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< Back VAdm ANIL K CHAWLA EDITOR-MARITIME AFFAIRS akchawlanav@csdronline.com VAdm Anil K Chawla is the former Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval Command and a Distinguished Fellow at CSDR. He joined the National Defence Academy in Jan 1978. Commissioned in the Indian Navy on 01 Jan 1982, he specialized in Navigation and Direction in 1988 and subsequently navigated two of the Navy’s frontline frigates. On promotion to the rank of Vice Admiral, he took over as the Director General of Naval Operations on 31 Dec 2014. He took over as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval Command, Kochi on 31 Jul 18. Vice Admiral Chawla was conferred the Vishisht Seva Medal on 26 Jan 13 and the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal on 26 Jan 2015 for distinguished service. He was conferred with the honorary title of Aide-De-Camp to the President of India on 01 Dec 2019. He was awarded the Param Vishisht Medal for distinguished service of the highest order on 26 Jan 2020. akchawlanav@csdronline.com 123-456-7890

Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (Retd.), served as an Officer in the Indian Army, and retired as Northern Army Commander in 2016. He has vast experience in counter-insurgency and crisis-management at the strategic level. dhooda@csdronline.org < Back Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (Retd.) Lt. Gen. Hooda was commissioned into the 4th Battalion of the 4th Gorkha Rifles in 1976 and initially served in Nagaland during the peak of insurgency. As a Major General, he was responsible for counter-insurgency operations in Manipur and South Assam. From 2012 to 2016, Lt. Gen. Hooda was stationed in Jammu and Kashmir and retired as the Army Commander of Northern Command in 2016. During this time, he handled numerous strategic challenges that emerged on the borders with Pakistan and China. Lt. Gen. Hooda has been awarded the Vasishta Seva Medal (twice), the Ati Vasishta Seva Medal, the Uttam Yudh Seva Medal, and the Param Vishisht Seva Medal for his exemplary military service. In 2019 Lt. Gen. Hooda authored a comprehensive National Security Strategy document. He is one of India’s foremost commentators on India’s national security. dhooda@csdronline.org

Prof. Anne-Marie Brady teaches Political Science at the University of Canterbury, and is an expert on Chinese politics. A fluent Mandarin speaker, she is also a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington DC. anne-marie.brady@canterbury.ac.nz < Back Prof. Anne-Marie Brady Professor Anne-Marie Brady's groundbreaking, policy-relevant, research demonstrates the important role of the academic as "critic and conscience" in a modern democracy. Professor Brady is a specialist of Chinese politics (domestic politics and foreign policy), polar politics, China-Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy. She is a fluent Mandarin Chinese speaker. She is founding and executive editor of The Polar Journal (Taylor and Francis Publishers). She has published ten books and over fifty scholarly papers. She has written op eds for the New York Times, The Guardian, The Australian, Sydney Morning Herald, The Financial Times, among others. Professor Brady's recent books include Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), China's Thought Management (Routledge, 2012), The Emerging Politics of Antarctica (Routledge, 2013), China as a Polar Great Power (Cambridge University Press and Wilson Press, 2017), and Small States and the Changing Global Order: New Zealand Faces the Future (Springer, 2019). anne-marie.brady@canterbury.ac.nz

fd72283e-4414-460e-a18f-9d1dd898aa00 < All op-eds Electoral Targeting: Lessons Learned from Digital Campaign Trails in Southeast Asia Ms Munira Mustaffa Various pessimistic predictions have been made regarding the future of democracies in Southeast Asia as a result of the diverse governments and political regimes with transitioning democratic system issues. The experience of liberation struggles in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Laos, the abuse of constitutions by authoritarian governments in the Philippines, and the development of international legal standards and doctrines shaped their constitutional designs . While electoral integrity is frequently emphasised, the significance of election security preparedness in the region and the accompanying risks are not being addressed effectively because of existing challenges. Election security preparedness entails implementing measures to protect the electoral process and safeguard it from interference, hybrid threats, or other types of coordinated attacks in order to preserve its integrity and credibility. Finland is an example of a country that is actively working on implementing measures for election security preparedness. Common approaches to managing election security include validating and verifying voters, protecting ballots, and securely transmitting election results. However, these measures frequently prioritise safeguarding the voting infrastructure over addressing potential political vulnerabilities. Political vulnerabilities in the context of election security refer to potential weaknesses or vulnerabilities in the electoral process that could be exploited to interfere with or undermine the integrity of the election. These vulnerabilities may be related to the technology used in the electoral process, the rules and regulations governing the election, or the political environment in which the election takes place. The popularly accepted belief is that democratic nations hold elections to determine who will lead the government and make significant decisions. However, the often underappreciated nuance is that in the case of Southeast Asia, elections usually come after a process of democratisation has already begun. In other words, the election itself is not what causes democracy to happen; rather, it is the end result or culmination of other processes and events that precede it. Arguably, flawed elections are essential to the maintenance of authoritarian government because it is through elections that authoritarian regimes are able to collect information, pursue legitimacy, manage political elites, and preserve neo-patrimonial dominance, all of which enable them to sustain their rule over the people. Some specific examples of political vulnerabilities in the region may include: 1) lack of transparency and accountability in the electoral process, which can lead to suspicions of fraud or manipulation; and 2) political polarisation or instability that can create an environment conducive to election-related violence or post-election coup d’état , or 3) intimidation and manipulations such as the strategic use of conspiracy theories and hate speech . Electoral politics in Southeast Asia can be a complex and multifaceted affair with a history of political ritualism, democratic competition, electoral anomalies and abuse; some may qualify as free and fair but not necessarily clean, while others may be free but not fair. The relationship between elections and democracy in the region is likely to vary from country to country and can be influenced by a range of social, economic, and political factors, such as: 1. The strength of civil society organisations (CSOs) : Strong CSOs can help promote transparency and accountability in the electoral process and advocate for democratic rights. They can also mobilise voters and serve as a check on the actions of governments and other powerful political players. On the other hand, weak or suppressed CSOs may be unable to fulfil these roles, leading to less democratic and transparent elections. 2. Voter intimidation or coercion: Some individuals or groups may try to intimidate or coerce voters into supporting a particular candidate or political party, either through threats or incentives, or purging of voter rolls or the use of other tactics to prevent certain groups of people from voting. 3. Fraud or vote-rigging : There have been instances of fraudulent voting or vote-rigging in some elections in Southeast Asia, such as malapportionment and gerrymandering . 4. Disinformation or propaganda: The spread of false or misleading information, particularly through social media, can create confusion and sway public opinion in favour of certain candidates or parties. 5. Campaign finance irregularities : Elections can also be vulnerable to campaign finance violations, such as the use of illegal or undeclared funds to finance campaigns and digital astroturfing . 6. Inadequate election administration : Poorly administered elections, such as those with inadequate voter education or inadequate safeguards against fraud, can also contribute to election vulnerabilities. 7. Social media manipulation : Social media can play a significant role in shaping public opinion and influencing the outcome of elections. Given that elections serve as a vital instrument for upholding democratic values and holding officials accountable to the people, they may be subject to a variety of manipulations and interferences . Voters must be able to differentiate between legitimate political campaigns and malicious electoral interference, but they may have difficulties doing so. For this reason, electoral regulations and content moderation are needed to support voter education efforts. During election seasons, there are two key vulnerable points in which sophisticated information operators would look for to exploit or leverage to achieve their goals, and that would be: influencing voter turnout and influencing voter choices. Election interference refers to any attempt to influence or subvert the outcome of an election by illegal or illegitimate means. This can take many forms, including hacking into voting systems or tampering with ballots, spreading false or misleading information about candidates or the voting process, suppressing or bribing voters, or manipulating the media to sway public opinion. Election interference is a significant threat to the fairness and integrity of democratic elections. The rapidly changing and competitive nature of the cyberspace , where multiple actors compete to control information and narratives, makes it difficult for regional policymakers to understand and effectively address election disinformation. Election disinformation is defined as deliberate, organised dissemination of false or misleading information with the goal of influencing election outcomes. This can take many forms, including false or misleading news stories, provocative social media posts, or digital astroturfing to manipulate and create uncertainty among voters, and undermine trust in the electoral process by eroding the credibility of candidates or political parties. Savvy political actors would hire influence operators, troll farms , or digital armies to spread campaign messaging and carry out malign influence campaigns against their opponents in an attempt to gain an advantage. These strategies may include using social media for counter-mobilisation (organising people against the opposition), discourse framing (shaping public discussion) in their favour, preference divulgence (gathering information about false preferences), and elite coordination (consolidating) with other elites. In recent years, social media platforms have become a valuable tool for political campaigns because they enable political players to reach a large audience quickly and effectively. More specifically, social media manipulation has become an integral part of information wars and election rigging, and it poses the potential to undermine the integrity of elections and earn its instigators an electoral advantage. Incumbent state actors and adversarial political players routinely leverage social media to extend their hold on power and limit opposition candidates by spreading disinformation, propaganda, and other malicious messaging that aims to interfere with and undermine the electoral process. In Malaysia and the Philippines , CSOs play an important role in observing elections by monitoring and detecting electoral fraud and subversion tactics such as disinformation, polarising messages, or hate speech. Governments, civil society organisations (CSOs), and election officials must cooperate in reaffirming their commitment to democratic practices to safeguard their electoral process and guarantee that the elections are free, fair, and clean. It is crucial to realise that erosion of trust is the primary cause of people's susceptibility to disinformation, and that the public need to be better educated in order to be more informed. CSOs must be granted more autonomy in order to enhance political education and increase media literacy, critical thinking, and fact-checking among the general public. This can be accomplished by allowing CSOs to establish independent oversight bodies and granting journalists and the media the freedom to observe and cover the voting process. Additionally, policymakers must maintain a close working relationship with social media platforms and tech companies to ensure they adhere to their content moderation policies and ensure, and that false or misleading posts are removed from their platforms as quickly as possible to limit public exposure and prevent harm. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

23847be1-eec8-4342-bd9e-13e81f0d71a7 < All op-eds Indo-Pacific formulation and ‘sea-changes’ for India Ms. Shereen Sherif In the light of the Indo-Pacific gaining significance in geo-political conception governing strategic choices of countries within and beyond the geographical expanse of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it is no doubt that India has been gaining an increasing role in the security architecture involving the region. With its predominant maritime thrust, Indo-Pacific merits an analysis of its effects upon its eponymous ocean and the role of India. Growing salience of Indo-Pacific is a result of, among other things, the changing strategic, security and economic interactions in the region with a pivotal role accorded to India and the Indian Ocean. Historically, Indian Ocean has been a major site of competition and contestation among different stakeholder countries for political power and economic resources. During the colonial times, the Western imperial powers controlled vast majority of the Indian Ocean littoral, deciding much of the internal political and external defence policies of the colonies. A case in point is the role of the Royal Navy’s control of Indian Ocean and their extended influence on all the entry and exit points, reducing the Indian Ocean to a British lake. The end of the colonial era heralded a new geopolitical order resulting in the entry of new players in the field. The British withdrawal from the East of Suez in 1960s generated a debate about the supposed power vacuum in the region. The Afro-Asian countries’ call for maintaining the Indian Ocean as a peace zone was ineffective in restricting the entry of United States and Soviet Union’s into the Indian Ocean. Great power presence and their politics in the Indian Ocean during the cold war period assumed competitive dimensions, which may be considered a transformative event. The end of Cold War, the emerging multi polarity in Asia and the resultant power shift from West to East further pushed a reconsideration of geo-politics in the region with an initial focus on Asia-Pacific and a gradual shift to Indo-Pacific. While ostensibly, the reconfiguration of Asia-Pacific into Indo-Pacific accords India and the Indian Ocean a central role in global security, bringing India into the foreground is a direct outcome of the strategic calculus of different stakeholder countries’ with their security and economic interests tied to the region. The recent transformation is also reflective of India’s potential as a counterweight to a growing China. It is clear from the above that contingent on political, strategic and economic imperatives, geopolitical frameworks have undergone transformations throughout history and countries around the world resort to various mechanisms to strengthen their reach in a region of strategic prominence. While the nomenclature and general functioning within the framework of the Indo-Pacific points to a significant economic and military role played by India in the strategic grouping/theatre, the significance of the Indo-Pacific is also a function of domestic and international politics and economic considerations of other nations in the region. The responses of two major powers in the region, Russia and China, is crucial in determining the future course of action within the geo-strategic set up as any alterations in the balance of power in any sub region will have a direct bearing on the rest of the grouping. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Through most of his 40 year illustrious career General Hasnain has served in turbulent environment and hot spots. From Sri Lanka to Siachen Glacier, from the North East to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), and in UN operations from Mozambique to Rwanda, he has seen it all in crucial appointments. < Back Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) served seven tours in J&K, decorated in almost of them and knows the J&K conflict comprehensively. He commanded the Indian Army’s Srinagar based 15 Corps and is today one of the foremost writers and analysts on J&K, Pakistan, Middle East and transnational extremist violence. He is a much sought after speaker and writes for major Indian newspapers – The Times of India, The Indian Express, The Hindu, Deccan Chronicle and The Asian Age, besides being a regular participant in television debates on mainstream television. With a strong academic background from Sherwood College Nainital, St Stephen’s College Delhi, the Royal College of Defence Studies, Kings College London and the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, Hawaii, he has been at the forefront of encouraging the adoption of the US initiated Scholar Warrior concept in the Indian Army. He has spoken at the Lee Kwan Yu School for Public Policy, the Rajaratnam School for International Studies and the Indian Institute for South Asian Studies, all at Singapore. He has also spoken at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), London. He is associated with the Vivekanand International Foundation and Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, as Distinguished Fellow and is on the Governing Council of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS). He speaks on National Security at various military, civil services and corporate institutions with a view to enhance India’s strategic culture. He has recently visited Iran and was at the forefront of neutralizing Pakistani influence operations in that country. On 13 Jul 2018 The President of India appointed Lt Gen Hasnain as Chancellor of the Central University of Kashmir. Gen Hasnain has six decorations awarded by the President for India and two by the Army Chief. He superannuated from the Indian Army in Jul 2013 after 40 years of active service.

Dr. Bec Strating is the Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, in the Department of Politics, Media and Philosophy at La Trobe University in Melbourne. B.Strating@latrobe.edu.au < Back Dr. Bec Strating Dr. Bec Strating is the Director of La Trobe Asia and an Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations in the Department of Politics, Media and Philosophy. Her research focuses on maritime disputes in Asia and Australian foreign and defence policy. She has written three monographs, most recently "Defending the Maritime Rules-Based Order" (2020). In 2019, she was awarded an Asian Studies Visiting Fellowship to research at the East West Center in Washington DC for three months. She was also a visiting affiliate fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, an affiliated researcher at Georgetown University and is currently a non-visiting fellow at the Perth US Asia Centre. She has co-edited two special issues and multiple journal articles and book chapters. In 2019, her second monograph, The Post-Colonial Security Dilemma, was published with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in 2019. In 2018, she was awarded the prestigious Boyer Prize by the Australian Institute of International Affairs for best article published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs in 2017 for her paper ‘Timor-Leste’s Foreign Policy Approach to the Timor Sea: Pipeline or Pipedream?’ She has written over 70 commentary pieces for organisations such as Lowy Institute, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The Conversation, East Asia Forum, New Mandela, Asia Global Online and Australian Outlook. She regularly provides comment to media including the ABC, the Australian and Sydney Morning Herald. She has testified in Australian federal parliament as an expert witness. B.Strating@latrobe.edu.au

7b48db71-2f02-4ed3-ae3f-84088a3eccee < All op-eds Does India Need a New Indo-Pacific Strategy? Oorja Tapan The reception of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic construct adjoining the contiguous waters of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean has gained traction in recent years with the swing of the geopolitical centre of gravity towards this region. This has also overlapped with the noteworthy rise of China, it's territorial claims in the South China Sea, its belligerence in the East China Sea and its rapid advance into the Indian Ocean through strategic and economic initiatives like the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI). Throughout history, the maritime domain has played a vital role in creating global and regional powers and affecting the security “Supercomplex” of geographical regions. Pertinent examples corroborate this aspect like the UK Navy being a major factor contributing to “Pax-Britannica” (1815-1914) in 19th century or the U.S. establishing military (naval) bases throughout the Asia-Pacific in order to maintain its ‘Sphere of Influence’ for “Pax Americana” in 20th century. India had been distant from the strategic standing of Indo-Pacific region in the last century (for the most part) and thus, this region has not featured much in India’s security architecture. China’s military and economic expansion (‘String of Pearls’ strategy) in the Indo-Pacific region has forewarned India of the certainty of these fluctuating dynamics. India clearly needs a viable Indo-Pacific strategy to secure its maritime domain for a primary ‘balance of power’ in the region. With the shocks in international politics by the Afghanistan and Ukraine crises, the paradoxes in our strategic culture are being exposed. Our civilisational history has become so imperious that India has been repeatedly ignoring its geography and therefore overlooking the “geo” comes first being common in both geopolitics and geostrategy . The minds of Indian policymakers are preoccupied with Pakistan and China vis-a-vis ‘continentality’. This has been a distraction because we have not been conscious enough of our 7500 km of coastline engulfing major choke points and lines of commerce. Thus, India needs to look at Indo-Pacific as a more workable opportunity to extend its influence. Secondly, there is an opportunity for India to discover ‘plug points’ for integration in the supply chains, especially the more ‘organic’ global supply chain – as opposed to China’s state-driven chain – which could also act to strengthen Quad linkages through initiatives like Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF formed in 2022), Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI), Blue Dot Network, Asia-Africa growth Corridor, among others. Projected future trends for the Indian economy include further maritime connectivity, a multilateral approach for transition from the existing ‘Brown’ to a ‘Blue’ economy, and prospects and challenges ascending from the maritime impact of ‘Industry 4.0.’ India is not a weighty financial or military player east of the Malacca Straits , but to the west of the straits, its geography makes it the foremost anchor for any stratagem that connects the Pacific with the Indian Ocean. India shares maritime and land borders with four out of the ten ASEAN states. Extending out 2,000 kilometres into the Indian Ocean, India leads the western end of the Malacca Straits; thereby enhancing China’s “Malacca dilemma” while simultaneously creating opportunity for itself. India's Indo-Pacific strategy has now become, in the main, a subset of its China policy, with significant contradictions . The Indian government denies balancing China, while at the same time, its actions affirm that very interpretation when it seeks to build increasingly close strategic relationships with the United States and its allies, such as Japan and other regional powers in the maritime domain, specifically, the Indo-Pacific. Many scholars interpret this as “hedging” – not only by India, but by other smaller and middle powers in the region to offset the Chinese threat. Rajagopalan (2020) terms such a diplomatic tool as “evasive balancing”, which is neither pure balancing nor pure hedging- but a contradictory mixture of efforts to engage in balancing while trying to reassure the target. Being extremely cautious of its tedious relationship with China, India has shied away from several military exercises.From the economic standpoint, China is one of India’s largest and most significant trading partners. From a security outlook, the Doklam standoff brought the two countries to confrontation, and with India being the only QUAD state sharing continental borders with China, India was wary of outrightly antagonising China. This is also because China views the idea of Indo-Pacific from a containment logic. It calls out QUAD as an ’Asian NATO’ . However, LAC clashes between the two nations in 2020 made India reconsider its China Strategy, consequently allowing Australia to be a part of Malabar military exercises along with Japan and USA and thus acknowledging the need for a cohesive Indo-Pacific strategy. With access to Indonesia’s strategically located deep sea Sabang port, Oman’s Duqm port, Iran’s Chabahar port and INS Vikrant commissioned now, India has been pacing its maritime and naval doctrines to modernise its Navy and is strategically seeking to counter aggressive manoeuvres at the sea. As Ashley Tellis points out , the re-emergence of China as a global power fundamentally challenges the United States and India in different, but complementary, ways. America’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ involves rebalancing America’s global military weight to Asia, strengthening its traditional alliances in the region and building new partnerships, including with India. Yet, India finds itself hesitant to follow through the logic of “buck-passing by USA” to itself, along with other American allies in Asia. Self-doubt, fears about losing strategic autonomy, apprehensions about being a junior partner and domestic political concerns have significantly limited Delhi’s capacity for strategic cooperation with powers bigger than itself. Many of the Indo-Pacific regional responses to China’s rise, including India’s, are corroborated by different scholars as diplomatic tools of balancing (covert/internal or visible/external; soft or hard), reassurance strategies, hedging, appeasement, and “bandwagoning” in the balance of power literature . The balancing component of India's China strategy contains both internal and external balancing elements. India’s Indo-Pacific strategy is a subset of this whole. Other than normal economic, security or diplomatic intercourse, India involves itself in external balancing with China through partnerships with the United States, Japan, Australia, France, UAE, Bahrain, ASEAN, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, Seychelles, Mauritius, and other African states and SIDS along with multiple military exercises. On the internal balancing side, India is engaged in setting up a new army strike corps facing China, repositioning Indian air power to this border, building up Indian infrastructure along the joint border, and enhancing India's nuclear and space deterrence capabilities. However, the Indian government stresses on an inclusive, all-pervasive definition of Indo-Pacific, not directed against China (thus, reassuring) or any other actor in the maritime domain. India should analyse whether the aforementioned mix of internal, bilateral and regional responses of India in its China Policy, with Indo-Pacific as a subset, are proving helpful for it, specifically, in dealing with China or not. The members of Indo-Pacific Circle should further delve into question of ‘balancing’ in IR theories to explore the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), the conceptual problems of alliance and alliance/alignment formation. India’s meandering balancing strategies vis-à-vis China with a mix of cooperation and confrontation in the domain of Indo-Pacific become more problematic with rising Chinese aggression. India needs a solid and concrete positioning as well as an assertive posture in the Indo-Pacific. OORJA TAPAN is a PhD scholar and Junior Research Fellow in Diplomacy and Disarmament Division at Centre for International Politics, Organisation & Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

The Indo-Pacific Circle is a knowledge and networking platform that hosts early and mid-career scholars from India and ASEAN countries engaged in shaping emergent narratives in the region. The Indo-Pacific Circle is a curated network of early and mid-career scholars from the Indo-Pacific engaged in shaping the emergent narratives of the region. The Indo-Pacific Circle has three main objectives: Network & Build Community Co-Create & Define the Indo-Pacific Amplify Indo-Pacific Voices Around the Globe If you are an early, mid-career scholar (aged 25-45 years) based in the region and working on issues concerning the Indo-Pacific, and would like to: - Connect with other scholars from the region - Amplify your expertise among the international IR community - Get published on IPC’s platform JOIN THE CIRCLE. APPLY NOW OUR MENTORS Dr. BEC STRATING Dr. Bec Strating is the Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, in the Department of Politics, Media, and Philosophy at La Trobe University in Melbourne. KNOW MORE OUR HOST INSTITUTIONS Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR) is a New Delhi based think tank that combines rigorous academic research with policy advocacy and strategic consultancy. Read more STEERING COMMITTEE Dr. Happymon Jacob Dr. Happymon Jacob is the Founder and Honourary Director of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research. Dr Jacob is Associate Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). READ MORE Lt. Gen. Hooda (Retd) Lt. Gen. Hooda (Retd) is a Co-founder and Director of the Centre for Defense and Security of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research. Lt. Gen. Hooda was commissioned into the 4th Battalion of the 4th Gorkha Rifles in 1976 and initially served in Nagaland during the peak of insurgency. READ MORE OUR TEAM Gaurav Saini Read More Amba Wattal Read More Devika Makkat Read More

< Back PROF. JAGANNATH PANDA EDITOR-INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION jpanda@isdp.eu Prof. Jagannath Panda is the Head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA). He is also the Executive Editor for ISDP. Dr. Panda is a Professor at the Department of Regional and Global Studies at the University of Warsaw. He is also the Director for Europe-Asia Research Cooperation at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies ( YCAPS ); and a Senior Fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies ( HCSS ) in the Netherlands. He is the Series Editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia. Prof. Panda is a Contributing Editor for The National Interest (Washington DC) and an Author at The Diplomat . He is an Advisor to the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS), and is also the Member of the Editorial Board of various international journals such as the Journal of Asian Public Policy ( JAPP: Routledge ) and The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (KIDA). jpanda@isdp.eu 123-456-7890

955b0062-ca5f-40b9-9e33-cf64b00cb2ab < All op-eds Can Loss and Damage Trigger Solidarity in the Indo-Pacific? Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Ms Priyanka Jaiswal The 27 th Conference of Parties (COP-27) in Sharm el-Sheikh, held in November 2022, concluded with the establishment of the much-awaited Loss and Damage Fund . The most vulnerable, developing countries, including countries of the Indo-Pacific, have been demanding finance from the industrialised countries (that have ‘historical responsibility’ for climate change) for the losses and damages suffered by the former. Hence, this outcome is regarded as a historic victory for them, and more generally, for climate justice. Even South Asian nations that have traditionally not had a common position on climate change (despite common interests) in the climate change negotiations, spoke in one voice about the urgency of setting up a loss and damage financing facility at COP-27. Climate change-related extreme weather events have become the new normal in South Asia. In 2022 alone, the region witnessed a deadly heatwave (mainly in India and Pakistan) and catastrophic floods (the worst being in Pakistan). The future does not look promising either as studies reveal that such phenomena are expected to get worse in the coming decades, as also indicated by the sixth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It is against this background that the solidarity shown by developing, vulnerable countries of South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region at COP-27 was unprecedented. South Asia at COP-27 The South Asian nations’ positions on the loss and damage issue were strengthened by the scale of disasters that the region faced in 2022. The devastating 2022 Pakistan floods, which affected almost 33 million people and caused damage amounting to USD 15 billion, in particular, led to the country’s leadership taking charge of the loss and damage negotiations as a part of the G-77 & China. As large parts of Pakistan continue to remain underwater, with many people still living in relief camps and many having lost their shelter and livelihoods, the country is in dire need of international assistance for recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. Loss and damage has been one of the thorniest issues in global climate governance because of its association with liability and compensation, which industrialised countries have long resisted in the negotiations. Although the first call for addressing climate-induced loss and damage was raised by Vanuatu in 1991 and the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM) was established in 2013 more than two decades later, it took almost a decade since then to establish a Loss and Damage Fund. The road to establishing this fund at COP-27 was also arduous as industrialised countries continued to use various tactics to dilute the CBDR-RC (Common but Differentiated Responsibilities & Respective Capabilities) principle of the UNFCCC by demanding countries such as India and China to contribute to the fund; and at times, by attempting to restrict the number of countries that could access the fund. They also launched an insurance-based mechanism – ‘Global Shield’ – to support the most vulnerable countries, which was seen by developing countries and non-governmental organisations as a mere “ distraction ” from their obligation to establish the loss and damage fund. The agreement is a significant win for the Global South, including for South Asia that unitedly fought for the inclusion of loss and damage as a COP-27 agenda item and thereafter, the establishment of the fund itself. Moreover, this move is being seen as a victory of climate justice in general. The fact that despite having per capita emissions well below the global average, South Asian countries, including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal are among the top ten most affected countries underscores a form of climate injustice that needs to be addressed in global climate governance. All South Asian nations and developing, vulnerable countries of the Indo-Pacific region collectively demanded support for both ex-ante (early warning, resilience-building, etc.) and ex-post (relief, recovery, etc.) measures to deal with climate-induced loss and damage. They also stressed upon the need for new, additional, adequate, and predictable funding, in the form of grants rather than loans or other financial mechanisms that could push developing countries into deeper debt. The Battle is far from Over On loss and damage, the battle is far from over. Several questions with respect to who would contribute to the fund, how much, and who would be the beneficiaries, remain unresolved. Which countries would constitute “ particularly vulnerable ” within the purview of the fund remains unclear and therefore, the probability of the emergence of contentions over it remain high. Until the fund is operationalized, and its decision-making and technical procedures are determined, the Global South would have to continue to keep fighting for their rightful share of finances to deal with climate-induced loss and damage. Having learnt lessons from the past on climate finance-related pledges made by the industrialised countries that have time and again been broken, the Global South cannot afford to dilute the solidarity that it showcased at COP-27. It is in the interest of countries of the Global South, including countries of the Indo-Pacific that are considered highly vulnerable to climate change, to keep aside their geopolitical and other differences, to push the industrialised ones to deliver on their commitments and pay up their fair share of climate finance. This is crucial for the upcoming COP-28 in Dubai, wherein the decisions of COP-27 will be further concretized. Countries of South Asia (and the Indo-Pacific region) have put in place several national plans and strategies to mitigate and adapt to climate change, but progress on cooperation through regional organisations has been slow, the causes of which primarily lay in the complex geopolitics of the region. To deal with a challenge that is not confined by political boundaries, and which is characterised by shared and similar challenges and interests, it becomes imperative for South Asia and even countries of the broader Indo-Pacific region to strengthen regional collaboration on disaster risk reduction, climate-resilient reconstruction, and building overall socio-ecological and economic resilience. The region is in dire need of financial and technical resources and capacities to cope with climate change-related impacts. Presenting a united front through a regional common position, not only on loss and damage, but also other pillars of climate action (mitigation and adaptation), would help amplify the region’s concerns in global forums and thus the region’s needs could be better met. The issue of loss and damage presents an opportunity for countries of the Indo-Pacific to collaborate in many ways, including sharing technical knowledge on vulnerabilities and assessing the requirements in terms of resources. It remains to be seen whether climate change could indeed emerge as a catalyst for cooperation in South Asia that brings the region’s countries together, not only to forge an efficient and inclusive regional partnership, but also to transition towards a sustainable future. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

96097172-78de-4e94-9d7a-fa004fe415e9 < All op-eds A Comparative Study Media Systems in India and Japan Lucy Alexander Media in every country is entwined with politics, international relations, culture, and history. Its functioning is primarily determined by the type of government, with different degrees of control or none at all. It acts as the bridge between the government and its citizens and plays a constructive and crucial role in shaping public opinion and forming political agendas. Mass media does not function in isolation; it is either state-owned or privately owned. The significance of media can vary with each government; in a democracy, it typically acts as the “watchdog of the government” or the “fourth pillar of democracy.” What determines the narrative of different media systems has been a long-held debate. Factors which include in governing mass media comprises politics, history, culture, and religion. India and Japan have varied approaches in terms of media regulations and the selection of the countries offer different dimensions for comparisons. There are democracies (India and Japan); developed countries (Japan) and developing countries (India and Japan); patriarchal and conservative societies (India and Japan). Indian media has both publicly owned and private-owned media houses. Due to the high commercialization of the Indian media, it has become a machinery of political propaganda and an instrument for industrialists for their interests. As a result of these ties, objective reporting of news becomes an issue as media houses would have biases and inclinations towards different parties. “Indian media is divided politically as well as ideologically. Some newspapers favor secular ideology while some support right-wing politics, a divide similar to nationalists and loyalists press before partition and this divide is further subdivided on different issues” (Kumar, 2011). While media systems in Japan are in line with the political framework within which they operate. Japan has had a single-party rule for most of its post-war period, where opposition parties have remained out of power for a considerable period. Therefore, media is very cautious when it comes to writing about the ruling political party. During the 1940s and 1950s a popular political satire; was suspended in 1954 soon after the end of the American occupation. This was the first instance when the freedom of expression was suppressed by the Japanese government. Both India and Japan are democracies, which guarantee freedom of expression in their constitution, however this freedom can be seen as restrained with biased and prejudiced reporting by the media. What can be seen in both the media is that though issues are discussed, there is no addressal of solutions or reforms. In turn media becomes a catalyst for reinforcing the stereotypes. In Japan, due to the culture of apology, the accused in any controversy will proceed with resigning from their positions as seen in the case of Yoshiro Mori; former Prime Minister of Japan made headlines in February 2021 for making sexist comments to a Japanese Olympic Committee meeting that women board members talked too much which eventually led to the resignation of Yoshiro Mori. This again does not initiate any change in policies, change by politicians or lead to a slowdown or lessening of such incidents happening in the future. While in case of India, it is a step back from Japan in terms of issuing apology, but both the countries don’t provide any redressal of the problems. Despite both the countries’ constitution being shaped by western ideals and features, and the influence of western media has only been increasing in the respective countries, the society in India and Japan is patriarchal and conservative in nature; therefore, it cannot be assumed that media in any democracy would guarantee freedom of expression. Media has an influencing role in changing perceptions but not enough for creating changes. If Indians and Japanese are asked to name the most influential group in their society, all may choose the media but when it comes to who is most influential in policymaking, the media is seen as less influential than bureaucrats, politicians, or big business. Therefore, because of strict legal rules on their use, they have played a very limited role in making policy changes in India and Japan than in the United States and some other democracies. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More