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8bfb6011-fcbe-482f-9066-7a4e9224f1ad < All op-eds Maritime Migration in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean: A dire need for greater cooperation Dr. Niloy Biswas The Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean are historical maritime routes for both South and South-East Asia. Recently, these have emerged as routes for intra-Asian and trans-regional movements of people, mainly from Bangladesh and Myanmar, to Southeast Asian destinations (ex. Malaysia and Thailand) and then extend the journey towards Australia. The drivers of such migration are essentially informed by three factors: economy, conflict, and climate. First, unemployment and the youth bulge influence the regular outflow of migrants from Bangladesh, Myanmar and other South Asian countries to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe. A significant part of it also undertakes irregular paths to reach the destination. For Southeast Asia as a destination, using the Bay of Bengal is a viable choice for many who could not have afforded the formal channels of migration. Second, conflict in Myanmar has significantly escalated irregular migration along this route. After a series of ethnic clashes instigated by the Rakhine nationalists in 2012, about 140,000 of an estimated 1.1 million Rohingyas fled, ending up in camps within Myanmar . Some tried to escape Myanmar by sea and landed in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. In the May 2015 tragedy, some 32 shallow graves were discovered on a remote mountain in Thailand , at a so-called ‘waiting area,’ where Rohingya migrants were being held to be smuggled to Malaysia. It raised the flag for the international community on the gravity of the matter. In 2017, over one million Rohingya people escaped the Rakhine State of Myanmar to avoid death, rape, discrimination, and torture and took shelter in neighbouring Bangladesh. After the 2017 influx, they and their fellow Bangladeshi migrants accompanied together on the boat to cross the Bay of Bengal. Third, the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean expose a critical climate-vulnerable space. There is a prevalence of short-term natural disasters in the region, induced by seasonal weather shifts and long-term climate change impacts. Moreover, this is a densely-populated region, and a significant part of the world’s population lives along its coastline. Finally, this resource-abundance region has attracted other powerful nations for excavations and extending their strategic sphere of influence. It has become an essential sub-region in the international connectivity discourse and a strategically significant trans-regional space. In such a critical maritime space, we have experienced the abandonment of thousands of men, women, and children by the state and smugglers. The network of smugglers and spoilers existed to maltreat the governance, arguably lowly addressed by some governments across the region. Irregularities in the migration governance and inhumaneness in migrants’ experience have made them more susceptible to the threats of complex vulnerabilities. Some countries have considered a mixture of hard and soft security approaches. For example, Malaysia recently pushed back to sea one and possibly more fishing trawlers with hundreds of Rohingya asylum seekers aboard. Thailand has indicated that it will refuse entry to Rohingya boats . Bangladesh coast guard officials rescued one boat of Rohingya refugees, which had reportedly been turned away by Malaysia nearly two months earlier. About 390 starving Rohingya, most under 20 years old, were brought ashore, with reports that as many as 100 may have died on board before the rescue . Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott stated that turning around boats was “ absolutely necessary if the scourge of people smuggling is to be beaten .” Australia introduced Operation Sovereign Borders , a military-led campaign to “stop the boats” with asylum seekers. Moreover, Australia had invested more resources in the detention centres on the islands of Manus and Nauru that had housed more than 1000 refugees and asylum seekers for several years before being pushed back to the sea. Thailand has engaged its naval forces to stop boat migrants, predominantly Rohingya asylum seekers from Myanmar, from landing on its territory. Moreover, it also implemented some harsh anti-refugee policies, including ‘push backs’ of any vessel attempting to disembark on the Thai shores . Malaysian former Deputy Home Minister Wan Junaidi Jafaar said, “We have been very nice to the people who broke into our border. We have treated them humanely, but they cannot be flooding our shores like this . ” He also said, “We have to send the right message that they are not welcome here.” The nations in the Indo-Pacific merit greater cooperation to deal with this crisis together. Although a majority of the countries in the region are not signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967, the concerned states should borrow the idea of the interpretation of ‘place of safety’ from the convention that includes the consideration of protection against threats to the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded fear of persecution regarding refugees and asylum seekers retrieved from a situation of distress at sea. It is critical to note that a multilateral arrangement between the states in the Indo-pacific must not interpret ‘place of safety’ as prisons detaining the refugees and asylum seekers. Again, there is a need to redesign the method of offshore processing, which is often used as a mere tool of border control that involves forcibly transferring asylum seekers to third states for legal processing of their claims. The detention centre, a temporary correctional facility offshore for the awaiting aspirant migrants, limits the fundamental rights to liberty and freedom of movement in international and regional human rights legal instruments. Therefore, it is to be understood as a measure of last resort and strictly in conformity with national and international law, bearing in mind the ‘ underlying purpose of preventing persons being deprived of their liberty arbitrarily .’ As the Indo-Pacific nations promote a rule-based order, maritime migrants must be considered with a humanitarian lens, and the rules cannot just be technically imposed upon them. It is discussed earlier how often disembarkation of rescued refugees has increasingly been denied by certain destination states in the Indian Ocean. As non-signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention, most of these South and South-East Asia countries do not feel an obligation to the reception of refugees. Moreover, stringent national laws on citizenship and border control governance are an existential reality; the refugee and asylum management tasks remain ad hoc and vague. Broadly, these have highlighted an international practice of promoting non-arrival strategies and deterrent practices at sea . The security-based approaches in Europe also increased contactless control practices as ‘consensual containment’ schemes . Will the Indo-Pacific nations replicate the same? It is critical to rethink the strategies to prevent unsafe sea migration. Global best practices can inform the Indo-pacific regional cooperation endeavours; however, they may not need to borrow the statist policies among the coastal states and reproduce similar patterns here. In this regard, sustained cooperation between state and non-state organisations will produce a durable solution. About the Author Dr. Niloy Ranjan Biswas is an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka. In 2016, he completed his PhD in International Politics from the City, University of London. He was a recipient of the Fulbright Fellowship (2010-12) to pursue a second Master’s degree in Security Policy Studies at The George Washington University, Washington DC. Dr. Biswas has co-edited two books and authored more than thirty journal articles and book chapters. He has written extensively on deradicalisation and preventing violent extremism, refugees and forced migration, security governance reform, and South Asian regional contributions to United Nations peace support endeavours. Email: niloy@du.ac.bd . Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

< Back Devika Makkat Research Assistant Devika is a Research Assistant at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research. Devika holds a Bachelor's in International Relations with a minor in Public Policy from FLAME University, Pune. She has a PG Diploma in Interdisciplinary Research, also from FLAME University. Her interest lies in security studies, foreign policy, and development studies with a focus on South Asia and the USA.

b6c39c75-22d8-4e68-8748-b4b49f861a0d < All op-eds Powerhouse: clean energy transitions in the Indo-Pacific Ms Parul Bakshi This blog has been republished from the The Intercept blog by the Lowy Institute with permission. With a global energy crisis underway due to rising prices , coupled with a forecast of a harsh northern hemisphere winter and supply volatility brought on by the Russia–Ukraine war, all eyes are on the future of energy transition . The Indo-Pacific will be at the centre of this transition, with rapidly expanding Southeast Asian economies and burgeoning populations forming a large share of the exponentially rising global energy demand. An energy transition is broadly defined as the pathway to transforming the energy mix towards low carbon, sustainable and renewable forms of energy. One of its key components is maintaining energy security. Traditionally, energy security has encapsulated the 4 As – availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability – but scholars today also focus on defined aspects such as minimal vulnerability, enhanced resilience and equitable access to energy. Over the past decades, the classical distinction between importers and exporters of energy has blurred. A traditional importer such as the United States is today a crucial energy exporter after its shale gas revolution . Further transformations in the energy landscape due to the global clean energy transition are expected to augment the energy self-sufficiency ratio of nations as their dependency on domestic renewable sources increases, leading to improved energy security. While this might be the case, the belief that such transitions could lead to reduced volatility of energy security is far-fetched. The increasing risk of geopolitical turbulence makes it imperative to promote shared interests and principles of energy security in the region. The ongoing transition away from fossil fuels will usher in a growing reliance on procuring supplies of hydrogen, ammonia, biofuels and other alternatives. Renewables will therefore alter the arenas of energy interaction, transform traditional energy markets and mark a shift in trading partners while reshaping patterns of conflict and cooperation between countries. Since the Indo-Pacific will be a major energy hub that houses critical and strategic energy trade routes, this reshaping will be most pronounced in the region. Instances of such shifts are already evident in the urgency to decarbonise and diversify energy sources. In 2020, traditional oil giant Saudi Arabia demonstrated the world’s first successful blue ammonia supply network by producing and shipping 40 tonnes of high-grade low-carbon fuel to Japan. Similarly, Japanese oil company Inpex successfully brought clean ammonia produced by the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company to Japan. Furthermore, Singapore was the major export destination of biodiesel from India in the 2020–21 financial year. Meanwhile, key Indo-Pacific players such as Japan and Australia are fuelling their bilateral relationship through hydrogen, with the world’s first liquefied hydrogen carrier ship completing its maritime transport of the fuel from Victoria to Kobe in February this year. India is also preparing to jump on the hydrogen exporter bandwagon. Among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Singapore imported hydropower-generated clean electricity from Laos via Thailand and Malaysia through grid interconnections for the first time in June. Countries such as Brunei have also started exporting small quantities of hydrogen to Japan. Although new and emerging interdependent energy relations are forming within the Indo-Pacific, fault lines have also emerged, with Indonesia recently announcing a ban on green energy export, putting a halt to the vision of an integrated ASEAN power grid. In countries such as Australia , in an attempt to secure energy supplies while meeting sustainability goals, nuclear energy is again being debated as a potential addition to the energy mix. However, a rise in the use of nuclear power would result in an increased reliance on uranium imports for many countries. It is interesting to note here that Russia is a key exporter of uranium to the United States and European Union , and with the fuel not being subject to the ongoing Russian sanctions, it adds to the debate on reliance on Russia and energy security. With the continuous growth in solar and wind energy across the region, the critical minerals essential to manufacturing these technologies will become increasingly important. Since these rare earths are concentrated in specific nations, particularly China, diversifying the sources and enabling stable supply becomes imperative to expanding renewable energies and ensuring energy security. In 2010, China imposed an export ban on rare earths to Japan due to a territorial dispute. It is anticipated that the energy-intensive undertones of China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative will impact the geopolitics around energy trade routes, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Such a scenario increases the need for regional countries to embark on a strategy to secure energy supply routes and affordable energy supplies. Recently, South Korea and Mongolia and India and Australia agreed to boost cooperation on global supply chains, especially concerning rare earths. As China and Russia continue to weaponise these supply capacities to exert geopolitical leverage to coerce other countries for their political purposes, it highlights the prominence of geopolitics of energy. The increasing risk of geopolitical turbulence, as seen recently with growing tensions in Taiwan , makes it imperative to promote shared interests and principles of energy security in the region. The future of smooth energy transitions and the development of a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific rely on a deeper understanding of evolving energy security and fostering a rules-based order safeguarding the same. As the Indo-Pacific comes under the spotlight with major players attempting to expand their influence, energy can act as a means to further relations and interests. Dialogues such as the Sydney Energy Forum are setting the stage. But is the Indo-Pacific prepared for the new contours of energy security? Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Prof. C. Raja Mohan is a visiting research professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. He was also the Founding Director of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, India. isascrm@nus.edu.sg < Back Prof. C. Raja Mohan C. Raja Mohan was a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie India. A leading analyst of India’s foreign policy, Mohan is also an expert on South Asian security, great-power relations in Asia, and arms control. He is the foreign affairs columnist for the Indian Express, and a visiting research professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. He was a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board. From 2009 to 2010, Mohan was the Henry Alfred Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress. Previously, he was a professor of South Asian studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. He also served as the diplomatic editor and Washington correspondent of the Hindu. Mohan’s most recent books are Modi’s World: Expanding India's Sphere of Influence (Harper Collins India, 2015) and India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security (Routledge, 2016) (co-edited with Anit Mukherjee). His other books include Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), Power Realignments in Asia: China, India and the United States (Sage, 2009) (co-edited with Alyssa Ayres), Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order (India Research Press, 2006), and Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (Palgrave, 2004). isascrm@nus.edu.sg

Amb. Rakesh Sood is veteran of the Indian Foreign Service, having held posts including India’s Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, and the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non – Proliferation. < Back Amb. Rakesh Sood Ambassador Rakesh Sood joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1976, serving in Brussels, Dakar, Geneva, and Islamabad in different capacities, and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington DC. At the Foreign Ministry, he set up the Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division and led it for eight years. He has served as India’s first Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and later as Ambassador to Afghanistan, Nepal and France. After retiring in 2013, Ambassador Sood was Special Envoy of the Prime Minister for Disarmament and Non – Proliferation till May 2014. Ambassador Sood has been a principal participant at The Chao Track II Dialogues.

6049429b-ef9a-4bd8-9f8d-53bbeb789c0f < All op-eds India's G20 Presidency: The Effectiveness Of Its Leadership Depends On How It Overcomes Its Dilemmas Ms Sanchari Ghosh India assumed the presidency of G-20 for one year commencing on December 1, 2022. Its presidency comes at a time when the world has been gripped by uncertainties arising out of post-pandemic economic recession ; the ripple effects of the Russia-Ukraine war, particularly food and energy insecurity; and long-standing problems such as climate change, terrorism, and xenophobic tendencies across the world. Through its stewardship, India hopes to make a meaningful impact towards abating the prevalent disharmony and this hope is reflected in the theme adopted for its presidency: Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam or ‘One Earth, One Family, One Future’. It is an opportunity for India to showcase that it is ready to take on the task of reinvigorating multilateral institutions which have been found vulnerable due to continued geopolitical rivalries. The current president (India) along with its predecessor (Indonesia) and successor (Brazil) form the Troika at the G-20 and this is the first instance when all three members of the Troika are among the developing countries. As a result, India’s presidency holds special significance as far as furthering the interests of the developing world is concerned. Moreover, with the increasing importance of the concept of Indo-Pacific , and considering that there are substantial overlaps between the agenda of G-20 and the issues that are pertinent to the Indo-Pacific, India can use its year-long G-20 presidency to manifest its vision of a " free, inclusive, and open " Indo-Pacific. However, this article argues that there are inherent contradictions vis-a-vis India's approach towards multilateralism in general as well as regarding its vision of the Indo-Pacific region. The effectiveness of its leadership will depend on how India navigates through both these contradictions. The dilemma in India’s multilateralism As several scholars have argued , India has always dealt with the dilemma of maintaining the identity of a third-world country on one hand, while simultaneously expecting to be recognized as a responsible global power on the other. In the years following its independence, India took upon itself the responsibility to lead a coalition of non-aligned countries which would steer away from the cold war power dynamics. During this time, while India critiqued the West-led multilateral institutions, it shied away from taking the mantle of reform on its own shoulders. The trend continued even after the end of the Cold War, and this reticence defies the aspirations for India to be recognized as a global leader. It has been argued that India is a status-quoist and risk-averse state which favours a very slow and incremental change in the international system. In the past, India could bypass the responsibility of bringing about change in the multilateral institutions by arguing that these institutions lack proportionate representation of the global south. Therefore, now that India is actually in a leadership role of an influential grouping like the G-20, it will be interesting to note how it balances the duality of its role perception: whether it identifies itself as the leader of the global south or as a newly emerged power which belongs to the high table of international diplomacy. For instance, there have been calls for expanding the membership of G-20 as many countries have expressed dissatisfaction against their exclusion from the grouping. G-20 consists of 19 countries along with the European Union (EU); the presence of the EU makes Europe, and consequently the West, over-represented. Africa is grossly under-represented (only South Africa is a member), and so is South-East Asia. It has been argued that if the EU can be accommodated in the G-20 architecture, then the same should be extended to include the African Union and ASEAN as well. India’s commitment to ‘ universality and inclusivity ’ will be tested through its willingness to push for such reforms. The dilemma in India’s Indo-Pacific vision In his speech at Chulalongkorn University, Thailand on August 18, 2022, India's External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar spoke that India envisages a “free, open, inclusive, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, one which is built on a rules-based international order”. He also reiterated that India stands by the notion of ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific. However, in the same speech, Jaishankar called QUAD the most prominent plurilateral platform that addresses contemporary challenges and opportunities in the Indo-Pacific. As has been pointed out , emphasis on minilateral groupings like the QUAD goes against the principles of openness and inclusivity proclaimed by India. Moreover, the rise of QUAD has also raised suspicion among the ASEAN states that it could disrupt the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) from its position of centrality in the region’s security order. There are also apprehensions that certain initiatives by the QUAD, such as the launch of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) program could lead to increased militarization of the region. The argument is that the surveillance actions undertaken through the IPMDA program could trigger a Chinese response which could spiral into a wider military conflict in the region. It is not surprising, therefore, that China has already accused the QUAD of being nothing less than an Asian version of NATO . The Indian strategic community seems to be torn between projecting New Delhi as a benign power in the region on one hand and pushing toward increasing militarization of the region with an eye on China on the other. India’s G-20 presidency presents it with an opportunity to be recognized as a reliable security actor in the region. Post-pandemic economic recovery, supply chain resilience, technology, and climate change are a few of the overlapping issues straddling both the G-20 grouping and the Indo-Pacific region. Establishing agreements on these issues at the G-20 forum will allow India to provide a model for building a stable security architecture in the Indo-Pacific as well. Penchant for strategic autonomy How India handles the quandary of these divergent tracks relating to its multilateralism and its Indo-Pacific vision will determine how effective its leadership becomes in forging a just and inclusive regional and world order that it claims to stand for. Ambivalence has been a characteristic feature of Indian foreign policy and overcoming this will not come naturally. An argument can be made that ambivalence derives from the quest of achieving its preference for strategic autonomy which is deeply rooted in India’s strategic culture. However, it should be noted that India’s leadership at any regional or world forum will be potent only if it is well accepted by the states which are being led; and while deliberate ambiguity and strategic autonomy might go hand in hand, ambiguity does not sit well with leadership. Thus, India can use its one-year presidency to demonstrate that it is capable of leading a broadly divided G-20 to make decisive interventions for the benefit of developed and developing states alike. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

4ca30026-10d9-4215-a82b-d1b91d3b44f5 < All op-eds Understanding ASEAN Blue Economy and Cambodia’s Maritime Governance Challenges Mr Thong Mengdavid Since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, this regional organisation has rallied tremendous efforts to promote the ASEAN’s community-building, yet there are still numerous challenges such as territorial conflicts, shifting demographics, economic inequality, and environmental degradation, that the ASEAN must unify to address. For Southeast Asia, which has about 66% of its area covered by water bodies, maritime space has always been a crucial avenue for growth through trade. To harness this maritime potential sustainably, ASEAN adopted the ‘Declaration on the Blue Economy ’ during the 38th and 39th ASEAN Summit in October 2021. In 2023, under Indonesia’s chairmanship, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Blue Economy Framework . The framework focuses on the development and conservation of ocean, seas, marine and coastal ecosystems. Additionally, it also serves as the ASEAN guidelines to promote value creation, inclusiveness and sustainability aspects to support SDGs and mechanisms to diffuse maritime disputes. Cambodia is at the early stage of maximising the benefits of the blue economy since the Kingdom does not have a clear policy framework and effective mechanism for addressing critical challenges such as declining fish stocks, overfishing, illegal practices, ecosystem degradation and pollution. The term ‘Blue Economy’ is a multifaceted and cross-cutting concept that involves all three pillars of the ASEAN, namely ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Political-Security. The ASEAN Blue Economy Framework acknowledges the ocean and seas as key drivers of economic growth, interconnectivities and marine cooperation, while taking into account the need to ensure ocean sustainability and rules-based ocean governance. The three core pillars of ASEAN were established to enhance mutual trust and confidence among members, promote respect for international laws, foster a culture of peace, democracy and human rights and support peaceful resolutions of dispute and respect each other's sovereignty. However, these values are undermined by fast-changing geopolitics, great power rivalry, fragility of global security and slow economic growth. To protect and strengthen its regional position in the face of these geopolitical changes, ASEAN has published 'ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, (AOIP) in 2019 which serves as a roadmap to promote and enable a regional environment conducive to peace, stability, and prosperity. AOIP objectives are to encourage ASEAN member states (AMS) to promote intra-cooperation and to work with external partners on four key areas: maritime cooperation, connectivity, sustainable development, and economic cooperation. The AOIP also strengthens ASEAN's centrality and community building process, as well as the implementation of ASEAN maritime cooperation, connectivity, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), economic cooperation, and other areas of collaboration under regional forums and initiatives such as ARF, EAS, Bali Concord II, ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). Both AOIP and ASEAN Blue Economy complement each other and have the potential to foster the region's sustainable, resilient, and inclusive development. For instance, the two documents support the principles of the 1982 UNLCOS and ASEAN's standards and values as established in the ASEAN Charter and other related documents, according to the ASEAN Declaration approved by the 40th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh (2022). Furthermore, both AOIP and ASEAN Blue Economy strengthen regional maritime cooperation through marine environmental protection,maritime security, maritime connectivity, maritime sustainability and maritime culture. Finally, the two documents contribute to the resolution of common issues, advance the UN SDGs 2030, and promote economic integration, climate change, biodiversity conservation, and disaster management. As a result, the AOIP and the ASEAN Blue Economy may be viewed as mutually reinforcing and synergistic frameworks that can assist ASEAN in realising its goal of a peaceful, stable, and wealthy region. Additionally, Cambodia’s perception toward the blue economy is that it is an emerging concept that could advance Cambodia's aspiration to promote the sustainable, resilient and inclusive use of marine and coastal resources. Cambodia has stressed regional and global integration, notably in terms of security and economic growth, since joining ASEAN in 1999. Since then, the Kingdom advocates the regional integration process, inclusive development and respect for ASEAN Centrality. Holding the ASEAN chair for the third time, Cambodia has been promoting ASEAN identity and community, supporting ASEAN initiatives on disaster management, climate changes, pandemic response and sustainable development goals. Cambodia also has considerable potential to ensure the sustainable use of marine and coastal resources for economic growth, improve livelihood and jobs while preserving the health of the ocean ecosystem. ASEAN Blue Economy might assist Cambodia in promoting sustainable, resilient, and inclusive economic growth by strengthening marine trade and governance via maritime resources management, technological advancement and innovation and marine-based manufacturing and biology research. Balancing economic progress with environmental conservatism is critical for the Kingdom's socioeconomic development. Cambodia, as an ASEAN member, may benefit from the blue economy by increasing maritime industries such as fisheries, aquaculture, tourism, and shipping, which contribute to national employment, infrastructure development, and food security. According to the Ministry of Environment (2020), three blue economic sectors, fisheries, tourism and shipping and ports, contributed an estimated nearly $2.8 billion in gross value. Furthermore, the blue economy has the potential to increase marine environmental preservation, research, and restoration, as well as minimise maritime pollution. Because of greater management such as biological research and tourism, sustainable marine resource management, education and research will minimize the impact of climate change, illicit fishing and preserve marine biology. According to Pouch and Oum ( 2023 ), the Kingdom cannot realise its full potential to implement legal and policy frameworks related to coastal and marine areas and resources due to a lack of an integrated policy framework and institutional arrangements, as well as limited capacity, human resources, technology, and investment in coastal and marine infrastructure and services. For instance, The National Committee on Management and Development of Cambodian Coastal regions was founded in 2012 to lead and coordinate the sustainable and responsible management and development of coastal regions with limited budget and manpower. Moreover, the ocean policy framework has not yet been well established without clear spatial planning on how coastal areas or marine resources are managed or used sustainably and inclusively. Lastly, the Kingdom has limited data available related to marine and maritime resources and activities, thus there is lack of recording and reporting related to marine and coastal related resources and activities. Despite all of these challenges, the ASEAN Blue Economy will diminish the Kingdom's reliance on foreign shipping firms for international commerce, with a negative trade balance and risks from falling seafood populations, overfishing, unlawful practices, ecosystem degradation, and pollution. As a result, Cambodia must take a multifaceted and holistic approach to blue economy growth, focusing on environmental sustainability and people's well-being. It must also increase its law enforcement, access sustainable funding choices such as blue finance, and engage in the global framework as well as the ASEAN Blue Economy Cooperation Framework. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

​Dr. Toby Dalton is Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program, and Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has formerly been a staff member in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. TDalton@ceip.org < Back Dr. Toby Dalton Dr. Dalton is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program and Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He works primarily on regional security in East and South Asia and the evolution of the global nuclear order. He is the co-author (with George Perkovich) of Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism (Oxford University Press, 2016). Before joining Carnegie, Dr. Dalton served in policy advisory positions at the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration, including a posting at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. He was a Luce Scholar in Seoul, South Korea, and a professional staff member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He holds a PhD in Public Policy from the George Washington University. TDalton@ceip.org

dc844891-b3a0-4bbc-96f8-330381138081 < All op-eds Operationalizing the Indo-Pacific framework Mr Paras Ratna Introduction Be it China’s Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) or the Build Back Better World ( B3W ) initiative, geopolitical contestations are increasingly getting manifested through overseas assistance and infrastructure financing. The recently held Quad Tokyo summit too emphasized cooperation on infrastructure to ensure growth and development in the Indo-Pacific region and has accordingly pledged to invest USD 50 billion to boost regional connectivity. The threat of the Chinese century and unipolar Asia is prompting powers within Asia such as Japan, and India to collaborate with the US, and Australia to provide public goods like infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region. As the world is gradually recovering from the COVID-19-induced shock, there seems a convergence of both geopolitical as well as the geoeconomics imperative to have a resilient, dependable, and sustainably financed critical infrastructure(s) in the post-Covid world. The reverberations of the same are being felt alike across the political and business circles. There is a vacuum as far as dependable critical infrastructure is concerned, making it a priority concern for the Indo-Pacific regional framework which is at the crossroads of politics and economics. Getting the ‘Quad’ wheels to turn Quad Joint Leaders’ Joint Statement too emphasized the need for the development of the inclusive and resilient Indo-Pacific framework in collaboration with like-minded partners. For the Indo-Pacific to have a serious heft, it needs to be complemented by a series of developmental and economic initiatives aimed at integrating the region. The Quad countries have demonstrated their willingness to collaborate on providing quality infrastructure in the region. In this regard, they have also set up a quad coordination group on infrastructure. This was launched as a part of the G7’s Build Back Better World (B3W) announcement . Quad infrastructure partnerships aim to collaborate with one another for delivering infrastructure by focusing on “digital connectivity, climate, health, health security, and gender equality infrastructure”. Notable initiatives like the Blue Dot Network initiative aimed at providing a certification framework for enabling countries to identify and pursue infrastructure investments that maximize the positive socio, economic, and environmental externality are already underway. The emphasis on “quality infrastructure” by the Quad countries is a veiled contrast to BRI often associated with unsustainable financing and debt trap. It is pertinent to note that Quad partnerships and collaborations have been careful in not limiting it to just military partnerships but developing it as an economic framework, something which the categorization/criticism of Quad as an ‘Asian NATO’ fails to capture. Quality infrastructure and connectivity form the core of meaningful operationalization of any regional integration framework, and, to this effect, Quad countries have taken stride by establishing or strengthening the mandate of their overseas infrastructure finance wing. For instance, the US, in 2018, launched the International Development Finance Cooperation ( DFC ) worth USD 60 bn as a part of the Build Act, aimed at assisting US overseas infrastructure projects. DFC has already pledged investments worth USD 200 million ranging across 10 projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. n the other hand, Japan has launched the ‘ Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure ’ aimed at investing USD 110 billion over the next five years towards quality infrastructure development in Asia. Australia too has injected AUD 1 billion to its infrastructure financing agency ‘Export Finance Australia ’ for supporting overseas infrastructure projects in the pacific. Additionally, it has set up Australia Infrastructure Financing Facility ( AIFFP ) aimed at financing infra projects through loans and grants ranging up to AUD 3billion and AUD 5billion respectively. Similarly, the Government of India engages in overseas infrastructure financing through its EXIM (Export-Import Bank) by extending line of credits (LOCs) that enables the recipient countries to strengthen their physical and social infrastructure. As of 2021 , India has extended LOCs worth USD 30.5 billion to 65 countries. In its extension of the line of credit, India prioritizes its immediate neighbourhood. Here, it is worth noting that regional connectivity in S.Asia is hampered by India’s domestic infrastructure deficiency as well, and investing in it has a positive spillover for the broader region. In this regard, India has established National Infrastructure Investment Fund ( NIIF ) to raise financial resources for funding domestic infrastructure projects. It is important to note that although India’s contribution to overseas assistance is less than 1%, it is a substantial contribution compared to high-income Quad countries like Australia (0.22%). Need to leverage the private sector The prioritization of infrastructure by the Quad grouping in their summits is a welcome step and makes both geopolitical and geoeconomic sense. As per the estimates of the Asian Development Bank ( ADB) , the infrastructure needs in the Asia-Pacific (read Indo-Pacific) region is slated to be around 26 trillion USD i.e. 1.7 trillion USD annually, a significant requirement compared to the current per annum investment of 881 billion USD. Thereby, making infra financing a ripe zone for geopolitical contestations in the region. Given the quantum of investment, there is a need to actively engage the private sector for the realization of the infrastructure push. In this regard, Quad countries have initiated frameworks to rope in private capital. For instance, the US Chamber of commerce in collaboration with its India and Japan chapter has launched the trilateral forum aimed at engaging the private sector for infrastructure projects. Similarly in 2018, the US, Australia, and Japan launched the trilateral partnership for infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific. Apart from delivering quality infrastructure reflective of international best practices, a major objective of these forums is to bring in private partnerships for these infrastructural projects. Notwithstanding the aforementioned initiatives, Quad countries' infrastructure outreach is still in the catching-up stage compared to the Belt and Road Initiative. Quad countries' success in terms of delivering large-scale infrastructural projects vis-a-vis BRI has been largely limited. In fact, it hasn’t been able to galvanize the private sector in a manner that was anticipated. This could be attributed to the inability of the Quad grouping/ frameworks to address business risks that overseas infrastructure financing entails for the private sector. Contrary to the government whose end result is tilted more towards political outcomes such as influence/goodwill, the private sector’s calculus is tilted towards the return on investment that could be derived from financing a particular project. As per the Participation in Infrastructure ( PPI ) report 2021 , private participation in infrastructure financing is uneven and regions like South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-Saharan Africa have witnessed a decline in PPI compared to other regions like East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean. Source: PPI, 2021. The report further notes that notwithstanding the signs of recovery in private commitments to the infrastructure visible in its increase in 2021 vis-a-vis 2020, it remained low compared to the average commitment of the last five years. Investment Commitments in Infrastructure Projects with Private Participation in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 2012-2021 is given below (Table 2). Source: PPI, 2021. Factors like an inept regulatory framework of the recipient country, unreliability of the projected risk profile of the project, and sovereign risk- a situation where the government of the recipient country unilaterally changes the terms of the contract etc; adversely affect the firm's interest without much recourse, thereby, deterring private participation in overseas infrastructure financing. Therefore, the majority of private-sector capital doesn’t get invested in the low-income economies that have an urgent need for infrastructural investment. Recommendations Effective operationalization of the Indo-Pacific framework requires the private sector to work in sync with the Government initiative. Hitherto, that has been a far cry. To fine-tune the same, Quad countries should address the risk associated with overseas infrastructure financing by eliminating information asymmetry. It is suggested to establish an entity/platform that provides services like risk profiling of the project, probable range of return on investment, expected support from the government, a primer on the regulatory framework of the recipient countries, and credible local organizations for possible collaborations. Blue Dot Network (BDN) launched in 2019, aimed at certifying quality projects in accordance with the international standards could be used for this purpose. This would enable the private sector to assess the viability of these projects in an objective manner. However, to this date BDN hasn’t certified a single project, therefore it is imperative to operationalize it at the earliest. Quad countries can establish a joint advisory council with members from the government and private sector esp. from trade and industry associations. This body could perform functions like providing technical inputs regarding the identification of any infrastructure project, preparatory survey to assess the viability of the project, criteria for selection of local partners etc. With the overall official development assistance of Quad countries, including that of high-income countries like the US, Japan, and Australia remaining quite low (around 0.2% of Gross National Income) compared to China; they could jointly think of establishing an Indo-Pacific infrastructure bank along the lines of AIIB or establishing a branch/wing in existing bodies like the World Bank for financing greenfield infrastructure projects in the low-income countries at a sustainable interest rate. Lastly, the frequent usage of coercive tools of statecraft like sanctions by the US adds to the complexity for the private sector and impedes their participation as well as the regional connectivity initiatives of partner countries. Chabahar port in Iran is the case in point. Thus, the US needs to be cognizant of the interests of partners while implementing sanctions. As the race for providing infrastructure heats up, countries in the Indo-Pacific would certainly want a quality, sustainable, and affordable infrastructure financing alternative, so as to resist excess dependency on China. This diversification strategy was quite evident in the recently announced Indo-Pacific economic framework, where 11 out of the 13 founding members (except India and the US) are also part of the China-led economic grouping Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In fact, there is a growing appreciation of the fact that the world today is far more economically interconnected and ideologically fluid, underlining the importance of the economic co-optation of member states for the successful operationalization of any geopolitical framework, and for that leveraging the private sector, given its capital, expertise, and efficiency becomes crucial. Paras Ratna is a PhD researcher at the National University of Singapore. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

ea00e7e5-a102-40f4-9ae9-7c7e0fa56f5e < All op-eds Reflections on the Battle for Elysée Palace and Future Impacts on the Indo-Pacific Dr Yatharth Kachiar and Shankar Narayan S French national elections do not stir much euphoria in a geographically far away region like the Indo-Pacific. During the election phase in France, domestic issues have dominated the debate, and foreign policy issues have largely taken a backseat. Nevertheless, the outcome of these battles for Elysée Palace will significantly impact the future of the EU, NATO and the Indo-Pacific region. As a resident power, France has immense stakes in the stability and security of the Indo-Pacific. Over 2 million French nationals are in the region, and 1.65 million resides in the French territories. Around 93% of France’s exclusive economic zone is in the Indo-Pacific, and more than 7000 French troops are permanently posted in the region. Consequently, the diplomatic and defence posture of the next French President towards the Indo-Pacific will have a direct impact on the geopolitics of the region. Continuity and Innovation Since 1958, French foreign policy and diplomacy have focused primarily on building a secure and stable cooperation with the US, transforming the EU into a strategic autonomous actor at the global stage, showing openness to engage Russia diplomatically, and promoting stability and development in Africa. Overall, the state elites in France have always preferred to maintain continuity in the foreign policy realm. Nevertheless, certain novelties such as a desire to build and strengthen military presence and political influence in the Indo-Pacific region have also permeated the French foreign policy in recent years. Initiated by President Macron, the French policy towards the Indo-Pacific centered around bolstering the country’s global standing and protecting its overseas territories in the region. In New Caledonia, a French overseas territory in the Indo-Pacific, Macron delivered a speech when the island was awaiting a referendum for independence. During his speech, Macron stated that France would be less beautiful without New Caledonia . This shows the importance that France attaches to its overseas territories and the Indo-Pacific, as without these overseas territories in the Indo-Pacific, the country’s influence over the region would become feeble. Macron’s Vision of the Indo-Pacific Emmanuel Macron, compared to his political opponent Marine Le Pen, has been more outward-looking in his policies. Being a pro-EU president, Macron always aligned with the EU’s idea of multilateralism. On the Indo-Pacific, he maintains that France should act as an inclusive and stabilizing mediating power in the region. France’s Indo-Pacific strategy outlined by Macron in 2018 focused on preserving the French-American friendship, disentangling France from the ongoing rivalry between US and China, and protecting French interests from the rise of China. An essential aspect of this strategy is to strengthen cooperation between France-Australia-India. Despite facing setback by the AUKUS defence pact, France invited Australia along with 30 other nations from the region to the Indo-Pacific Forum co-organised by the French Foreign Ministry and the EU in Paris in February 2022. This shows that multilateralism remains a core component of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy. At present, France holds the presidency of the Council of the EU. This puts the country in a better position to assert its role and that of the EU in the region. It is very likely that Macron, who has secured another term, will assertively pursue French interests in the Indo-Pacific. Such an approach is necessary to maintain France’s position at the global level. At the same time, as Ms Le Pen’s populist party enjoys more acceptance than ever, there is a possibility that it still might win future elections. If a populist regime comes to power in France, it can reverse decades of progress made in world politics in a few years. This was evident in Trump’s administration. Therefore, Macron is more likely to strengthen France’s external position so that it will not be at the mercy of populist parties in the future. It is highly likely that under Macron’s Presidency, France will play a very active role in the Indo-Pacific region in terms of alliance-building, strengthening security, and achieving progress in non-traditional security areas through multilateralism. Unpredictability under Marine Le Pen & the National Rally Under Ms Le Pen (and those who share the platform) French foreign policy would potentially enter into an unpredictable and unknown arena. Until now, her stance on the foreign policy issues, especially NATO, EU, climate change, and free trade agreements, indicates a parochial approach toward the international relations. Ms Le Pen has been vocal about quitting NATO’s integrated military command that it rejoined in 2009 “so that France is not dragged into wars that are not its own.” She is equally wary of joining any future European military command . Recently, the Ukraine war has constrained Ms Le Pen to advocate sympathy for Russia and President Putin openly. In 2017, as a nationalist, she had proclaimed deep admiration for President Putin. Although Ms Le Pen has condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, she remains critical of the European sanctions on Russian oil and gas as it leads to energy price rise in France. Given her ideological proximity to populist and nationalist leaders, it is highly likely that Ms Le Pen will eventually embrace like-minded leaders such as Mr Putin, Viktor Orban, and President Xi Xinping. On the question of China, Ms Le Pen stated that under her government, “France would continue to stand up against China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific and the opportunity for France is to demonstrate that we have the power to be an element of pacification.” Ms Le Pen is also critical of Beijing’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang. However, she is not in favour of imposing sanctions on China for Human Rights abuses. Under Ms Le Pen, the French role would continue to involve a lot of mix messaging to China. However, it may compromise one of the most critical components of the French foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific, i.e. multilateralism. To sum up, a future entrance of Ms Le Pen (& the National Rally) into the Elysee Palace would be good news for the right-wing, populist, and authoritarian leaders. At the same time, it will also be a setback for French policy in the Indo-Pacific and multilateralism in global politics. (Dr Yatharth Kachiar is an Assistant Professor, and Shankar Narayan S is a Research Scholar at the Manipal Centre for European Studies, MAHE, Karnataka) Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

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a61fa192-bf99-4002-a7d8-ada2ae822499 < All op-eds The Need for Quad as a Techno-democratic Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Mr Arjun Gargeyas The leaders of the various Quad countries have conducted numerous diplomatic gatherings throughout the past year. A recurrent underlying theme throughout the sessions was the extended focus on the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. Topics discussed at the meetings ranged from the role of the Quad in the Indo-Pacific region to regional economic/trade challenges. Along with the US, the Indo-Pacific region's three nations (India, Australia and Japan) constitute the Quad, in which technology cooperation has played a significant role in bringing the four states together. China continues to play a crucial role in how these nations formulate their responses and international strategies when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. It is clear that China has advanced to the point where it is now influencing the region technologically. Beijing's diplomatic goals have benefited from the private sector's success in some critical technical fields, which has been aided by ongoing governmental backing. The Chinese government has looked to its domestic technology giants in addition to its most important foreign policy initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to strengthen its diplomatic ties around the world and increase its technological footprint. It is essential that one state/private organisation does not control the market and stifle technological advancement in important industries in the age of geopolitical consequences of technology ecosystems. Through its Digital Silk Roads initiative , China has already succeeded in capturing continents like Africa by convincing these countries to adopt Chinese technology. States in the South, South East, and East Asia have a chance to avoid slipping into China's "technology debt trap," which would essentially give China and its corporations a lot of influence. The Quad nations are technologically advanced and rising powers in the Indo-Pacific region. It is also interesting that the Quad nations, each of which has comparative advantages that can aid in containing the Chinese juggernaut, are moving toward establishing a strong alliance and credible technical cooperation. In the current political environment, it is crucial for China's competitors to decouple essential technological supply chains from nations like China. Modern commercial and military applications increasingly rely on critical software and networked technologies like telecommunications, the Internet of Things, and quantum, in addition to hardware supply chains like semiconductors. The influence and control that China might have over smaller countries can be lessened by keeping Chinese businesses and their technologies out of other states' technological ecosystems. Setting Standards in AI The Quad, especially the regional parts of the grouping—India, Japan, and Australia—have a variety of technological strengths and specialities that, when combined, can create a powerful alternative to anything a Chinese corporation might have to offer. Japan, a country known for its intellectual prowess, demonstrated in its Fifth Science and Technology Basic Plan its dedication to the development of emerging technologies. The official Artificial Intelligence Technology Strategy , produced by the Japanese government, is centred on the nation's AI R&D and industrialisation strategy. In order to boost technological competitiveness and gain the upper hand in the geopolitical power dynamics, the administration also emphasised the importance of AI innovation. With the signing of an MoU to advance AI cooperation between the two nations, the Indian government has selected Japan as one of the crucial partners in developing future AI solutions. Australia has also pushed for the active involvement of its foreign ministry in developing and establishing technical AI and IoT standards. Australia has taken the lead in highlighting the importance of AI technology standards and has published an official document on it, arguing for a plurilateral approach. The three nations may work together to set the benchmark for future governance of emerging technologies by combining their technological expertise and commitment to creating relevant standards. Breaking the Huawei Telecom Monopoly With Huawei's success as a domestic telecom juggernaut in the 5G era, China scored a home run. China and Huawei currently jointly own the largest number of 5G-related patents and technological standards. With firms like Huawei and ZTE establishing communication networks in nations in Central Asia and Africa, China has solidified its position in the telecommunications industry as a result. Other Indo-Pacific countries may become unduly dependent on Chinese telecom technology due to the lure of low costs, subsidised equipment, and quicker access to modern communications technologies like 5G. The Quad nations have a significant impact here. India has entered the world of communication standards after receiving clearance from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) for its very own homegrown 5G technology standard , the 5Gi. The regional 5G standard was created to enhance connectivity and reach in India, which can serve as a template for other nations in the area. Even though it is still early, India may use its booming telecom sector to create new, more suitable technology for the Indo-Pacific area. Numerous of its telecom behemoths, including Jio and Airtel, are also members of the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) alliance , which collaborates to develop 5G technological alternatives. Rakuten, a leading provider of communications services in Japan, has also based its current 5G network on O-RAN technological specs and is actively working with other Indian tech firms on both their hardware and software. Although the three nations have the required expertise in 5G, they must rely on hardware, specifically telecom equipment made by US and European corporations and technical standards established by both US and Chinese firms. A strong alliance between the three nations (along with the US and the Quad) can aid in the establishment of manufacturing facilities for telecom equipment and specialised technical professionals to create alternative 5G standards. By doing so, the reliance on Chinese technology can be lessened and serve as a model for countries in the Indo-Pacific. In order to prevent other countries from falling into the Chinese technology trap, the expansion of China and its influence in important technology industries have prompted measures to equal and offer genuine alternatives. To check the Indo-Pacific region from becoming reliant on Chinese technology infrastructure, the Quad can collaborate to develop new technologies and produce substitutes for crucial ones that China has exported. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More