5c59d598-2c27-4e2f-a134-b9a60e51acca < All op-eds Japan’s Missing Nuclear Energy Policy Parul Bakshi This blog has been republished from the East Asia Forum with permission. The urgent global need to meet climate ambitions, growing uncertainty about securing vital energy resources due to the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict and the inability of renewable resources to meet exponentially rising energy demand is bringing momentum back to the nuclear energy debate. Some argue that a zero-carbon future will remain an unattainable dream if nuclear energy is not used to fight the ill effects of global warming. While this contention continues to be debated, a recent report by the International Energy Agency suggests that nuclear energy is set to make a comeback and witness a doubling of capacity between 2020–2050. The situation is particularly acute for Japan. With a relatively low share of national energy resources, it has relied on imports of coal, oil and natural gas to meet its energy needs. It is no surprise then that Japan has been one of the foremost countries to have expanded its nuclear power plant fleet to ensure energy self-sufficiency. Japan’s 2010 Strategic Energy Plan aimed to expand the share of nuclear energy — otherwise known as its ‘ dream energy ’ — to meet half of its electricity demand by 2030. But the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 led to the dramatic reversal of these plans to the extent that a complete nuclear phase-out was considered. While the vision for the phase-out was set aside upon the Liberal Democratic Party’s return to power, Japan’s nuclear energy policy has lacked clarity in meeting its set targets. A share of 20–22 per cent of nuclear energy is envisioned in the latest draft of the Strategic Energy Plan in 2022. While this target has remained the same since the 2014 Strategic Energy Plan, the process of attaining it is still unclear. As of June 2022 , only ten out of Japan’s 54 nuclear reactors have been given the go-ahead to restart, while just four are currently in operation and 21 have been decommissioned. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has repeatedly reiterated the need to restart more plants and the crucial role that nuclear energy plays in Japan’s security and stability, announcing that up to nine reactors would be in operation by the end of 2022. With liquefied natural gas prices in Japan reaching historic highs and Japan’s continued resolve to include nuclear energy, it is time to look into establishing a substantive Japanese nuclear energy policy. Whether Japan will make a full-fledged return to the league of major nuclear-powered countries is yet to be seen, but it seems unlikely. For continued reliance on nuclear energy, Japan will have to extend not only the reactor lifespan beyond the stipulated 60 years — a move that might rekindle public fears and opposition — but also construct new plants, which could take a decade. This will be ineffective in meeting short-term energy requirements that the nation is struggling with, while also leaving Japan behind in the global green race with implications for its 2050 net zero climate vision. Other barriers to expanding nuclear energy involve overcoming local opposition, lawsuits against restarts, delayed assessments and excessive safety goals stipulated by the Nuclear Regulation Authority. Cost overruns of nuclear projects, nuclear waste management, and the political and societal implications of nuclear disasters also pose challenges. Yet Hiroshi Kajiyama, Japan’s former minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, has called nuclear energy ‘ indispensable ’ for Japan. Kishida’s New Capitalism — which focusses on inclusivity, sustainability and touts green innovation as an area that would benefit from enhanced government research and development investment — could incentivise the development of related nuclear technologies such as Finnish Onkalo nuclear spent fuel repository technology and Small Modular Reactors. Under the shadow of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, a transparent account of the government’s nuclear policy could help both the nuclear industry and the public. But Japan must have a clear idea of how to manage its existing nuclear power capacity given the precarious geopolitical energy climate. With rising fuel prices and a weak yen, Japan is in the midst of the most serious energy crisis the country has ever faced. The ambiguity that shrouds the future of nuclear energy serves no good to Japan, domestically or internationally. A clear policy vision articulating how the existing hurdles will be overcome is essential for continuing investment to ensure a stable power supply and for insulating the sector from any unforeseen political instability at the leadership level. Nuclear energy is not the one-stop solution Japan is hoping for. Tokyo will have to make continued progress in renewables and other technologies such as hydrogen, carbon capture, energy utilisation and storage (CCUS). But with the government consistently including nuclear energy in its Strategic Energy Plan, it would be prudent to highlight how the desired targets are to be achieved by 2030. A clear nuclear energy vision will help stakeholders in the energy industry gain a better sense of the Japanese nuclear industry’s direction, so that they can prepare for the resulting implications rather than second guessing whether the government will be able to put talk into action. Parul Bakshi is a Doctoral Candidate at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, India and previously a Special Research Student and Japan Foundation Fellow at the University of Tokyo, Japan. She is the co-editor of India-Japan Relations @70: Building Beyond the Bilateral (2022). Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

8bfb6011-fcbe-482f-9066-7a4e9224f1ad < All op-eds Maritime Migration in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean: A dire need for greater cooperation Dr. Niloy Biswas The Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean are historical maritime routes for both South and South-East Asia. Recently, these have emerged as routes for intra-Asian and trans-regional movements of people, mainly from Bangladesh and Myanmar, to Southeast Asian destinations (ex. Malaysia and Thailand) and then extend the journey towards Australia. The drivers of such migration are essentially informed by three factors: economy, conflict, and climate. First, unemployment and the youth bulge influence the regular outflow of migrants from Bangladesh, Myanmar and other South Asian countries to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe. A significant part of it also undertakes irregular paths to reach the destination. For Southeast Asia as a destination, using the Bay of Bengal is a viable choice for many who could not have afforded the formal channels of migration. Second, conflict in Myanmar has significantly escalated irregular migration along this route. After a series of ethnic clashes instigated by the Rakhine nationalists in 2012, about 140,000 of an estimated 1.1 million Rohingyas fled, ending up in camps within Myanmar . Some tried to escape Myanmar by sea and landed in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. In the May 2015 tragedy, some 32 shallow graves were discovered on a remote mountain in Thailand , at a so-called ‘waiting area,’ where Rohingya migrants were being held to be smuggled to Malaysia. It raised the flag for the international community on the gravity of the matter. In 2017, over one million Rohingya people escaped the Rakhine State of Myanmar to avoid death, rape, discrimination, and torture and took shelter in neighbouring Bangladesh. After the 2017 influx, they and their fellow Bangladeshi migrants accompanied together on the boat to cross the Bay of Bengal. Third, the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean expose a critical climate-vulnerable space. There is a prevalence of short-term natural disasters in the region, induced by seasonal weather shifts and long-term climate change impacts. Moreover, this is a densely-populated region, and a significant part of the world’s population lives along its coastline. Finally, this resource-abundance region has attracted other powerful nations for excavations and extending their strategic sphere of influence. It has become an essential sub-region in the international connectivity discourse and a strategically significant trans-regional space. In such a critical maritime space, we have experienced the abandonment of thousands of men, women, and children by the state and smugglers. The network of smugglers and spoilers existed to maltreat the governance, arguably lowly addressed by some governments across the region. Irregularities in the migration governance and inhumaneness in migrants’ experience have made them more susceptible to the threats of complex vulnerabilities. Some countries have considered a mixture of hard and soft security approaches. For example, Malaysia recently pushed back to sea one and possibly more fishing trawlers with hundreds of Rohingya asylum seekers aboard. Thailand has indicated that it will refuse entry to Rohingya boats . Bangladesh coast guard officials rescued one boat of Rohingya refugees, which had reportedly been turned away by Malaysia nearly two months earlier. About 390 starving Rohingya, most under 20 years old, were brought ashore, with reports that as many as 100 may have died on board before the rescue . Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott stated that turning around boats was “ absolutely necessary if the scourge of people smuggling is to be beaten .” Australia introduced Operation Sovereign Borders , a military-led campaign to “stop the boats” with asylum seekers. Moreover, Australia had invested more resources in the detention centres on the islands of Manus and Nauru that had housed more than 1000 refugees and asylum seekers for several years before being pushed back to the sea. Thailand has engaged its naval forces to stop boat migrants, predominantly Rohingya asylum seekers from Myanmar, from landing on its territory. Moreover, it also implemented some harsh anti-refugee policies, including ‘push backs’ of any vessel attempting to disembark on the Thai shores . Malaysian former Deputy Home Minister Wan Junaidi Jafaar said, “We have been very nice to the people who broke into our border. We have treated them humanely, but they cannot be flooding our shores like this . ” He also said, “We have to send the right message that they are not welcome here.” The nations in the Indo-Pacific merit greater cooperation to deal with this crisis together. Although a majority of the countries in the region are not signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967, the concerned states should borrow the idea of the interpretation of ‘place of safety’ from the convention that includes the consideration of protection against threats to the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded fear of persecution regarding refugees and asylum seekers retrieved from a situation of distress at sea. It is critical to note that a multilateral arrangement between the states in the Indo-pacific must not interpret ‘place of safety’ as prisons detaining the refugees and asylum seekers. Again, there is a need to redesign the method of offshore processing, which is often used as a mere tool of border control that involves forcibly transferring asylum seekers to third states for legal processing of their claims. The detention centre, a temporary correctional facility offshore for the awaiting aspirant migrants, limits the fundamental rights to liberty and freedom of movement in international and regional human rights legal instruments. Therefore, it is to be understood as a measure of last resort and strictly in conformity with national and international law, bearing in mind the ‘ underlying purpose of preventing persons being deprived of their liberty arbitrarily .’ As the Indo-Pacific nations promote a rule-based order, maritime migrants must be considered with a humanitarian lens, and the rules cannot just be technically imposed upon them. It is discussed earlier how often disembarkation of rescued refugees has increasingly been denied by certain destination states in the Indian Ocean. As non-signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention, most of these South and South-East Asia countries do not feel an obligation to the reception of refugees. Moreover, stringent national laws on citizenship and border control governance are an existential reality; the refugee and asylum management tasks remain ad hoc and vague. Broadly, these have highlighted an international practice of promoting non-arrival strategies and deterrent practices at sea . The security-based approaches in Europe also increased contactless control practices as ‘consensual containment’ schemes . Will the Indo-Pacific nations replicate the same? It is critical to rethink the strategies to prevent unsafe sea migration. Global best practices can inform the Indo-pacific regional cooperation endeavours; however, they may not need to borrow the statist policies among the coastal states and reproduce similar patterns here. In this regard, sustained cooperation between state and non-state organisations will produce a durable solution. About the Author Dr. Niloy Ranjan Biswas is an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka. In 2016, he completed his PhD in International Politics from the City, University of London. He was a recipient of the Fulbright Fellowship (2010-12) to pursue a second Master’s degree in Security Policy Studies at The George Washington University, Washington DC. Dr. Biswas has co-edited two books and authored more than thirty journal articles and book chapters. He has written extensively on deradicalisation and preventing violent extremism, refugees and forced migration, security governance reform, and South Asian regional contributions to United Nations peace support endeavours. Email: niloy@du.ac.bd . Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

< Back Devika Makkat Research Assistant Devika is a Research Assistant at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research. Devika holds a Bachelor's in International Relations with a minor in Public Policy from FLAME University, Pune. She has a PG Diploma in Interdisciplinary Research, also from FLAME University. Her interest lies in security studies, foreign policy, and development studies with a focus on South Asia and the USA.

b6c39c75-22d8-4e68-8748-b4b49f861a0d < All op-eds Powerhouse: clean energy transitions in the Indo-Pacific Ms Parul Bakshi This blog has been republished from the The Intercept blog by the Lowy Institute with permission. With a global energy crisis underway due to rising prices , coupled with a forecast of a harsh northern hemisphere winter and supply volatility brought on by the Russia–Ukraine war, all eyes are on the future of energy transition . The Indo-Pacific will be at the centre of this transition, with rapidly expanding Southeast Asian economies and burgeoning populations forming a large share of the exponentially rising global energy demand. An energy transition is broadly defined as the pathway to transforming the energy mix towards low carbon, sustainable and renewable forms of energy. One of its key components is maintaining energy security. Traditionally, energy security has encapsulated the 4 As – availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability – but scholars today also focus on defined aspects such as minimal vulnerability, enhanced resilience and equitable access to energy. Over the past decades, the classical distinction between importers and exporters of energy has blurred. A traditional importer such as the United States is today a crucial energy exporter after its shale gas revolution . Further transformations in the energy landscape due to the global clean energy transition are expected to augment the energy self-sufficiency ratio of nations as their dependency on domestic renewable sources increases, leading to improved energy security. While this might be the case, the belief that such transitions could lead to reduced volatility of energy security is far-fetched. The increasing risk of geopolitical turbulence makes it imperative to promote shared interests and principles of energy security in the region. The ongoing transition away from fossil fuels will usher in a growing reliance on procuring supplies of hydrogen, ammonia, biofuels and other alternatives. Renewables will therefore alter the arenas of energy interaction, transform traditional energy markets and mark a shift in trading partners while reshaping patterns of conflict and cooperation between countries. Since the Indo-Pacific will be a major energy hub that houses critical and strategic energy trade routes, this reshaping will be most pronounced in the region. Instances of such shifts are already evident in the urgency to decarbonise and diversify energy sources. In 2020, traditional oil giant Saudi Arabia demonstrated the world’s first successful blue ammonia supply network by producing and shipping 40 tonnes of high-grade low-carbon fuel to Japan. Similarly, Japanese oil company Inpex successfully brought clean ammonia produced by the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company to Japan. Furthermore, Singapore was the major export destination of biodiesel from India in the 2020–21 financial year. Meanwhile, key Indo-Pacific players such as Japan and Australia are fuelling their bilateral relationship through hydrogen, with the world’s first liquefied hydrogen carrier ship completing its maritime transport of the fuel from Victoria to Kobe in February this year. India is also preparing to jump on the hydrogen exporter bandwagon. Among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Singapore imported hydropower-generated clean electricity from Laos via Thailand and Malaysia through grid interconnections for the first time in June. Countries such as Brunei have also started exporting small quantities of hydrogen to Japan. Although new and emerging interdependent energy relations are forming within the Indo-Pacific, fault lines have also emerged, with Indonesia recently announcing a ban on green energy export, putting a halt to the vision of an integrated ASEAN power grid. In countries such as Australia , in an attempt to secure energy supplies while meeting sustainability goals, nuclear energy is again being debated as a potential addition to the energy mix. However, a rise in the use of nuclear power would result in an increased reliance on uranium imports for many countries. It is interesting to note here that Russia is a key exporter of uranium to the United States and European Union , and with the fuel not being subject to the ongoing Russian sanctions, it adds to the debate on reliance on Russia and energy security. With the continuous growth in solar and wind energy across the region, the critical minerals essential to manufacturing these technologies will become increasingly important. Since these rare earths are concentrated in specific nations, particularly China, diversifying the sources and enabling stable supply becomes imperative to expanding renewable energies and ensuring energy security. In 2010, China imposed an export ban on rare earths to Japan due to a territorial dispute. It is anticipated that the energy-intensive undertones of China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative will impact the geopolitics around energy trade routes, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Such a scenario increases the need for regional countries to embark on a strategy to secure energy supply routes and affordable energy supplies. Recently, South Korea and Mongolia and India and Australia agreed to boost cooperation on global supply chains, especially concerning rare earths. As China and Russia continue to weaponise these supply capacities to exert geopolitical leverage to coerce other countries for their political purposes, it highlights the prominence of geopolitics of energy. The increasing risk of geopolitical turbulence, as seen recently with growing tensions in Taiwan , makes it imperative to promote shared interests and principles of energy security in the region. The future of smooth energy transitions and the development of a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific rely on a deeper understanding of evolving energy security and fostering a rules-based order safeguarding the same. As the Indo-Pacific comes under the spotlight with major players attempting to expand their influence, energy can act as a means to further relations and interests. Dialogues such as the Sydney Energy Forum are setting the stage. But is the Indo-Pacific prepared for the new contours of energy security? Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Prof. C. Raja Mohan is a visiting research professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. He was also the Founding Director of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, India. isascrm@nus.edu.sg < Back Prof. C. Raja Mohan C. Raja Mohan was a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie India. A leading analyst of India’s foreign policy, Mohan is also an expert on South Asian security, great-power relations in Asia, and arms control. He is the foreign affairs columnist for the Indian Express, and a visiting research professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. He was a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board. From 2009 to 2010, Mohan was the Henry Alfred Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress. Previously, he was a professor of South Asian studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. He also served as the diplomatic editor and Washington correspondent of the Hindu. Mohan’s most recent books are Modi’s World: Expanding India's Sphere of Influence (Harper Collins India, 2015) and India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security (Routledge, 2016) (co-edited with Anit Mukherjee). His other books include Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), Power Realignments in Asia: China, India and the United States (Sage, 2009) (co-edited with Alyssa Ayres), Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order (India Research Press, 2006), and Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (Palgrave, 2004). isascrm@nus.edu.sg

Chennai Residency 23-27 July, 2022 This annual residency brought together 50-60 members of the Indo-Pacific Circle to discuss their ongoing research, take part in workshops, and spark new collaborative research opportunities. Experts Amb P.S Raghavan Suhasini Haidar Daniel Shields Prof. Shankari Sundararaman Prof. Lawrence Prabhakar Amb Rakesh Sood Cmde R.S Vasan Virsa Perkins MK Narayanan Manu Pillai Emily Tallo Kenji Miyata Michael Costa Sonika Gupta Organizing Team Devyani Chaturvedi Laura Rose O'Connor Devika Makkat Esha Chadha Dr Tishya Khillare Bashir Ali Abbas Dr Gaurav Saini Prathit Singh

10 Lecture Course INDO PACIFIC Video Channel Name Play Video Play Video 00:23 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:32 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:29 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:31 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:23 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:32 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:29 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy. Play Video Play Video 00:31 Video Title This is a great space to update your audience with a description of your video. Include information like what the video is about, who produced it, where it was filmed, and why it’s a must-see for viewers. Remember this is a showcase for your professional work, so be sure to use intriguing language that engages viewers and invites them to sit back and enjoy.

82e4faaa-176d-485c-9cb1-622dce764eb4 < All op-eds 5O Years of Indonesia-ROK Relations: Challenges and Opportunities Ratih Indraswari Indonesia and the Republic of Korea(ROK) welcome their 50th bilateral anniversary this year. The history of their relations dates back to 1968, when Indonesia opened its consular services in Seoul, followed by the establishment of the Indonesia Embassy in 1973. The relationship was generally on a low profile. In 2006 Roh Moo Hyun and SBY agreed to establish a strategic partnership status. However, it was only after Moon Jae In's presidency, that relations progressed rapidly. In 2017 Moon brought up a delegation of 200 businessmen to Indonesia and announced its New Southern Policy emphasizing the three pillars, prosperity, peace, and people. The initiative clearly articulated Seoul's focus on its Southern neighbours by elevating ASEAN Member State status, including Indonesia. Indonesia welcomed the initiative. Jokowi and Moon upgraded the relationship into Special Strategic Partnership in 2017 . This partnership focused on cooperation, including defense and foreign affairs, bilateral trade and infrastructure development, people-to-people exchanges, and regional & global cooperation. With the opposition winning the election, there is scepticism about President Yoon Suk Yeol's policy towards ASEAN, particularly Indonesia, as Seoul's important partner. A shift to ROK's traditional partner, the United States is the highlight of the ROK conservatives party. with increasing provocation from North Korea, Seoul has redrawn its focus on the security of the Korean Peninsula. Despite the presence of doubts, Indonesia-ROK relations are set to be stronger. Economics is undoubtedly leading the bilateral relationship. Trade trends between the two countries rose. Quite Uninhibted by Covid, trade continues to grow from 16,3 million USD in 2017 to 20.5 million USD in 2022 . Making the ROK the 7th largest trading partner of Indonesia. Furthermore, it is expected that the trade quota will further rise along with the commencement of IK CEPA (Indonesia – Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement). Similarly, the investment trend with regard to Indonesia has also increased. In 2017 investment accounted for 2 million USD, however in 2022 after a meeting with President Yoon in Seoul, President Jokowi managed to secure an investment commitment of up to 6.7 million USD focusing on Electric Vehicle production and its subsidiary . However, for Jakarta, the picture does not seem very bright. Indonesia has much homework left. Based on the ASEAN-Korea Figure 2021 data, in comparison to other Southeast Asian member states, the trade volume of the ROK with Indonesia in 2021 stood 4th at 11% , behind Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia. The gap with Vietnam is high with almost half of ROK's total trade at 46% done with Vietnam. On investment, within the last three years average, Indonesia ranks third behind Vietnam and Singapore . Hence, Indonesia needs to seek niche sectors. One way is to shift cooperation from manufacturing to high technology field in which Seoul has the competitive advantage. Especially in sectors related to smart cities, electric vehicles, batteries, and digital trade cooperation. Another way, is to utilize public-private partnerships in investment projects, making use Korean companies and SMEs subsidiaries in the aforementioned sectors. Politically, during the ASEAN-ROK Meeting in Cambodia, President Yoon launched KASI (Korea ASEAN Solidarity Initiative) that further highlights ASEAN Centrality and supporting the ASEAN Outlook of Indo-Pacific. President Yoon's meeting with President Jokowi in July 2022 was his first official summit with ASEAN Leaders. Importantly, Indonesia assumes the ASEAN presidency in 2023 and plays an important role within ROK’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet a concrete roadmap of KASI remains to be unveiled. Since KASI is argued as a product of ROK’s US-centric government, its compatibility with AOIP is in question. Will KASI support ASEAN Centrality as promised when the tension between China and the US is heightened? An honest assessment must be applied to the security front. Indonesia has the capacity to provide a good office. In July 2023, the top nuclear envoys of the ROK and the US met in Indonesia to coordinate their responses to the North Korea missile threat. However, its position as an external party in the Korean peninsula issue is awkward. Indonesia might offer its help through the ASEAN platform. ARF has been offering its venue for negotiation on the North Korea issue but its effectiveness is limited. Instead of on traditional security issues, Indonesia and ROK should spend their energy on non-traditional issues. In line with Indonesia's G20 goal to focus on global health architecture, both countries should work more on health security management. Efforts to address the global pandemic was successful in that Indonesia received 7 million USD on KOICA's Covid-19 responses program. Indonesia also played a co-chair of COVAX AMC, a vaccine-sharing facility to ensure regional resiliencies. This platform can be a base for Indonesia-ROK health management and later duplicated to prepare for future health threats. The people-to-people exchange is often heralded as the “crème de la crème” sector due to Hallyu popularity in Southeast Asia. K-wave is a one-sided love. ASEAN Youth's interest in Hallyu goes beyond the entertainment industry. Despite the pandemic, the ASEAN Korea Figure 2022 shows that throughout the year, inbound tourism from ASEAN to Korea is increasing. However, the ASEAN brand is limited. The lack of an “ASEAN Wave” is apparent. Last year, the ASEAN Korea Center conducted a Survey on Mutual Perception of ASEAN and Korean Youth . The survey shows that more than 90% of Korean youth experienced Korean arts and culture, and only 55% of Korean youth said that they have experienced ASEAN arts and culture. A similar trend can be seen in the Korean perception about Indonesia. Indonesia is famous as a global tourism destination. However, a comparison with other ASEAN countries shows this is not the case for Korean nationals. Korean visitors to Indonesia in 2019 were 388 thousand, in comparison to Vietnam (4.291), Thailand (1888), the Philippines (1783), Singapore (646), and Malaysia (508). In 2020 the overall tourism rate dropped and Indonesia ranked 5th as Korea's destination place. Increasing the number of Korean visitors to Indonesia is important to strengthen the people-pillar between Indonesia and ROK. Tourism is one obvious sector but the often neglected one is educational exchange. The overall score on the exchange program between Korean youth and ASEAN, including Indonesia, is very low. Although Southeast Asian students contribute as the second largest foreign students in Korea, Indonesian students only contribute 3% of the total . Furthermore, the number of Korean students in Indonesia are far smaller than other nationalities. Welcoming the 50th year of partnership, Indonesia and ROK face unprecedented challenges. There are some key issues that need attention. Firstly, health security and its impact on the economy need to be examined. Indonesia- ROK partnership must be the foundational pillar of regional resilience to mitigate risks. Secondly, the adoption of technology is crucial to address societal challenges and create prosperous cities, with the use of electric vehicles and sustainable technology. Thirdly, though traditional security matters amidst great power rivalry, yet regional peace is more important. Indonesia and ROK must remain strong in its standing for a peaceful region. Fourthly, cooperation must spill over to the grassroots level. Both countries should not be satisfied with elite level mutual understanding. Investment in youth is needed to create stronger people-to-people cooperation between Indonesia and ROK. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

76327b7b-9ef3-4dd2-ba2d-d8e90cd55081 < All op-eds Taiwan’s Critical Position in the Indo-Pacific: Implications for India Dr. Kaustav Padmapati The year 2022 was quite eventful for Taiwan as China did not stop its bullying tactics against the island nation and has been building up its military offensive against it. Taiwan constitutes a vital component of Indo Pacific region due to its crucial geographical and strategic position. To a significant extent, it is also due to the island nation’s critical position regarding Sino-US relations. Taiwan’s strategic location connects the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan . India is among the politically prominent players in the Indo- Pacific region along with China, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the countries of Southeast Asia. Shifting geopolitical calculations, with China’s emergence as a major player and the declining role of the United States as a major power, have moved global focus toward the Indo-Pacific region. Today, the region has become home to numerous flashpoints as Beijing desires to turn the power balance in its favour, while Washington is wary of Chinese intentions . There are several unresolved territorial and maritime issues in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s hostile claims on East and South China sea regions have led to competing territorial claims being raised by counties, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan. The relative decline of US influence in the Indo-Pacific has opened new opportunities for other significant powers such as Japan, Australia, and India to become active in preserving political stability and supporting economic sustainability in the Indo-Pacific Region. India is a prominent Asian power. Indo- Pacific is both a strategic and a profitable realm that includes pivotal marine routes that link the coastlands of the two abysses. Many countries, including India, have a serious worry about Beijing’s intervention or greater Chinese presence within the Indo- Pacific and in the international community means for issues such as human rights, rule of law, democracy, and the most burning territorial issue like Taiwan. China’s increasing presence close to the territorial waters, and ambitious projects in the neighbourhood under the Belt and Road Initiative are a direct threat to India’s position as the main security provider and regional power. Taiwan also has great geopolitical significance in the Indo- Pacific Region. The island is located in the middle of what the United States considered its “forward defense perimeter” in the 1950s and what China now considers the so-called “First Island Chain”, which runs from Japan through the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Taiwan protects immediate access to the Western Pacific via the Yonaguni Strait between Taiwan and Japan, and the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. On the east coast, Taiwan’s deep-water naval bases at Su’ao and Hualien allow submarines to directly slip unnoticed into one of the deepest maritime channels in the Pacific. Therefore, Taiwan is crucial for Beijing not only politically but also for its geopolitical significance. Taiwan has been facing an increasingly aggressive China since 2021. New speculations and anxiety have surfaced about the political future of the island nation as Chinese President Xi Jinping, on 8 th October 2021 declared China’s possible peaceful “reunification” with Taiwan . This controversial statement came after Beijing sent a record number of military jets into Taiwan's defence zone. Since the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) Tsai Ing Wen became the President of Taiwan in 2016, Beijing resorted to a series of aggressive actions against Taipei, which included economic pressures and military bullying. President Xi during China’s 20th Communist Party Congress held in October 2022, renewed the vow to reunify the PRC with Taiwan. President Xi’s wish is made even more real by an increased People Liberation Army’s (PLA) activities surrounding Taiwan and Japan’s southwestern islands. The world is a witness that PLA’s movements surrounding Taiwan have increased tremendously in recent months. According to media reports, from July to August 2022, there was a 766% increase in the monthly average of PLA aircraft flying around Taiwan’s airspace. US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taipei even fueled these activities. Beijing was furious as Washington “blatantly violated China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” it also launched missiles, which landed in Japan’s economic exclusion-zone waters after passing over the Taiwan Strait. The PLA Navy also retaliated as the presence of defense vessels in the waters surrounding the island significantly increased since Pelosi’s visit. China repeatedly claims that Taiwan is no longer just a sovereignty issue for China but a key component in achieving a geopolitical victory in the China-US great power rivalry and challenging the Indo-Pacific rules-based order. This motive in Chinese territorial behaviour is a cause for worry for India and some other fellow democracies. New Delhi advocates a rules-based, open, balanced liberal order and stable trading environment in the Indo- Pacific region. India looks at the Indo- Pacific as an open, libertarian, and democratic zone. So, New Delhi must protect Taiwan to ensure rules-based liberal order in the Indo-Pacific region. However, according to several China experts, the journey of India- Taiwan relations has happened under the shadow of China only. Taiwan never featured prominently within India’s Act East Policy as always been overshadowed by much bigger Sino- Indian ties. Reacting to all the complaints from Taipei, New Delhi finally broke its silence in August 2019 as India’s Ministry of External Affair’s spokesperson made a short and calculated statement as Beijing was overreacting during Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in the same month. Reacting to the Chinese pressure around Taiwan Strait, New Delhi rejected any unilateral action to change the status quo and to maintain peace and stability in the region . Taiwan appreciated India’s stand. The PRC strictly practices the “one China” policy and has always considered “Taiwan” as an inseparable piece of mainland China. Over the years, the concept of the “one China” principle evolved along with China’s attempt to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. According to Harsh P. Pant (2022) from the Observer Research Foundation, the omission of the “one China” principle in the official statement from the Ministry of External Affairs is intentional . It was shared in 2014 by then-Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sushma Swaraj, that Beijing could not expect India to verbalize its support when China has ignored Indian sovereignty concerns in Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. Beijing reacted immediately as Sun Weidong, Chinese envoy to India called on the Indian Government to reiterate its support for the “one China” principle. There are numerous benefits if New Delhi engages more closely with Taipei. Taiwan is a young democracy in East Asia, which offers a pluralistic and inclusive experience to its residents. Taiwan’s vibrant democratic model, which is praised in the Indo- Pacific region for its openness and transparency, could oppose PRC’s authoritarian development model. The Indo- Pacific region deserves more free and democratic liber democracies like Taiwan . So, it is the responsibility of all the major democracies of the region to protect Taiwan from potential Chinese invasion as the PRC attempts to diminish the civil society of Taiwan and confidence in its governance through various ways of using strong words and coercion. So, being a fair democracy, India must be concerned about Taiwan’s future as reunification by force or war would disrupt sea lines of communication and technology supply chains by providing China with a dominant status in the first island chain to the second island chain. In the face of assertive China, it’s the appropriate time for New Delhi to engage more politically and economically with Taiwan. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

97074589-c679-483d-a375-6ee0ad46237d < All op-eds IMEC Roadblocks: India's 'Look West' Maritime Vision Hits a Snag Sanchari Ghosh On the sidelines of the G20 Summit in September 2023, India, Italy, France, Germany, the European Union, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia jointly signed a memorandum of understanding for the establishment of the India-Middle-East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which encompasses both railway and sea links . The strategic location of the Middle East at the crossroads of two continents - Asia and Europe, and India’s reliance on the Middle East for a substantial portion of its energy imports hold pivotal significance in India’s broader maritime diplomacy within the context of the Indo-Pacific. As the IMEC seeks to extend India's enduring connection with the Middle East, this article aims to contextualize it within the framework of India’s maritime diplomacy, especially the ‘Look West’ component of it. IMEC is a renewed attempt to reinvigorate the link that dates back to the days of the Indus Valley Civilization, which was further expanded during the Roman times when trade contracts were established between Kerala and shippers in Alexandria.India's engagement with the Arab Gulf countries had been expanding since the 1970s, well before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh launched India’s "Look West" policy in 2005. The post-Cold War dynamics, in which the Gulf States host India’s large diaspora and supply the bulk of India’s oil as well as the historical economic and cultural linkages led to this development. The ‘Look West’ intensified through its transformation into ‘Act West' with special impetus on maritime diplomacy Under Modi’s regime bringing India closer to Gulf countries and turning it into one of the most important dimensions of India’s Indian Ocean diplomacy, the Indian Navy has not only initiated a program for security collaboration with the Gulf States but has also strengthened its operational coordination with their navies through defense cooperation. The IMEC helps India overcome its barrier to establishing land connectivity with West Asia which has been disrupted due to perennially distraught relations with Pakistan. This proposed corridor would bypass this hindrance by linking ports on India’s west coast to those in the UAE and Saudi Arabia to further boost India’s maritime diplomacy with the West Asian region. Although this project matters to all the concerned countries as a counter arrangement to China’s Belt and Road Initiative that aims to position China as the centre of the global economy, it especially supplements India’s broader vision of the Indo-Pacific that prioritises the multilateral organisations like GCC as part of its ‘Look West’ maritime diplomacy. As the IMEC strategically connects India to the Middle East and Europe, creating a comprehensive trade and energy network, it not only enhances India's economic ties but also strengthens its geopolitical influence across the Indo-Pacific region. Given India’s apparent hesitancy to fully align with the West, as demonstrated by its reluctance to perceive the Quad as an explicitly anti-China alliance, its preference for an evasive balancing approach, and its endorsement of the BRICS expansion , it looks for opportunities to re-establish connections with non-Western nations. The IMEC seamlessly fits into this broader geopolitical strategy. It also indicates India’s keenness to integrate the Western Indian Ocean into a cohesive space. The Western Indian Ocean assumes critical importance in realizing an integrated Indo-Pacific vision as it serves as a key maritime crossroads connecting the Indian Ocean to the broader Pacific region. This maritime domain plays a pivotal role in facilitating trade, energy transit, and strategic connectivity, bridging continents and fostering economic interdependence. This vision was previously absent from India's policies and a transformative reimagination has already materialized with India's endorsement of U2I2 (a grouping of India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States) mirroring the Quad in the Western Indian Ocean. However, some serious drawbacks arising out of logistical limitations, the complex geopolitics of the West Asian region, and the recent intensification of the Israel-Hamas War undermine the strategic and economic potential of the IMEC. The proposed plan contains two corridors: the east corridor connecting India to the Arabian Gulf (primarily a maritime route) and the northern corridor connecting the Arabian Gulf to Europe (a combination of railway and sea link). The objective here is to boost road, rail, and maritime connectivity, facilitating increased movement of goods and services among South Asia, West Asia and Europe. However, the overall process may face challenges with prohibitively high loading and unloading costs. The transportation of goods originating from Europe to reach India, and vice versa, which would be unloaded at Israeli ports, entails the use of expensive rail routes. Moreover, this transportation process involves traversing numerous border crossings, thereby necessitating the resolution of tariff and transit expenses. These challenges arise from logistical complexities, raising questions about the overall feasibility of the initiative. Moreover, the internal political instability in West Asia, which is the only region in the world lacking an inclusive regional security system complicates matters. From the decade-long rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia to the new forms of religious extremist groups in the region, the complex geopolitics of West Asia deters India from choosing a definite path concerning its ‘Look West’ policy. Although Iran has made slow progress in fully operationalizing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) – a corridor connecting India to the Caspian Sea, Russia, and Northern Europe through Iran, it is expected that India and Iran will soon sign a deal on the Chabahar Port. However, the decades-long hostility between Iran and Israel compromises the chosen route of IMEC that passes through the Israeli port of Haifa. This situation raises questions in Tehran. Consequently, India may find itself in a dilemma, whether to proceed with signing a deal on the Chabahar Port or move ahead with the IMEC. These problems have been compounded due to the intensification of the Israel-Hamas war which has created an obstacle for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to participate in the IMEC project alongside Israel. The success of the entire project hinges on the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, an extension of the Abraham Accords that led Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE to officially recognize Israel in August 2020. However, the Israeli bombardment of Gaza has halted the progression of this normalization process. Even if the war subsides , it would have a long-term impact on IMEC. Thus, the kind of diplomatic cooperation that IMEC warrants is questionable and is way more complicated now. India has long pursued proactive maritime diplomacy in the Indian Ocean to counter Chinese assertiveness. However, India's stance on West Asia is influenced by the region's internal dynamics, over which it has limited control. Despite the historical foundations of India's relations with the Arab Gulf countries, the intricacies of West Asia present challenges for its 'Look West' strategy. The success or failure of IMEC in the coming days hinges on how its member nations, including India, address these challenges. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

d6bbd321-6548-4d54-a89f-44f0aa4ae061 < All op-eds Russian Military offensive: The Revisionist Agenda and the Ripple Effects Dr. Nansi Paulraj Russian Military offensive: The Revisionist Agenda and the Ripple Effects Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, termed Special Military Operations (Invasion) started on 24th February 2022. The reason for this is to protect its Russian ethnic minorities, and halt the entry of Ukraine into NATO. In effect, Russia does not recognize Ukraine as an independent country and feels free to invade and bully it into submission. This war is costing massive loss of innocent lives and damage to infrastructure, in addition to going against both the nature and ecology of the region. This aggression has shaken European security architecture, which has been crafted since the second World War. I further ague that it has indeed strengthened NATO and brought the US into firm leadership in this region. The West and its allies have since imposed heavy sanctions upon Russia. Many countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and West Asia who believe in a multipolar world order have not taken sides, even as they oppose the war. They believe that Russia supports their national interests and that Russian security interests should be considered in any negotiations. They oppose all wars, and treat Ukraine in that continuity. The Ukrainian crisis has adversely affected the global economy, it is contributing to a sharp rise in the global defense expenditure and worse, the ‘nuclear aspirants’ reviving nuclear option. The humanitarian situation in Ukraine is persistently deteriorating with the huge exodus of refugees to the bordering states is at an alarming scale. At this juncture, the international community is facing more daunting questions and formidable challenges. Do the claims and comparison that Russia reviving its old order and Vladimir Putin is emulating Peter the Great with the ideology of “gathering the Russian lands” and the reign of Catherine the Great of the 18th century with idealistic and cynical policy, who conquered and controlled their neighboring territories an accurate analysis? Unlike Catherine II, who turned Russia into a great power, does Putin have long term strategy and a primary goal of securing Russia’s sphere of influence in the Eurasian space and holding back its drift over to the NATO. Is Russia trying to reassert its place in the new world order? Is Ukraine a pawn of the great power competition? These questions are conjectures. The post-Cold War optimistic security agreements from Atlantic to Urals are dilapidated. In this space, the US is trying to establish its primacy as the principal institution of reassurance of security in Europe. The competition between ‘Democracy’ and ‘Sovereign Democracy’ is playing with innocent lives. India’s strategic neutrality is becoming a major concern for US global primacy and its grand scheme of things in the Indo Pacific - but there seems no option for India. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

adac72d5-ff74-4dc6-afdb-ca1522319e48 < All op-eds Japan Eyes More Nuclear Power for Energy Security Parul Bakshi This blog has been republished from the East Asia Forum with permission. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed Japan to reevaluate its energy strategy once again. A sharp rise in the price of LNG, a lack of energy alternatives to reduce reliance on Russian LNG imports and Tokyo’s commitment to phasing out Russian coal and oil imports — all while ensuring Japan’s energy security — are making this reevaluation difficult. Even measures such as wearing turtlenecks to reduce energy consumption have been suggested. The Japanese government is unsurprisingly using the uncertainty around energy security as a reason to proactively push its nuclear energy policy. The policy can be traced to former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s administration. In 2012, following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Abe put nuclear energy back on the table as a potential critical energy source for Japan. Nuclear power has been touted as an important pillar in enhancing Japan’s energy self-sufficiency . Its use is also proposed as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, meet decarbonisation targets and a valuable source of baseload electricity. Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been emphasising the importance of nuclear power, calling for accelerating nuclear energy use on several occasions in the past year . But the Kishida cabinet’s Green Transformation (GX) strategic plan is being criticised for merely restating Japan’s decade old energy policy goals while pledging to accelerate the previously promised trend of nuclear energy use over the next ten years. GX assumes that nuclear power will account for 20–22 per cent of Japan’s energy mix in 2030 — a target that the Japanese government proposed in its Basic Energy Plan in 2014. In 2022, though, nuclear power only accounted for around 8 per cent of electricity supply. Kishida’s government hopes to extend the operation of nuclear power plants beyond the current 60-year limit to achieve this target. While the government believes life extensions are considerably cheaper than building new plants, they still represent substantial capital investments. The International Energy Agency estimates that extending the operational life of one gigawatt of nuclear capacity for at least 10 years costs US$500 million to US$1 billion . Even though countries like the United States have extended the lifespan of their reactors, no reactor in the world has been in commercial operation for more than 60 years. Kishida’s cabinet also proposes replacing aging nuclear facilities with new technologies like light-water reactors, small nuclear reactors and nuclear fusion. While these technologies could be promising, their present commercial viability is questionable. Even if nuclear power supplies only 10 per cent of Japan’s electricity after 2050, more than 10 new reactors may have to be built. Reactor restarts also incur significant costs ranging from US$700 million to US$1 billion per unit, regardless of reactor size or age. From the 2011 financial year to March 2017, total restart costs were estimated to be 1900 billion yen (US$17 billion) for eight companies, according to a Japan Atomic Industrial Forum survey . Yet according to polling by Nikkei , 53 per cent of Japanese support restarting reactors so long as safety can be ensured — the first time a majority has favoured this in over a decade. But stringent safety regulations, Nuclear Regulation Authority inspections and citizens’ class action lawsuits against reactors have hindered the desired pace of a post-Fukushima return to nuclear power . These bottlenecks continue to exist, even while public opinion might be shifting. However, over 3000 public comments received were critical of the nuclear policy shift. As a result, Yasutoshi Nishimura, Japan’s Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry, has stated that the government’s plan would be explained clearly to deepen public understanding of it. In response to Kishida’s announcement to consider the construction of new nuclear power plants in Japan, former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi reiterated reasons why the policy could fail. Other than stressing safety and financial concerns, he emphasised the dangers of nuclear waste and the challenges in finding a disposal site . Previously, observers have highlighted the need for Japan to provide more clarity on its nuclear energy policy, especially regarding the fate of existing nuclear reactors. The steps the government is taking to promote nuclear energy show the direction Japan intends to take. But there continue to be questions about how the government’s goals related to nuclear energy will be achieved — especially around issues such as radioactive waste treatment, risk minimisation and commercial feasibility. Stable political leadership, consistent stakeholder engagement and appropriate legislation are required to make the government’s vision for nuclear energy to become a critical element in Japan’s energy mix a reality. But the government should be mindful of cost–benefit analyses and ensure the push for nuclear energy does not come at the cost of reversing the expansion of renewables. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More