2017), and Small States and the Changing Global Order: New Zealand Faces the Future (Springer, 2019). anne-marie.brady@canterbury.ac.nz

fd72283e-4414-460e-a18f-9d1dd898aa00 < All op-eds Electoral Targeting: Lessons Learned from Digital Campaign Trails in Southeast Asia Ms Munira Mustaffa Various pessimistic predictions have been made regarding the future of democracies in Southeast Asia as a result of the diverse governments and political regimes with transitioning democratic system issues. The experience of liberation struggles in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Laos, the abuse of constitutions by authoritarian governments in the Philippines, and the development of international legal standards and doctrines shaped their constitutional designs . While electoral integrity is frequently emphasised, the significance of election security preparedness in the region and the accompanying risks are not being addressed effectively because of existing challenges. Election security preparedness entails implementing measures to protect the electoral process and safeguard it from interference, hybrid threats, or other types of coordinated attacks in order to preserve its integrity and credibility. Finland is an example of a country that is actively working on implementing measures for election security preparedness. Common approaches to managing election security include validating and verifying voters, protecting ballots, and securely transmitting election results. However, these measures frequently prioritise safeguarding the voting infrastructure over addressing potential political vulnerabilities. Political vulnerabilities in the context of election security refer to potential weaknesses or vulnerabilities in the electoral process that could be exploited to interfere with or undermine the integrity of the election. These vulnerabilities may be related to the technology used in the electoral process, the rules and regulations governing the election, or the political environment in which the election takes place. The popularly accepted belief is that democratic nations hold elections to determine who will lead the government and make significant decisions. However, the often underappreciated nuance is that in the case of Southeast Asia, elections usually come after a process of democratisation has already begun. In other words, the election itself is not what causes democracy to happen; rather, it is the end result or culmination of other processes and events that precede it. Arguably, flawed elections are essential to the maintenance of authoritarian government because it is through elections that authoritarian regimes are able to collect information, pursue legitimacy, manage political elites, and preserve neo-patrimonial dominance, all of which enable them to sustain their rule over the people. Some specific examples of political vulnerabilities in the region may include: 1) lack of transparency and accountability in the electoral process, which can lead to suspicions of fraud or manipulation; and 2) political polarisation or instability that can create an environment conducive to election-related violence or post-election coup d’état , or 3) intimidation and manipulations such as the strategic use of conspiracy theories and hate speech . Electoral politics in Southeast Asia can be a complex and multifaceted affair with a history of political ritualism, democratic competition, electoral anomalies and abuse; some may qualify as free and fair but not necessarily clean, while others may be free but not fair. The relationship between elections and democracy in the region is likely to vary from country to country and can be influenced by a range of social, economic, and political factors, such as: 1. The strength of civil society organisations (CSOs) : Strong CSOs can help promote transparency and accountability in the electoral process and advocate for democratic rights. They can also mobilise voters and serve as a check on the actions of governments and other powerful political players. On the other hand, weak or suppressed CSOs may be unable to fulfil these roles, leading to less democratic and transparent elections. 2. Voter intimidation or coercion: Some individuals or groups may try to intimidate or coerce voters into supporting a particular candidate or political party, either through threats or incentives, or purging of voter rolls or the use of other tactics to prevent certain groups of people from voting. 3. Fraud or vote-rigging : There have been instances of fraudulent voting or vote-rigging in some elections in Southeast Asia, such as malapportionment and gerrymandering . 4. Disinformation or propaganda: The spread of false or misleading information, particularly through social media, can create confusion and sway public opinion in favour of certain candidates or parties. 5. Campaign finance irregularities : Elections can also be vulnerable to campaign finance violations, such as the use of illegal or undeclared funds to finance campaigns and digital astroturfing . 6. Inadequate election administration : Poorly administered elections, such as those with inadequate voter education or inadequate safeguards against fraud, can also contribute to election vulnerabilities. 7. Social media manipulation : Social media can play a significant role in shaping public opinion and influencing the outcome of elections. Given that elections serve as a vital instrument for upholding democratic values and holding officials accountable to the people, they may be subject to a variety of manipulations and interferences . Voters must be able to differentiate between legitimate political campaigns and malicious electoral interference, but they may have difficulties doing so. For this reason, electoral regulations and content moderation are needed to support voter education efforts. During election seasons, there are two key vulnerable points in which sophisticated information operators would look for to exploit or leverage to achieve their goals, and that would be: influencing voter turnout and influencing voter choices. Election interference refers to any attempt to influence or subvert the outcome of an election by illegal or illegitimate means. This can take many forms, including hacking into voting systems or tampering with ballots, spreading false or misleading information about candidates or the voting process, suppressing or bribing voters, or manipulating the media to sway public opinion. Election interference is a significant threat to the fairness and integrity of democratic elections. The rapidly changing and competitive nature of the cyberspace , where multiple actors compete to control information and narratives, makes it difficult for regional policymakers to understand and effectively address election disinformation. Election disinformation is defined as deliberate, organised dissemination of false or misleading information with the goal of influencing election outcomes. This can take many forms, including false or misleading news stories, provocative social media posts, or digital astroturfing to manipulate and create uncertainty among voters, and undermine trust in the electoral process by eroding the credibility of candidates or political parties. Savvy political actors would hire influence operators, troll farms , or digital armies to spread campaign messaging and carry out malign influence campaigns against their opponents in an attempt to gain an advantage. These strategies may include using social media for counter-mobilisation (organising people against the opposition), discourse framing (shaping public discussion) in their favour, preference divulgence (gathering information about false preferences), and elite coordination (consolidating) with other elites. In recent years, social media platforms have become a valuable tool for political campaigns because they enable political players to reach a large audience quickly and effectively. More specifically, social media manipulation has become an integral part of information wars and election rigging, and it poses the potential to undermine the integrity of elections and earn its instigators an electoral advantage. Incumbent state actors and adversarial political players routinely leverage social media to extend their hold on power and limit opposition candidates by spreading disinformation, propaganda, and other malicious messaging that aims to interfere with and undermine the electoral process. In Malaysia and the Philippines , CSOs play an important role in observing elections by monitoring and detecting electoral fraud and subversion tactics such as disinformation, polarising messages, or hate speech. Governments, civil society organisations (CSOs), and election officials must cooperate in reaffirming their commitment to democratic practices to safeguard their electoral process and guarantee that the elections are free, fair, and clean. It is crucial to realise that erosion of trust is the primary cause of people's susceptibility to disinformation, and that the public need to be better educated in order to be more informed. CSOs must be granted more autonomy in order to enhance political education and increase media literacy, critical thinking, and fact-checking among the general public. This can be accomplished by allowing CSOs to establish independent oversight bodies and granting journalists and the media the freedom to observe and cover the voting process. Additionally, policymakers must maintain a close working relationship with social media platforms and tech companies to ensure they adhere to their content moderation policies and ensure, and that false or misleading posts are removed from their platforms as quickly as possible to limit public exposure and prevent harm. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

23847be1-eec8-4342-bd9e-13e81f0d71a7 < All op-eds Indo-Pacific formulation and ‘sea-changes’ for India Ms. Shereen Sherif In the light of the Indo-Pacific gaining significance in geo-political conception governing strategic choices of countries within and beyond the geographical expanse of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it is no doubt that India has been gaining an increasing role in the security architecture involving the region. With its predominant maritime thrust, Indo-Pacific merits an analysis of its effects upon its eponymous ocean and the role of India. Growing salience of Indo-Pacific is a result of, among other things, the changing strategic, security and economic interactions in the region with a pivotal role accorded to India and the Indian Ocean. Historically, Indian Ocean has been a major site of competition and contestation among different stakeholder countries for political power and economic resources. During the colonial times, the Western imperial powers controlled vast majority of the Indian Ocean littoral, deciding much of the internal political and external defence policies of the colonies. A case in point is the role of the Royal Navy’s control of Indian Ocean and their extended influence on all the entry and exit points, reducing the Indian Ocean to a British lake. The end of the colonial era heralded a new geopolitical order resulting in the entry of new players in the field. The British withdrawal from the East of Suez in 1960s generated a debate about the supposed power vacuum in the region. The Afro-Asian countries’ call for maintaining the Indian Ocean as a peace zone was ineffective in restricting the entry of United States and Soviet Union’s into the Indian Ocean. Great power presence and their politics in the Indian Ocean during the cold war period assumed competitive dimensions, which may be considered a transformative event. The end of Cold War, the emerging multi polarity in Asia and the resultant power shift from West to East further pushed a reconsideration of geo-politics in the region with an initial focus on Asia-Pacific and a gradual shift to Indo-Pacific. While ostensibly, the reconfiguration of Asia-Pacific into Indo-Pacific accords India and the Indian Ocean a central role in global security, bringing India into the foreground is a direct outcome of the strategic calculus of different stakeholder countries’ with their security and economic interests tied to the region. The recent transformation is also reflective of India’s potential as a counterweight to a growing China. It is clear from the above that contingent on political, strategic and economic imperatives, geopolitical frameworks have undergone transformations throughout history and countries around the world resort to various mechanisms to strengthen their reach in a region of strategic prominence. While the nomenclature and general functioning within the framework of the Indo-Pacific points to a significant economic and military role played by India in the strategic grouping/theatre, the significance of the Indo-Pacific is also a function of domestic and international politics and economic considerations of other nations in the region. The responses of two major powers in the region, Russia and China, is crucial in determining the future course of action within the geo-strategic set up as any alterations in the balance of power in any sub region will have a direct bearing on the rest of the grouping. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Through most of his 40 year illustrious career General Hasnain has served in turbulent environment and hot spots. From Sri Lanka to Siachen Glacier, from the North East to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), and in UN operations from Mozambique to Rwanda, he has seen it all in crucial appointments. < Back Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) served seven tours in J&K, decorated in almost of them and knows the J&K conflict comprehensively. He commanded the Indian Army’s Srinagar based 15 Corps and is today one of the foremost writers and analysts on J&K, Pakistan, Middle East and transnational extremist violence. He is a much sought after speaker and writes for major Indian newspapers – The Times of India, The Indian Express, The Hindu, Deccan Chronicle and The Asian Age, besides being a regular participant in television debates on mainstream television. With a strong academic background from Sherwood College Nainital, St Stephen’s College Delhi, the Royal College of Defence Studies, Kings College London and the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, Hawaii, he has been at the forefront of encouraging the adoption of the US initiated Scholar Warrior concept in the Indian Army. He has spoken at the Lee Kwan Yu School for Public Policy, the Rajaratnam School for International Studies and the Indian Institute for South Asian Studies, all at Singapore. He has also spoken at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), London. He is associated with the Vivekanand International Foundation and Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, as Distinguished Fellow and is on the Governing Council of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS). He speaks on National Security at various military, civil services and corporate institutions with a view to enhance India’s strategic culture. He has recently visited Iran and was at the forefront of neutralizing Pakistani influence operations in that country. On 13 Jul 2018 The President of India appointed Lt Gen Hasnain as Chancellor of the Central University of Kashmir. Gen Hasnain has six decorations awarded by the President for India and two by the Army Chief. He superannuated from the Indian Army in Jul 2013 after 40 years of active service.