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a61fa192-bf99-4002-a7d8-ada2ae822499 < All op-eds The Need for Quad as a Techno-democratic Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Mr Arjun Gargeyas The leaders of the various Quad countries have conducted numerous diplomatic gatherings throughout the past year. A recurrent underlying theme throughout the sessions was the extended focus on the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. Topics discussed at the meetings ranged from the role of the Quad in the Indo-Pacific region to regional economic/trade challenges. Along with the US, the Indo-Pacific region's three nations (India, Australia and Japan) constitute the Quad, in which technology cooperation has played a significant role in bringing the four states together. China continues to play a crucial role in how these nations formulate their responses and international strategies when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. It is clear that China has advanced to the point where it is now influencing the region technologically. Beijing's diplomatic goals have benefited from the private sector's success in some critical technical fields, which has been aided by ongoing governmental backing. The Chinese government has looked to its domestic technology giants in addition to its most important foreign policy initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to strengthen its diplomatic ties around the world and increase its technological footprint. It is essential that one state/private organisation does not control the market and stifle technological advancement in important industries in the age of geopolitical consequences of technology ecosystems. Through its Digital Silk Roads initiative , China has already succeeded in capturing continents like Africa by convincing these countries to adopt Chinese technology. States in the South, South East, and East Asia have a chance to avoid slipping into China's "technology debt trap," which would essentially give China and its corporations a lot of influence. The Quad nations are technologically advanced and rising powers in the Indo-Pacific region. It is also interesting that the Quad nations, each of which has comparative advantages that can aid in containing the Chinese juggernaut, are moving toward establishing a strong alliance and credible technical cooperation. In the current political environment, it is crucial for China's competitors to decouple essential technological supply chains from nations like China. Modern commercial and military applications increasingly rely on critical software and networked technologies like telecommunications, the Internet of Things, and quantum, in addition to hardware supply chains like semiconductors. The influence and control that China might have over smaller countries can be lessened by keeping Chinese businesses and their technologies out of other states' technological ecosystems. Setting Standards in AI The Quad, especially the regional parts of the grouping—India, Japan, and Australia—have a variety of technological strengths and specialities that, when combined, can create a powerful alternative to anything a Chinese corporation might have to offer. Japan, a country known for its intellectual prowess, demonstrated in its Fifth Science and Technology Basic Plan its dedication to the development of emerging technologies. The official Artificial Intelligence Technology Strategy , produced by the Japanese government, is centred on the nation's AI R&D and industrialisation strategy. In order to boost technological competitiveness and gain the upper hand in the geopolitical power dynamics, the administration also emphasised the importance of AI innovation. With the signing of an MoU to advance AI cooperation between the two nations, the Indian government has selected Japan as one of the crucial partners in developing future AI solutions. Australia has also pushed for the active involvement of its foreign ministry in developing and establishing technical AI and IoT standards. Australia has taken the lead in highlighting the importance of AI technology standards and has published an official document on it, arguing for a plurilateral approach. The three nations may work together to set the benchmark for future governance of emerging technologies by combining their technological expertise and commitment to creating relevant standards. Breaking the Huawei Telecom Monopoly With Huawei's success as a domestic telecom juggernaut in the 5G era, China scored a home run. China and Huawei currently jointly own the largest number of 5G-related patents and technological standards. With firms like Huawei and ZTE establishing communication networks in nations in Central Asia and Africa, China has solidified its position in the telecommunications industry as a result. Other Indo-Pacific countries may become unduly dependent on Chinese telecom technology due to the lure of low costs, subsidised equipment, and quicker access to modern communications technologies like 5G. The Quad nations have a significant impact here. India has entered the world of communication standards after receiving clearance from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) for its very own homegrown 5G technology standard , the 5Gi. The regional 5G standard was created to enhance connectivity and reach in India, which can serve as a template for other nations in the area. Even though it is still early, India may use its booming telecom sector to create new, more suitable technology for the Indo-Pacific area. Numerous of its telecom behemoths, including Jio and Airtel, are also members of the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) alliance , which collaborates to develop 5G technological alternatives. Rakuten, a leading provider of communications services in Japan, has also based its current 5G network on O-RAN technological specs and is actively working with other Indian tech firms on both their hardware and software. Although the three nations have the required expertise in 5G, they must rely on hardware, specifically telecom equipment made by US and European corporations and technical standards established by both US and Chinese firms. A strong alliance between the three nations (along with the US and the Quad) can aid in the establishment of manufacturing facilities for telecom equipment and specialised technical professionals to create alternative 5G standards. By doing so, the reliance on Chinese technology can be lessened and serve as a model for countries in the Indo-Pacific. In order to prevent other countries from falling into the Chinese technology trap, the expansion of China and its influence in important technology industries have prompted measures to equal and offer genuine alternatives. To check the Indo-Pacific region from becoming reliant on Chinese technology infrastructure, the Quad can collaborate to develop new technologies and produce substitutes for crucial ones that China has exported. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

fe80cc45-066c-47fa-a736-8de00182d28d < All op-eds Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: An Overview Dr. Angana Guha Roy As more and more powers jockey for influence in the Indo-Pacific, Canada launched its long-awaited Indo-Pacific strategy, implicating a shift in its foreign policy agenda. The strategy document launched on November 27 envisions the critical role the region will play in shaping Canada’s future. “Acting in Canada’s National Interests complying with its values” is the central tenet of the strategy. The emerging international order bears witness to the reality that economic interdependence cannot prevent war or build an undisputed foundation to conflict resolution. In fact, economic interdependence has been used by emboldened authoritarian countries like China to further their geopolitical interests by downplaying international norms rules and norms. Hence Canada, which in the recent past came under a critical scanner for aiming to only promote economic diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific without broadly defining its defence and security objectives, came up with an Indo-Pacific Strategy that calls for a “generational shift” in Canada’s foreign policy. The 26 page document offers a comprehensive framework of Canada’s roadmap to engage with the region outlining five strategic objectives centring on peace, security, trade, investment, and a more dynamic and proactive Canada. Canada’s strategy document positions itself in the middle of the grand bargain of major powers underlining a cautious two-pronged China strategy based on selective opposition and selective cooperation. The document marks Canada’s first strategic pushback against China after their relations turned frosty during the tenure of President Xi Jinping. The strategy calls for “profound disengagement” with “disruptive power ” China, in areas of human rights violation, international norms violation, military offensive and economic coercion implicitly hinting at China’s disregard for UN rulings on disputes in the South China sea and its action to further militarize and challenge navigation and overflight rights. Further, Canada’s highlighted reference to tackling China’s coercive measures, stems from its own experience of bearing the impact of coercive diplomacy and non-trade market practices such as forced labour . China’s increasing reluctance to comply with the mandates of the UN such as blocking the UN High Commissioner for Human Right’s report on the situation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang has further enhanced the concern among stakeholder nations. In June this year, Defense Minister Anita Anand while speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue, flagged Canada’s concerns wherein she denounced China’s practice of coercive diplomacy, irresponsible state-sponsored cyber activity, and theft of international property and sensitive technology. In the recent past, Canada was compelled to issue directives to Canadian tourists and the business community to account for the growing risk of arbitrary Chinese laws. In a nutshell, the strategy is directed against policies and behaviour that defy the existing rules-based international order that undermine Canada’s national interests. Events like President Xi’s public scolding of Canadian PM Justin Trudeau during a G20 meeting in Bali, reports of China’s clandestine interference in Canada’s election to push ahead candidates affiliated with the CCP, Chinese nationals operating an illegal network of Chinese police stations in Canada, and China conducting “dangerous interceptions” of Royal Canadian Air force (RCAF) security missions, further revealed the points of friction between the two governments. Xi’s dubious commitment to work with regional players for a stable Asia Pacific and CCP’s hegemonic ambitions left little room for addressing differences through dialogue. Canada’s “evolving” approach to China adopting harder measures might be the starting point of slow and steady decoupling from China. However, the document stresses the importance of inevitably “cooperating” with China, given the size and span of its economy to address issues such as climate change, biodiversity loss, global health and nuclear proliferation. Aligning with the key democratic stakeholders in the region like the United States, European Union, and Australia, Canada aims to pursue a multifaceted engagement with Taiwan ,in areas of trade, technology, democratic governance, health, and countering disinformation. Weeks before launching the strategy document Canadian delegation visited Taipei, voicing support for its membership in the World Health Organization and International Civil Aviation Organization. As the strategy promises a larger military footprint in the Indo-Pacific region to ensure “peace” and “stability” , it will ensure an added security cushion for Taiwan. Defying China’s position, Canada resolves to defend the status quo of the Taiwan Strait against any unilateral action. Chinese media deplored and rejected Canada’s blunt Indo-Pacific strategy calling it an “antithesis of multilateralism” which would eventually harm regional inclusivity. Further, it stressed Canada’s asymmetrical capability , misjudgement of regional dynamic reality, and aggressive tones and ignorance toward China would eventually harm its objective to collaborate with regional players. Canada’s tough China talks have raised questions about its membership in the QUAD in the near future. Although the leadership has remained silent on this aspect, the rolled-out strategy does underline Canada’s ties with all the QUAD countries. Particularly while mentioning India as a “crucial partner” the strategy commits to working out a bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. In the recent past, the Business Council of Canada acknowledged the importance of building stronger and enduring economic ties with India to achieve success in the Indo-Pacific. As Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy aims to expand its involvement in the security horizon it must commit to boosting its defence posture. Canada is required to review its defence policy and improve its defence procurement system taking into account the new foreign policy direction. Further, Canada is facing a crisis of recruitment and retention in the Canadian armed forces . The current number of “trained effective” regulars is just over 53,000 which is below the set target of 20,000 by the government . At present Canada’s diplomatic rhetoric does offer an outline of its objectives but the implementation process would require a more proactive, dynamic and engaged Canada devoted to the existing security challenges and gaps in the region. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS

OUR HOST INSTITUTIONS Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR) is a New Delhi based think-tank that combines rigorous academic research with policy advocacy and strategic consultancy. Based out of New Delhi — a key national capital in the emerging geopolitics of South Asia and Indo-Pacific allows CSDR to understand and help shape the ever-changing geopolitical panorama of the region. CSDR works on issues such as foreign policy, regional connectivity, defense strategy, intelligence, strategic technologies, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, climate change, and energy security. CSDR’s multidisciplinary network of research professionals and senior policy practitioners fuses incisive research with experiential knowledge. This collaboration underpins its programmatic activities empowering it to conduct timely and independent analysis, produce policy-relevant knowledge, and curate multi-stakeholder dialogue platforms for governments, businesses, research endowments, and other associated institutions. Visit website

adcaf831-2799-4ca9-9515-0cdd222ac863 < All op-eds Key Takeaways from the 20th Party Congress: Its Implications for India Dr Priya Suresh At China’s 20 th Party Congress, the Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping delivered a lengthy speech outlining the perceived accomplishments of the past five years and setting the stage for the CCP's priorities and strategies for the coming five years. The 20 th Party Congress has come at a critical juncture as the country embarks to construct a strong and modern socialist country. At the 20 th Party Congress, Xi Jinping presented a clear vision for the next five years. He was appointed the President for the third term and all the six people assisting Xi made it to the Politburo Standing Committee. President Xi announced the new leadership would not be apprehensive by “high winds, choppy waters and even dangerous storms” an explicit mention of the Party’s grip on Power. https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/xis-work-report-to-the-20th-party-congress-5-takeaways/ Xi’s position has been further strengthened making ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ the CCPs guiding philosophy for the future. The 20 th Party Congress cemented Xi’s authority as the strong and most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping. The Party Congress is more indicative of the fact that Xi does not act merely as the guardian of the Party spirit but as an advocate of the CCPs role in Chinese Society and its crucial mission of determining China’s future in the world. The Congress held high the banner of Socialism with Chinese characteristics and a model to be imbued by the rest of the world. The Party leadership has been strengthened in all respects. The most significant outcome of the 20 th Party Congress was Xi’s clear focus on carrying forward the mantle of achieving the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. The Party will continue its concerted effort of development and make breakthroughs in the field of technology and industry. Xi highlighted the Party’s key role in the growth and development of the Chinese economy. Xi is the Head of the Party, the State, and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, it is important to see how he proposes to use the next five years in China’s favour. Xi’s speech is ambitious and has set the tone for the next five years and beyond. One of the major policies is outward-looking in international politics, emphasising a proactive role in major global issues that go beyond China’s national and regional interests. Hongkong & Taiwan The most assertive section of the 20 th Party Congress was on Hong Kong and Taiwan. Xi appreciated the work of the CCP in the crackdown on pro-democracy activists in the region. In resolving the question of Taiwan, the Party shall unswervingly advance the cause of national reunification. China shall continue to adhere to the one-China principle and any form of external interference shall be dealt with severely. Xi’s dream mentioned the reunification of Taiwan and the hope to complete it by 2049. Xi’s speech strongly emphasised ‘national rejuvenation’ and any violation of China’s unity and sovereignty shall be dealt with severely. Xi did not rule out the probability of the use of force to ensure the reunification of Taiwan. Zero Covid Policy Xi reiterated a zero-covid policy approach as a necessity for the benefit of the economy. The pandemic prevention measures were very effective and shall continue to stay. Xi continued to highlight the importance of stopping the spread and reducing fatalities. Xi repeatedly emphasised the commitment to the zero-covid strategy. Assertive Foreign Policy and Security Posture Xi hinted at the continuation of the country’s aggressive foreign policy posture for the next five years as he presented the 20 th Part Congress Report. No individual country was mentioned but affirmed an assertive policy as Xi touted China’s growing global clout and warned against any external interference to suppress or contain China. Xi placed special emphasis on advancing China’s national security and urged a “strong system of strategic deterrence” https://indianexpress.com/article/world/china-ramp-nuclear-arsenal-xis-assertion-establish-strong-strategic-deterrence-experts-8224361/ Xi’s speech reflected a vigorous upgrading of capabilities with new military and strategic guidance. Xi accelerated the building of a world-class military and strongly emphasised security. China continues to grapple in key areas – ideological domain, development-rural and urban, ecological conservation and protection remain formidable tasks. Xi did not rule out any unforeseen challenges and claimed various “black swan and grey rhino” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-xi-idUSKBN29Y12N events can occur at any time. Upholding and strengthening the Party leadership shall only help accelerate the country's development. China will continue to pursue independent foreign policy and shall practise a “defensive national policy”. China shall continue to follow the wolf warrior approach and assertive diplomatic tactics as and when needed. Xi’s claim to supremacy and consolidation of power can see a more aggressive and assertive China. What can India expect with Xi’s third term? Given the security environment, any projections shall be difficult. China’s move will depend on a case-to-case model. Any major change in India-China relations is unlikely with New Delhi insisting on a resolution of eastern Ladakh. Xi’s cabinet shows a “strong Indian undercurrent” reflected in candidates' selection and elevation. Wang Yi is one such recognizable name dealing with the US and India. Wolf warrior diplomats at the helm of affairs will pose a great challenge to India in bilateral and multilateral forums. Given the new game plan for the next five years, India must prepare for a periodic if not an increase in China’s assertive action vis-à-vis the LAC and regional power politics. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

77525501-b681-4995-9ea4-2b1f81d7fc28 < All op-eds Air Pollution and Climate Change Politics in the Indo-Pacific Dr. Helena Varkkey South Asia and Southeast Asia are both rapidly developing regions. However, economic development often comes alongside environmental degradation, especially if this growth is fueled by the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources. Air Pollution, Fires, and Climate Change In recent decades, air pollution has become an increasingly serious problem in both regions. Several cities in India, alongside places like Chiang Mai in Thailand and Riau in Indonesia, frequently top ‘most polluted’ lists. While baseline air pollution is already high in these areas, agricultural fires and fires related to agricultural land-use change have been identified as major contributors to seasonal (dry season, harvesting season) air pollution. Scientists continue to improve their understanding of how air pollution contributes to climate change. One critical link lies in tropical peatlands, found in abundance in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. These carbon-rich forests are important carbon sinks; however, drainage and conversion of these lands into plantations reverse the process and accelerate carbon release into the atmosphere. Drainage also increases the risk of fires. The changing climate, which may cause prolonged and more intense droughts in South Asia and Southeast Asia, further sustains ideal conditions for fires. Governance Challenges Most governments have identified agriculture-related fires as a priority issue to be resolved due to their dire impacts on social health, the economy, and the environment. However, this has proven challenging: these fires have often been described as a ‘wicked’ problem, one that is almost impossible to solve due to its complex and interrelated nature. In Southeast Asia, alongside smallholder practises, powerful local and transnational agribusiness companies have been linked to these fires. The sectors linked to these fires have often been identified as nationally strategic sectors by governments, like palm oil, sugar, and corn. ASEAN has identified the transboundary haze-producing fires as a regional priority since the 1980s. However, limitations of the ASEAN Way mode of engagement, which prioritises economic development, consensus, and non-interference, has often been blamed for the lack of progress on regional cooperation over haze. In South Asia, India was found to be the largest source of transboundary air pollution. It is important for regions like Southeast Asia and South Asia to engage in knowledge exchange over governance solutions for this ‘wicked’ problem. Fires and Climate Politics Agriculture is an integral part of the economy, culture, and society of South Asia and Southeast Asia. The commodities produced on these agricultural lands often make their way to major markets in the West. Climate consciousness in the West has affected agriculture in the South in complex ways. For example, Western consumers increasingly link palm oil production to environmental destruction. Corporate buyers have demanded ‘sustainably produced’ palm oil. However, there remains an aversion to products containing palm oil among Western consumers. This has resulted in an oversupply of palm oil produced sustainably, but largely unable to be sold as such. Climate-linked global initiatives like REDD+ operating in South Asia and Southeast Asia to address fires, among other issues, have met with mixed success. However, recent developments at COP26 in climate financing and loss and damages have been promising in fostering closer understanding between the North and the South over this complex issue. Initiatives based in the South, like Singapore’s Climate Impact X Carbon Exchange, also potentially offer solutions rooted closer to home. The challenge now is to move towards workable governance solutions to address fires and land-use change in ways that mitigate climate change at a global level, improve public health regionally, and sustain development and prosperity nationally and on the ground. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Dr. Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy &; Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Dr. Rajagopalan was the Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019). She was also a Non- Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre from April-December 2020. < Back Dr Rajeswari Rajagopalan Dr Rajagopalan is senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat and writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues. Dr. Rajagopalan joined ORF after a five-year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (2003-2007), Government of India, where she was an Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan in 2012. Dr. Rajagopalan has authored or edited nine books including Global Nuclear Security: Moving Beyond the NSS (2018), Space Policy 2.0 (2017), Nuclear Security in India (2015), Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity among Asian Great Powers (2012), The Dragon's Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Its Implications for Asia (2009). She has published research essays in edited volumes, and in peer reviewed journals such as India Review, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air and Space Power Journal, International Journal of Nuclear Law and Strategic Analysis. She has also contributed essays to newspapers such as The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Times of India, and The Economic Times. She has been invited to speak at international fora including the United Nations Disarmament Forum (New York), the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) (Vienna), Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the European Union.

Adm. Anil Kumar Chawla (Retd.) served as the 28th Flag Officer Commanding- in-Chief, of the Southern Naval Command. He also served as the Indian Navy’s Chief of Personnel in 2016-18. < Back Adm. Anil Kumar Chawla (Retd.) Vice Admiral Anil Kumar Chawla, PVSM, AVSM, NM, VSM, ADC is a retired Indian Navy officer, who served as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval Command.

521bf3ea-356d-419d-be92-ce5d50c6276b < All op-eds Explainable AI for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Abhivardhan In this article, it is proposed that while governments in the Indo-Pacific region including India focus on strengthening digital public infrastructure and emphasize on the need to develop Responsible AI ethics practices, shifting to develop Explainable AI ethical principles would become imperative within the scope of technology governance, which would widen the pivot of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Responsible AI and the Indo-Pacific’s Pivot for Critical Technologies Looking at the Quad ’s statements on critical technologies , and their commitment to establish standards for emerging and critical technologies along with unveiling an Expert Group on Critical and Emerging Technologies, it seems clear that the grouping intends to address shaping ethical, legal and industrial standards and the economic relationship behind technology transfer and innovation. It is necessary because many algorithmic activities & operations undergone through these sophisticated AI technologies, be it in through complex machine learning algorithms, analytics, automation or any sub-segment transcend geographies and can be used in a way, which could be intrusive for human environments, both physical and digital. Protecting knowledge and information is also a key priority because in an interconnected world, AI technologies are the beneficiaries of transnationally available data and their algorithmic practices & operations shape with time. Now, companies across Asia, due to the lack of relevant AI standards in several Indo-Pacific countries garner data which is not ethically guaranteed. If data is not fostered and used in an ethical way, which at the same is not explainable, then neither the consumer nor the regulator is aware of the method through which these technologies work. For example, the US Government already is concerned about the role of companies like TikTok whose recommendation algorithms are intrusive and could endanger data security. India has already banned TikTok through the security exceptions of General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) since mid 2020. This is why since 2020, countries across the Indo-Pacific are already developing regulations on AI technologies. The NITI Aayog in India came up with Responsible AI guidelines as Japan and Singapore came up with their AI governance frameworks. This is how Responsible AI guidelines became mainstream in the region. However, the disruptive and evolutionary use of AI technologies, is not possible to be covered under the Responsible AI guidelines due to the aspect of innovation in these technologies, which remains uninformed and inexplicable in most use cases. Now, many AI innovations are naturally, localized . When companies democratize the technology-based services and products, many of them ignore the lack of explainability of such generic narrow AI technologies. Also, when AI technologies fail to explain their steps, trends and missteps, companies fail to address issues surrounding trust building, knowledge management and data quality under the existing Responsible AI guidelines. These are some of the critical risks and issues that come up with the lack of AI explainability: AI technologies have use cases which are fungible There exist different stakeholders for different cases on AI-related disputes which are not taken into consideration Various classes of mainstream AI technologies exist and not all classes are dealt by every major country in Asia which develops and uses AI technologies The role of algorithms in shaping the economic and social value of digital public goods remains unclear and uneven within law These factors then affect the role of Responsible AI guidelines, when self-regulatory / oversight bodies are established to address algorithmic bias. Let us suppose that a technology company asserts that they would like to have oversight bodies to address issues as to how their AI technologies affect market conditions, then lack of market consensus / business-level standards regulatory / self-regulatory standards shows that the Responsible AI guidelines are not practical and merely symbolic. Even in the case of algorithmic bias, for every class of AI technologies, bias differs, and may be dealt better with a context and qualitative aspect (which again depends on data localisation issues). Even if data attribution is done, it is not possible to develop absolute considerations on the same because many machine learning-based models have explainability issues. This is where Responsible AI is a limited concept and consists of flaws, which is why, focusing on Explainable AI becomes necessary. Achieving Explainable AI Consensus Explainable AI, is very different from Responsible AI. In fact, the larger focus of this concept is to ensure that all possible technologies within the umbrella of “artificial intelligence” become explicit and explainable about their decision-making and implementation. The algorithmic operations & activities conducted by any AI technology, must be understandable and explainable for consumers. A lack of explainability for sure, is an ethical dilemma, which may be attributed to the black box problem and its legal implications. However, at the same time, Explainable AI may be helpful to find out the multi-sector policy repercussions that the “black box problem” (which means lack of explainability of algorithmic operations and activities) have. Explainable AI may also expand to the specificity of stakeholders beyond ethical statements and declarations on maintaining a status quo on AI governance, because having a consensus makes stakeholders, especially public and private actors, responsible to partner and opt for self-regulatory measures. Developing a regulatory sandbox, which India, for example, has already begun with, in the case of few AI technologies, can also be attributed to the idea of Explainable AI, clearly showing how explainability of AI technologies is necessary. To conclude, the Quad grouping and other minilateral forums in the Indo-Pacific region, including the I2U2 and others, may build consensus to shape AI explainability standards , which can be of much use to promote a safe, resilient and qualitative transmission of ethical data and safer AI-based products and services across Asia and Africa. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

5314c6dc-0958-499b-8d1b-dde248ee7e69 < All op-eds Malaysia's Foreign Policy under Anwar Ibrahim: Continuities and Prospects Dr Choong Pui Yee After years of being the prime minister-designate, Anwar Ibrahim finally became the Prime Minister of Malaysia after the 15th general election held in November 2022. Malaysia’s current Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim is no ordinary figure in the political scene in Malaysia. He began his political career as a founding leader of an Islamic Youth Organisation known as ABIM. Anwar was subsequently co-opted by former Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad to the political party of UMNO. During his years with the UMNO-led government in the 1990s, he served as a Finance Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia until his fallout with Mahathir during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Anwar was subsequently dismissed as Deputy Prime Minister, charged and jailed for corruption and sodomy. His dismissal and subsequent incarceration triggered the opposition movement, also known as the Reformasi movement. The Reformasi movement sowed the seeds of an alternative political movement in Malaysia and led to the formation of the Social Justice Party. After years of ups and downs, the Anwar-led Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition won the 2022 election and ushered in a new beginning for the country. In the international scene, Anwar’s tumultuous political career earned him some sympathizers if not ardent supporters. He is often viewed as a center-left-leaning political figure. Without compromising his Islamic religious credentials, he also embraced the progressive values of democracy and human rights. In sum, his credentials sealed him as a progressive Muslim leader. Expect Continuities As Malaysia opens a new chapter under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim, this new chapter also allows the country to redefine its stance on foreign policy. In his maiden press conference , Anwar highlighted the importance of China and called for enhanced bilateral relations with this regional power. At the same time, Anwar also did not leave out other key partners such as the United States, Europe, India as well as ASEAN and emphasized that relations with these countries are equally crucial. Such statements are most likely deliberate as Anwar has to signal to his foreign partners Malaysia’s stance on foreign policy. That he would not upset the status quo. The main reason for highlighting these few countries is simply because Malaysia could not ignore the importance of these key partners. China, in particular, is Malaysia’s largest trading partner . Investment from China has generated tens of thousands of working opportunities and has deepened the ties between these two countries. Naturally, Malaysia would only want to continue such economic ties with China. Besides economic ties, Malaysia simply could not disregard the growing influence of China in the region. But it is also because it would be natural for Malaysia to be wary of China’s growing influence. Despite China’s official stance of advocating for peaceful negotiations and co-existence with other countries, China has demonstrated its assertive foreign policy stance if not to Malaysia but to other countries such as Australia. At present, apart from the ongoing South China Sea dispute, Malaysia does not have an immediate reason that would put the bilateral relations between the two countries to the test. However, given how China outweighs Malaysia in terms of economic and political power, it is only prudent for Malaysia to maintain a cordial relationship with this regional power. At the same time, by underscoring the importance of other key power such as the United States and regional partners such as India and ASEAN, Anwar suggests that Malaysia is pursuing a policy of balancing. Although it may take some time for Anwar and his team to crystalize Malaysia’s foreign policy, some continuities should be expected. Specifically, non-alignment and inclusive cooperation would continue to guide Malaysia’s foreign policy. Malaysia would most likely not choose a side between the two great powers, namely China and the U.S., maintain cordial relations with existing partners, and played a key role within ASEAN. Malaysia and the Indo-Pacific Region Although continuity should be expected, Anwar also could not ignore the emerging importance of the regional construct of the Indo-Pacific. Conceived in 2007 by Japan, Indo-Pacific seeks constructive amalgamation of the wider Asia Pacific region and the Indian Ocean. The term has since been widely accepted. Under previous Prime Ministers, Malaysia has been rather silent when it comes to this emerging reality of the Indo-Pacific. Apart from the domestic instability, the vigilance against great power competition are reasons that explain Malaysia’s relative silence in the past two years. With the domestic political instability coupled with the ongoing pandemic, Malaysia’s two former Prime Ministers may not see the need to prioritize responding to the Indo-Pacific construct. Furthermore, a high-profile position could entrap the country in big power competition. Malaysia, a founding member of ASEAN also needs to consider that the Indo-Pacific construct would not replace ASEAN’s centrality. However, unlike the previous two Prime Ministers whose political mandate is void of an electoral mandate, Anwar has another five years that he could utilize to charter Malaysia’s position in the Indo-Pacific region. One that does not contradict Malaysia or ASEAN’s non-alignment approach. As argued cogently by Kwek , Malaysia could leverage its geographical centrality for wider connectivity-building in response to the Indo-Pacific construct. Anwar could take the lead and work with partners in ASEAN to operationalize the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), one which envisages ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. The AOIP is currently strong on aspiration but weak on the operational direction. Anwar who is adept in foreign policy should realize that putting structures and championing AOIP could help seal Malaysia as an important key player in the Indo-Pacific region. This may help strengthen Malaysia’s consistent approach to inclusivity and non-alignment. In doing so, Malaysia could simultaneously underscore ASEAN’s centrality, played an important role in setting the agenda of the Indo-Pacific, and hedge against uncertainties down the line. While the lack of collective will from regional partners would present its own challenges, the mere attempt should be explored. Should Anwar seek to elevate Malaysia’s status in the Indo-Pacific region, he may be able to help defend ASEAN’s centrality and position Malaysia as an aspiring middle power in the wider Indo-Pacific region. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. 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fea6ec0e-6c8f-4bb5-99aa-7c64031b0b3b < All op-eds Charting the Quad’s Bilateral Way Forward Ms. Eerishika Pankaj As the next Quad summit draws close – presently scheduled for May 2022 – the remarkable growth of the grouping in the past five years is worthy of recap. Its future, however, remains increasingly dependent on the strength of the bilateral ties between the four member powers, especially given recent events ranging from Afghanistan to AUKUS to Ukraine, all of which have shown divergences in interests and outlooks. In order to strengthen the Quad, it is important that the grouping not just expand its Indo-Pacific focus by looking at more areas to cover, but also find avenues to link already established individual, bilateral and trilateral ventures of its members to give a holistic boost to the grouping. The age of minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific has actively begun, with more trilaterals, ventures and partnerships emerging every month. The goal of such widespread engagement –with often overlapping aims –is to ultimately build trust. For the Quad, such confidence building was spearhead upon the grouping’s revitalization by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, supported by his approach of building personal camaraderie with leaders. At present, the Quad has evolved from a mere consultation framework to a critical Indo-Pacific security grouping with leadership summits, foreign ministerial and senior official level consultations, naval exercises like Malabar with all Quad partners and a widespread focus post-pandemic on sectors of interest ranging from vaccines to critical technology to rare minerals. Such growth culminated into a long-awaited joint statement titled ‘ Spirit of the Quad ’ released in 2021. A foundation of strong bilaterals? Building such multilateral synergy amongst four of the biggest and strongest Indo-Pacific democracies has been a herculean task that has cohesively spearheaded the evolution of their ties. Such foreign policy connect has however been ultimately founded on the basis of domestic policy building, with each of the four powers realising the importance of the Indo-Pacific in their individual capacity before connecting with partner states. Therein, as the Quad looks to prove its mettle and move forward with renewed focus, it is also equally important to remember –as seen with Japan and India on matters ranging from the G7 expansion to Ukraine –that partners do not have to always agree. Hence, drawing deeper roots by linking together initial domestic ventures –to both reinvigorate the initiatives and strengthen the linkages between the Quad countries –is a much-needed goal. Key initiatives to tap into are Australia’s Pacific Step-up; India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), SAGARMALA, Bharatmala, Cotton and Spice Routes as well as the notion of Security and Growth for All (SAGAR) cushioned within Delhi’s Act East Policy (AEP); Japan’s Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI) guided by its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) policy; and the US’ AsiaEDGE and the US-led Build Back Better World (B3W) which it launched with the G7. Trilateral avenues like the US-Japan-Australia led Blue Dot Network (BDN) and India-Japan-Australia led Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) are critical to such a compatibility building vision as well. As the number of ventures in the region continues to grow —the new creation of a Middle East Quad showing expansion of minilaterals beyond the Indo-Pacific geography led by US and India —the emphasis on quality over quantity must be remembered. Overlapping of goals of such ventures, it can be argued, aides stronger trust and confidence building. However, it is important that the funds and energy being invested in each initiative receive due diligence. For instance, despite the stir they caused in media and strategic circles upon their launch, initiatives like BDN, Sagarmala, SCRI, AsiaEDGE and B3W are yet to produce any quantifiable successes. All in all, beyond EPQI, few Indo-Pacific ventures of the four states have led to tangible outcomes that make a dent against the massive Chinese investments going into the Indo-Pacific region. Proving a vision beyond China The focus of the Quad powers on maintaining a rules based international order has many a times given rise to the label of being an anti-China body. Beijing itself has touted it an ‘exclusive clique’ reminiscent of ‘Cold War mentality’ and ‘bloc politics’. However, it is important to note that while the Quad’s ‘like-mindedness’ is bound together by a shared threat perception to a democratic, free and open Indo-Pacific due to China’s revolutionary revisionism , the grouping has never officially identified as an anti-China coalition. Considering the critical economic ties of the four powers to China —especially Australia, India and Japan —the grouping has maintained that its goal remains protection of the rules-based order . Hence, while it maintains focus on containing –rather than outrightly countering –China, its scope extends beyond the Beijing threat to emphasis on engaging with the region and each other better in their own capacities. By looking inwards into their own ventures, reinvigoration of the initiatives that they have already invested millions in can be done, so as to make them fruitful by direct bilateral engagements with each other under the Quad’s umbrella. Such a linkage would also further deter Chinese attempts at discrediting the Quad as an anti-China US-led bloc framework. For instance, Australia’s Pacific Step-up and the Quad (as a whole and individually with each of the other members) have immense and still unventured room for collaboration. Beginning of such collaborations would only strengthen the core of the Quad, and also make room for engagement with non-Quad partner states like the UK and European Union (EU), fuelling a potential rotational ‘ Quad Plus ’ mechanism dream. In lieu of the upcoming the Quad summit, there is no denying that we have see a maturation of the dialogue process with broader goals and varying degrees of engagement up to the national leader level. Still, a call for the Quad to look inwards and further cement ties between its foundational members by forming deeper, long-term and domestic ventures driven linkages is increasingly crucial. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. 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e86a2b53-a61e-48bd-9aad-9fd36b432865 < All op-eds China’s hostage diplomacy against India Dr. Sriparna Pathak As China’s economic and political clout increases at the international stage amidst a raging pandemic with origins in China, the various tools China uses in conducting international relations keeps constantly expanding. Hitherto unheard forms of conducting foreign relations like ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ and ‘weaponisation of trade’ have come to occupy centre stage of Chinese foreign policy. Outlining six diplomatic highlights for China in 2021, Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng spoke of Xi Jinping’s proposal of a Global Development Initiative at the UN, the extension of China- Russia friendship treaty, the virtual meeting between Xi and Biden, Meng Wanzhou’s return home, completion of the China-Laos railway and China’s vaccine diplomacy. Meng’s return home is tied to China’s hostage diplomacy as in its response to Meng’s arrest in Canada, China arrested two Canadian citizens- Michael Kovrig and Michale Spavor in 2018 on charges of espionage. Kovrig is a former diplomat while Spavor is a businessman. Even though charges of espionage were levied against the Canadian citizens, the two were released as soon as Meng’s release was secured! The espionage charges magically disappeared, making China’s motives behind taking the two Canadian citizens clear! China has often taken foreigners as hostages to use them as bargaining chips! Despite article 34 of the 1949 Geneva Convention stating that taking hostages is prohibited, China has often engaged in taking hostages to further its political goals. The latest case of taking hostages by China is that of the abduction of 17-year-old Miran Taron from the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Taron’s friend Hohny Yaiying who managed to escape informed authorities that Taron was abducted by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Taron and Yaiying are local hunters from Arunachal Pradesh’s Zido village and the abduction took place near where the Brahmaputra River, (known as Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet) enters India in Arunachal Pradesh. In September 2020, the PLA had kidnapped five boys from Arunachal Pradesh and had released them after about a week. Further back in May, a 21 year old man was abducted by the PLA from the same area, and he was released after the Indian Army’s intervention. India-China relations have hit their lowest since 1962, as the PLA, disrespecting all agreements on border control and management infiltrated into Indian territory in 2020 and killed 20 Indian soldiers in the most barbaric ways possible using batons and barbed wires. Both sides have since stepped up monitoring the 3488 kilometres border. Since April 2020, the PLA has blocked Indian troops from reaching at least 10 patrolling points (PP) in eastern Ladakh, running from Depsang Plains in the north to the Pangong Tso in the south. There are at least 65 PPSs from the base of Karakoram to Chumar. The 14 rounds of talks between the two sides have yielded no breakthrough. In order to ensure that locals do not get caught in the crossfire, India’s Ministry of Defence issued orders asking grazers to restrict their cattle movements. Nevertheless, because there is no earmarked line going through forests, it is difficult for grazers and hunters to determine which area falls into the disputed category. It is not just Indian grazers who tread into disputed territory, Chinese grazers do the same! The only difference is that they do not get abducted by the Indian side. A three-member delegation to India’s defence minister Rajnath Singh in January this year, stated how the PLA uses Chinese nomads in Ladakh to transgress into Indian territory while India has restricted its own nomads to pasture lands, severely impacting the lives of the locals. While the playbook remains largely the same for recipients of China’s hostage diplomacy, in India’s case there is an added element of psychological warfare to it. Taking locals hostages sends the message to India that China is in control of the territory and the territory is beyond negotiations or formal diplomacy. In the 1962 debacle, China undertook brainwashing techniques of the 3962 prisoners of war (POWs) as part of what Beijing calls ‘imparting correct ideological education’ to help understand the ‘territorial issues along the China-India border’. China maintains its narrative that Indian POWs enjoyed ‘extra-standard humane treatment’. However, as stated by the POWs themselves, to break their morale, Indian officers were sent to solitary confinement for weeks. Chinese account of the camps in which the Indian POWs were kept does not mention these constant indoctrination sessions or the torture POWs were put through. In the case of the current standoff, a photo showing an Indian Army personnel overpowering another man is being shared with the claim that the Indian army holds more than 150 Chinese soldiers hostage in Arunachal Pradesh. The photo was shared with different claims in Hindi, both of which implied that it showed a scene from the recent face-off in Tawang. However, as revealed by fact checkers, the photograph is a still from a film titled LAC, which was made in 2020! While China actually takes Indian locals hostage, it puts out the false narrative about India taking hostages, using false imagery and narratives in the digital domain. As China’s economic and political clout keeps increasing at the international stage, it becomes pertinent for India to take cognisance of the myriad tools China uses to influence and impact Indian public opinion, psyche and morale. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More