SEARCH RESULTS

Dr. Sinderpal Singh Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at the Nanyang Technological University. He was formerly also a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University Singapore. issinderpal@ntu.edu.sgUniversity of Singapore. < Back Dr. Sinderpal Singh Sinderpal Singh is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research interests include the international relations of South Asia with a special focus on Indian foreign policy as well as the geo-politics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Before joining RSIS, Sinderpal was a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, and a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore. He has published articles in journals such as Asia Policy, Asian Security and Pacific Affairs; his single-authored book is entitled India in South Asia: Domestic Identity Politics and Foreign Policy from Nehru to the BJP (Routledge 2013; paperback version, 2015). He has also contributed book chapters on aspects of India’s Northeast, specifically in relation to India-ASEAN land connectivity and India’s broader ‘Look East Policy’. He is Associate Editor of the journal South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, published on behalf of the South Asian Studies Association of Australia (first published in 1971). He received his PhD from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, his MA from the Australian National University, and his BA from the National University of Singapore. issinderpal@ntu.edu.sg

fed3b486-2980-4a95-b805-abf32e80586a < All op-eds Do Maritime Policies Matter to Those Living at Sea? Dr. Vilashini Somiah In the study of Maritime Southeast Asia, scholars would unpack the historical and contemporary importance of water bodies from historical, sociological, cultural, political, and economic perspectives. Often these discourses and debates lead back to the issue of fluidity and porousness of seas and oceans throughout this uniquely archipelagic maritime region that is Indonesia, The Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore (ASEAN observer Timor-Leste should also be mentioned here). In policy studies, this is often equated with the current narratives of security, defense, territorial disputes and a list of potential crises, threats and criminal activities (human smuggling, trafficking, violent extremism, piracy, illegal fishing, and environmental devastations). Within the Indo-Pacific, maritime borders, diplomacy, and sea mobility is commonly associated with the Asian superpowers, specifically China , India , Australia, Japan , and at times ASEAN, and their individual and collective influences on the issue. There have been some challenges identified by policy experts in the development of maritime policies, namely the issue of differing mechanics of security, which are influenced by a nation's military practices, human and financial resources, and also one’s geographical terrain; this can result in different security, mobility and migratory outcomes overall. The maritime nations of ASEAN , for example, (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, The Philippines, Brunei, and land-locked members with considerable coastal areas like Vietnam and Myanmar) have each approached shared maritime concerns differently despite sharing intimate and interwoven maritime history, heritage, and borders with each other. As their maritime problems continue to expand and intensify with time, experts have recommended stronger and more direct communication between nation-states through the formation of regional councils, customizable security and economic frameworks, and the expansion of partnerships with other experienced maritime countries within the Indo Pacific like India and China, and with time the EU, The US and NATO. But for those who research the area from the ground up, these policies have been equated with rigid and sometimes archaic ways of understanding water bodies, which fail to capture very important nuances of identity, belonging, and the pre-territorial and pre-boundary movements of littoral (to mean along the shore of part of seas or lakes) communities. Communities living in the coast also feel that such land-centric policies for development and strategic ties continue to perpetuate their littoral way of life as being dangerous and threatening. The bottom line is that while governments continue to work on securing and strengthening their maritime issues, they also enable an old (and problematic) narrative of littoral communities and spaces only existing as problems to be solved. Borneo for example (also my area of research), is the largest island in Asia and the third largest in the world, and its political division between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei means that international, regional, and local maritime laws have been in place to ensure economic trading of goods and produce, and maritime boundaries are secured and protected. However, while international sea laws are in place to help foster more efficient diplomatic ties between neighbouring nation-states of these maritime spaces, local laws enacted can sometimes be in contradiction to them. An example of this is The Malaysian Territorial Sea Act 2012 (TSA), which sets out 12 nautical miles as the breadth of the territorial sea throughout Malaysia. The history leading to the enactment of the TSA is long and complicated but it is generally a response to international laws such as the (Alteration of Boundaries) Order in Council, 1954 (vis-à-vis the Colonial Boundaries Act, 1895), which determines the boundaries of a British colony and the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982 , a multilateral treaty governing the world's oceans. However, in the case of Sabah and Sarawak, the territory for the exploitation or exploration of the territorial sea is limited to only 3 nautical miles , which has been greatly contested by local activists and politicians and accused of being unconstitutional . The arguments made by those protesting the change have accused the Malaysian government of wanting to have complete control over the state’s rights to fisheries, marine, and mineral resources. The Malaysian government, however, has responded by explaining that while international law limits the Malaysian territorial waters to 12 nautical miles (22km) from the coast, the TSA had always limited the states’ waters to 3 nautical miles (5.5km) from the coast. Before 1963, Sabah and Sarawak, as independent nations, had sovereignty over waters up to the full 12 nautical miles from their shores, but this had to change as they became states under the federation of Malaysia. Regardless of ongoing debates, for those living on the coast, contradictory or overlapping international and domestic policy quandaries such as the above mentioned only translate to further inconveniences in their daily lives at sea, which eventually impact their access to work, social connectivity, and native practices. From this other social problems often ensues: specific to Malaysia, the rigid governing of water boundaries has also led to modern day migratory issues of epic proportions, mirroring the displacement of migrants and refugees coming from countries like Ukraine, Syria, Sub-Saharan Africa and Myanmar. Littoral communities from east Sabah in Malaysia, southern Philippines and eastern Kalimantan of Indonesia see their maritime movement between these nation states as fluid and natural. Non-legally recognised movements are considered illicit and in many cases, criminal, and when arrested they are eventually deported. For the children of these people, they are deemed stateless and undocumented. Further complicating this is the villainizing of local littoral populations who share similar cultural and ethnic identities to these nearby migrants , all of whom are often deemed as dangerous by authorities. While many littoral communities have expressed wanting to respect national laws and international boundaries, it becomes clear to many maritime communities that these policies have given very little consideration to their immediate needs and difficulties in place of the protection of sovereign borders. It cannot be denied that securing maritime borders are in fact important to national security and will continue to be the focus of countries in the Indo-Pacific, especially that of developing nations. However, it is important to recognise that for littoral communities, it is easy to understand how International maritime treaties and cooperation seem to have overlooked their everyday practices and relationships with their sacred water bodies. Their retaliation towards this comes in the form of a rejection of these maritime conventions; these communities are only concerned with their daily survival and will utilise their maritime space for the movements of goods, peoples and ideas indefinitely. Solving this quandary will require littoral and maritime communities to be invited to contribute to the building of more effective policies. With a potential shift on civil engagement, newer maritime laws and policies, both domestic and international, can not only help ensure security and economic stability, but also more important concerns in the 21st century such as Covid-19 healthcare and recovery , climate change and gender equality . Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

LAUNCH EVENT Event title: IPC Online Launch Date: 10th February 2022 Time: Washington D.C.: 0730 - 0900 hrs New Delhi: 1800 - 1930 hrs Singapore: 2030 - 2200 hrs WATCH VIDEO EVENT DETAILS SPECIAL ADDRESS Ambassador Kelly Keiderling Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Dept of State. KEYNOTE ADDRESS Prof. C. Raja Mohan Visiting Research Professor, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore INTRODUCTIONS TO THE CIRCLE Sushant Singh Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research Dr. Happymon Jacob Associate Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Founder, CSDR, New Delhi PANEL DISCUSSION: FRAMING THE INDO-PACIFIC: PATHWAYS TO THE FUTURE MODERATOR Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (Retd) PANELLISTS Ankit Panda Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr. Sana Hashmi Visiting Fellow, Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation Manoj Kewalramani Fellow - China Studies, Takshashila Institution, Bangalore. Dr. Kittipos Phuttivanich Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Ramkhamhaeng University, Thailand.

7a22a302-d74a-4fd1-bc84-657d51e1fde6 < All op-eds The Impact Of A Probable Iran-Israel War On the Maritime Security of West Asia and the Indo-Pacific Region Dr Shelly Johny V. The October 7 Hamas attack on southern Israel led to the death of 1400 Israelis and other nationals, and the kidnapping of 229 people. This resulted in a sustained bombing campaign of the Gaza Strip by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), further leading to a mounting number of Palestinian deaths. Israel has gathered more than 300,000 IDF reservists, armour, and artillery on the perimeter of the Gaza Strip in preparation for a ground invasion with the purported aim of wiping out Hamas. This has heightened tensions in the region with Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon threatening that an Israeli ground incursion into the Strip would result in a massive retaliation. The likelihood of a war between Iran and Israel is huge if IDF moves ahead with its plans of wiping out Hamas completely. It is clear that Iran’s lack of reaction would compromise its credibility in the ‘Axis of Resistance’ (that it built in the region including Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Ansar Allah or the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen). If Iran and Hezbollah fail to protect Hamas now, the Axis of Resistance that they built will be severely weakened, and affect their own deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis Israel West Asia is surrounded by some of the most important shipping lanes in the world including the Suez Canal, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Hormuz Strait. While a war in which Iran intervenes will have widespread consequences for the wider West Asian region, its impact will be felt as far as the Indo-Pacific region. The three important maritime theatres that can be affected by a war between Israel and Iran are the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. Each of these theatres can be affected by the conflict in their own unique ways because of their peculiar geopolitical challenges. For example, Iran is not part of the Eastern Mediterranean but has influence through its ally Syria and proxy Hezbollah. On the other hand, Israel has the capability to conduct its naval operations in this theatre and to a certain extent in the Red Sea, while it does not have that much access to the Persian Gulf area. At the same time, the U.S. because of its predominant naval capabilities will be able to play a domineering role in all these maritime theatres. There is no account of Israel having conducted any naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Israel also did not attack any of the ports of Syria during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, though it is a matter of conjecture if these ports were not attacked because of Soviet presence in them . The end of conventional warfare between states in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict (after 1973) changed the dynamics of naval warfare between the two sides. Israel launched Operation Litani in 1978 in response to a terrorist attack by PLO to destroy guerrilla bases in southern Lebanon and establish a security zone in that region adjoining Israel to prevent further attacks. During this operation, the Israeli Air Force struck at the port of Tyre, where the Palestinians were said to have received large deliveries of arms . When Palestinian guerrillas continued their operations against Israel even after Operation Litani, Israel conducted an invasion of Lebanon in 1982 going as far north as Beirut with the aim of expelling the PLO from Lebanon. Israel changed its tactics towards guerrillas operating in Lebanon during this war. The Israel Navy conducted a blockade of West Beirut, beginning in June 1982 to put pressure on the Lebanese to force the PLO to leave Lebanon. The blockade was maintained by a ring of patrol boats, gunboats, and missile boats supported by submarines. The siege lasted until August 1982 when a deal was reached for the withdrawal of the PLO leadership and fighters from Lebanon. The PLO was replaced by the Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah in conducting attacks against Israel and its proxy in southern Lebanon, the South Lebanon Army (SLA) headed by Maronite Christians from southern Lebanon allied with Israel. The attacks by Hezbollah continued in the years after Israel first withdrew from most of Lebanon except an area of southern Lebanon adjoining Israel in 1985 and then its complete withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. Israel conducted two military operations against Hezbollah in the 1990s when it still retained control of a part of southern Lebanon. During the seventeen-day Operation Grapes of Wrath conducted by Israel against Hezbollah in 1996, the Israel Navy blockaded the ports of Beirut, Sidon and Tyre in a repetition of the tactic that it used in 1982 . In the more devastating war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, Israel not only blockaded all Lebanese ports but even bombed the Beirut port and its lighthouse In the civil war that broke out in Syria in 2011 as part of the anti-government protests, Iran through the Quds force of its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah, and pro-Iranian Shia militias from other parts of the region provided support to the Syrian government which allowed the latter to survive. Iran has been using a supply corridor extending from Iraq to eastern Syria to transfer weapons to Hezbollah and other pro-Iran Shia militias in Syria and Lebanon. Israel, for years, has targeted airports and sea ports in the government-held parts of Syria in an apparent attempt to prevent arms shipments from Iran. However, the recent increase in Israeli attacks against Syrian seaports could be to counter Iranian attempts to transfer weapons by sea as the usual supply corridor extending from Iraq to eastern Syria was targeted by intensified Israeli strikes . In the event of the present Gaza War spreading to Lebanon through strong retaliations by Hezbollah, Israel is likely to repeat its tactic of blockading Lebanese ports or even bombing them. The war in Gaza has already begun impacting offshore production and exploration of natural gas in the Levantine basin off the shores of Syria, Lebanon, and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel stopped gas production at the offshore Tamar gas field located 25 kilometres off the shore of Ashkelon though it is unclear if Hamas has the capability to target the field. However, Lebanon has not halted its gas exploration in offshore Block 9, south of the Lebanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) It is not clear if Israel would target the drilling rig and other facilities in Lebanon’s Block 9 in the event of the conflict spreading. If it is seen that Syria-based Shia militias are actively intervening in the conflict, Israel might blockade ports in Syria as well. Israel has targeted ships bound for Syria carrying Iranian oil and military supplies. But in continuation of what it has been doing for some years, the Israeli priority would be to target pro-Iranian camps and installations in south-western Syria close to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Through an understanding with Russia, Israel has agreed not to target the Syrian regime in Damascus, which is adjacent to the area currently targeted by Israel. However, this policy could change if the conflict intensifies. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

6f82c91d-96b7-4c9e-a473-e7797779d187 < All op-eds Biden’s Healing Plan: Where is it? Anurag Mishra As Joe Biden ascended to the Presidency, he sent waves across America and the world that gave people “hope.” In the challenging times when the world faced the most devastating health crisis, America had more to cure from. In his victory speech, Biden announced healing a bitterly divided country and ending the pandemic as his two topmost priorities. Dubbing the electoral victory a moral triumph, Biden had undertaken to comfort America. The speech Biden made had landed well with the people, but how well-meaning his efforts have been to remove the chasm and provide the healing touch remains a matter of debate. While some believe that the differences and divisions have only grown since Biden took the reins, others see the continued marginalization of democratic radical leadership as a position sustained in the right earnest. Biden’s campaign had run on noble but ambiguous lines that left political pundits a lot to look for in the dark. This article inquires how successful or not Biden has been in embarking on a path of unity and restoring the soul of America. The Divergences The last presidential election was arguably the most divisive in the recent history of the US. Despite Biden’s call for unity, a report by USC shows that the country remains as divided as it was at the start of Biden’s Presidency. The issues that riled up the country during Trump’s Presidency have continued to drive wedges between the parties and the people. Among the more divisive are the issues relating to climate change, environment protection, gun laws, and immigration. According to a Pew survey , the parties have gone adrift more than ever in the past over climate change issues. Although the younger republican lot does see climate change as a crisis, the repeated onslaughts of President Trump and other Republicans over climate crisis have created divisions among the parties and the people. Biden’s prompt appointment of John Kerry as a special envoy for climate and an immediate return to the Paris accord made it clear where the parties stand on this issue. The Republican disregard for climate change reflects equally concerning environmental protection. While eight out of ten Democrats feel climate protection is of utmost importance, less than four Republicans out of ten seem to worry about it. Thus, the Biden Administration’s expenditure and the constraints it has put over American polluting enterprises and land-use changes have caused the Republicans and Democrats fiercely against each other. According to the latest Pew survey , the number of Americans who want stricter gun laws (even in the wake of numerous school shootings across the US) has decreased from 60 percent in 2019 to 53 percent today. The rift is even wider when we compare the number of people who see gun violence as a significant issue in American society; the republicans v democrats are pitted at 18 percent to 73. America also remains divided on the question of immigrants. As Trump’s border wall remains an object of fancy in the public imagination, the unpraiseworthy handling of the southern border is one of the most criticized actions of the Biden Administration. The troubles for the Biden administration concerning uniting the divided nation are far from over. With the overturning of Roe v Wade, the Supreme Court of the USA has let the genie out of the bottle. By a single judgment, the Supreme Court has made abortion illegal in more than eight states. Several other states are in the offing to either completely ban abortions or regulate them heavily. Prospects vis a vis bridging the divide seem not very promising. Convergences In his forthcoming book titled “The Fight of His Life: Inside Joe Biden’s White House,” Charles Whipple describes Biden’s ascendance to the Oval office as “He’s been dealt an extraordinarily bad hand.” To deliver the country from such bitter divisions is no mean task but has Biden done enough to bridge divides instead of widening them is a point worth discussing. In Biden’s Presidency, points of bipartisan consensus and convergences have not been very forthcoming. However, that is not to say that there have been no attempts or success to have consensus. Lately, the school shootings in Texas gave America a much-needed shock to lose its reluctance toward stricter gun laws. Despite most Americans supporting the right to own firearms, Gallup’s poll had suggested in the previous year that Americans are not opposed to a stricter legal regime for their guns and heirloom. Taking a cue from the outrage and riding on sentiments, the US Senate passed bipartisan gun-safety legislation with a considerable margin. Not only that, but Biden also secured a bipartisan victory with his $1.2 trillion infrastructure plan. Additionally, Biden’s steadfast support for Ukraine has also received bipartisan approval. Onwards? Yes. Upwards? Not sure! Biden’s miseries have also been aggravated due to an un-friendly Supreme Court. As Americans brace for more turnovers, and Biden may be compelled to pass executive orders to negate those rulings, the divisions only seem to grow from here. The going-after of Donald Trump, the unilateral executive orders on abortions, and the relentless pursuit of stricter gun laws have only added to the woes of the cause of unity and bipartisanship. It is not so that political divisions have marred only the United States. Of late, social and political divisions have seen a rise in many democracies, viz. India, Australia, and France, and tackling such divisions have been arduous for the respective governments and political communities worldwide. Thomas A. Bayliss, in his paper, suggests that to overcome political divisions, political blocks within a polity need to evolve an “elite consensus” to keep the democracy from becoming more fragmented. However, an effort to arrive at such a political consensus over the more divisive issues has been virtually missing on the part of the Biden administration. The priorities listed on the White House website mention seven priorities of the current administration. From mending the fraught race relations to restoring America’s global standing, the pursuit of unity and bipartisanship don’t find space. President Biden had done right in identifying the problems of American politics but has so far belied his promises of ushering in an era of healing. President Biden, despite several failings, has the time to salvage the cause of unity and do more than what his opponents dismiss as jawboning. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

dd0e37b8-775f-4734-bbe5-eaeef5531dc5 < All op-eds Chinese campaigns increasingly targeting India’s Cyberspace Ms Kritika Roy China-nexus threat actors have been called out for their pertinent snooping and espionage campaigns that are aligned with the country’s national interest. Their espionage activities are global and are assumed to be at least state-directed or ordered, even if individuals might not be employees of the state. The frequency of China-linked malicious cyber operations has seen a gradual rise, with India frequently being targeted, among other nations and businesses. The major motivation for targeting India’s cyberspace includes commercial espionage, coercive tactics or attaining the Chinese strategic objectives. A Snippet of Recent Campaigns Recently, seven of India’s State Load Dispatch Centres (SLDC), which carries out real-time operations for grid control and electricity dispatch, were targeted by threat actors in a prolonged operation. The sustained campaign was intended to achieve the Chinese strategic objectives and the targeting was believed to have begun in September 2021. The threat activity group, dubbed TAG-38, has reportedly employed a modular backdoor named ShadowPad – a sophisticated remote access trojan (RAT) frequently used in Chinese espionage campaigns, to compromise the power grids. ShadowPad is a commonly used backdoor in varied cyber operations undertaken by groups linked to the People’s Liberation Army (P LA) and Ministry of State Security (MSS). With most of the SLDC situated in the northern part of India, one of them was in close proximity to the disputed India-China border in Ladakh which was noted to have been already targeted in a similar attack in February 2021. The hacking group identified as RedEcho was believed to have “strong overlaps” with a China-linked threat group. Indeed, further investigations indicated that in February China nexus threat launched a series of attacks against key Indian organizations including the Bennett Coleman and Co Ltd (BCCL) and the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) database that contains biometric information of billions of citizens. The breach was traced back to the threat activity group TAG-28, another China-linked group that focuses on gathering intelligence. In addition to India’s energy sector campaign, researchers have also observed the command and control (C2) infrastructure of the well-known Chinese malware PlugX heavily targeting the Indian military and public sector after May 2020. Persistence – A Long Running Strategy In considering what is currently known about the China-linked threat actors, a number of attributes stand out. First, the persistent nature of the campaigns, once the initial access is achieved most of the threat actors have been noted to build persistence within networks. This could be indicative of their constant effort of shoveling out sensitive information and user credentials. Second, the presence of malicious actors could also be seen as a possible prepositioning of a kill-switch that can be leveraged during conflict situations or escalations. Shying away from Proportionate Response? India on many occasions does acknowledge the attacks emerging from China but refrains from linking it to broader malicious Chinese campaigns. As seen in the recent power grid attack case wherein the Indian spokesperson pointed out that “We have seen reports. There is a mechanism to safeguard our critical infrastructure to keep it resilient. We haven't raised this issue with China,” indicating a posture of restraint. Understandably, the defensive posture may emanate from the willingness to not escalate the crisis, despite the attacks being traced to hackers operating from China. However, continuous restraint may, in long term, be seen as an inherent weakness and an opportunity for the adversary to continue its operations. Drawing parallels with the recent Russia-Ukraine war that has well indicated that cyberspace is an equally potent ground to unleash havoc on the adversary. The series of malware and data wipers deployed by Russia-linked threat actors in Ukraine, not only disrupted communications or sabotaged operations but also created chaos and confusion. Noteworthy is the fact that Ukraine has always been a testing ground for Russia-linked cyber threats, for instance, the power grid hack of 2015 that caused a power outage for several hours or the NotPetya attack of 2017 causing a massive supply chain nightmare. With respect to China-linked cyber campaigns against India it should be noted that in case of conflict or escalation, the China nexus threat actor may not only be called upon for reconnaissance or siphoning off credentials but also for launching a synchronized assault by the state. Hence, it is high time for India to be vocal about the attribution and simultaneously strengthen its cyberspace capabilities. India could also support or be at the forefront of multi-level initiatives to deter threats in cyberspace. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

5c59d598-2c27-4e2f-a134-b9a60e51acca < All op-eds Japan’s Missing Nuclear Energy Policy Parul Bakshi This blog has been republished from the East Asia Forum with permission. The urgent global need to meet climate ambitions, growing uncertainty about securing vital energy resources due to the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict and the inability of renewable resources to meet exponentially rising energy demand is bringing momentum back to the nuclear energy debate. Some argue that a zero-carbon future will remain an unattainable dream if nuclear energy is not used to fight the ill effects of global warming. While this contention continues to be debated, a recent report by the International Energy Agency suggests that nuclear energy is set to make a comeback and witness a doubling of capacity between 2020–2050. The situation is particularly acute for Japan. With a relatively low share of national energy resources, it has relied on imports of coal, oil and natural gas to meet its energy needs. It is no surprise then that Japan has been one of the foremost countries to have expanded its nuclear power plant fleet to ensure energy self-sufficiency. Japan’s 2010 Strategic Energy Plan aimed to expand the share of nuclear energy — otherwise known as its ‘ dream energy ’ — to meet half of its electricity demand by 2030. But the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 led to the dramatic reversal of these plans to the extent that a complete nuclear phase-out was considered. While the vision for the phase-out was set aside upon the Liberal Democratic Party’s return to power, Japan’s nuclear energy policy has lacked clarity in meeting its set targets. A share of 20–22 per cent of nuclear energy is envisioned in the latest draft of the Strategic Energy Plan in 2022. While this target has remained the same since the 2014 Strategic Energy Plan, the process of attaining it is still unclear. As of June 2022 , only ten out of Japan’s 54 nuclear reactors have been given the go-ahead to restart, while just four are currently in operation and 21 have been decommissioned. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has repeatedly reiterated the need to restart more plants and the crucial role that nuclear energy plays in Japan’s security and stability, announcing that up to nine reactors would be in operation by the end of 2022. With liquefied natural gas prices in Japan reaching historic highs and Japan’s continued resolve to include nuclear energy, it is time to look into establishing a substantive Japanese nuclear energy policy. Whether Japan will make a full-fledged return to the league of major nuclear-powered countries is yet to be seen, but it seems unlikely. For continued reliance on nuclear energy, Japan will have to extend not only the reactor lifespan beyond the stipulated 60 years — a move that might rekindle public fears and opposition — but also construct new plants, which could take a decade. This will be ineffective in meeting short-term energy requirements that the nation is struggling with, while also leaving Japan behind in the global green race with implications for its 2050 net zero climate vision. Other barriers to expanding nuclear energy involve overcoming local opposition, lawsuits against restarts, delayed assessments and excessive safety goals stipulated by the Nuclear Regulation Authority. Cost overruns of nuclear projects, nuclear waste management, and the political and societal implications of nuclear disasters also pose challenges. Yet Hiroshi Kajiyama, Japan’s former minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, has called nuclear energy ‘ indispensable ’ for Japan. Kishida’s New Capitalism — which focusses on inclusivity, sustainability and touts green innovation as an area that would benefit from enhanced government research and development investment — could incentivise the development of related nuclear technologies such as Finnish Onkalo nuclear spent fuel repository technology and Small Modular Reactors. Under the shadow of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, a transparent account of the government’s nuclear policy could help both the nuclear industry and the public. But Japan must have a clear idea of how to manage its existing nuclear power capacity given the precarious geopolitical energy climate. With rising fuel prices and a weak yen, Japan is in the midst of the most serious energy crisis the country has ever faced. The ambiguity that shrouds the future of nuclear energy serves no good to Japan, domestically or internationally. A clear policy vision articulating how the existing hurdles will be overcome is essential for continuing investment to ensure a stable power supply and for insulating the sector from any unforeseen political instability at the leadership level. Nuclear energy is not the one-stop solution Japan is hoping for. Tokyo will have to make continued progress in renewables and other technologies such as hydrogen, carbon capture, energy utilisation and storage (CCUS). But with the government consistently including nuclear energy in its Strategic Energy Plan, it would be prudent to highlight how the desired targets are to be achieved by 2030. A clear nuclear energy vision will help stakeholders in the energy industry gain a better sense of the Japanese nuclear industry’s direction, so that they can prepare for the resulting implications rather than second guessing whether the government will be able to put talk into action. Parul Bakshi is a Doctoral Candidate at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, India and previously a Special Research Student and Japan Foundation Fellow at the University of Tokyo, Japan. She is the co-editor of India-Japan Relations @70: Building Beyond the Bilateral (2022). Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

8bfb6011-fcbe-482f-9066-7a4e9224f1ad < All op-eds Maritime Migration in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean: A dire need for greater cooperation Dr. Niloy Biswas The Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean are historical maritime routes for both South and South-East Asia. Recently, these have emerged as routes for intra-Asian and trans-regional movements of people, mainly from Bangladesh and Myanmar, to Southeast Asian destinations (ex. Malaysia and Thailand) and then extend the journey towards Australia. The drivers of such migration are essentially informed by three factors: economy, conflict, and climate. First, unemployment and the youth bulge influence the regular outflow of migrants from Bangladesh, Myanmar and other South Asian countries to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe. A significant part of it also undertakes irregular paths to reach the destination. For Southeast Asia as a destination, using the Bay of Bengal is a viable choice for many who could not have afforded the formal channels of migration. Second, conflict in Myanmar has significantly escalated irregular migration along this route. After a series of ethnic clashes instigated by the Rakhine nationalists in 2012, about 140,000 of an estimated 1.1 million Rohingyas fled, ending up in camps within Myanmar . Some tried to escape Myanmar by sea and landed in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. In the May 2015 tragedy, some 32 shallow graves were discovered on a remote mountain in Thailand , at a so-called ‘waiting area,’ where Rohingya migrants were being held to be smuggled to Malaysia. It raised the flag for the international community on the gravity of the matter. In 2017, over one million Rohingya people escaped the Rakhine State of Myanmar to avoid death, rape, discrimination, and torture and took shelter in neighbouring Bangladesh. After the 2017 influx, they and their fellow Bangladeshi migrants accompanied together on the boat to cross the Bay of Bengal. Third, the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean expose a critical climate-vulnerable space. There is a prevalence of short-term natural disasters in the region, induced by seasonal weather shifts and long-term climate change impacts. Moreover, this is a densely-populated region, and a significant part of the world’s population lives along its coastline. Finally, this resource-abundance region has attracted other powerful nations for excavations and extending their strategic sphere of influence. It has become an essential sub-region in the international connectivity discourse and a strategically significant trans-regional space. In such a critical maritime space, we have experienced the abandonment of thousands of men, women, and children by the state and smugglers. The network of smugglers and spoilers existed to maltreat the governance, arguably lowly addressed by some governments across the region. Irregularities in the migration governance and inhumaneness in migrants’ experience have made them more susceptible to the threats of complex vulnerabilities. Some countries have considered a mixture of hard and soft security approaches. For example, Malaysia recently pushed back to sea one and possibly more fishing trawlers with hundreds of Rohingya asylum seekers aboard. Thailand has indicated that it will refuse entry to Rohingya boats . Bangladesh coast guard officials rescued one boat of Rohingya refugees, which had reportedly been turned away by Malaysia nearly two months earlier. About 390 starving Rohingya, most under 20 years old, were brought ashore, with reports that as many as 100 may have died on board before the rescue . Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott stated that turning around boats was “ absolutely necessary if the scourge of people smuggling is to be beaten .” Australia introduced Operation Sovereign Borders , a military-led campaign to “stop the boats” with asylum seekers. Moreover, Australia had invested more resources in the detention centres on the islands of Manus and Nauru that had housed more than 1000 refugees and asylum seekers for several years before being pushed back to the sea. Thailand has engaged its naval forces to stop boat migrants, predominantly Rohingya asylum seekers from Myanmar, from landing on its territory. Moreover, it also implemented some harsh anti-refugee policies, including ‘push backs’ of any vessel attempting to disembark on the Thai shores . Malaysian former Deputy Home Minister Wan Junaidi Jafaar said, “We have been very nice to the people who broke into our border. We have treated them humanely, but they cannot be flooding our shores like this . ” He also said, “We have to send the right message that they are not welcome here.” The nations in the Indo-Pacific merit greater cooperation to deal with this crisis together. Although a majority of the countries in the region are not signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967, the concerned states should borrow the idea of the interpretation of ‘place of safety’ from the convention that includes the consideration of protection against threats to the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded fear of persecution regarding refugees and asylum seekers retrieved from a situation of distress at sea. It is critical to note that a multilateral arrangement between the states in the Indo-pacific must not interpret ‘place of safety’ as prisons detaining the refugees and asylum seekers. Again, there is a need to redesign the method of offshore processing, which is often used as a mere tool of border control that involves forcibly transferring asylum seekers to third states for legal processing of their claims. The detention centre, a temporary correctional facility offshore for the awaiting aspirant migrants, limits the fundamental rights to liberty and freedom of movement in international and regional human rights legal instruments. Therefore, it is to be understood as a measure of last resort and strictly in conformity with national and international law, bearing in mind the ‘ underlying purpose of preventing persons being deprived of their liberty arbitrarily .’ As the Indo-Pacific nations promote a rule-based order, maritime migrants must be considered with a humanitarian lens, and the rules cannot just be technically imposed upon them. It is discussed earlier how often disembarkation of rescued refugees has increasingly been denied by certain destination states in the Indian Ocean. As non-signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention, most of these South and South-East Asia countries do not feel an obligation to the reception of refugees. Moreover, stringent national laws on citizenship and border control governance are an existential reality; the refugee and asylum management tasks remain ad hoc and vague. Broadly, these have highlighted an international practice of promoting non-arrival strategies and deterrent practices at sea . The security-based approaches in Europe also increased contactless control practices as ‘consensual containment’ schemes . Will the Indo-Pacific nations replicate the same? It is critical to rethink the strategies to prevent unsafe sea migration. Global best practices can inform the Indo-pacific regional cooperation endeavours; however, they may not need to borrow the statist policies among the coastal states and reproduce similar patterns here. In this regard, sustained cooperation between state and non-state organisations will produce a durable solution. About the Author Dr. Niloy Ranjan Biswas is an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka. In 2016, he completed his PhD in International Politics from the City, University of London. He was a recipient of the Fulbright Fellowship (2010-12) to pursue a second Master’s degree in Security Policy Studies at The George Washington University, Washington DC. Dr. Biswas has co-edited two books and authored more than thirty journal articles and book chapters. He has written extensively on deradicalisation and preventing violent extremism, refugees and forced migration, security governance reform, and South Asian regional contributions to United Nations peace support endeavours. Email: niloy@du.ac.bd . Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

< Back Devika Makkat Research Assistant Devika is a Research Assistant at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research. Devika holds a Bachelor's in International Relations with a minor in Public Policy from FLAME University, Pune. She has a PG Diploma in Interdisciplinary Research, also from FLAME University. Her interest lies in security studies, foreign policy, and development studies with a focus on South Asia and the USA.

b6c39c75-22d8-4e68-8748-b4b49f861a0d < All op-eds Powerhouse: clean energy transitions in the Indo-Pacific Ms Parul Bakshi This blog has been republished from the The Intercept blog by the Lowy Institute with permission. With a global energy crisis underway due to rising prices , coupled with a forecast of a harsh northern hemisphere winter and supply volatility brought on by the Russia–Ukraine war, all eyes are on the future of energy transition . The Indo-Pacific will be at the centre of this transition, with rapidly expanding Southeast Asian economies and burgeoning populations forming a large share of the exponentially rising global energy demand. An energy transition is broadly defined as the pathway to transforming the energy mix towards low carbon, sustainable and renewable forms of energy. One of its key components is maintaining energy security. Traditionally, energy security has encapsulated the 4 As – availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability – but scholars today also focus on defined aspects such as minimal vulnerability, enhanced resilience and equitable access to energy. Over the past decades, the classical distinction between importers and exporters of energy has blurred. A traditional importer such as the United States is today a crucial energy exporter after its shale gas revolution . Further transformations in the energy landscape due to the global clean energy transition are expected to augment the energy self-sufficiency ratio of nations as their dependency on domestic renewable sources increases, leading to improved energy security. While this might be the case, the belief that such transitions could lead to reduced volatility of energy security is far-fetched. The increasing risk of geopolitical turbulence makes it imperative to promote shared interests and principles of energy security in the region. The ongoing transition away from fossil fuels will usher in a growing reliance on procuring supplies of hydrogen, ammonia, biofuels and other alternatives. Renewables will therefore alter the arenas of energy interaction, transform traditional energy markets and mark a shift in trading partners while reshaping patterns of conflict and cooperation between countries. Since the Indo-Pacific will be a major energy hub that houses critical and strategic energy trade routes, this reshaping will be most pronounced in the region. Instances of such shifts are already evident in the urgency to decarbonise and diversify energy sources. In 2020, traditional oil giant Saudi Arabia demonstrated the world’s first successful blue ammonia supply network by producing and shipping 40 tonnes of high-grade low-carbon fuel to Japan. Similarly, Japanese oil company Inpex successfully brought clean ammonia produced by the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company to Japan. Furthermore, Singapore was the major export destination of biodiesel from India in the 2020–21 financial year. Meanwhile, key Indo-Pacific players such as Japan and Australia are fuelling their bilateral relationship through hydrogen, with the world’s first liquefied hydrogen carrier ship completing its maritime transport of the fuel from Victoria to Kobe in February this year. India is also preparing to jump on the hydrogen exporter bandwagon. Among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Singapore imported hydropower-generated clean electricity from Laos via Thailand and Malaysia through grid interconnections for the first time in June. Countries such as Brunei have also started exporting small quantities of hydrogen to Japan. Although new and emerging interdependent energy relations are forming within the Indo-Pacific, fault lines have also emerged, with Indonesia recently announcing a ban on green energy export, putting a halt to the vision of an integrated ASEAN power grid. In countries such as Australia , in an attempt to secure energy supplies while meeting sustainability goals, nuclear energy is again being debated as a potential addition to the energy mix. However, a rise in the use of nuclear power would result in an increased reliance on uranium imports for many countries. It is interesting to note here that Russia is a key exporter of uranium to the United States and European Union , and with the fuel not being subject to the ongoing Russian sanctions, it adds to the debate on reliance on Russia and energy security. With the continuous growth in solar and wind energy across the region, the critical minerals essential to manufacturing these technologies will become increasingly important. Since these rare earths are concentrated in specific nations, particularly China, diversifying the sources and enabling stable supply becomes imperative to expanding renewable energies and ensuring energy security. In 2010, China imposed an export ban on rare earths to Japan due to a territorial dispute. It is anticipated that the energy-intensive undertones of China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative will impact the geopolitics around energy trade routes, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Such a scenario increases the need for regional countries to embark on a strategy to secure energy supply routes and affordable energy supplies. Recently, South Korea and Mongolia and India and Australia agreed to boost cooperation on global supply chains, especially concerning rare earths. As China and Russia continue to weaponise these supply capacities to exert geopolitical leverage to coerce other countries for their political purposes, it highlights the prominence of geopolitics of energy. The increasing risk of geopolitical turbulence, as seen recently with growing tensions in Taiwan , makes it imperative to promote shared interests and principles of energy security in the region. The future of smooth energy transitions and the development of a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific rely on a deeper understanding of evolving energy security and fostering a rules-based order safeguarding the same. As the Indo-Pacific comes under the spotlight with major players attempting to expand their influence, energy can act as a means to further relations and interests. Dialogues such as the Sydney Energy Forum are setting the stage. But is the Indo-Pacific prepared for the new contours of energy security? Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Prof. C. Raja Mohan is a visiting research professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. He was also the Founding Director of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, India. isascrm@nus.edu.sg < Back Prof. C. Raja Mohan C. Raja Mohan was a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie India. A leading analyst of India’s foreign policy, Mohan is also an expert on South Asian security, great-power relations in Asia, and arms control. He is the foreign affairs columnist for the Indian Express, and a visiting research professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. He was a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board. From 2009 to 2010, Mohan was the Henry Alfred Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress. Previously, he was a professor of South Asian studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. He also served as the diplomatic editor and Washington correspondent of the Hindu. Mohan’s most recent books are Modi’s World: Expanding India's Sphere of Influence (Harper Collins India, 2015) and India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security (Routledge, 2016) (co-edited with Anit Mukherjee). His other books include Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), Power Realignments in Asia: China, India and the United States (Sage, 2009) (co-edited with Alyssa Ayres), Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order (India Research Press, 2006), and Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (Palgrave, 2004). isascrm@nus.edu.sg

Amb. Rakesh Sood is veteran of the Indian Foreign Service, having held posts including India’s Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, and the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non – Proliferation. < Back Amb. Rakesh Sood Ambassador Rakesh Sood joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1976, serving in Brussels, Dakar, Geneva, and Islamabad in different capacities, and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington DC. At the Foreign Ministry, he set up the Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division and led it for eight years. He has served as India’s first Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and later as Ambassador to Afghanistan, Nepal and France. After retiring in 2013, Ambassador Sood was Special Envoy of the Prime Minister for Disarmament and Non – Proliferation till May 2014. Ambassador Sood has been a principal participant at The Chao Track II Dialogues.