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Chennai Residency 23-27 July, 2022 This annual residency brought together 50-60 members of the Indo-Pacific Circle to discuss their ongoing research, take part in workshops, and spark new collaborative research opportunities. Experts Amb P.S Raghavan Suhasini Haidar Daniel Shields Prof. Shankari Sundararaman Prof. Lawrence Prabhakar Amb Rakesh Sood Cmde R.S Vasan Virsa Perkins MK Narayanan Manu Pillai Emily Tallo Kenji Miyata Michael Costa Sonika Gupta Organizing Team Devyani Chaturvedi Laura Rose O'Connor Devika Makkat Esha Chadha Dr Tishya Khillare Bashir Ali Abbas Dr Gaurav Saini Prathit Singh

10 Lecture Course INDO PACIFIC Video Channel Name Play Video Play Video 00:23 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:32 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:29 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:31 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:23 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:32 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:29 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:31 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy.

82e4faaa-176d-485c-9cb1-622dce764eb4 < All op-eds 5O Years of Indonesia-ROK Relations: Challenges and Opportunities Ratih Indraswari Indonesia and the Republic of Korea(ROK) welcome their 50th bilateral anniversary this year. The history of their relations dates back to 1968, when Indonesia opened its consular services in Seoul, followed by the establishment of the Indonesia Embassy in 1973. The relationship was generally on a low profile. In 2006 Roh Moo Hyun and SBY agreed to establish a strategic partnership status. However, it was only after Moon Jae In's presidency, that relations progressed rapidly. In 2017 Moon brought up a delegation of 200 businessmen to Indonesia and announced its New Southern Policy emphasizing the three pillars, prosperity, peace, and people. The initiative clearly articulated Seoul's focus on its Southern neighbours by elevating ASEAN Member State status, including Indonesia. Indonesia welcomed the initiative. Jokowi and Moon upgraded the relationship into Special Strategic Partnership in 2017 . This partnership focused on cooperation, including defense and foreign affairs, bilateral trade and infrastructure development, people-to-people exchanges, and regional & global cooperation. With the opposition winning the election, there is scepticism about President Yoon Suk Yeol's policy towards ASEAN, particularly Indonesia, as Seoul's important partner. A shift to ROK's traditional partner, the United States is the highlight of the ROK conservatives party. with increasing provocation from North Korea, Seoul has redrawn its focus on the security of the Korean Peninsula. Despite the presence of doubts, Indonesia-ROK relations are set to be stronger. Economics is undoubtedly leading the bilateral relationship. Trade trends between the two countries rose. Quite Uninhibted by Covid, trade continues to grow from 16,3 million USD in 2017 to 20.5 million USD in 2022 . Making the ROK the 7th largest trading partner of Indonesia. Furthermore, it is expected that the trade quota will further rise along with the commencement of IK CEPA (Indonesia – Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement). Similarly, the investment trend with regard to Indonesia has also increased. In 2017 investment accounted for 2 million USD, however in 2022 after a meeting with President Yoon in Seoul, President Jokowi managed to secure an investment commitment of up to 6.7 million USD focusing on Electric Vehicle production and its subsidiary . However, for Jakarta, the picture does not seem very bright. Indonesia has much homework left. Based on the ASEAN-Korea Figure 2021 data, in comparison to other Southeast Asian member states, the trade volume of the ROK with Indonesia in 2021 stood 4th at 11% , behind Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia. The gap with Vietnam is high with almost half of ROK's total trade at 46% done with Vietnam. On investment, within the last three years average, Indonesia ranks third behind Vietnam and Singapore . Hence, Indonesia needs to seek niche sectors. One way is to shift cooperation from manufacturing to high technology field in which Seoul has the competitive advantage. Especially in sectors related to smart cities, electric vehicles, batteries, and digital trade cooperation. Another way, is to utilize public-private partnerships in investment projects, making use Korean companies and SMEs subsidiaries in the aforementioned sectors. Politically, during the ASEAN-ROK Meeting in Cambodia, President Yoon launched KASI (Korea ASEAN Solidarity Initiative) that further highlights ASEAN Centrality and supporting the ASEAN Outlook of Indo-Pacific. President Yoon's meeting with President Jokowi in July 2022 was his first official summit with ASEAN Leaders. Importantly, Indonesia assumes the ASEAN presidency in 2023 and plays an important role within ROK’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet a concrete roadmap of KASI remains to be unveiled. Since KASI is argued as a product of ROK’s US-centric government, its compatibility with AOIP is in question. Will KASI support ASEAN Centrality as promised when the tension between China and the US is heightened? An honest assessment must be applied to the security front. Indonesia has the capacity to provide a good office. In July 2023, the top nuclear envoys of the ROK and the US met in Indonesia to coordinate their responses to the North Korea missile threat. However, its position as an external party in the Korean peninsula issue is awkward. Indonesia might offer its help through the ASEAN platform. ARF has been offering its venue for negotiation on the North Korea issue but its effectiveness is limited. Instead of on traditional security issues, Indonesia and ROK should spend their energy on non-traditional issues. In line with Indonesia's G20 goal to focus on global health architecture, both countries should work more on health security management. Efforts to address the global pandemic was successful in that Indonesia received 7 million USD on KOICA's Covid-19 responses program. Indonesia also played a co-chair of COVAX AMC, a vaccine-sharing facility to ensure regional resiliencies. This platform can be a base for Indonesia-ROK health management and later duplicated to prepare for future health threats. The people-to-people exchange is often heralded as the “crème de la crème” sector due to Hallyu popularity in Southeast Asia. K-wave is a one-sided love. ASEAN Youth's interest in Hallyu goes beyond the entertainment industry. Despite the pandemic, the ASEAN Korea Figure 2022 shows that throughout the year, inbound tourism from ASEAN to Korea is increasing. However, the ASEAN brand is limited. The lack of an “ASEAN Wave” is apparent. Last year, the ASEAN Korea Center conducted a Survey on Mutual Perception of ASEAN and Korean Youth . The survey shows that more than 90% of Korean youth experienced Korean arts and culture, and only 55% of Korean youth said that they have experienced ASEAN arts and culture. A similar trend can be seen in the Korean perception about Indonesia. Indonesia is famous as a global tourism destination. However, a comparison with other ASEAN countries shows this is not the case for Korean nationals. Korean visitors to Indonesia in 2019 were 388 thousand, in comparison to Vietnam (4.291), Thailand (1888), the Philippines (1783), Singapore (646), and Malaysia (508). In 2020 the overall tourism rate dropped and Indonesia ranked 5th as Korea's destination place. Increasing the number of Korean visitors to Indonesia is important to strengthen the people-pillar between Indonesia and ROK. Tourism is one obvious sector but the often neglected one is educational exchange. The overall score on the exchange program between Korean youth and ASEAN, including Indonesia, is very low. Although Southeast Asian students contribute as the second largest foreign students in Korea, Indonesian students only contribute 3% of the total . Furthermore, the number of Korean students in Indonesia are far smaller than other nationalities. Welcoming the 50th year of partnership, Indonesia and ROK face unprecedented challenges. There are some key issues that need attention. Firstly, health security and its impact on the economy need to be examined. Indonesia- ROK partnership must be the foundational pillar of regional resilience to mitigate risks. Secondly, the adoption of technology is crucial to address societal challenges and create prosperous cities, with the use of electric vehicles and sustainable technology. Thirdly, though traditional security matters amidst great power rivalry, yet regional peace is more important. Indonesia and ROK must remain strong in its standing for a peaceful region. Fourthly, cooperation must spill over to the grassroots level. Both countries should not be satisfied with elite level mutual understanding. Investment in youth is needed to create stronger people-to-people cooperation between Indonesia and ROK. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

76327b7b-9ef3-4dd2-ba2d-d8e90cd55081 < All op-eds Taiwan’s Critical Position in the Indo-Pacific: Implications for India Dr. Kaustav Padmapati The year 2022 was quite eventful for Taiwan as China did not stop its bullying tactics against the island nation and has been building up its military offensive against it. Taiwan constitutes a vital component of Indo Pacific region due to its crucial geographical and strategic position. To a significant extent, it is also due to the island nation’s critical position regarding Sino-US relations. Taiwan’s strategic location connects the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan . India is among the politically prominent players in the Indo- Pacific region along with China, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the countries of Southeast Asia. Shifting geopolitical calculations, with China’s emergence as a major player and the declining role of the United States as a major power, have moved global focus toward the Indo-Pacific region. Today, the region has become home to numerous flashpoints as Beijing desires to turn the power balance in its favour, while Washington is wary of Chinese intentions . There are several unresolved territorial and maritime issues in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s hostile claims on East and South China sea regions have led to competing territorial claims being raised by counties, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan. The relative decline of US influence in the Indo-Pacific has opened new opportunities for other significant powers such as Japan, Australia, and India to become active in preserving political stability and supporting economic sustainability in the Indo-Pacific Region. India is a prominent Asian power. Indo- Pacific is both a strategic and a profitable realm that includes pivotal marine routes that link the coastlands of the two abysses. Many countries, including India, have a serious worry about Beijing’s intervention or greater Chinese presence within the Indo- Pacific and in the international community means for issues such as human rights, rule of law, democracy, and the most burning territorial issue like Taiwan. China’s increasing presence close to the territorial waters, and ambitious projects in the neighbourhood under the Belt and Road Initiative are a direct threat to India’s position as the main security provider and regional power. Taiwan also has great geopolitical significance in the Indo- Pacific Region. The island is located in the middle of what the United States considered its “forward defense perimeter” in the 1950s and what China now considers the so-called “First Island Chain”, which runs from Japan through the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Taiwan protects immediate access to the Western Pacific via the Yonaguni Strait between Taiwan and Japan, and the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. On the east coast, Taiwan’s deep-water naval bases at Su’ao and Hualien allow submarines to directly slip unnoticed into one of the deepest maritime channels in the Pacific. Therefore, Taiwan is crucial for Beijing not only politically but also for its geopolitical significance. Taiwan has been facing an increasingly aggressive China since 2021. New speculations and anxiety have surfaced about the political future of the island nation as Chinese President Xi Jinping, on 8 th October 2021 declared China’s possible peaceful “reunification” with Taiwan . This controversial statement came after Beijing sent a record number of military jets into Taiwan's defence zone. Since the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) Tsai Ing Wen became the President of Taiwan in 2016, Beijing resorted to a series of aggressive actions against Taipei, which included economic pressures and military bullying. President Xi during China’s 20th Communist Party Congress held in October 2022, renewed the vow to reunify the PRC with Taiwan. President Xi’s wish is made even more real by an increased People Liberation Army’s (PLA) activities surrounding Taiwan and Japan’s southwestern islands. The world is a witness that PLA’s movements surrounding Taiwan have increased tremendously in recent months. According to media reports, from July to August 2022, there was a 766% increase in the monthly average of PLA aircraft flying around Taiwan’s airspace. US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taipei even fueled these activities. Beijing was furious as Washington “blatantly violated China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” it also launched missiles, which landed in Japan’s economic exclusion-zone waters after passing over the Taiwan Strait. The PLA Navy also retaliated as the presence of defense vessels in the waters surrounding the island significantly increased since Pelosi’s visit. China repeatedly claims that Taiwan is no longer just a sovereignty issue for China but a key component in achieving a geopolitical victory in the China-US great power rivalry and challenging the Indo-Pacific rules-based order. This motive in Chinese territorial behaviour is a cause for worry for India and some other fellow democracies. New Delhi advocates a rules-based, open, balanced liberal order and stable trading environment in the Indo- Pacific region. India looks at the Indo- Pacific as an open, libertarian, and democratic zone. So, New Delhi must protect Taiwan to ensure rules-based liberal order in the Indo-Pacific region. However, according to several China experts, the journey of India- Taiwan relations has happened under the shadow of China only. Taiwan never featured prominently within India’s Act East Policy as always been overshadowed by much bigger Sino- Indian ties. Reacting to all the complaints from Taipei, New Delhi finally broke its silence in August 2019 as India’s Ministry of External Affair’s spokesperson made a short and calculated statement as Beijing was overreacting during Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in the same month. Reacting to the Chinese pressure around Taiwan Strait, New Delhi rejected any unilateral action to change the status quo and to maintain peace and stability in the region . Taiwan appreciated India’s stand. The PRC strictly practices the “one China” policy and has always considered “Taiwan” as an inseparable piece of mainland China. Over the years, the concept of the “one China” principle evolved along with China’s attempt to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. According to Harsh P. Pant (2022) from the Observer Research Foundation, the omission of the “one China” principle in the official statement from the Ministry of External Affairs is intentional . It was shared in 2014 by then-Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sushma Swaraj, that Beijing could not expect India to verbalize its support when China has ignored Indian sovereignty concerns in Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. Beijing reacted immediately as Sun Weidong, Chinese envoy to India called on the Indian Government to reiterate its support for the “one China” principle. There are numerous benefits if New Delhi engages more closely with Taipei. Taiwan is a young democracy in East Asia, which offers a pluralistic and inclusive experience to its residents. Taiwan’s vibrant democratic model, which is praised in the Indo- Pacific region for its openness and transparency, could oppose PRC’s authoritarian development model. The Indo- Pacific region deserves more free and democratic liber democracies like Taiwan . So, it is the responsibility of all the major democracies of the region to protect Taiwan from potential Chinese invasion as the PRC attempts to diminish the civil society of Taiwan and confidence in its governance through various ways of using strong words and coercion. So, being a fair democracy, India must be concerned about Taiwan’s future as reunification by force or war would disrupt sea lines of communication and technology supply chains by providing China with a dominant status in the first island chain to the second island chain. In the face of assertive China, it’s the appropriate time for New Delhi to engage more politically and economically with Taiwan. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

97074589-c679-483d-a375-6ee0ad46237d < All op-eds IMEC Roadblocks: India's 'Look West' Maritime Vision Hits a Snag Sanchari Ghosh On the sidelines of the G20 Summit in September 2023, India, Italy, France, Germany, the European Union, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia jointly signed a memorandum of understanding for the establishment of the India-Middle-East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which encompasses both railway and sea links . The strategic location of the Middle East at the crossroads of two continents - Asia and Europe, and India’s reliance on the Middle East for a substantial portion of its energy imports hold pivotal significance in India’s broader maritime diplomacy within the context of the Indo-Pacific. As the IMEC seeks to extend India's enduring connection with the Middle East, this article aims to contextualize it within the framework of India’s maritime diplomacy, especially the ‘Look West’ component of it. IMEC is a renewed attempt to reinvigorate the link that dates back to the days of the Indus Valley Civilization, which was further expanded during the Roman times when trade contracts were established between Kerala and shippers in Alexandria.India's engagement with the Arab Gulf countries had been expanding since the 1970s, well before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh launched India’s "Look West" policy in 2005. The post-Cold War dynamics, in which the Gulf States host India’s large diaspora and supply the bulk of India’s oil as well as the historical economic and cultural linkages led to this development. The ‘Look West’ intensified through its transformation into ‘Act West' with special impetus on maritime diplomacy Under Modi’s regime bringing India closer to Gulf countries and turning it into one of the most important dimensions of India’s Indian Ocean diplomacy, the Indian Navy has not only initiated a program for security collaboration with the Gulf States but has also strengthened its operational coordination with their navies through defense cooperation. The IMEC helps India overcome its barrier to establishing land connectivity with West Asia which has been disrupted due to perennially distraught relations with Pakistan. This proposed corridor would bypass this hindrance by linking ports on India’s west coast to those in the UAE and Saudi Arabia to further boost India’s maritime diplomacy with the West Asian region. Although this project matters to all the concerned countries as a counter arrangement to China’s Belt and Road Initiative that aims to position China as the centre of the global economy, it especially supplements India’s broader vision of the Indo-Pacific that prioritises the multilateral organisations like GCC as part of its ‘Look West’ maritime diplomacy. As the IMEC strategically connects India to the Middle East and Europe, creating a comprehensive trade and energy network, it not only enhances India's economic ties but also strengthens its geopolitical influence across the Indo-Pacific region. Given India’s apparent hesitancy to fully align with the West, as demonstrated by its reluctance to perceive the Quad as an explicitly anti-China alliance, its preference for an evasive balancing approach, and its endorsement of the BRICS expansion , it looks for opportunities to re-establish connections with non-Western nations. The IMEC seamlessly fits into this broader geopolitical strategy. It also indicates India’s keenness to integrate the Western Indian Ocean into a cohesive space. The Western Indian Ocean assumes critical importance in realizing an integrated Indo-Pacific vision as it serves as a key maritime crossroads connecting the Indian Ocean to the broader Pacific region. This maritime domain plays a pivotal role in facilitating trade, energy transit, and strategic connectivity, bridging continents and fostering economic interdependence. This vision was previously absent from India's policies and a transformative reimagination has already materialized with India's endorsement of U2I2 (a grouping of India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States) mirroring the Quad in the Western Indian Ocean. However, some serious drawbacks arising out of logistical limitations, the complex geopolitics of the West Asian region, and the recent intensification of the Israel-Hamas War undermine the strategic and economic potential of the IMEC. The proposed plan contains two corridors: the east corridor connecting India to the Arabian Gulf (primarily a maritime route) and the northern corridor connecting the Arabian Gulf to Europe (a combination of railway and sea link). The objective here is to boost road, rail, and maritime connectivity, facilitating increased movement of goods and services among South Asia, West Asia and Europe. However, the overall process may face challenges with prohibitively high loading and unloading costs. The transportation of goods originating from Europe to reach India, and vice versa, which would be unloaded at Israeli ports, entails the use of expensive rail routes. Moreover, this transportation process involves traversing numerous border crossings, thereby necessitating the resolution of tariff and transit expenses. These challenges arise from logistical complexities, raising questions about the overall feasibility of the initiative. Moreover, the internal political instability in West Asia, which is the only region in the world lacking an inclusive regional security system complicates matters. From the decade-long rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia to the new forms of religious extremist groups in the region, the complex geopolitics of West Asia deters India from choosing a definite path concerning its ‘Look West’ policy. Although Iran has made slow progress in fully operationalizing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) – a corridor connecting India to the Caspian Sea, Russia, and Northern Europe through Iran, it is expected that India and Iran will soon sign a deal on the Chabahar Port. However, the decades-long hostility between Iran and Israel compromises the chosen route of IMEC that passes through the Israeli port of Haifa. This situation raises questions in Tehran. Consequently, India may find itself in a dilemma, whether to proceed with signing a deal on the Chabahar Port or move ahead with the IMEC. These problems have been compounded due to the intensification of the Israel-Hamas war which has created an obstacle for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to participate in the IMEC project alongside Israel. The success of the entire project hinges on the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, an extension of the Abraham Accords that led Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE to officially recognize Israel in August 2020. However, the Israeli bombardment of Gaza has halted the progression of this normalization process. Even if the war subsides , it would have a long-term impact on IMEC. Thus, the kind of diplomatic cooperation that IMEC warrants is questionable and is way more complicated now. India has long pursued proactive maritime diplomacy in the Indian Ocean to counter Chinese assertiveness. However, India's stance on West Asia is influenced by the region's internal dynamics, over which it has limited control. Despite the historical foundations of India's relations with the Arab Gulf countries, the intricacies of West Asia present challenges for its 'Look West' strategy. The success or failure of IMEC in the coming days hinges on how its member nations, including India, address these challenges. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

d6bbd321-6548-4d54-a89f-44f0aa4ae061 < All op-eds Russian Military offensive: The Revisionist Agenda and the Ripple Effects Dr. Nansi Paulraj Russian Military offensive: The Revisionist Agenda and the Ripple Effects Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, termed Special Military Operations (Invasion) started on 24th February 2022. The reason for this is to protect its Russian ethnic minorities, and halt the entry of Ukraine into NATO. In effect, Russia does not recognize Ukraine as an independent country and feels free to invade and bully it into submission. This war is costing massive loss of innocent lives and damage to infrastructure, in addition to going against both the nature and ecology of the region. This aggression has shaken European security architecture, which has been crafted since the second World War. I further ague that it has indeed strengthened NATO and brought the US into firm leadership in this region. The West and its allies have since imposed heavy sanctions upon Russia. Many countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and West Asia who believe in a multipolar world order have not taken sides, even as they oppose the war. They believe that Russia supports their national interests and that Russian security interests should be considered in any negotiations. They oppose all wars, and treat Ukraine in that continuity. The Ukrainian crisis has adversely affected the global economy, it is contributing to a sharp rise in the global defense expenditure and worse, the ‘nuclear aspirants’ reviving nuclear option. The humanitarian situation in Ukraine is persistently deteriorating with the huge exodus of refugees to the bordering states is at an alarming scale. At this juncture, the international community is facing more daunting questions and formidable challenges. Do the claims and comparison that Russia reviving its old order and Vladimir Putin is emulating Peter the Great with the ideology of “gathering the Russian lands” and the reign of Catherine the Great of the 18th century with idealistic and cynical policy, who conquered and controlled their neighboring territories an accurate analysis? Unlike Catherine II, who turned Russia into a great power, does Putin have long term strategy and a primary goal of securing Russia’s sphere of influence in the Eurasian space and holding back its drift over to the NATO. Is Russia trying to reassert its place in the new world order? Is Ukraine a pawn of the great power competition? These questions are conjectures. The post-Cold War optimistic security agreements from Atlantic to Urals are dilapidated. In this space, the US is trying to establish its primacy as the principal institution of reassurance of security in Europe. The competition between ‘Democracy’ and ‘Sovereign Democracy’ is playing with innocent lives. India’s strategic neutrality is becoming a major concern for US global primacy and its grand scheme of things in the Indo Pacific - but there seems no option for India. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

adac72d5-ff74-4dc6-afdb-ca1522319e48 < All op-eds Japan Eyes More Nuclear Power for Energy Security Parul Bakshi This blog has been republished from the East Asia Forum with permission. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed Japan to reevaluate its energy strategy once again. A sharp rise in the price of LNG, a lack of energy alternatives to reduce reliance on Russian LNG imports and Tokyo’s commitment to phasing out Russian coal and oil imports — all while ensuring Japan’s energy security — are making this reevaluation difficult. Even measures such as wearing turtlenecks to reduce energy consumption have been suggested. The Japanese government is unsurprisingly using the uncertainty around energy security as a reason to proactively push its nuclear energy policy. The policy can be traced to former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s administration. In 2012, following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Abe put nuclear energy back on the table as a potential critical energy source for Japan. Nuclear power has been touted as an important pillar in enhancing Japan’s energy self-sufficiency . Its use is also proposed as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, meet decarbonisation targets and a valuable source of baseload electricity. Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been emphasising the importance of nuclear power, calling for accelerating nuclear energy use on several occasions in the past year . But the Kishida cabinet’s Green Transformation (GX) strategic plan is being criticised for merely restating Japan’s decade old energy policy goals while pledging to accelerate the previously promised trend of nuclear energy use over the next ten years. GX assumes that nuclear power will account for 20–22 per cent of Japan’s energy mix in 2030 — a target that the Japanese government proposed in its Basic Energy Plan in 2014. In 2022, though, nuclear power only accounted for around 8 per cent of electricity supply. Kishida’s government hopes to extend the operation of nuclear power plants beyond the current 60-year limit to achieve this target. While the government believes life extensions are considerably cheaper than building new plants, they still represent substantial capital investments. The International Energy Agency estimates that extending the operational life of one gigawatt of nuclear capacity for at least 10 years costs US$500 million to US$1 billion . Even though countries like the United States have extended the lifespan of their reactors, no reactor in the world has been in commercial operation for more than 60 years. Kishida’s cabinet also proposes replacing aging nuclear facilities with new technologies like light-water reactors, small nuclear reactors and nuclear fusion. While these technologies could be promising, their present commercial viability is questionable. Even if nuclear power supplies only 10 per cent of Japan’s electricity after 2050, more than 10 new reactors may have to be built. Reactor restarts also incur significant costs ranging from US$700 million to US$1 billion per unit, regardless of reactor size or age. From the 2011 financial year to March 2017, total restart costs were estimated to be 1900 billion yen (US$17 billion) for eight companies, according to a Japan Atomic Industrial Forum survey . Yet according to polling by Nikkei , 53 per cent of Japanese support restarting reactors so long as safety can be ensured — the first time a majority has favoured this in over a decade. But stringent safety regulations, Nuclear Regulation Authority inspections and citizens’ class action lawsuits against reactors have hindered the desired pace of a post-Fukushima return to nuclear power . These bottlenecks continue to exist, even while public opinion might be shifting. However, over 3000 public comments received were critical of the nuclear policy shift. As a result, Yasutoshi Nishimura, Japan’s Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry, has stated that the government’s plan would be explained clearly to deepen public understanding of it. In response to Kishida’s announcement to consider the construction of new nuclear power plants in Japan, former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi reiterated reasons why the policy could fail. Other than stressing safety and financial concerns, he emphasised the dangers of nuclear waste and the challenges in finding a disposal site . Previously, observers have highlighted the need for Japan to provide more clarity on its nuclear energy policy, especially regarding the fate of existing nuclear reactors. The steps the government is taking to promote nuclear energy show the direction Japan intends to take. But there continue to be questions about how the government’s goals related to nuclear energy will be achieved — especially around issues such as radioactive waste treatment, risk minimisation and commercial feasibility. Stable political leadership, consistent stakeholder engagement and appropriate legislation are required to make the government’s vision for nuclear energy to become a critical element in Japan’s energy mix a reality. But the government should be mindful of cost–benefit analyses and ensure the push for nuclear energy does not come at the cost of reversing the expansion of renewables. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

27bbe719-7484-45a9-82ac-e77b90010a68 < All op-eds Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Treesa Shaju This blog has been republished from 9DashLine with permission. Worsening climate vulnerabilities and more opportunities in terms of climate cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region have spurred a series of national, regional, and multilateral climate action initiatives in recent years, including the ASEAN Climate Change Strategic Action Plan (ACCSAP) 2023-2030 and Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP). Despite recognising the need for urgency in climate action, as well as the various approaches and strategies to tackling climate vulnerabilities, many of these initiatives do not go the extra mile to delineate the question(s) of differentiated vulnerabilities and capacities. At this point, there is a considerable gap in acknowledging, assessing, and tackling the intersectional aspects of these climate vulnerabilities. Defining intersectionality in the climate context Intersectionality entails recognising the complex interplay of discriminatory or oppressive conditions that individuals may encounter due to their intersecting identities. For instance, an indigenous queer woman may simultaneously experience discrimination rooted in her gender, sexuality, and indigenous heritage. In the realm of climate change-related discourse, structural inequity (mostly defined in terms of disparity in vulnerabilities, capacities, etc., that result from certain discriminatory practices by individuals, collectivities/societies, systems/institutions, and so on) has often been viewed through narrow lenses. For example, in recent times, initiatives such as the Gender Action Plan of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have acknowledged the gender-specific impacts of climate change but do not necessarily pay much attention to the intra-gender disparities in how climate change affects different groups. Such a unidimensional approach overlooks the concurrent influences of an individual’s intersecting identities. Conducting research and writing policy without acknowledging these intersecting dimensions risks decontextualising vulnerabilities/capacities and isolating climate actions and initiatives in a silo. Taking an intersectional approach to climate change recognises the interconnected and interwoven nature of social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural issues in the formulation of climate change policies and strategies. Intersectional climate vulnerabilities in the Indo-Pacific The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities, including ocean acidification, extreme weather events, rising sea levels, freshwater scarcity, infrastructural vulnerabilities and more. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Those disproportionately affected by climate change often possess multiple identities that are discriminated against in the region. These discriminatory practices are based on income/resources, education/knowledge, gender, ethnicity, religion, disability, and more. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Climate vulnerabilities are additionally underpinned by gender-based or influenced differentiations about land ownership, labour and resource distribution, and decision-making power. Women are often more dependent on natural resources, through gender-segregated tasks such as collecting water and firewood and small-scale sustenance farming. Experts have also linked the impact of climate change-induced water and food shortages with a rise in domestic violence against women . Additionally, LGBTQIA+ individuals and individuals with disabilities are particularly vulnerable, facing an elevated risk of marginalisation and violence, often experiencing neglect in disaster situations and subsequent responses. An intersectional approach to climate action and cooperation could address these disparities. Climate action in the Indo-Pacific Within the Indo-Pacific, countries face differentiated impacts of climate change . For example, island nations face an existential risk from sea level rise, coastal inundation, saltwater intrusion, and other climate impacts. Similarly, countries with huge coastal cities and populations also face these risks. Many countries in the region are threatened by drought and desertification. The lack of climate resilience among populations and infrastructure would demand greater attention (policies, resources, etc.) from countries and regional and multilateral organisations alike. Climate cooperation initiatives in the Indo-Pacific are essential for addressing the urgent challenges of climate change and fostering resilience among the region’s diverse countries. A notable example is the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) , in which low-lying island nations collaborate to advocate for global climate action, emphasising the need for major emitters to reduce their emissions (especially in the Global North), mobilising finances for adaptation measures, and seeking loss and damage compensation. Similarly, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) promotes sustainable development and cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, including climate resilience efforts. Sector-specific initiatives also exist, such as the ASEAN Climate Resilience Network , which is targeted at agricultural adaptation (and exploring mitigation potential as a secondary priority) in the Southeast Asian region that is highly dependent on this sector for economic development. These initiatives, among others, underscore the importance of regional and multilateral cooperation to mitigate the impacts of climate change and build a sustainable future for the Indo-Pacific. Some of these initiatives are embracing more inclusive and responsive structures by integrating gender inclusivity into their frameworks. Locating gender in existing climate action and cooperation The Pacific Islands Forum, through the 66th session for the Commission for Status of Women (CSW66), mentions gender inclusion in terms of climate resilience in a broader sense while acknowledging gender-based violence in their societies. Centring women and girls in climate resilience efforts while seeking to intervene in violence against women and girls (VAWG), gender-based violence (GBV), and domestic violence (DV) can be understood as an intersectional approach to building climate resilience. Another initiative that opts for a partially intersectional lens is the Quad’s Guidelines for Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific. These guidelines mention the need for the inclusion of women and girls in decision-making and the advancement of gender equality in the context of HADR. Refreshingly, the guidelines have also introduced regulations to actively centre disabled individuals during crises. However, there is still less evidence of the use of fundamental transformative approaches that take the full spectrum view of intersectionality, such as a non-binary approach to gender, ethnicity, religion, class, and race, which continues to lead to an invisibilisation of various marginalised groups from the decision-making processes. Most multilateral climate policies in the region largely fail to acknowledge the significance of gender-responsive or gender-transformative climate action as a vital strategy (that leaves no one behind) to address climate change. Hence, a widely employed intersectional approach is still a way off in this context. This is hindering the comprehensive and effective mitigation of climate-related concerns, as it overlooks the unique vulnerabilities and perspectives of women and other marginalised groups. A more inclusive approach that acknowledges the integral role of gender equity and justice in fostering sustainable climate action is the need of the hour, as it ensures that the concerns and contributions of all individuals, regardless of gender, are taken into account in the pursuit of socio-ecological resilience and sustainability. The representation of women in formal climate change-related decision-making processes remains notably limited across the world, including in the Indo-Pacific. According to estimates , in Asia and the Pacific “only 7 per cent of all environment-related ministries (comprising agriculture, crude oil, climate change, energy, fisheries, irrigation, marine resources, mines, rural development, transportation, and others) have a female minister, compared to a global average of 12 per cent”. As a result, the valuable insights and multifaceted concerns of women are frequently marginalised during the formulation and implementation of climate change policies. Moreover, roles in disaster risk reduction (DRR) response efforts are also predominantly occupied by men, often confining their consultations primarily to male community leaders and constituents. This exclusionary pattern is in contrast with the reality that in most communities (especially indigenous communities ) women are knowledge custodians, expected to pass down their knowledge to future generations. The resulting lack of decision-making agency for women within climate action and cooperation inhibits indigenous and rural women from harnessing their knowledge to contribute to sustainability solutions. Integrating gender responsiveness and intersectionality into climate action in the Indo-Pacific Intersectionality in climate governance would signify an approach that recognises the complex interplay of social identities, vulnerabilities, and inequalities when addressing climate change impacts and policies. The approach would seek inclusivity by considering factors such as gender, disability, socioeconomic status, race, and ethnicity across the varying cultures of the Indo-Pacific. Such an approach would also require strong policies addressing poverty alleviation, caste or race-based discrimination, gender-based violence, and disability rights, among others. Intersectionality cannot be implemented in a vacuum. Several countries in the region, including Indonesia, have gradually begun to integrate intersectional approaches into their national climate policies. Indonesia’s commitment to disability rights and inclusion, exemplified in its National Action Plan for Climate Change Adaptation (RANAPI), serves as a model. It includes disabled-friendly infrastructure and involves disabled people’s organisations and civil society actors in policy development. Moreover, non-state initiatives, such as the Pacific Gender and Climate Change Toolkit , are examples of intersectional practices that prioritise equity, ensuring climate initiatives are responsive to the unique vulnerabilities and strengths of diverse communities. The benefits of adopting an intersectional approach in climate cooperation include enhanced equity, more effective adaptation strategies, reduced conflicts, and improved community resilience. In view of these benefits, there has clearly been a greater acknowledgement of the importance of embracing intersectionality in addressing climate change-related challenges among the various stakeholders of climate action across the Indo-Pacific region. It is crucial for stakeholders involved in climate governance to enhance the momentum through more sustained and institutional efforts towards designing and implementing context-specific and inclusive intersectional climate action in the region. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

ad962a86-2122-4a05-84f0-204f1a35af06 < All op-eds Mapping Timor-Leste in ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outreach: Challenge or an Opportunity? Mr Satria Rizaldi Alchatib Timor Leste’s formal admission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the 41st ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh last year as an observer came after a long wait. Since its independence in 2002, Timor Leste had nurtured aspirations for an ASEAN membership. After a long eleven-year journey of negotiations, in September 2022 the country was granted “in principle” approval to join ASEAN. More recently, at the 42nd ASEAN Summit in Indonesia, ASEAN even adopted a roadmap for Timor Leste to become a full member. Prospects seem bright for Timor Leste’s full membership in ASEAN by September 2023. In this long journey, Timor Leste has faced mixed reactions to its bid for membership ranging from strong support to outright rejection. While the majority of ASEAN member states have favoured Timor Leste’s accession, in the past Laos and Singapore have expressed strong apprehensions, owing to the stark economic gap between Timor Leste and other members. Accounting for the lowest GDP per capita in South-East Asia, Timor Leste is arguably economically the most fragile country in the region. Nevertheless, the country’s full membership holds great significance when ASEAN seeks to expand its regional influence. The crucial question, therefore, is: What does this mean for ASEAN regionalism? Indonesia has consistently supported Timor Leste’s efforts to gain full membership in the ASEAN. Coming from a difficult relationship after Timor-Leste's separation from Indonesia in 1999, Indonesia’s support indicates an intention to develop a friendlier regional ecosystem and to make ASEAN a more rule-based international order. The long-established interpersonal ties between President Jose Ramos Horta, with various prominent figures in Indonesia including reformist president Abdurrahman Wahid also have a role to play in this. Having Indonesia as a front supporter is crucial to strengthen Timor-Leste’s presence in the ASEAN. As Indonesia is the current ASEAN chair, Timor Leste has a golden opportunity to push its bid for membership and must work on building multi-track diplomatic channels with Indonesia that will allow the country to populate particularly in B to B and CSO settings and drive its membership agenda. As outlined by Indonesian president and ASEAN chair Joko Widodo, agenda settings under his leadership will have to revolve around the implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and the Five-Point Consensus , a written commitment to resolve the protracted situation in Myanmar. These are unequivocally the key deliverables in meeting the ASEAN’s long-term vision in Indo-Pacific. Through this firm standard, member-states are expected to deliver through cooperation and reduce tension in realizing what lies at the core of AOIP, namely maritime security and the blue economy. In helping ASEAN achieve the five-point consensus peace plan for Myanmar, Timor-Leste has shown a progressive move by articulating its support for the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. Before regaining his current presidency, President Ramos-Horta partnered with a former Indonesian ambassador to convene a Joint Declaration on the Crisis in Myanmar. This was an essential move in terms of aligning perception and closing the gap at the civil society level. More importantly, it was a progressive endeavor to reaffirm Timor-Leste’s identity as a part of the ASEAN family. Given, Timor Leste’s geo-strategic location on the southernmost edge of the Indonesian archipelago, northwest of Australia, it will be interesting to see how the country’s potential full membership inclusion will shape ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific outlook. However, Timor-Leste’s capacity to commit to the AOIP agenda will be limited. The document was a response to the emerging multilateral arrangements involving key regional players—such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) and AUKUS (Australia, US, and UK trilateral security pact)—through non-violent and non-militaristic development exercises to meet sub-regional priorities in maritime connectivity, economic security, and sustainable development goals (SDG’s). This is where it is difficult for Timor-Leste to maintain its relevance in the AOIP framework due to its slow-progressive economic development to achieve regional SDG metrics. Timor-Leste's accession to ASEAN is principally and inevitably correct. However, needless to say, ASEAN needs a better economic and security posture in these challenging times and Timor-Leste’s admission will not be enough. Nevertheless, Timor-Leste requires a status transition to a full member as it will contribute to a more positive tone of inclusivity in the region. To bolster its commitment, Timor-Leste should start highlighting its humanitarian contribution to the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management and be more vocal in its position on Myanmar. This would send a clear message about whether or not Dili is fully onboard with the rest of the ASEAN members. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

749f5a1c-ebaa-4a45-8f3f-43364e9e4ee6 < All op-eds India’s G20 Presidency and the Future of Indian Leadership in International Affairs Don McLain Gill As the initial phase of the G20 continues to unfold, India has been demonstrating its deep understanding of the transitions taking place in the international power structure. While multipolarity has increasingly become a buzzword among commentators of international politics. It is crucial to conceptually decipher what it practically means for India’s leadership and the future of international geopolitical affairs. The most prominent characteristic of multipolarity rests on the nature of the dispersion of power in the international system. Accordingly, the potential emergence of new poles will not only significantly reorient the way states engage, but also how key regional and international issues are perceived and prioritized. Consequently, shifts in the distribution of power will also create shocks within traditional sources of power given the fluctuations of state influence and what they entail for the shaping of international narratives. However, today’s transition towards multipolarity should not only be analyzed through the lens of material power. Rather, the dynamism of state perception towards the established order also presents itself as an equally crucial determinant of what to expect in the years to come, particularly in line with inter-state cooperation and competition. This year’s G20 comes at a time of critical traditional and non-traditional security challenges that continue to plague the international system, albeit in varying degrees. Consequently, the finance and foreign ministers meeting at the G20 witnessed stark disagreements and divergences, particularly in line with the war in Ukraine. While such disagreements were expected, given the presence of ministers from the Western states and Russia, such an occurrence also reflected the rigid and binary approaches of particular states towards international affairs. Hence, the adamant nature of engagement between both sides has resulted in the inability of all members to maximize the potential of such a crucial platform, which seeks to provide solutions and address multi-dimensional challenges that are impacting the world today. It is this worrying international trend that highlights the need for an equitable voice. On the day of the foreign ministers' meeting, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a bold and pressing statement by emphasising how no group in the international system can claim leadership by side-lining and overlooking the plight, vulnerabilities, and sensitivity of the developing world. It is this difficult nature of political polarization at the expense of the interests of the silent majority, that the Indian Prime Minister seeks to rectify. India, under the Modi Government, has illustrated its steadfast commitment to play a bigger and more proactive role in translating its rise into a practical form of leadership. Being the world’s largest democracy, whose external engagements revolve around the centrality of international law, India’s growing accumulation of robust material capabilities will be grounded on its willingness to work within the established rules-based order. However, as a rising great power, India’s leadership will also draw on its history, principles, and experiences as a civilizational state. Such attributes will not only supplement the established order, but also pragmatically reform it. On the same day, External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar echoed this by indicating how the United Nations has become increasingly unable to address and represent contemporary realities. India seeks to draw on its pluralistic, inclusive, and democratically driven national attributes to project a kind of leadership that understands the complex yet necessary balance between diversity, development, and security. Moreover, India continues to endeavour to contribute equitable solutions to the plight of the developing world, given the increasingly worrying tendencies of marginalizing it due to the polarising dynamics of international geopolitics. Accordingly, the past few years witnessed more active participation by India in various political, security, and economic centered multilateral institutions across the world – including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), The Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Quad, and the G7 – to contribute towards a sustainable international political-economic outlook that banks on a people-centric, democratically motivated, and equitable approach. Furthermore, India has also spearheaded key initiatives such as the recent Voice of Global South Summit to provide a necessary platform for developing states to shape international narratives beyond the traditional locus of power. In addition, the establishment of a Global South Centre of Excellence will be India’s proactive contribution towards cultivating an avenue for engagement not only between state leaders but also members of civil society and epistemic communities to collectively pave a way forward for sustainable development, security, and stability. Furthermore, the way India continues to deal with various international security issues has also garnered the support of states across the developing world. Therefore, such examples, including the ongoing G20 presidency, provide a window to the future of India’s increasing leadership role in the world. However, several external and internal factors may continue to challenge or delay India’s rise. From the unwillingness of traditional sources of power to compromise to the parallel rise of an assertive China. However, such challenges also provide an opportunity for New Delhi to pragmatically recalibrate its policies to better position itself at the forefront of international affairs at a time of great geopolitical turbulence. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

e1dc05d7-3948-4a86-b220-e490949df3a4 < All op-eds The Indo-Pacific – a European Perspective Dr. Christian Wagner The Indo-Pacific will be the main theatre in the emerging systemic rivalry between the United States and China. This has also initiated a fundamental change in Europe’s perception of the region. For a long time, Europe - i.e. the European Union (EU) and its member states - have seen the region mostly as an economic opportunity. Europe is among the largest investors in the region and one of its most important trading partners. Germany conducts more than 20 percent of its trade with countries of the Indo-Pacific. The EU as the largest trading bloc has an overarching interest in the Indo-Pacific which will be shaped by multilateralism and a rules-based order rather than by great power competition. The Indo-Pacific strategy of the EU that builds on similar documents from France, Germany, and the Netherlands signals a geopolitical and geo-economic shift towards the region. Traditionally, the EU has its strength in the field of soft power rather than in hard power. Accordingly, the priority areas are: sustainable and inclusive prosperity, green transition, ocean governance, digital governance and partnerships, connectivity, human security, but also security and defence. The EU also aims at a stronger security role, for instance by coordinating future European naval presence in the region. European naval powers like France and the United Kingdom have traditionally been present in the Indo-Pacific. The mission of the German frigate Bayern underlines Germany’s new commitment to contribute to security in the region. Moreover, the EU plans to expand its CRIMARIO project in the Western Indian Ocean to other parts of the Indo-Pacific. Europe’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific will also be an important test case for its ambitions for sovereignty and strategic autonomy and its quest to become a global power. Europe faces various challenges. A first challenge will be to increase Europe’s visibility in the region. Countries like France, which is a resident power in the region, will follow different approaches compared to Germany or the Netherlands. So Europe’s approach to the region will be a differentiated rather than a unified one. Second, Europe has to provide proper resources. The EU’s Global Gateway strategy aims to mobilise 300 billion Euros until 2027. This would allow the EU to offer viable alternatives for infrastructure projects. Third, Europe and its member states will have to adapt to the emerging architecture in the region. Many regional organisations have lost importance in recent years whereas mini-lateral formats like Quad have gained importance. This is a challenge for the EU and countries like Germany which have traditionally been strong protagonists of regional organisations. The new connectivity agreements with established partners like India and Japan underline Europe’s ambitions to become a stronger player in the region. Europe’s economic strength will be an important contribution to the future of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. One of the main challenges will be to find a common, coherent and sustained approach among its members. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

9558cc4a-95d7-45a6-ac8c-9de09784136c < All op-eds 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year Purvaja Modak This blog has been republished from the Centre for Social and Economic Progress with permission. Brazil has taken over the presidency of the G20 from India on December 1, 2023, ushering in a troika with three member countries from the Global South (India, Brazil and South Africa) that also comprise of the IBSA. India was preceded by Indonesia in 2022, and beginning a four-year effort to prioritise the needs of the Global South at a time when the world faces difficult challenges like climate change, geopolitical turmoil, inequality and indebtedness. While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. The onus is now on Brazil to take forward the global development agenda in 2024. The country has declared a three-point agenda, namely combating hunger, poverty and inequality; focusing on three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, social, and environmental); and the reform of global governance (G20 Brasil 2024). These topics have been chosen keeping the objective of reducing inequalities at the heart of the reform effort as is reflected in the motto of the Brazilian presidency, ‘Building a Just World and a Sustainable Planet’. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva declared these priorities at the Leader’s summit in India in September 2023 when he took over the reins of the G20 presidency from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. He emphasised the country’s commitment to the fight against food shortages and nutritional insecurity. To that end, Brazil has proposed to launch a taskforce called Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty during its 2024 presidency. The task force will work on issues like low-carbon agricultural research and farming insurance reforms, especially in food-insecure countries, with financing support from other nations. Brazil hopes to leverage its experience from its flagship programme, Brazil Without Hunger Plan (Plano Brasil Sem Fome)—an initiative led by its Ministry of Development and Social Assistance, Family and the Fight Against Hunger (Ministério do Desenvolvimento e Assistência Social, Família e Combate à Fome/MDS). By focusing on sustainable development, the country hopes to convince the G20 member countries to increase their financial contributions to tackle climate change and wishes to leverage its own green energy potential for the world to invest in. To achieve this, Brazil has proposed a taskforce called Global Mobilization against Climate Change. The taskforce will promote a high-level dialogue among governments, financial institutions, and international organisations to enhance global macroeconomic and financial alignment to implement the goals of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement (G20 Brasil 2024). By making the reform of global governance its third priority, Brazil hopes to encourage greater participation by emerging countries in the decisions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) needs to be revitalised and its paralysed dispute settlement mechanism needs to start working again by reinstating a fully functional Appellate Body. The membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) needs to be restructured to include more developing countries. The eagerness from various countries, to join the expanded BRICS is an indication of their wish to join a grouping from the Global South re-emphasises their call for the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions. Brazil can leave its imprint on the G20 by stirring discussions on the reform of the global governance architecture towards implementable consensus. Brazil also hopes to advance the Indian G20 presidency’s work in strengthening MDBs, by following through with the roadmap laid out in the G20 Independent Expert Group’s (IEG) two volume- report , led by Lawrence Summers and NK Singh, that was aimed at creating ‘bigger, better and bolder MDBs’. Some of the recommendations of the report were: scaling up financial capacity, boosting joint action on climate, enhancing country-level collaboration, strengthening co-financing, and deepening MDBs’ ambition to cooperate to boost private capital mobilisation (World Bank, 2023). There is action on this agenda item already. At the IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in Marrakesh, Morocco, in October 2023, 10 leading MDBs supported the IEG’s report’s recommendation to explore ways to expand their lending capacity with “ an additional headroom of $300-400 billion in the next decade ”(African Development Bank Group, 2023). In a first-time global leadership role of this stature, Brazil plans to execute its development mandate by convening over 100 working group and task force meetings and over 20 ministerial meetings that will culminate in the Leader’s summit on November 18-19, 2024 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The National Commission for the Coordination of the Presidency of the G20 by Brazil has been set up to coordinate and oversee the smooth functioning of the G20 presidency and it is being chaired by Mauro Vieira, Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Fernando Haddad, Brazil’s Minister of Finance (G20 Brasil 2024). Brazil has also introduced the G20 Social to increase participation of non-governmental stakeholders in G20’s activities and decision-making processes. The G20 Social comprises of 13 engagement groups of the G20, namely C20 (Civil society); T20 (Think tanks); Y20 (Youth); W20 (Women); L20 (Labour); U20 (Cities); B20 (Business); S20 (Science); Startup20 (Startups); P20 (Parliaments); SAI20 (Supreme audit institutions); J20 (Supreme courts) and O20 (Oceans) (G20 Brasil 2024). The clock is ticking, and the stage is set for Brazil to make its mark on the G20 process by delivering outcomes brought about by multilateral consensus. Supporters of global governance are rooting for Brazil’s success on its three-point development agenda, especially at a time when the world is facing a polycrisis and global negotiations and consensus building seem more far fetched than ever. Brazil is faced with an ambitious agenda, and there are several challenges in its path. Brazil will need to manage the intense geopolitical divisions that currently exist in the G20’s membership if it hopes to release joint statements and end the year with a comprehensive Leader’s Declaration, a feat that India succeeded in achieving, despite acute scepticism from critics. The Brazilian presidency will have to keep the Israel–Hamas war, Russia’s war in Ukraine, global sanctions and the ongoing frictions between the United States (US) and China at the centre stage and manage sensitivities as it leads the G20 discourse. Other than governmental negotiations, Brazil will have to use back-channel diplomacy through its groupings like the expanded BRICS grouping (that previously only included Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and through its strategic partnerships with neighbouring countries in South America. The BRICS now also includes Argentina, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It will have to revitalise the IBSA to enable policy coordination between India, Brazil and South Africa. President Lula has an important role to play in balancing the powerplays emanating from these geopolitical interlinkages and divisions. The next two years are a unique time for President Lula to exhibit to the world his leadership potential and Brazil’s ability to lead the global governance discourse. It is interesting to note that Brazil’s G20 summit will be held in the same month (November 2024) as the US elections. The summit will also overlap with COP29. Negotiations at COP29 will pave way for COP30 in 2025 in Belem, Brazil. Brazil will also chair the BRICS grouping in 2025. This will overlap with South Africa’s G20 presidency in 2025, giving the troika of developing countries yet another chance to advance discussions on climate action, sustainability and development. But what the troika needs is a serious infusion of well researched, action oriented and implementable policy ideas that can be tabled for the consideration of the G20 leaders. That is where global think tanks come in, sharing solutions to the world’s most complex problems through one of the G20’s official engagement groups, the Think20 network. The Think20 (T20), often referred to as the ‘ideas bank’ for the G20 is tasked with a crucial mandate this year under the Brazilian presidency, and that comes out clearly in its tag line for the year – ‘Let’s rethink the world’. The T20 Brazil process will fulfil its task through six task forces, whose recommendations, put forth in the form of policy briefs, will comprehensively address the three themes that President Lula has declared: 1) Fighting inequalities, poverty, and hunger; 2) Sustainable climate action and inclusive just energy transitions; 3) Reforming the international financial architecture; 4) Trade and investment for sustainable and inclusive growth; 5) Inclusive digital transformation; 6) Strengthening multilateralism and global governance. The T20 Brazil process will then put forward policy recommendations to G20 officials involved in the Sherpa and Finance tracks and to the G20 leaders, in the form of a final T20 communiqué and the recommendations of the six taskforces. With the support of the Think20 and a development mandate based on the needs of the Global South, Brazil will have to ensure that there is policy connectivity at the G20, for the group to be taken seriously and for its efforts to bear fruit. Having four emerging market economies as leaders of the G20 in a row, will surely make it easier. Else, as critics often say, the G20 will become a ‘talk shop’ or merely a global gathering of policymakers with no concrete or enforceable outcomes. The stage is set, and an ambitious task has been laid out for Brazil. While the priorities for the year were released in 2023 when Brazil officially took on from India, action on the ground will unfurl in 2024. The G20 foreign ministers will meet in Rio de Janeiro on February 21-22, 2024, followed by G20 finance ministers in Sao Paulo on February 28-29, 2024. The statements coming out of these two meetings will indicate whether Brazil will be able to bring back the concept of sustainable development to the centre stage of international discussions, especially since geopolitics, wars and regional powerplays have overtaken its mandate over the last few years. The stakes are high and now Brazil must lead the way in showing critics that the G20 is, not a talk shop and is in fact, the economic steering committee for the world, as it was intended to be at its inception. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. 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