f5ad96bb-70f4-44d1-a8a1-8d28c207a279 < All op-eds How Could Russia’s War in Ukraine Intensify the Geopolitical Tussle in Myanmar? Mr Angshuman Choudhury How Russia’s War in Ukraine could intensify the geopolitical tussle in Myanmar The Russia-Ukraine crisis has given a whole new context to global affairs. As one of the most polarising events of this century so far, it has widened latent geopolitical fissures and possibly created new ones. Its knockdown effects on foreign policy behaviour in both international and regional contexts should not be underestimated. In Myanmar, the crisis seems to be intensifying pre-existing competitive tendencies between China and Russia – two major powers invested in the country for their own unique reasons. Greater competition between both for influence in junta-ruled Myanmar could have second-order effects on how India and Japan – two Indo-Pacific powers with longstanding interests in Myanmar – approach the junta. In many ways, Myanmar’s case may be seen as a reflection of the Russia-Ukraine crisis’ repercussions on geopolitics in the broader Indo-Pacific region. The China-Russia jostle Two recent developments are indicative of what big power politics could look like as the Russia-Ukraine crisis drags on. First, a little more than a month after Russia launched a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese foreign ministry announced that U Wunna Maung Lwin, the foreign minister of Myanmar’s junta, would be visiting China to meet his counterpart, Wang Yi. The in-person meeting took place on 1 April in Huangshan City, located in Anhui Province. This was the first time Yi was meeting Lwin in an one-on-one official meeting since the 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar. In no less than clear terms, it signalled Beijing’s intent to fully embrace the military regime next door. Until this meeting – during which China extended a 650 million RMB grant to Myanmar – Beijing had refrained from fully embracing the junta. Second, on 28 April, the President of the Russian republic of Tatarstan, Rustam Nurgaliyevich Minnikhanov, arrived on a working visit to Myanmar to meet the junta leadership, including Commander-in-Chief, Min Aung Hlaing. He brought along a coterie of industrialists from the republic, which is one of the most developed regions in Russia. Following the visit, media reports indicated high interest within the Tatarstan government and business lobbies to invest in Myanmar, including in the automobile and energy sectors. The Russian truck giant, Kamaz, which was part of the visiting delegation, is reportedly seeking to finalise an agreement with the junta to begin manufacturing in Myanmar soon. Notably, Kamaz also builds trucks that are used to mount the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile system, which the Myanmar military ordered one month before the February 2021 coup. Last June, Myanmar’s coup leader visited the Kazan Helicopter production facility in the Tatar capital in a show of growing intimacy between Russia and the junta. The Russia-Myanmar affair It is clear that Russia, even as it faces gruelling Western sanctions and unprecedented global isolation, is rushing in to plug the holes and protect its friendships (and customer base). The Myanmar junta is a natural target in this regard, and for good reasons. The junta has expressed unflinching support for the Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine. More importantly, it had already positioned itself as an eager buyer of Russian arms – a conscious move by the Burmese Generals to offset their own dependencies on China. Even before the coup, the Myanmar military seemed to have developed a growing appetite for Russian military hardware. For Moscow, the Burmese military became an important customer in the face of declining arms sales to the ASEAN region due to Western sanctions on Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. That the Myanmar military placed big-ticket orders of Russian platforms – from radars and SAMs to Sukhoi-30MK fighter jets and air defence systems – after 2014 gave a boost to this relationship. In order to expand its sales, Moscow wanted to familiarise the Burmese to Russian military systems, which was one of the reasons why in 2020, it allowed India to transfer a retrofitted Soviet-era Kilo-class submarine to the Myanmar navy. Just a week before the coup last year, Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, toured Myanmar to sign an agreement for the supply of various weapons to the military. After the coup, there was a dramatic uptick in mutual visits – including the participation of the Russian deputy defence minister in the 76th Armed Forces Day parade in March 2021 and a week-long visit by coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing, to Russia three months later. A week before Hlaing’s Russia visit, a 20-member Russian delegation led by the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy made a secret visit to Myanmar, showing how dearly Moscow valued the Burmese defence client base. In comparison, there has been sparse bilateral activity between China and Myanmar on the military-to-military side in recent times, especially after the coup. The Chinese, who are still the biggest arms suppliers to the Myanmar military, have been less than comfortable with the junta’s spirited outreach to the Russians (who are now Myanmar’s second-largest arms supplier). But, it hasn’t given up on the Burmese generals yet. Exactly a year after the Soviet-era Indian submarine sale to Myanmar, China transferred its own Ming-class diesel electric submarine to Myanmar. In Beijing’s Indian Ocean blueprint, Myanmar is an indispensable element, and investing in the latter’s defence ecosystem is a time-tested way to maintain strategic influence. Shifting sands Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing Western sanctions, as is clear by now, has thrown its Defence Industrial Sector (DIS) into an abyss of stalled deadlines and spare parts shortage. As a recent report by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute notes, this problem very much extends to Southeast Asia, where Vietnam and Myanmar are the two largest buyers of Russian military hardware. It also notes that as the war drags on, China is likely to provide greater economic and military assistance to Russia. This would, in turn, boost its leverage over Moscow and the Chinese will be in a position to secure greater concessions from the Russians on a host of issues pertaining to its regional and global interests. In Myanmar’s context, this would essentially mean greater legroom for Beijing to impose itself on the junta and in the process, offset any relative advantage that the Russians might have acquired over the last few years. In a situation where the Russian DIS fails to deliver on its promised timelines for both new weapons and upgrade packages, the Chinese will be able to step in and compensate. The junta will have little choice but to acquiesce, given the multi-front war that it is currently fighting inside Myanmar and the constant supply of weapons that such a conflict demands. Secondarily, China will be in a stronger position to ensure that its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects are expedited and its existing assets in Myanmar protected with greater vigour by the junta. As China tightens its grip around the junta under the shadow of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, its regional competitors who had so far maintained a neutral posture on the Myanmar coup, such as India and Japan, could shift their own positions and start engaging closely with the coup regime. Both New Delhi and Tokyo remain highly concerned about growing Chinese influence in Myanmar, which is why they have refrained from sanctioning or isolating the junta. A closer China-junta relationship would make them more nervous than ever. India, particularly, could ramp up its own defence sales to the Burmese military to offset the Chinese clout. In any case, Myanmar has emerged as one of New Delhi’s biggest arms buyers in recent times. According to some reports , India has transferred military platforms to Myanmar even after the coup. Hence, any uptick of Indian weapons sales in the months to come would not be surprising. Over the next few months, there is little doubt that Russia will go out on its limbs to retain its goodwill with its existing clients, including the Myanmar military. There is little doubt that this will push the Chinese to expand their own pitch with the junta. If India and Japan, both partners in the IPR and the Quad, respond along an equivalent track by normalising ties with the authoritarian junta, that could further dilute the core of the Indo-Pacific narrative and split it along the middle. In that sense, Myanmar could become a litmus test for the Indo-Pacific alliance in the post-Ukraine context. More importantly, it would create a broader legitimise a brutal regime that is currently at war with its own citizens. * Angshuman Choudhury is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Policy Research Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Amba is a Program Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research. Amba holds a Master’s in International Studies from Symbiosis International University, Pune. < Back Associate Editor: Amba Wattal Amba Wattal is a Program Associate for Indo-Pacific Affairs at CSDR, where she manages a diverse array of activities and initiatives within the Indo-Pacific Circle- a platform committed to advancing indigenous knowledge production and exchange across the region. Amba holds a Master’s degree in International Studies from Symbiosis International University, Pune, a Master’s degree in English Literature from Delhi University, and a Postgraduate Diploma in Human Rights.

a925d3c7-14c1-4cc4-ba22-d05c56ab86bf < All op-eds Quad Needs a More Near-Term, Outcomes-Focussed Approach Manoj Kewalramani Ever since its revitalisation, the Quad grouping, comprising India, the US, Japan and Australia, has evolved an ambitious agenda. Over the past two years, the Quad has established six leader-level working groups , covering domains like the COVID-19 Response and Global Health Security, Climate, Critical and Emerging Technologies, Cyber, Space, and Infrastructure. These are long-term agenda items that have primarily focussed on establishing frameworks and standards, boosting sharing of information and best practices, identifying vulnerabilities and discussing pathways to address them. The two most visible products of the Quad’s engagement so far have been the COVID-19 vaccine partnership and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA). These also underscore a desire to be near-term outcomes-focussed, while working on longer term challenges. Importantly, all these initiatives reflect a strategic congruence among the four countries in terms of the desire to shape a “free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific” region, address current challenges and shape the global governance agenda in key domains that will underpin future prosperity. This sense of purpose, however, does not imply the absence of disagreement over certain specific interests. For instance, member states have had clear differences in terms of their approaches to Russia’s war against Ukraine or the political developments in Myanmar. Complex Dynamics Some analysts tend to view these differences as fundamental contradictions that strike at the heart of the grouping. Such a view, however, is based in an archaic approach to international relations. It does not account for the impact of three decades of economic globalisation after the end of the Cold War, which created a web of networks and dependencies that cannot be immediately abandoned or transformed. Neither does it account for the changes in the dispersion of power across different countries around the world. The world today is not unipolar and neither is it moving in the direction of bipolarity. What is emerging is an uneven multipolarity. This is characterised by significant absolute power differentials in terms of comprehensive national power among the different poles. But this gap is far narrower when one takes into account relative power dispersion across different factors that constitute comprehensive national power. Invariably, such a situation engenders complexity in terms of any group’s dynamics. Moreover, such an old-world perspective on geopolitics misunderstands the nature and purpose of the Quad. The Quad is characterised by strategic congruence, political fluidity and diversity in terms of the geographies, capacities and specific interests of each member. Each of these are strengths rather than weaknesses. A strategic congruence among member states allows for clear and common agenda Fluidity provides for flexibility to accommodate differing interests. It creates room for domestic political manoeuvrability for each member state. It does not entail rigid commitments without necessarily limiting the scope and depth of cooperation. Ensuring that this situation remains an asset requires continued and frank engagement. Diversity in capabilities, experiences and interests ensures an inclusive approach and one that can leverage each other’s strengths The last of these three is perhaps the most critical to the Quad’s future success. This was amply evident in conceptualisation and execution of the Quad’s Vaccine Partnership, which saw each member state bringing a unique set of capabilities to the table. That said, there is something to be said about the need for the Quad to focus on outcomes and deliverables. For instance, the vaccine partnership was first announced at the leaders’ virtual summit in March 2021. Then, during the first in-person meeting between the Quad leaders in September 2021 , they committed to donating more than 1.2 billion COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022. As of May 2022, however, merely 257 million doses had been provided by the group. This number has since grown to around 670 million , informed the Assistant Australian Foreign Minister Tim Watts in a recent conversation. Nevertheless, it still falls well short of the original commitment. This underscores the importance of an outcomes-focussed approach that balances and long- and short-term objectives. IPMDA & Maritime Governance This is more so the case with the Quad’s maritime security and governance agenda. While the IPMDA was announced earlier this year during the May 2022 leaders’ summit in Tokyo , the roadmap for its implementation is rather unclear. Announcing the IPMDA, the Quad leaders had said that the initiative would “innovate upon existing maritime domain awareness efforts”, rely on “a combination of Automatic Identification System and radio-frequency technologies,” provide a “common operating picture” integrating “three critical regions—the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region,” and extend “support for information-sharing across existing regional fusion centers.” They envisioned a five-year window of investment in the initiative. The IPMDA is a significant agreement. It has the potential to go beyond merely domain awareness to not only provide a much needed boost to maritime governance, resource conservation and law enforcement, but also deepen potential intelligence cooperation. It is little surprise then that Chinese analysts have described it as a “rare” Quad initiative that “has teeth,” while also seeking to discredit it as an anti-China measure. The challenge, however, is that it has been six months since the announcement of the IPMDA, and there has been little information regarding the progress made in terms of the technologies that will be used, the process for tracking small fishing vessels, the methodology for sharing the data gathered and the consultations with partners with regard to implementation. It is important that these questions are addressed at the earliest. This is because domain awareness is merely the beginning of what should be a multi-pronged agenda for the Quad’s maritime security and governance effort. Closer coast guard cooperation among the Quad countries, maritime law enforcement equipment development and training support for littorals in the Indian Ocean Region and the use of shiprider agreements to boost law enforcement capacities of countries in the region is the way forward. In addition, Quad countries should engage in more active maritime health diplomacy, leveraging the strengths of partner states in geographies that are of primary interest to each of them. Such an approach can allow for expanded presence for each of them, while leveraging each other’s capabilities and social capital. For instance, the navies of India and Australia could work together to engage in health outreach and humanitarian and disaster management efforts in the South Pacific and the Western Indian Ocean region. Some of these initiatives can be operationalised rather easily and quickly. Doing so is important to ensure that the Quad is not just addressing the long-term challenges that countries in the Indo-Pacific face but is also seen as addressing immediate needs while building goodwill. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

ab30ce32-de14-46ad-9be7-d2bd9b7917a9 < All op-eds ASEAN: The Missing Piece in US’ Indo Pacific Strategy Aakriti Sethi During the Bush and Obama administration, ASEAN’s role in America’s Asia policy was elevated as the White House began recognizing its wider importance within and beyond the region. Apart from its strategic location compelling larger global players to acknowledge the importance of Southeast Asia, the region’s geopolitical role has had the ability to oscillate views critical to US-China rivalry. Since the Trump Presidency, American perception on China witnessed a sharp shift as anti-China sentiments crystallized. President Trump’s decision to launch a refurbished Asia policy (i.e. the Indo Pacific strategy in 2017) with renewed focus on harnessing a “free and open” rules-based order and strengthening US economic and defense ties with various partners and allies of the region met with bipartisan support. Viewed as one of the many ways to counter China’s influence within the region, President Trump ushered in an era of maximum competition with China that has had a far-reaching impact. Other major countries like Japan, Australia and India who have been long-time supporters of the Indo Pacific rather than the Asia-Pacific, welcomed this shift in the US policy. Being wary of this power struggle, ASEAN has time and again emphasized its centrality for maintaining an “inclusive regional architecture” and collective leadership which has been supported by the US. ASEAN centrality has been an important pillar for maintaining the regional status quo as it provided a means to form consensus within the region. However, understanding ASEAN’s possible role within the Indo-Pacific has received limited attention from the US. Southeast Asia is a region of significance that holds great economic value (and potential), located in the midst of key sea lanes of communication, and is home to dynamic yet politically diverse countries. Even as US officials have reiterated that ASEAN is “literally at the center of the Indo-Pacific , and plays a central role in the Indo-Pacific vision," American interaction with the region has been inconsistent. Since the Obama administration, there has been a perception gap about Southeast Asia not being a region of focus for the White House. The recent US-ASEAN summit can be seen as President Biden’s attempt at launching a “new era in the relations…guided by the complementary objectives of the Indo Pacific Strategy." By inviting all the member states to Washington DC, avoiding bilateral meetings on the sideline of the summit and engaging with the ASEAN platform to propagate a cohesive US-ASEAN message, there was an attempt at showcasing that the Southeast Asian regional organization reigns at the top of Biden administration’s foreign policy priority list. The American intention to build confidence in the US-ASEAN partnership and countering the growing Chinese influence was evident as new initiatives worth 150 million dollars for infrastructure, maritime security and healthcare were committed by President Biden. Unlike many parts of the world, Southeast Asia was not quick to embrace the concept of the Indo-Pacific. It was only in 2019 when ASEAN released the ASEAN Outlook of the Indo Pacific that the organization attempted to hesitantly navigate the new geopolitically-loaded construct. The ambivalent position of the group on the Indo-Pacific strategy has been due to China’s sustained influence over the region and a lack of concordance within member states. For America, countering this regional skepticism has been a challenge for multiple reasons. Firstly, the checkered diplomatic engagement with the region has posed questions about the role Southeast Asia plays in America’s larger Asia policy. The bare-minimum personal engagement of top US officials with their counterparts in Southeast Asia amidst the pandemic restrained the reception of the Indo Pacific strategy in Southeast Asia. Secondly, a lack of America-led economic framework(s) has weakened the appeal of the Indo-Pacific as a concept in the region. Even though the Biden administration launched the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), it lacks an active trade and investment plan for the ASEAN countries. During the recent summit, countries like Vietnam and Singapore claimed that the US lacks a clear plan, even though they are keen on possible economic prospects. Thirdly, on Russia, diverging opinions betweem the US and ASEAN countries addresses their differences in world view and foreign policy approaches. The cautious response to the Ukraine war by ASEAN showcased their unwillingness to weaken their relationship with Russia as countries like Myanmar, Vietnam and Indonesia depend on latter for defense equipments and weapons. Due to this, Russia was not mentioned in this year’s US-ASEAN joint statement. And fourthly, as the Quad has become more relevant in America’s strategic ambitions, the relevance of ASEAN centrality has come into question. The rise of this mini-lateral in the US policy discourse has triggered concerns about the role ASEAN could play in the region as the great power struggle intensifies. Within the context of brewing tensions with China over the South China Sea dispute, the Quad’s position in the evolving regional security architecture has been a puzzle for ASEAN countries. The 2022 summit was successful in displaying that America is ready to start afresh with ASEAN after a stagnation in ties over the past few years. However, the relationship has reached a juncture, where expectations from both sides need to be reevaluated. America’s desire to witness an ASEAN that is less reliant on China can only happen if the White House is able to incorporate ASEAN in its wider economic strategy. At the same time, as the competition between US and China hardens, seeking greater areas of convergence (like climate change) that quells the fear of binary choices for Southeast Asian countries will be ASEAN’s main challenge. The charm of the Indo-Pacific strategy for ASEAN countries lies in its economic and humanitarian aspect, rather than its geopolitical goals. Therefore, America presenting a vision for the Indo-Pacific that would help in achieving mutual benefits beyond the idea of balancing China would help in fostering greater consensus with the Southeast Asian countries. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

< Back VAdm ANIL K CHAWLA EDITOR-MARITIME AFFAIRS akchawlanav@csdronline.com VAdm Anil K Chawla is the former Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval Command and a Distinguished Fellow at CSDR. He joined the National Defence Academy in Jan 1978. Commissioned in the Indian Navy on 01 Jan 1982, he specialized in Navigation and Direction in 1988 and subsequently navigated two of the Navy’s frontline frigates. On promotion to the rank of Vice Admiral, he took over as the Director General of Naval Operations on 31 Dec 2014. He took over as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval Command, Kochi on 31 Jul 18. Vice Admiral Chawla was conferred the Vishisht Seva Medal on 26 Jan 13 and the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal on 26 Jan 2015 for distinguished service. He was conferred with the honorary title of Aide-De-Camp to the President of India on 01 Dec 2019. He was awarded the Param Vishisht Medal for distinguished service of the highest order on 26 Jan 2020. akchawlanav@csdronline.com 123-456-7890

Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (Retd.), served as an Officer in the Indian Army, and retired as Northern Army Commander in 2016. He has vast experience in counter-insurgency and crisis-management at the strategic level. dhooda@csdronline.org < Back Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (Retd.) Lt. Gen. Hooda was commissioned into the 4th Battalion of the 4th Gorkha Rifles in 1976 and initially served in Nagaland during the peak of insurgency. As a Major General, he was responsible for counter-insurgency operations in Manipur and South Assam. From 2012 to 2016, Lt. Gen. Hooda was stationed in Jammu and Kashmir and retired as the Army Commander of Northern Command in 2016. During this time, he handled numerous strategic challenges that emerged on the borders with Pakistan and China. Lt. Gen. Hooda has been awarded the Vasishta Seva Medal (twice), the Ati Vasishta Seva Medal, the Uttam Yudh Seva Medal, and the Param Vishisht Seva Medal for his exemplary military service. In 2019 Lt. Gen. Hooda authored a comprehensive National Security Strategy document. He is one of India’s foremost commentators on India’s national security. dhooda@csdronline.org

Prof. Anne-Marie Brady teaches Political Science at the University of Canterbury, and is an expert on Chinese politics. A fluent Mandarin speaker, she is also a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington DC. anne-marie.brady@canterbury.ac.nz < Back Prof. Anne-Marie Brady Professor Anne-Marie Brady's groundbreaking, policy-relevant, research demonstrates the important role of the academic as "critic and conscience" in a modern democracy. Professor Brady is a specialist of Chinese politics (domestic politics and foreign policy), polar politics, China-Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy. She is a fluent Mandarin Chinese speaker. She is founding and executive editor of The Polar Journal (Taylor and Francis Publishers). She has published ten books and over fifty scholarly papers. She has written op eds for the New York Times, The Guardian, The Australian, Sydney Morning Herald, The Financial Times, among others. Professor Brady's recent books include Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), China's Thought Management (Routledge, 2012), The Emerging Politics of Antarctica (Routledge, 2013), China as a Polar Great Power (Cambridge University Press and Wilson Press, 2017), and Small States and the Changing Global Order: New Zealand Faces the Future (Springer, 2019). anne-marie.brady@canterbury.ac.nz

fd72283e-4414-460e-a18f-9d1dd898aa00 < All op-eds Electoral Targeting: Lessons Learned from Digital Campaign Trails in Southeast Asia Ms Munira Mustaffa Various pessimistic predictions have been made regarding the future of democracies in Southeast Asia as a result of the diverse governments and political regimes with transitioning democratic system issues. The experience of liberation struggles in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Laos, the abuse of constitutions by authoritarian governments in the Philippines, and the development of international legal standards and doctrines shaped their constitutional designs . While electoral integrity is frequently emphasised, the significance of election security preparedness in the region and the accompanying risks are not being addressed effectively because of existing challenges. Election security preparedness entails implementing measures to protect the electoral process and safeguard it from interference, hybrid threats, or other types of coordinated attacks in order to preserve its integrity and credibility. Finland is an example of a country that is actively working on implementing measures for election security preparedness. Common approaches to managing election security include validating and verifying voters, protecting ballots, and securely transmitting election results. However, these measures frequently prioritise safeguarding the voting infrastructure over addressing potential political vulnerabilities. Political vulnerabilities in the context of election security refer to potential weaknesses or vulnerabilities in the electoral process that could be exploited to interfere with or undermine the integrity of the election. These vulnerabilities may be related to the technology used in the electoral process, the rules and regulations governing the election, or the political environment in which the election takes place. The popularly accepted belief is that democratic nations hold elections to determine who will lead the government and make significant decisions. However, the often underappreciated nuance is that in the case of Southeast Asia, elections usually come after a process of democratisation has already begun. In other words, the election itself is not what causes democracy to happen; rather, it is the end result or culmination of other processes and events that precede it. Arguably, flawed elections are essential to the maintenance of authoritarian government because it is through elections that authoritarian regimes are able to collect information, pursue legitimacy, manage political elites, and preserve neo-patrimonial dominance, all of which enable them to sustain their rule over the people. Some specific examples of political vulnerabilities in the region may include: 1) lack of transparency and accountability in the electoral process, which can lead to suspicions of fraud or manipulation; and 2) political polarisation or instability that can create an environment conducive to election-related violence or post-election coup d’état , or 3) intimidation and manipulations such as the strategic use of conspiracy theories and hate speech . Electoral politics in Southeast Asia can be a complex and multifaceted affair with a history of political ritualism, democratic competition, electoral anomalies and abuse; some may qualify as free and fair but not necessarily clean, while others may be free but not fair. The relationship between elections and democracy in the region is likely to vary from country to country and can be influenced by a range of social, economic, and political factors, such as: 1. The strength of civil society organisations (CSOs) : Strong CSOs can help promote transparency and accountability in the electoral process and advocate for democratic rights. They can also mobilise voters and serve as a check on the actions of governments and other powerful political players. On the other hand, weak or suppressed CSOs may be unable to fulfil these roles, leading to less democratic and transparent elections. 2. Voter intimidation or coercion: Some individuals or groups may try to intimidate or coerce voters into supporting a particular candidate or political party, either through threats or incentives, or purging of voter rolls or the use of other tactics to prevent certain groups of people from voting. 3. Fraud or vote-rigging : There have been instances of fraudulent voting or vote-rigging in some elections in Southeast Asia, such as malapportionment and gerrymandering . 4. Disinformation or propaganda: The spread of false or misleading information, particularly through social media, can create confusion and sway public opinion in favour of certain candidates or parties. 5. Campaign finance irregularities : Elections can also be vulnerable to campaign finance violations, such as the use of illegal or undeclared funds to finance campaigns and digital astroturfing . 6. Inadequate election administration : Poorly administered elections, such as those with inadequate voter education or inadequate safeguards against fraud, can also contribute to election vulnerabilities. 7. Social media manipulation : Social media can play a significant role in shaping public opinion and influencing the outcome of elections. Given that elections serve as a vital instrument for upholding democratic values and holding officials accountable to the people, they may be subject to a variety of manipulations and interferences . Voters must be able to differentiate between legitimate political campaigns and malicious electoral interference, but they may have difficulties doing so. For this reason, electoral regulations and content moderation are needed to support voter education efforts. During election seasons, there are two key vulnerable points in which sophisticated information operators would look for to exploit or leverage to achieve their goals, and that would be: influencing voter turnout and influencing voter choices. Election interference refers to any attempt to influence or subvert the outcome of an election by illegal or illegitimate means. This can take many forms, including hacking into voting systems or tampering with ballots, spreading false or misleading information about candidates or the voting process, suppressing or bribing voters, or manipulating the media to sway public opinion. Election interference is a significant threat to the fairness and integrity of democratic elections. The rapidly changing and competitive nature of the cyberspace , where multiple actors compete to control information and narratives, makes it difficult for regional policymakers to understand and effectively address election disinformation. Election disinformation is defined as deliberate, organised dissemination of false or misleading information with the goal of influencing election outcomes. This can take many forms, including false or misleading news stories, provocative social media posts, or digital astroturfing to manipulate and create uncertainty among voters, and undermine trust in the electoral process by eroding the credibility of candidates or political parties. Savvy political actors would hire influence operators, troll farms , or digital armies to spread campaign messaging and carry out malign influence campaigns against their opponents in an attempt to gain an advantage. These strategies may include using social media for counter-mobilisation (organising people against the opposition), discourse framing (shaping public discussion) in their favour, preference divulgence (gathering information about false preferences), and elite coordination (consolidating) with other elites. In recent years, social media platforms have become a valuable tool for political campaigns because they enable political players to reach a large audience quickly and effectively. More specifically, social media manipulation has become an integral part of information wars and election rigging, and it poses the potential to undermine the integrity of elections and earn its instigators an electoral advantage. Incumbent state actors and adversarial political players routinely leverage social media to extend their hold on power and limit opposition candidates by spreading disinformation, propaganda, and other malicious messaging that aims to interfere with and undermine the electoral process. In Malaysia and the Philippines , CSOs play an important role in observing elections by monitoring and detecting electoral fraud and subversion tactics such as disinformation, polarising messages, or hate speech. Governments, civil society organisations (CSOs), and election officials must cooperate in reaffirming their commitment to democratic practices to safeguard their electoral process and guarantee that the elections are free, fair, and clean. It is crucial to realise that erosion of trust is the primary cause of people's susceptibility to disinformation, and that the public need to be better educated in order to be more informed. CSOs must be granted more autonomy in order to enhance political education and increase media literacy, critical thinking, and fact-checking among the general public. This can be accomplished by allowing CSOs to establish independent oversight bodies and granting journalists and the media the freedom to observe and cover the voting process. Additionally, policymakers must maintain a close working relationship with social media platforms and tech companies to ensure they adhere to their content moderation policies and ensure, and that false or misleading posts are removed from their platforms as quickly as possible to limit public exposure and prevent harm. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

6aaed066-270b-4b36-b146-307e46178468 < All op-eds Fighting disinformation with media literacy in Southeast Asia Dr Benjamin Yew Hoong Loh In early May 2022, Ferdinand “BongBong” Marcos Junior won the Philippines presidential election with an overwhelming victory. This was a shocking result as his father was responsible for plunging the country into a deep recession over his family’s plundering of the state’s finances during his term that ended in 1986 through a people’s revolution. Images of his mother’s shoe collection became infamous to highlight the family’s reckless and unashamed use of public funds. The return to power of one of the Philippines most notorious families has been attributed by journalists and analysts to the power of disinformation campaigns perpetuated by politically-linked agents. The Marcos family employed an effective and organized disinformation campaign which “revised” its family’s history to highlight that the country was in a golden age rather than a corrupt authoritarian regime. Social media has emerged as the new political battleground in the last decade as it is ripe for manipulation through these special political agents, often referred to as online trolls or cybertroopers. The role of these clandestine agents is to influence and distort political discourses in online spaces such as social media, comment sections and forums. According to the Oxford Internet Institute , at least 81 countries employed some form of cybertroopers to engage in information warfare on social media. These cybertroopers employ a variety of strategies to sow discord in digital political discursive spaces. They often masquerade as regular people with specific viewpoints to either artificially inflate public support or distort and misrepresent opposing viewpoints. In most countries, cybertroopers are often deployed internally either by local governments or political parties with some cases involving bigger countries like China and Russia seeking to manipulate international discourse to promote the interests of their respective countries. While social media platforms have tried to stop this indirectly through banning of suspicious troll accounts and more recently with labeling of state-affiliated accounts on Twitter , these actions are only effective to a certain degree. Once disinformation gets distributed it can start radicalizing people to believe these points and they in turn become “political diehards”. This was a tactic that was incredibly successful in President Duterte’s presidential campaign where he successfully indoctrinated large swathes of the Philippines public to support his bid (who became known as Diehard Duterte Supporters ). The Marcos campaign clearly learned from this and directed much resources and efforts to replicate its success. In Malaysia, a similar strategy was also employed by disgraced former Prime Minister Najib Razak. After his government lost the general election in 2018, largely in part due to his involvement with the now infamous 1MDB case , which was seen as the main cause behind rising costs of living in the country. With a new government in place, Najib was expected to fade in popularity once his corruption trial began. But in early 2019, he launched a social media campaign called Malu Apa Bossku (loosely translated to mean “What is there to be ashamed about, my boss”). The campaign’s goal was to rehabilitate Najib’s image in the most obnoxious and downright hypocritical way possible: Reframe his image as a man of the people. The campaign likened him to working class urban Malay youths to highlight that he is down to earth, approachable, hardworking and a victim of slander from the government. The yearlong campaign successfully reclaimed his narrative and manipulated a large segment of Malaysians that has all but restored the political clout of a deposed leader. Even after being convicted of corruption and after failing his first appeal (a final appeal is still pending), his popularity is at an all time high. There is a strong likelihood that he would be running in the country’s next general election and there is even a chance he may stand as a prime minister candidate. After Bong Bong’s win, this is entirely possible and his political resurrection would be complete. Similar disinformation campaigns are happening across Southeast Asia as Thailand and Cambodia head to the polls this year too. How do we fight this? Relying on the government to do this is fundamentally problematic as the reason many disinformation campaigns are so successful is simply because of great distrust amongst disenfranchised citizens in government structures and institutions. Relying on them to verify fake news will only entrench political diehards in their positions. Public trust in state institutions and the media is at an all time low and so many measures that predicate this will likely fail with those radicalized by disinformation campaigns. Aside from online platforms having to step up their efforts to block, identify and isolate disinformation and its agents, individual media literacy development is another step that is needed. When large numbers of the public no longer trust information institutions, it is necessary to at least provide them with the tools and critical thinking skills to properly assess and evaluate their media bubbles. Even if the majority of individuals lack critical thinking skills to properly do so, minimal media literacy should be inculcated so that they would be able to understand that they are being manipulated by political agents. Governments and civil society need to push for more media literacy programs that instill the means, tools and practices to protect people from information warfare efforts and bring some much needed stability to whatever is left of the digital public sphere. Democracy is at stake and extreme political polarization will become the norm unless we can prepare people to understand how to consume and process information in a healthy and protected manner. Dr Benjamin YH Loh is a media scholar that employs digital ethnography to study online communities and the digital public sphere in Malaysia and the region. He focuses much of his work on the confluence between technology and society, with a particular focus on minority and marginalized communities. He is the co-editor of “Sabah from the Ground: The 2020 Elections and the Politics of Survival'' (SIRD/ISEAS, 2021) and publishes Op-Eds with Malaysiakini, SCMP and Nikkei Asia Review. He is currently a senior lecturer at the School of Media and Communication at Taylor’s University and an Associate with the Asia Centre. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

47254e4c-9749-4c87-92a5-3f2e7c17703a < All op-eds An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Abhivardhan Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming the Indo-Pacific region, with the potential to revolutionize industries, enhance healthcare, and improve the lives of billions of people. However, as AI becomes more powerful and pervasive, it is important to ensure that it is used safely and responsibly. In April 2021, the Quad launched the Critical and Emerging Technologies Working Group (CETWG) to promote cooperation on critical technologies, including AI. The CETWG has identified several priority areas for collaboration, which include Developing principles for responsible development and use of AI Sharing information and expertise on AI Safety. Promoting research and development in AI Safety. The Quad's work on AI Safety is a welcome development, but it is important to recognize that a comprehensive approach is needed to address the complex and interconnected challenges of AI safety that are emerging from limited geographies. Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. The Chinese Approach to AI Regulation The three Chinese regulations on artificial intelligence (AI) are characterized by a strong emphasis on government control and data ownership. This is reflected in the following key features of these regulations: Maximality : The Chinese government takes a maximalist approach to regulating AI, seeking to cover all aspects of AI development and deployment. This is evident in the comprehensive scope of the regulations, which address everything from data privacy to algorithm ethics. Micromanagement : The Chinese government adopts a micromanaged approach to regulating AI, seeking to control the details of how AI systems are developed, deployed, and used. This is evident in the specific requirements imposed on AI service providers, such as the need to obtain licenses and implement specific technical measures. Public ownership : The Chinese government asserts public ownership over data and algorithms, treating them as public resources that must be managed and controlled by the government. This is reflected in the requirement for AI service providers to register with the government and obtain licenses, as well as the government's right to access and control AI data. The Biden Administration’s Executive Order on AI The United States Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a comprehensive and forward-looking document that outlines several important principles and requirements for the responsible development and use of AI. Here is a summary of the features of this Executive Order: The Executive Order emphasizes the need for robust and reliable evaluations of AI systems, including post-deployment performance monitoring. This is an important step in ensuring that AI systems are safe and effective in real-world settings. The legal instrument also calls for the development of effective labeling and content provenance mechanisms to track and flag AI-generated content. This is important for transparency and accountability, that could help prevent the misuse of AI-generated content. The Executive Order provides a flexible and technology-conscious definition of AI, which helps capture the ever-evolving nature of AI technologies. The definitions of "synthetic content," "testbed," and "watermarking" provided in the Executive Order are clear and concise. These definitions are important to ensure a common understanding of these key terms in the context of AI systems. The European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act The legislation represents a comprehensive pan-European regulatory framework for artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Key features of the Act include the classification of AI into risk-based levels, with stringent regulations applied to high-risk AI systems. The European Commission has adopted a horizontal approach with a proportionate risk-based methodology, choosing Option 3+ over Option 4, aligning with the need for a balanced regulatory environment conducive to AI innovation. The Act emphasizes the importance of human oversight, quality risk assessments for AI companies, and robust data governance practices. It addresses the intricate challenges associated with developing, testing, and monitoring high-risk AI systems, setting forth detailed criteria & procedures for compliance, and aims to ensure ethical and safe AI development, safeguarding fundamental rights and aligning with the unique requirements of the European AI landscape. The Indian AI Landscape India's rapidly evolving AI landscape presents opportunities and challenges that demand a thorough re-examination of the nation's regulatory capacity. The proliferation of AI applications across industries necessitates transparent, safe, and standardized regulations. AI technology use across various sectors raises concerns regarding transparency, safety, data processing, privacy, and consent. These challenges require attention and sector-specific standardization to drive policy interventions and innovations globally. India needs to reinvent its regulatory capacity and intelligence streams to enable technology-neutral regulation and governance of AI technologies. Transparency and safety in AI applications pose a primary concern for emerging markets. Many AI use cases lack transparency in commercial viability and safety, particularly in data processing, privacy, consent, and dark patterns. Sector-specific standardization for algorithmic activities and operations is absent, hindering regulatory interventions and innovations globally. Enforcing existing sector-specific regulations, starting with data protection and processing, is the solution to pave the way for effective AI regulation. Despite legislative advancements in digital sovereignty, digital connectivity, drones, and data protection, the AI and Law discourse in India shows limited transformation. Discussions mainly revolve around data protection rights and the civil and criminal liability of digital intermediaries. The government's proposed frameworks to regulate the use and processing of personal and non-personal data, including the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 , and the proposed Digital India Act, reflect the Council of Ministers' commitment to these discussions. However, the focus on AI regulation remains limited, even in frameworks like the one proposed for the National Data Management Office (NDMO) . The absence of self-regulatory Explainable AI or Responsible AI guidelines from key AI and tech market players across places also underscores the need for a comprehensive and distinctive approach to AI regulation that aligns with India's unique requirements and standards. A recently proposed Artificial Intelligence (Development & Regulation) Bill was suggested in line with such requirements poignant for the development of the Indo-Pacific as an AI hub for the Global South and Democratic Asia. Establishing a comprehensive Indo-Pacific perspective on AI safety requires collective effort. A shared understanding of AI risks and opportunities must be cultivated through open dialogue and collaboration across the region. Guiding principles, anchored in human dignity and rights, are essential for steering responsible AI development. The Chinese regulatory approach emphasizes government control and public ownership of data,contrasting with the Biden Administration's focus on robust evaluations and transparency. The European Union's AI Act introduces risk-based classification and emphasizes human oversight. India, amid a rapidly evolving AI landscape, requires focused regulatory re-evaluation. The proposed Artificial Intelligence Bill reflects private initiatives to position India as an AI hub. By synthesizing these diverse approaches, the Indo-Pacific region can collectively navigate AI challenges, ensuring ethical integration. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

02b9323d-d013-4da1-b1d8-3e08e63ed478 < All op-eds The Assertiveness of Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping Jay Maniyar The President of the Peoples’ Republic of China, PRC, is the incredibly powerful, assertive, uncompromising, and permanent Xi Jinping. China’s foreign policy has witnessed a noticeable climbing nationalist fervour since President Xi came to power. Across the board, there has been a remarkable shift in the way China sees the world. Inferring from the Indian foreign policy doyen, J. N. Dixit, it is understood that an assertive Chinese foreign policy stems from a historically nationalist mind-set of the Chinese peoples as a whole. On the face of it, the principles laid out by China are well-attuned to a peace-abiding, genuinely-intentioned, and internationally-responsible nation-state. Characteristic Chinese foreign policy ticks off all the boxes as far as what it seeks to achieve in Asia and the world is concerned. Maintaining world peace, friendly relations with neighbouring countries, a lasting cooperation policy with all countries, and an openness policy aimed at welcoming the world to China are all part of Beijing’s foreign policy agenda . These are an honest indication of a rising power that will perform much convincingly in seeking to establish its reign worldwide. Openness, in particular, is being innovatively handled through strategies such as ‘dual circulation’. However, President Xi does appear to be interpreting, at times, that these guidelines will be interpreted to what he perceives to be in pure Chinese interests. Jagannath Panda describes this ‘new era’ foreign policy as evolving from being focussed on Asia to competing on the global stage with the United States of America (US). From an economic perspective, Chinese foreign policy remains rabidly attuned to achieving maximum economic gains in any geography and this is even made apparent by China-led multilateralism through institutions such as Boao Forum and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China remains geared for resource hunts anywhere in the Indo-Pacific region, while it actively ‘debt trap’s countries through a vehement economic agenda of profiteering coupled with perennial entrapment. Sri Lanka, for example, has been most afflicted by this Chinese approach and finds itself continually subordinated to Chinese Indian Ocean interests. The Indian Ocean is also subject to a Chinese foreign policy that aims to establish maritime supremacy through Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), encircle its contemporary in India through a ‘String of Pearls’, and apply the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) paradigm to a large area in the western Indo-Pacific region. The latter aims to ascertain Chinese influence in Asia by tying down unsuspecting countries through joint infrastructural interests, ample connectivity initiatives, and several growth zones. Some of the manifest points of Xi’s foreign policy include: 1. There is, now, a newfound keenness on the resolution of all matters pertaining to territorial acquisition, tantamount to the use of force by Beijing wherever, whenever, and howsoever mandated by the ruling state. This is exemplified by how, at one end, China irks its neighbours through state-endorsed armed entities such as its maritime mafia and their relatively low-intensity transgressions, to threatening countries such as Japan with nuclear obliteration over Tokyo's interference in the Taiwan matter. 2. China exhibits a certain boldness in military actions and activity across the entire stretch of the Indo-Pacific region: The following data gives a brief idea about Chinese military assertiveness at the expense of noble ideals furthered in the foreign policy agenda: I. The Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) has engaged in vilification across borders, such as in Ladakh (India). The Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is rapidly modernizing and bulking its inventory to achieve blue-water status on an urgent basis. The Peoples' Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) routinely violates Japanese airspace in a show of territorial aggression. These are just a few examples. II. Chinese island-building takes place through extensive land reclamation in the South China Sea and military assets such as surface-to-air missiles are deployed in this strategically-challenging environment (for China, itself, and the world) III. Chinese military basing (Djibouti, East Africa), naval deployments (nuclear-capable submarines in the Indian Ocean), and intelligence-gathering missions (Bay of Bengal) are coupled with benevolent ventures such as anti-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa. 3. Since a while now, China has conveyed, more often than not, a tendency to want to unilaterally shape the regional and global status-quo entirely in Beijing’s favour. This is evinced from China’s outright rejection of the Indo-Pacific idea, its disregard for India’s Indian Ocean necessitation, and its desire to establish control over the South and East China Seas as also many other waters. A Rising Assertiveness in Plenty of Foreign Policy Avenues China’s growing foreign policy assertiveness is nothing but a crude display of firebrand realism in international relations. At present, no country epitomizes the realist diktat of the absolute centrality and primacy of a nation-nation-state as far as self-interest is concerned as does China. François Bougon says that Xi has even sought to bring China out of its ‘low profile’ abroad by tacitly encouraging young Chinese nationalists to mock and deride enemies such as Japan and the US. The Chinese self-impression, officially called Face (or mianzi , in Mandarin), is being increasingly threatened by its radical foreign policy. A time may come when China could prove to be too difficult to handle. Chinese diplomacy, too, has gained a ferocity unlike any other phase in contemporary history. Since diplomacy is linked to the conduct of foreign policy, The pursuit of a so-called Wolf Warrior diplomacy has made a particular impression of the way the world sees China and has made the country more aggressive in the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. Utilization of technology-oriented mechanisms such as informationization, targeted cyber espionage, and many others are integral to the Chinese agenda. Countries across Asia remain committed to the ‘One China policy even in the wake of Chinese excesses and its hardening national commitment concerning Taiwan. Any challenge presented to the contrary is met with disdain by Beijing and accompanied by impromptu reprimand and rebuke. Conclusion – Chinese Foreign Policy, a Rising Concern for the World If not moderated wherever required and not brought to a screeching halt if necessary, China’s foreign policy bears the potential to alter regional and global dynamics entirely on its own. Led by Xi Jinping’s authoritarian control, China’s power projection is scaling unprecedented heights in the modern era. However, tackling China to the point of overpowering it, at least, considerably is proving to be a taxing and time-consuming endeavour of herculean proportions. How the machinations and manipulations of Chinese foreign policy are effectively dealt with, remains to be seen. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Dr. Sinderpal Singh Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at the Nanyang Technological University. He was formerly also a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University Singapore. issinderpal@ntu.edu.sgUniversity of Singapore. < Back Dr. Sinderpal Singh Sinderpal Singh is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research interests include the international relations of South Asia with a special focus on Indian foreign policy as well as the geo-politics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Before joining RSIS, Sinderpal was a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, and a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore. He has published articles in journals such as Asia Policy, Asian Security and Pacific Affairs; his single-authored book is entitled India in South Asia: Domestic Identity Politics and Foreign Policy from Nehru to the BJP (Routledge 2013; paperback version, 2015). He has also contributed book chapters on aspects of India’s Northeast, specifically in relation to India-ASEAN land connectivity and India’s broader ‘Look East Policy’. He is Associate Editor of the journal South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, published on behalf of the South Asian Studies Association of Australia (first published in 1971). He received his PhD from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, his MA from the Australian National University, and his BA from the National University of Singapore. issinderpal@ntu.edu.sg