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dc844891-b3a0-4bbc-96f8-330381138081 < All op-eds Operationalizing the Indo-Pacific framework Mr Paras Ratna Introduction Be it China’s Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) or the Build Back Better World ( B3W ) initiative, geopolitical contestations are increasingly getting manifested through overseas assistance and infrastructure financing. The recently held Quad Tokyo summit too emphasized cooperation on infrastructure to ensure growth and development in the Indo-Pacific region and has accordingly pledged to invest USD 50 billion to boost regional connectivity. The threat of the Chinese century and unipolar Asia is prompting powers within Asia such as Japan, and India to collaborate with the US, and Australia to provide public goods like infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region. As the world is gradually recovering from the COVID-19-induced shock, there seems a convergence of both geopolitical as well as the geoeconomics imperative to have a resilient, dependable, and sustainably financed critical infrastructure(s) in the post-Covid world. The reverberations of the same are being felt alike across the political and business circles. There is a vacuum as far as dependable critical infrastructure is concerned, making it a priority concern for the Indo-Pacific regional framework which is at the crossroads of politics and economics. Getting the ‘Quad’ wheels to turn Quad Joint Leaders’ Joint Statement too emphasized the need for the development of the inclusive and resilient Indo-Pacific framework in collaboration with like-minded partners. For the Indo-Pacific to have a serious heft, it needs to be complemented by a series of developmental and economic initiatives aimed at integrating the region. The Quad countries have demonstrated their willingness to collaborate on providing quality infrastructure in the region. In this regard, they have also set up a quad coordination group on infrastructure. This was launched as a part of the G7’s Build Back Better World (B3W) announcement . Quad infrastructure partnerships aim to collaborate with one another for delivering infrastructure by focusing on “digital connectivity, climate, health, health security, and gender equality infrastructure”. Notable initiatives like the Blue Dot Network initiative aimed at providing a certification framework for enabling countries to identify and pursue infrastructure investments that maximize the positive socio, economic, and environmental externality are already underway. The emphasis on “quality infrastructure” by the Quad countries is a veiled contrast to BRI often associated with unsustainable financing and debt trap. It is pertinent to note that Quad partnerships and collaborations have been careful in not limiting it to just military partnerships but developing it as an economic framework, something which the categorization/criticism of Quad as an ‘Asian NATO’ fails to capture. Quality infrastructure and connectivity form the core of meaningful operationalization of any regional integration framework, and, to this effect, Quad countries have taken stride by establishing or strengthening the mandate of their overseas infrastructure finance wing. For instance, the US, in 2018, launched the International Development Finance Cooperation ( DFC ) worth USD 60 bn as a part of the Build Act, aimed at assisting US overseas infrastructure projects. DFC has already pledged investments worth USD 200 million ranging across 10 projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. n the other hand, Japan has launched the ‘ Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure ’ aimed at investing USD 110 billion over the next five years towards quality infrastructure development in Asia. Australia too has injected AUD 1 billion to its infrastructure financing agency ‘Export Finance Australia ’ for supporting overseas infrastructure projects in the pacific. Additionally, it has set up Australia Infrastructure Financing Facility ( AIFFP ) aimed at financing infra projects through loans and grants ranging up to AUD 3billion and AUD 5billion respectively. Similarly, the Government of India engages in overseas infrastructure financing through its EXIM (Export-Import Bank) by extending line of credits (LOCs) that enables the recipient countries to strengthen their physical and social infrastructure. As of 2021 , India has extended LOCs worth USD 30.5 billion to 65 countries. In its extension of the line of credit, India prioritizes its immediate neighbourhood. Here, it is worth noting that regional connectivity in S.Asia is hampered by India’s domestic infrastructure deficiency as well, and investing in it has a positive spillover for the broader region. In this regard, India has established National Infrastructure Investment Fund ( NIIF ) to raise financial resources for funding domestic infrastructure projects. It is important to note that although India’s contribution to overseas assistance is less than 1%, it is a substantial contribution compared to high-income Quad countries like Australia (0.22%). Need to leverage the private sector The prioritization of infrastructure by the Quad grouping in their summits is a welcome step and makes both geopolitical and geoeconomic sense. As per the estimates of the Asian Development Bank ( ADB) , the infrastructure needs in the Asia-Pacific (read Indo-Pacific) region is slated to be around 26 trillion USD i.e. 1.7 trillion USD annually, a significant requirement compared to the current per annum investment of 881 billion USD. Thereby, making infra financing a ripe zone for geopolitical contestations in the region. Given the quantum of investment, there is a need to actively engage the private sector for the realization of the infrastructure push. In this regard, Quad countries have initiated frameworks to rope in private capital. For instance, the US Chamber of commerce in collaboration with its India and Japan chapter has launched the trilateral forum aimed at engaging the private sector for infrastructure projects. Similarly in 2018, the US, Australia, and Japan launched the trilateral partnership for infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific. Apart from delivering quality infrastructure reflective of international best practices, a major objective of these forums is to bring in private partnerships for these infrastructural projects. Notwithstanding the aforementioned initiatives, Quad countries' infrastructure outreach is still in the catching-up stage compared to the Belt and Road Initiative. Quad countries' success in terms of delivering large-scale infrastructural projects vis-a-vis BRI has been largely limited. In fact, it hasn’t been able to galvanize the private sector in a manner that was anticipated. This could be attributed to the inability of the Quad grouping/ frameworks to address business risks that overseas infrastructure financing entails for the private sector. Contrary to the government whose end result is tilted more towards political outcomes such as influence/goodwill, the private sector’s calculus is tilted towards the return on investment that could be derived from financing a particular project. As per the Participation in Infrastructure ( PPI ) report 2021 , private participation in infrastructure financing is uneven and regions like South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-Saharan Africa have witnessed a decline in PPI compared to other regions like East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean. Source: PPI, 2021. The report further notes that notwithstanding the signs of recovery in private commitments to the infrastructure visible in its increase in 2021 vis-a-vis 2020, it remained low compared to the average commitment of the last five years. Investment Commitments in Infrastructure Projects with Private Participation in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 2012-2021 is given below (Table 2). Source: PPI, 2021. Factors like an inept regulatory framework of the recipient country, unreliability of the projected risk profile of the project, and sovereign risk- a situation where the government of the recipient country unilaterally changes the terms of the contract etc; adversely affect the firm's interest without much recourse, thereby, deterring private participation in overseas infrastructure financing. Therefore, the majority of private-sector capital doesn’t get invested in the low-income economies that have an urgent need for infrastructural investment. Recommendations Effective operationalization of the Indo-Pacific framework requires the private sector to work in sync with the Government initiative. Hitherto, that has been a far cry. To fine-tune the same, Quad countries should address the risk associated with overseas infrastructure financing by eliminating information asymmetry. It is suggested to establish an entity/platform that provides services like risk profiling of the project, probable range of return on investment, expected support from the government, a primer on the regulatory framework of the recipient countries, and credible local organizations for possible collaborations. Blue Dot Network (BDN) launched in 2019, aimed at certifying quality projects in accordance with the international standards could be used for this purpose. This would enable the private sector to assess the viability of these projects in an objective manner. However, to this date BDN hasn’t certified a single project, therefore it is imperative to operationalize it at the earliest. Quad countries can establish a joint advisory council with members from the government and private sector esp. from trade and industry associations. This body could perform functions like providing technical inputs regarding the identification of any infrastructure project, preparatory survey to assess the viability of the project, criteria for selection of local partners etc. With the overall official development assistance of Quad countries, including that of high-income countries like the US, Japan, and Australia remaining quite low (around 0.2% of Gross National Income) compared to China; they could jointly think of establishing an Indo-Pacific infrastructure bank along the lines of AIIB or establishing a branch/wing in existing bodies like the World Bank for financing greenfield infrastructure projects in the low-income countries at a sustainable interest rate. Lastly, the frequent usage of coercive tools of statecraft like sanctions by the US adds to the complexity for the private sector and impedes their participation as well as the regional connectivity initiatives of partner countries. Chabahar port in Iran is the case in point. Thus, the US needs to be cognizant of the interests of partners while implementing sanctions. As the race for providing infrastructure heats up, countries in the Indo-Pacific would certainly want a quality, sustainable, and affordable infrastructure financing alternative, so as to resist excess dependency on China. This diversification strategy was quite evident in the recently announced Indo-Pacific economic framework, where 11 out of the 13 founding members (except India and the US) are also part of the China-led economic grouping Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In fact, there is a growing appreciation of the fact that the world today is far more economically interconnected and ideologically fluid, underlining the importance of the economic co-optation of member states for the successful operationalization of any geopolitical framework, and for that leveraging the private sector, given its capital, expertise, and efficiency becomes crucial. Paras Ratna is a PhD researcher at the National University of Singapore. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

ea00e7e5-a102-40f4-9ae9-7c7e0fa56f5e < All op-eds Reflections on the Battle for Elysée Palace and Future Impacts on the Indo-Pacific Dr Yatharth Kachiar and Shankar Narayan S French national elections do not stir much euphoria in a geographically far away region like the Indo-Pacific. During the election phase in France, domestic issues have dominated the debate, and foreign policy issues have largely taken a backseat. Nevertheless, the outcome of these battles for Elysée Palace will significantly impact the future of the EU, NATO and the Indo-Pacific region. As a resident power, France has immense stakes in the stability and security of the Indo-Pacific. Over 2 million French nationals are in the region, and 1.65 million resides in the French territories. Around 93% of France’s exclusive economic zone is in the Indo-Pacific, and more than 7000 French troops are permanently posted in the region. Consequently, the diplomatic and defence posture of the next French President towards the Indo-Pacific will have a direct impact on the geopolitics of the region. Continuity and Innovation Since 1958, French foreign policy and diplomacy have focused primarily on building a secure and stable cooperation with the US, transforming the EU into a strategic autonomous actor at the global stage, showing openness to engage Russia diplomatically, and promoting stability and development in Africa. Overall, the state elites in France have always preferred to maintain continuity in the foreign policy realm. Nevertheless, certain novelties such as a desire to build and strengthen military presence and political influence in the Indo-Pacific region have also permeated the French foreign policy in recent years. Initiated by President Macron, the French policy towards the Indo-Pacific centered around bolstering the country’s global standing and protecting its overseas territories in the region. In New Caledonia, a French overseas territory in the Indo-Pacific, Macron delivered a speech when the island was awaiting a referendum for independence. During his speech, Macron stated that France would be less beautiful without New Caledonia . This shows the importance that France attaches to its overseas territories and the Indo-Pacific, as without these overseas territories in the Indo-Pacific, the country’s influence over the region would become feeble. Macron’s Vision of the Indo-Pacific Emmanuel Macron, compared to his political opponent Marine Le Pen, has been more outward-looking in his policies. Being a pro-EU president, Macron always aligned with the EU’s idea of multilateralism. On the Indo-Pacific, he maintains that France should act as an inclusive and stabilizing mediating power in the region. France’s Indo-Pacific strategy outlined by Macron in 2018 focused on preserving the French-American friendship, disentangling France from the ongoing rivalry between US and China, and protecting French interests from the rise of China. An essential aspect of this strategy is to strengthen cooperation between France-Australia-India. Despite facing setback by the AUKUS defence pact, France invited Australia along with 30 other nations from the region to the Indo-Pacific Forum co-organised by the French Foreign Ministry and the EU in Paris in February 2022. This shows that multilateralism remains a core component of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy. At present, France holds the presidency of the Council of the EU. This puts the country in a better position to assert its role and that of the EU in the region. It is very likely that Macron, who has secured another term, will assertively pursue French interests in the Indo-Pacific. Such an approach is necessary to maintain France’s position at the global level. At the same time, as Ms Le Pen’s populist party enjoys more acceptance than ever, there is a possibility that it still might win future elections. If a populist regime comes to power in France, it can reverse decades of progress made in world politics in a few years. This was evident in Trump’s administration. Therefore, Macron is more likely to strengthen France’s external position so that it will not be at the mercy of populist parties in the future. It is highly likely that under Macron’s Presidency, France will play a very active role in the Indo-Pacific region in terms of alliance-building, strengthening security, and achieving progress in non-traditional security areas through multilateralism. Unpredictability under Marine Le Pen & the National Rally Under Ms Le Pen (and those who share the platform) French foreign policy would potentially enter into an unpredictable and unknown arena. Until now, her stance on the foreign policy issues, especially NATO, EU, climate change, and free trade agreements, indicates a parochial approach toward the international relations. Ms Le Pen has been vocal about quitting NATO’s integrated military command that it rejoined in 2009 “so that France is not dragged into wars that are not its own.” She is equally wary of joining any future European military command . Recently, the Ukraine war has constrained Ms Le Pen to advocate sympathy for Russia and President Putin openly. In 2017, as a nationalist, she had proclaimed deep admiration for President Putin. Although Ms Le Pen has condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, she remains critical of the European sanctions on Russian oil and gas as it leads to energy price rise in France. Given her ideological proximity to populist and nationalist leaders, it is highly likely that Ms Le Pen will eventually embrace like-minded leaders such as Mr Putin, Viktor Orban, and President Xi Xinping. On the question of China, Ms Le Pen stated that under her government, “France would continue to stand up against China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific and the opportunity for France is to demonstrate that we have the power to be an element of pacification.” Ms Le Pen is also critical of Beijing’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang. However, she is not in favour of imposing sanctions on China for Human Rights abuses. Under Ms Le Pen, the French role would continue to involve a lot of mix messaging to China. However, it may compromise one of the most critical components of the French foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific, i.e. multilateralism. To sum up, a future entrance of Ms Le Pen (& the National Rally) into the Elysee Palace would be good news for the right-wing, populist, and authoritarian leaders. At the same time, it will also be a setback for French policy in the Indo-Pacific and multilateralism in global politics. (Dr Yatharth Kachiar is an Assistant Professor, and Shankar Narayan S is a Research Scholar at the Manipal Centre for European Studies, MAHE, Karnataka) Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

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a61fa192-bf99-4002-a7d8-ada2ae822499 < All op-eds The Need for Quad as a Techno-democratic Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Mr Arjun Gargeyas The leaders of the various Quad countries have conducted numerous diplomatic gatherings throughout the past year. A recurrent underlying theme throughout the sessions was the extended focus on the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. Topics discussed at the meetings ranged from the role of the Quad in the Indo-Pacific region to regional economic/trade challenges. Along with the US, the Indo-Pacific region's three nations (India, Australia and Japan) constitute the Quad, in which technology cooperation has played a significant role in bringing the four states together. China continues to play a crucial role in how these nations formulate their responses and international strategies when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. It is clear that China has advanced to the point where it is now influencing the region technologically. Beijing's diplomatic goals have benefited from the private sector's success in some critical technical fields, which has been aided by ongoing governmental backing. The Chinese government has looked to its domestic technology giants in addition to its most important foreign policy initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to strengthen its diplomatic ties around the world and increase its technological footprint. It is essential that one state/private organisation does not control the market and stifle technological advancement in important industries in the age of geopolitical consequences of technology ecosystems. Through its Digital Silk Roads initiative , China has already succeeded in capturing continents like Africa by convincing these countries to adopt Chinese technology. States in the South, South East, and East Asia have a chance to avoid slipping into China's "technology debt trap," which would essentially give China and its corporations a lot of influence. The Quad nations are technologically advanced and rising powers in the Indo-Pacific region. It is also interesting that the Quad nations, each of which has comparative advantages that can aid in containing the Chinese juggernaut, are moving toward establishing a strong alliance and credible technical cooperation. In the current political environment, it is crucial for China's competitors to decouple essential technological supply chains from nations like China. Modern commercial and military applications increasingly rely on critical software and networked technologies like telecommunications, the Internet of Things, and quantum, in addition to hardware supply chains like semiconductors. The influence and control that China might have over smaller countries can be lessened by keeping Chinese businesses and their technologies out of other states' technological ecosystems. Setting Standards in AI The Quad, especially the regional parts of the grouping—India, Japan, and Australia—have a variety of technological strengths and specialities that, when combined, can create a powerful alternative to anything a Chinese corporation might have to offer. Japan, a country known for its intellectual prowess, demonstrated in its Fifth Science and Technology Basic Plan its dedication to the development of emerging technologies. The official Artificial Intelligence Technology Strategy , produced by the Japanese government, is centred on the nation's AI R&D and industrialisation strategy. In order to boost technological competitiveness and gain the upper hand in the geopolitical power dynamics, the administration also emphasised the importance of AI innovation. With the signing of an MoU to advance AI cooperation between the two nations, the Indian government has selected Japan as one of the crucial partners in developing future AI solutions. Australia has also pushed for the active involvement of its foreign ministry in developing and establishing technical AI and IoT standards. Australia has taken the lead in highlighting the importance of AI technology standards and has published an official document on it, arguing for a plurilateral approach. The three nations may work together to set the benchmark for future governance of emerging technologies by combining their technological expertise and commitment to creating relevant standards. Breaking the Huawei Telecom Monopoly With Huawei's success as a domestic telecom juggernaut in the 5G era, China scored a home run. China and Huawei currently jointly own the largest number of 5G-related patents and technological standards. With firms like Huawei and ZTE establishing communication networks in nations in Central Asia and Africa, China has solidified its position in the telecommunications industry as a result. Other Indo-Pacific countries may become unduly dependent on Chinese telecom technology due to the lure of low costs, subsidised equipment, and quicker access to modern communications technologies like 5G. The Quad nations have a significant impact here. India has entered the world of communication standards after receiving clearance from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) for its very own homegrown 5G technology standard , the 5Gi. The regional 5G standard was created to enhance connectivity and reach in India, which can serve as a template for other nations in the area. Even though it is still early, India may use its booming telecom sector to create new, more suitable technology for the Indo-Pacific area. Numerous of its telecom behemoths, including Jio and Airtel, are also members of the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) alliance , which collaborates to develop 5G technological alternatives. Rakuten, a leading provider of communications services in Japan, has also based its current 5G network on O-RAN technological specs and is actively working with other Indian tech firms on both their hardware and software. Although the three nations have the required expertise in 5G, they must rely on hardware, specifically telecom equipment made by US and European corporations and technical standards established by both US and Chinese firms. A strong alliance between the three nations (along with the US and the Quad) can aid in the establishment of manufacturing facilities for telecom equipment and specialised technical professionals to create alternative 5G standards. By doing so, the reliance on Chinese technology can be lessened and serve as a model for countries in the Indo-Pacific. In order to prevent other countries from falling into the Chinese technology trap, the expansion of China and its influence in important technology industries have prompted measures to equal and offer genuine alternatives. To check the Indo-Pacific region from becoming reliant on Chinese technology infrastructure, the Quad can collaborate to develop new technologies and produce substitutes for crucial ones that China has exported. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

fe80cc45-066c-47fa-a736-8de00182d28d < All op-eds Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: An Overview Dr. Angana Guha Roy As more and more powers jockey for influence in the Indo-Pacific, Canada launched its long-awaited Indo-Pacific strategy, implicating a shift in its foreign policy agenda. The strategy document launched on November 27 envisions the critical role the region will play in shaping Canada’s future. “Acting in Canada’s National Interests complying with its values” is the central tenet of the strategy. The emerging international order bears witness to the reality that economic interdependence cannot prevent war or build an undisputed foundation to conflict resolution. In fact, economic interdependence has been used by emboldened authoritarian countries like China to further their geopolitical interests by downplaying international norms rules and norms. Hence Canada, which in the recent past came under a critical scanner for aiming to only promote economic diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific without broadly defining its defence and security objectives, came up with an Indo-Pacific Strategy that calls for a “generational shift” in Canada’s foreign policy. The 26 page document offers a comprehensive framework of Canada’s roadmap to engage with the region outlining five strategic objectives centring on peace, security, trade, investment, and a more dynamic and proactive Canada. Canada’s strategy document positions itself in the middle of the grand bargain of major powers underlining a cautious two-pronged China strategy based on selective opposition and selective cooperation. The document marks Canada’s first strategic pushback against China after their relations turned frosty during the tenure of President Xi Jinping. The strategy calls for “profound disengagement” with “disruptive power ” China, in areas of human rights violation, international norms violation, military offensive and economic coercion implicitly hinting at China’s disregard for UN rulings on disputes in the South China sea and its action to further militarize and challenge navigation and overflight rights. Further, Canada’s highlighted reference to tackling China’s coercive measures, stems from its own experience of bearing the impact of coercive diplomacy and non-trade market practices such as forced labour . China’s increasing reluctance to comply with the mandates of the UN such as blocking the UN High Commissioner for Human Right’s report on the situation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang has further enhanced the concern among stakeholder nations. In June this year, Defense Minister Anita Anand while speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue, flagged Canada’s concerns wherein she denounced China’s practice of coercive diplomacy, irresponsible state-sponsored cyber activity, and theft of international property and sensitive technology. In the recent past, Canada was compelled to issue directives to Canadian tourists and the business community to account for the growing risk of arbitrary Chinese laws. In a nutshell, the strategy is directed against policies and behaviour that defy the existing rules-based international order that undermine Canada’s national interests. Events like President Xi’s public scolding of Canadian PM Justin Trudeau during a G20 meeting in Bali, reports of China’s clandestine interference in Canada’s election to push ahead candidates affiliated with the CCP, Chinese nationals operating an illegal network of Chinese police stations in Canada, and China conducting “dangerous interceptions” of Royal Canadian Air force (RCAF) security missions, further revealed the points of friction between the two governments. Xi’s dubious commitment to work with regional players for a stable Asia Pacific and CCP’s hegemonic ambitions left little room for addressing differences through dialogue. Canada’s “evolving” approach to China adopting harder measures might be the starting point of slow and steady decoupling from China. However, the document stresses the importance of inevitably “cooperating” with China, given the size and span of its economy to address issues such as climate change, biodiversity loss, global health and nuclear proliferation. Aligning with the key democratic stakeholders in the region like the United States, European Union, and Australia, Canada aims to pursue a multifaceted engagement with Taiwan ,in areas of trade, technology, democratic governance, health, and countering disinformation. Weeks before launching the strategy document Canadian delegation visited Taipei, voicing support for its membership in the World Health Organization and International Civil Aviation Organization. As the strategy promises a larger military footprint in the Indo-Pacific region to ensure “peace” and “stability” , it will ensure an added security cushion for Taiwan. Defying China’s position, Canada resolves to defend the status quo of the Taiwan Strait against any unilateral action. Chinese media deplored and rejected Canada’s blunt Indo-Pacific strategy calling it an “antithesis of multilateralism” which would eventually harm regional inclusivity. Further, it stressed Canada’s asymmetrical capability , misjudgement of regional dynamic reality, and aggressive tones and ignorance toward China would eventually harm its objective to collaborate with regional players. Canada’s tough China talks have raised questions about its membership in the QUAD in the near future. Although the leadership has remained silent on this aspect, the rolled-out strategy does underline Canada’s ties with all the QUAD countries. Particularly while mentioning India as a “crucial partner” the strategy commits to working out a bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. In the recent past, the Business Council of Canada acknowledged the importance of building stronger and enduring economic ties with India to achieve success in the Indo-Pacific. As Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy aims to expand its involvement in the security horizon it must commit to boosting its defence posture. Canada is required to review its defence policy and improve its defence procurement system taking into account the new foreign policy direction. Further, Canada is facing a crisis of recruitment and retention in the Canadian armed forces . The current number of “trained effective” regulars is just over 53,000 which is below the set target of 20,000 by the government . At present Canada’s diplomatic rhetoric does offer an outline of its objectives but the implementation process would require a more proactive, dynamic and engaged Canada devoted to the existing security challenges and gaps in the region. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS

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adcaf831-2799-4ca9-9515-0cdd222ac863 < All op-eds Key Takeaways from the 20th Party Congress: Its Implications for India Dr Priya Suresh At China’s 20 th Party Congress, the Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping delivered a lengthy speech outlining the perceived accomplishments of the past five years and setting the stage for the CCP's priorities and strategies for the coming five years. The 20 th Party Congress has come at a critical juncture as the country embarks to construct a strong and modern socialist country. At the 20 th Party Congress, Xi Jinping presented a clear vision for the next five years. He was appointed the President for the third term and all the six people assisting Xi made it to the Politburo Standing Committee. President Xi announced the new leadership would not be apprehensive by “high winds, choppy waters and even dangerous storms” an explicit mention of the Party’s grip on Power. https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/xis-work-report-to-the-20th-party-congress-5-takeaways/ Xi’s position has been further strengthened making ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ the CCPs guiding philosophy for the future. The 20 th Party Congress cemented Xi’s authority as the strong and most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping. The Party Congress is more indicative of the fact that Xi does not act merely as the guardian of the Party spirit but as an advocate of the CCPs role in Chinese Society and its crucial mission of determining China’s future in the world. The Congress held high the banner of Socialism with Chinese characteristics and a model to be imbued by the rest of the world. The Party leadership has been strengthened in all respects. The most significant outcome of the 20 th Party Congress was Xi’s clear focus on carrying forward the mantle of achieving the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. The Party will continue its concerted effort of development and make breakthroughs in the field of technology and industry. Xi highlighted the Party’s key role in the growth and development of the Chinese economy. Xi is the Head of the Party, the State, and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, it is important to see how he proposes to use the next five years in China’s favour. Xi’s speech is ambitious and has set the tone for the next five years and beyond. One of the major policies is outward-looking in international politics, emphasising a proactive role in major global issues that go beyond China’s national and regional interests. Hongkong & Taiwan The most assertive section of the 20 th Party Congress was on Hong Kong and Taiwan. Xi appreciated the work of the CCP in the crackdown on pro-democracy activists in the region. In resolving the question of Taiwan, the Party shall unswervingly advance the cause of national reunification. China shall continue to adhere to the one-China principle and any form of external interference shall be dealt with severely. Xi’s dream mentioned the reunification of Taiwan and the hope to complete it by 2049. Xi’s speech strongly emphasised ‘national rejuvenation’ and any violation of China’s unity and sovereignty shall be dealt with severely. Xi did not rule out the probability of the use of force to ensure the reunification of Taiwan. Zero Covid Policy Xi reiterated a zero-covid policy approach as a necessity for the benefit of the economy. The pandemic prevention measures were very effective and shall continue to stay. Xi continued to highlight the importance of stopping the spread and reducing fatalities. Xi repeatedly emphasised the commitment to the zero-covid strategy. Assertive Foreign Policy and Security Posture Xi hinted at the continuation of the country’s aggressive foreign policy posture for the next five years as he presented the 20 th Part Congress Report. No individual country was mentioned but affirmed an assertive policy as Xi touted China’s growing global clout and warned against any external interference to suppress or contain China. Xi placed special emphasis on advancing China’s national security and urged a “strong system of strategic deterrence” https://indianexpress.com/article/world/china-ramp-nuclear-arsenal-xis-assertion-establish-strong-strategic-deterrence-experts-8224361/ Xi’s speech reflected a vigorous upgrading of capabilities with new military and strategic guidance. Xi accelerated the building of a world-class military and strongly emphasised security. China continues to grapple in key areas – ideological domain, development-rural and urban, ecological conservation and protection remain formidable tasks. Xi did not rule out any unforeseen challenges and claimed various “black swan and grey rhino” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-xi-idUSKBN29Y12N events can occur at any time. Upholding and strengthening the Party leadership shall only help accelerate the country's development. China will continue to pursue independent foreign policy and shall practise a “defensive national policy”. China shall continue to follow the wolf warrior approach and assertive diplomatic tactics as and when needed. Xi’s claim to supremacy and consolidation of power can see a more aggressive and assertive China. What can India expect with Xi’s third term? Given the security environment, any projections shall be difficult. China’s move will depend on a case-to-case model. Any major change in India-China relations is unlikely with New Delhi insisting on a resolution of eastern Ladakh. Xi’s cabinet shows a “strong Indian undercurrent” reflected in candidates' selection and elevation. Wang Yi is one such recognizable name dealing with the US and India. Wolf warrior diplomats at the helm of affairs will pose a great challenge to India in bilateral and multilateral forums. Given the new game plan for the next five years, India must prepare for a periodic if not an increase in China’s assertive action vis-à-vis the LAC and regional power politics. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

77525501-b681-4995-9ea4-2b1f81d7fc28 < All op-eds Air Pollution and Climate Change Politics in the Indo-Pacific Dr. Helena Varkkey South Asia and Southeast Asia are both rapidly developing regions. However, economic development often comes alongside environmental degradation, especially if this growth is fueled by the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources. Air Pollution, Fires, and Climate Change In recent decades, air pollution has become an increasingly serious problem in both regions. Several cities in India, alongside places like Chiang Mai in Thailand and Riau in Indonesia, frequently top ‘most polluted’ lists. While baseline air pollution is already high in these areas, agricultural fires and fires related to agricultural land-use change have been identified as major contributors to seasonal (dry season, harvesting season) air pollution. Scientists continue to improve their understanding of how air pollution contributes to climate change. One critical link lies in tropical peatlands, found in abundance in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. These carbon-rich forests are important carbon sinks; however, drainage and conversion of these lands into plantations reverse the process and accelerate carbon release into the atmosphere. Drainage also increases the risk of fires. The changing climate, which may cause prolonged and more intense droughts in South Asia and Southeast Asia, further sustains ideal conditions for fires. Governance Challenges Most governments have identified agriculture-related fires as a priority issue to be resolved due to their dire impacts on social health, the economy, and the environment. However, this has proven challenging: these fires have often been described as a ‘wicked’ problem, one that is almost impossible to solve due to its complex and interrelated nature. In Southeast Asia, alongside smallholder practises, powerful local and transnational agribusiness companies have been linked to these fires. The sectors linked to these fires have often been identified as nationally strategic sectors by governments, like palm oil, sugar, and corn. ASEAN has identified the transboundary haze-producing fires as a regional priority since the 1980s. However, limitations of the ASEAN Way mode of engagement, which prioritises economic development, consensus, and non-interference, has often been blamed for the lack of progress on regional cooperation over haze. In South Asia, India was found to be the largest source of transboundary air pollution. It is important for regions like Southeast Asia and South Asia to engage in knowledge exchange over governance solutions for this ‘wicked’ problem. Fires and Climate Politics Agriculture is an integral part of the economy, culture, and society of South Asia and Southeast Asia. The commodities produced on these agricultural lands often make their way to major markets in the West. Climate consciousness in the West has affected agriculture in the South in complex ways. For example, Western consumers increasingly link palm oil production to environmental destruction. Corporate buyers have demanded ‘sustainably produced’ palm oil. However, there remains an aversion to products containing palm oil among Western consumers. This has resulted in an oversupply of palm oil produced sustainably, but largely unable to be sold as such. Climate-linked global initiatives like REDD+ operating in South Asia and Southeast Asia to address fires, among other issues, have met with mixed success. However, recent developments at COP26 in climate financing and loss and damages have been promising in fostering closer understanding between the North and the South over this complex issue. Initiatives based in the South, like Singapore’s Climate Impact X Carbon Exchange, also potentially offer solutions rooted closer to home. The challenge now is to move towards workable governance solutions to address fires and land-use change in ways that mitigate climate change at a global level, improve public health regionally, and sustain development and prosperity nationally and on the ground. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Dr. Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy &; Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Dr. Rajagopalan was the Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019). She was also a Non- Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre from April-December 2020. < Back Dr Rajeswari Rajagopalan Dr Rajagopalan is senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat and writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues. Dr. Rajagopalan joined ORF after a five-year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (2003-2007), Government of India, where she was an Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan in 2012. Dr. Rajagopalan has authored or edited nine books including Global Nuclear Security: Moving Beyond the NSS (2018), Space Policy 2.0 (2017), Nuclear Security in India (2015), Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity among Asian Great Powers (2012), The Dragon's Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Its Implications for Asia (2009). She has published research essays in edited volumes, and in peer reviewed journals such as India Review, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air and Space Power Journal, International Journal of Nuclear Law and Strategic Analysis. She has also contributed essays to newspapers such as The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Times of India, and The Economic Times. She has been invited to speak at international fora including the United Nations Disarmament Forum (New York), the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) (Vienna), Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the European Union.

Adm. Anil Kumar Chawla (Retd.) served as the 28th Flag Officer Commanding- in-Chief, of the Southern Naval Command. He also served as the Indian Navy’s Chief of Personnel in 2016-18. < Back Adm. Anil Kumar Chawla (Retd.) Vice Admiral Anil Kumar Chawla, PVSM, AVSM, NM, VSM, ADC is a retired Indian Navy officer, who served as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval Command.

521bf3ea-356d-419d-be92-ce5d50c6276b < All op-eds Explainable AI for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Abhivardhan In this article, it is proposed that while governments in the Indo-Pacific region including India focus on strengthening digital public infrastructure and emphasize on the need to develop Responsible AI ethics practices, shifting to develop Explainable AI ethical principles would become imperative within the scope of technology governance, which would widen the pivot of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Responsible AI and the Indo-Pacific’s Pivot for Critical Technologies Looking at the Quad ’s statements on critical technologies , and their commitment to establish standards for emerging and critical technologies along with unveiling an Expert Group on Critical and Emerging Technologies, it seems clear that the grouping intends to address shaping ethical, legal and industrial standards and the economic relationship behind technology transfer and innovation. It is necessary because many algorithmic activities & operations undergone through these sophisticated AI technologies, be it in through complex machine learning algorithms, analytics, automation or any sub-segment transcend geographies and can be used in a way, which could be intrusive for human environments, both physical and digital. Protecting knowledge and information is also a key priority because in an interconnected world, AI technologies are the beneficiaries of transnationally available data and their algorithmic practices & operations shape with time. Now, companies across Asia, due to the lack of relevant AI standards in several Indo-Pacific countries garner data which is not ethically guaranteed. If data is not fostered and used in an ethical way, which at the same is not explainable, then neither the consumer nor the regulator is aware of the method through which these technologies work. For example, the US Government already is concerned about the role of companies like TikTok whose recommendation algorithms are intrusive and could endanger data security. India has already banned TikTok through the security exceptions of General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) since mid 2020. This is why since 2020, countries across the Indo-Pacific are already developing regulations on AI technologies. The NITI Aayog in India came up with Responsible AI guidelines as Japan and Singapore came up with their AI governance frameworks. This is how Responsible AI guidelines became mainstream in the region. However, the disruptive and evolutionary use of AI technologies, is not possible to be covered under the Responsible AI guidelines due to the aspect of innovation in these technologies, which remains uninformed and inexplicable in most use cases. Now, many AI innovations are naturally, localized . When companies democratize the technology-based services and products, many of them ignore the lack of explainability of such generic narrow AI technologies. Also, when AI technologies fail to explain their steps, trends and missteps, companies fail to address issues surrounding trust building, knowledge management and data quality under the existing Responsible AI guidelines. These are some of the critical risks and issues that come up with the lack of AI explainability: AI technologies have use cases which are fungible There exist different stakeholders for different cases on AI-related disputes which are not taken into consideration Various classes of mainstream AI technologies exist and not all classes are dealt by every major country in Asia which develops and uses AI technologies The role of algorithms in shaping the economic and social value of digital public goods remains unclear and uneven within law These factors then affect the role of Responsible AI guidelines, when self-regulatory / oversight bodies are established to address algorithmic bias. Let us suppose that a technology company asserts that they would like to have oversight bodies to address issues as to how their AI technologies affect market conditions, then lack of market consensus / business-level standards regulatory / self-regulatory standards shows that the Responsible AI guidelines are not practical and merely symbolic. Even in the case of algorithmic bias, for every class of AI technologies, bias differs, and may be dealt better with a context and qualitative aspect (which again depends on data localisation issues). Even if data attribution is done, it is not possible to develop absolute considerations on the same because many machine learning-based models have explainability issues. This is where Responsible AI is a limited concept and consists of flaws, which is why, focusing on Explainable AI becomes necessary. Achieving Explainable AI Consensus Explainable AI, is very different from Responsible AI. In fact, the larger focus of this concept is to ensure that all possible technologies within the umbrella of “artificial intelligence” become explicit and explainable about their decision-making and implementation. The algorithmic operations & activities conducted by any AI technology, must be understandable and explainable for consumers. A lack of explainability for sure, is an ethical dilemma, which may be attributed to the black box problem and its legal implications. However, at the same time, Explainable AI may be helpful to find out the multi-sector policy repercussions that the “black box problem” (which means lack of explainability of algorithmic operations and activities) have. Explainable AI may also expand to the specificity of stakeholders beyond ethical statements and declarations on maintaining a status quo on AI governance, because having a consensus makes stakeholders, especially public and private actors, responsible to partner and opt for self-regulatory measures. Developing a regulatory sandbox, which India, for example, has already begun with, in the case of few AI technologies, can also be attributed to the idea of Explainable AI, clearly showing how explainability of AI technologies is necessary. To conclude, the Quad grouping and other minilateral forums in the Indo-Pacific region, including the I2U2 and others, may build consensus to shape AI explainability standards , which can be of much use to promote a safe, resilient and qualitative transmission of ethical data and safer AI-based products and services across Asia and Africa. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More