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a925d3c7-14c1-4cc4-ba22-d05c56ab86bf < All op-eds Quad Needs a More Near-Term, Outcomes-Focussed Approach Manoj Kewalramani Ever since its revitalisation, the Quad grouping, comprising India, the US, Japan and Australia, has evolved an ambitious agenda. Over the past two years, the Quad has established six leader-level working groups , covering domains like the COVID-19 Response and Global Health Security, Climate, Critical and Emerging Technologies, Cyber, Space, and Infrastructure. These are long-term agenda items that have primarily focussed on establishing frameworks and standards, boosting sharing of information and best practices, identifying vulnerabilities and discussing pathways to address them. The two most visible products of the Quad’s engagement so far have been the COVID-19 vaccine partnership and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA). These also underscore a desire to be near-term outcomes-focussed, while working on longer term challenges. Importantly, all these initiatives reflect a strategic congruence among the four countries in terms of the desire to shape a “free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific” region, address current challenges and shape the global governance agenda in key domains that will underpin future prosperity. This sense of purpose, however, does not imply the absence of disagreement over certain specific interests. For instance, member states have had clear differences in terms of their approaches to Russia’s war against Ukraine or the political developments in Myanmar. Complex Dynamics Some analysts tend to view these differences as fundamental contradictions that strike at the heart of the grouping. Such a view, however, is based in an archaic approach to international relations. It does not account for the impact of three decades of economic globalisation after the end of the Cold War, which created a web of networks and dependencies that cannot be immediately abandoned or transformed. Neither does it account for the changes in the dispersion of power across different countries around the world. The world today is not unipolar and neither is it moving in the direction of bipolarity. What is emerging is an uneven multipolarity. This is characterised by significant absolute power differentials in terms of comprehensive national power among the different poles. But this gap is far narrower when one takes into account relative power dispersion across different factors that constitute comprehensive national power. Invariably, such a situation engenders complexity in terms of any group’s dynamics. Moreover, such an old-world perspective on geopolitics misunderstands the nature and purpose of the Quad. The Quad is characterised by strategic congruence, political fluidity and diversity in terms of the geographies, capacities and specific interests of each member. Each of these are strengths rather than weaknesses. A strategic congruence among member states allows for clear and common agenda Fluidity provides for flexibility to accommodate differing interests. It creates room for domestic political manoeuvrability for each member state. It does not entail rigid commitments without necessarily limiting the scope and depth of cooperation. Ensuring that this situation remains an asset requires continued and frank engagement. Diversity in capabilities, experiences and interests ensures an inclusive approach and one that can leverage each other’s strengths The last of these three is perhaps the most critical to the Quad’s future success. This was amply evident in conceptualisation and execution of the Quad’s Vaccine Partnership, which saw each member state bringing a unique set of capabilities to the table. That said, there is something to be said about the need for the Quad to focus on outcomes and deliverables. For instance, the vaccine partnership was first announced at the leaders’ virtual summit in March 2021. Then, during the first in-person meeting between the Quad leaders in September 2021 , they committed to donating more than 1.2 billion COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022. As of May 2022, however, merely 257 million doses had been provided by the group. This number has since grown to around 670 million , informed the Assistant Australian Foreign Minister Tim Watts in a recent conversation. Nevertheless, it still falls well short of the original commitment. This underscores the importance of an outcomes-focussed approach that balances and long- and short-term objectives. IPMDA & Maritime Governance This is more so the case with the Quad’s maritime security and governance agenda. While the IPMDA was announced earlier this year during the May 2022 leaders’ summit in Tokyo , the roadmap for its implementation is rather unclear. Announcing the IPMDA, the Quad leaders had said that the initiative would “innovate upon existing maritime domain awareness efforts”, rely on “a combination of Automatic Identification System and radio-frequency technologies,” provide a “common operating picture” integrating “three critical regions—the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region,” and extend “support for information-sharing across existing regional fusion centers.” They envisioned a five-year window of investment in the initiative. The IPMDA is a significant agreement. It has the potential to go beyond merely domain awareness to not only provide a much needed boost to maritime governance, resource conservation and law enforcement, but also deepen potential intelligence cooperation. It is little surprise then that Chinese analysts have described it as a “rare” Quad initiative that “has teeth,” while also seeking to discredit it as an anti-China measure. The challenge, however, is that it has been six months since the announcement of the IPMDA, and there has been little information regarding the progress made in terms of the technologies that will be used, the process for tracking small fishing vessels, the methodology for sharing the data gathered and the consultations with partners with regard to implementation. It is important that these questions are addressed at the earliest. This is because domain awareness is merely the beginning of what should be a multi-pronged agenda for the Quad’s maritime security and governance effort. Closer coast guard cooperation among the Quad countries, maritime law enforcement equipment development and training support for littorals in the Indian Ocean Region and the use of shiprider agreements to boost law enforcement capacities of countries in the region is the way forward. In addition, Quad countries should engage in more active maritime health diplomacy, leveraging the strengths of partner states in geographies that are of primary interest to each of them. Such an approach can allow for expanded presence for each of them, while leveraging each other’s capabilities and social capital. For instance, the navies of India and Australia could work together to engage in health outreach and humanitarian and disaster management efforts in the South Pacific and the Western Indian Ocean region. Some of these initiatives can be operationalised rather easily and quickly. Doing so is important to ensure that the Quad is not just addressing the long-term challenges that countries in the Indo-Pacific face but is also seen as addressing immediate needs while building goodwill. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

ab30ce32-de14-46ad-9be7-d2bd9b7917a9 < All op-eds ASEAN: The Missing Piece in US’ Indo Pacific Strategy Aakriti Sethi During the Bush and Obama administration, ASEAN’s role in America’s Asia policy was elevated as the White House began recognizing its wider importance within and beyond the region. Apart from its strategic location compelling larger global players to acknowledge the importance of Southeast Asia, the region’s geopolitical role has had the ability to oscillate views critical to US-China rivalry. Since the Trump Presidency, American perception on China witnessed a sharp shift as anti-China sentiments crystallized. President Trump’s decision to launch a refurbished Asia policy (i.e. the Indo Pacific strategy in 2017) with renewed focus on harnessing a “free and open” rules-based order and strengthening US economic and defense ties with various partners and allies of the region met with bipartisan support. Viewed as one of the many ways to counter China’s influence within the region, President Trump ushered in an era of maximum competition with China that has had a far-reaching impact. Other major countries like Japan, Australia and India who have been long-time supporters of the Indo Pacific rather than the Asia-Pacific, welcomed this shift in the US policy. Being wary of this power struggle, ASEAN has time and again emphasized its centrality for maintaining an “inclusive regional architecture” and collective leadership which has been supported by the US. ASEAN centrality has been an important pillar for maintaining the regional status quo as it provided a means to form consensus within the region. However, understanding ASEAN’s possible role within the Indo-Pacific has received limited attention from the US. Southeast Asia is a region of significance that holds great economic value (and potential), located in the midst of key sea lanes of communication, and is home to dynamic yet politically diverse countries. Even as US officials have reiterated that ASEAN is “literally at the center of the Indo-Pacific , and plays a central role in the Indo-Pacific vision," American interaction with the region has been inconsistent. Since the Obama administration, there has been a perception gap about Southeast Asia not being a region of focus for the White House. The recent US-ASEAN summit can be seen as President Biden’s attempt at launching a “new era in the relations…guided by the complementary objectives of the Indo Pacific Strategy." By inviting all the member states to Washington DC, avoiding bilateral meetings on the sideline of the summit and engaging with the ASEAN platform to propagate a cohesive US-ASEAN message, there was an attempt at showcasing that the Southeast Asian regional organization reigns at the top of Biden administration’s foreign policy priority list. The American intention to build confidence in the US-ASEAN partnership and countering the growing Chinese influence was evident as new initiatives worth 150 million dollars for infrastructure, maritime security and healthcare were committed by President Biden. Unlike many parts of the world, Southeast Asia was not quick to embrace the concept of the Indo-Pacific. It was only in 2019 when ASEAN released the ASEAN Outlook of the Indo Pacific that the organization attempted to hesitantly navigate the new geopolitically-loaded construct. The ambivalent position of the group on the Indo-Pacific strategy has been due to China’s sustained influence over the region and a lack of concordance within member states. For America, countering this regional skepticism has been a challenge for multiple reasons. Firstly, the checkered diplomatic engagement with the region has posed questions about the role Southeast Asia plays in America’s larger Asia policy. The bare-minimum personal engagement of top US officials with their counterparts in Southeast Asia amidst the pandemic restrained the reception of the Indo Pacific strategy in Southeast Asia. Secondly, a lack of America-led economic framework(s) has weakened the appeal of the Indo-Pacific as a concept in the region. Even though the Biden administration launched the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), it lacks an active trade and investment plan for the ASEAN countries. During the recent summit, countries like Vietnam and Singapore claimed that the US lacks a clear plan, even though they are keen on possible economic prospects. Thirdly, on Russia, diverging opinions betweem the US and ASEAN countries addresses their differences in world view and foreign policy approaches. The cautious response to the Ukraine war by ASEAN showcased their unwillingness to weaken their relationship with Russia as countries like Myanmar, Vietnam and Indonesia depend on latter for defense equipments and weapons. Due to this, Russia was not mentioned in this year’s US-ASEAN joint statement. And fourthly, as the Quad has become more relevant in America’s strategic ambitions, the relevance of ASEAN centrality has come into question. The rise of this mini-lateral in the US policy discourse has triggered concerns about the role ASEAN could play in the region as the great power struggle intensifies. Within the context of brewing tensions with China over the South China Sea dispute, the Quad’s position in the evolving regional security architecture has been a puzzle for ASEAN countries. The 2022 summit was successful in displaying that America is ready to start afresh with ASEAN after a stagnation in ties over the past few years. However, the relationship has reached a juncture, where expectations from both sides need to be reevaluated. America’s desire to witness an ASEAN that is less reliant on China can only happen if the White House is able to incorporate ASEAN in its wider economic strategy. At the same time, as the competition between US and China hardens, seeking greater areas of convergence (like climate change) that quells the fear of binary choices for Southeast Asian countries will be ASEAN’s main challenge. The charm of the Indo-Pacific strategy for ASEAN countries lies in its economic and humanitarian aspect, rather than its geopolitical goals. Therefore, America presenting a vision for the Indo-Pacific that would help in achieving mutual benefits beyond the idea of balancing China would help in fostering greater consensus with the Southeast Asian countries. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

< Back VAdm ANIL K CHAWLA EDITOR-MARITIME AFFAIRS akchawlanav@csdronline.com VAdm Anil K Chawla is the former Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval Command and a Distinguished Fellow at CSDR. He joined the National Defence Academy in Jan 1978. Commissioned in the Indian Navy on 01 Jan 1982, he specialized in Navigation and Direction in 1988 and subsequently navigated two of the Navy’s frontline frigates. On promotion to the rank of Vice Admiral, he took over as the Director General of Naval Operations on 31 Dec 2014. He took over as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval Command, Kochi on 31 Jul 18. Vice Admiral Chawla was conferred the Vishisht Seva Medal on 26 Jan 13 and the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal on 26 Jan 2015 for distinguished service. He was conferred with the honorary title of Aide-De-Camp to the President of India on 01 Dec 2019. He was awarded the Param Vishisht Medal for distinguished service of the highest order on 26 Jan 2020. akchawlanav@csdronline.com 123-456-7890

Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (Retd.), served as an Officer in the Indian Army, and retired as Northern Army Commander in 2016. He has vast experience in counter-insurgency and crisis-management at the strategic level. dhooda@csdronline.org < Back Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (Retd.) Lt. Gen. Hooda was commissioned into the 4th Battalion of the 4th Gorkha Rifles in 1976 and initially served in Nagaland during the peak of insurgency. As a Major General, he was responsible for counter-insurgency operations in Manipur and South Assam. From 2012 to 2016, Lt. Gen. Hooda was stationed in Jammu and Kashmir and retired as the Army Commander of Northern Command in 2016. During this time, he handled numerous strategic challenges that emerged on the borders with Pakistan and China. Lt. Gen. Hooda has been awarded the Vasishta Seva Medal (twice), the Ati Vasishta Seva Medal, the Uttam Yudh Seva Medal, and the Param Vishisht Seva Medal for his exemplary military service. In 2019 Lt. Gen. Hooda authored a comprehensive National Security Strategy document. He is one of India’s foremost commentators on India’s national security. dhooda@csdronline.org

Prof. Anne-Marie Brady teaches Political Science at the University of Canterbury, and is an expert on Chinese politics. A fluent Mandarin speaker, she is also a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington DC. anne-marie.brady@canterbury.ac.nz < Back Prof. Anne-Marie Brady Professor Anne-Marie Brady's groundbreaking, policy-relevant, research demonstrates the important role of the academic as "critic and conscience" in a modern democracy. Professor Brady is a specialist of Chinese politics (domestic politics and foreign policy), polar politics, China-Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy. She is a fluent Mandarin Chinese speaker. She is founding and executive editor of The Polar Journal (Taylor and Francis Publishers). She has published ten books and over fifty scholarly papers. She has written op eds for the New York Times, The Guardian, The Australian, Sydney Morning Herald, The Financial Times, among others. Professor Brady's recent books include Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), China's Thought Management (Routledge, 2012), The Emerging Politics of Antarctica (Routledge, 2013), China as a Polar Great Power (Cambridge University Press and Wilson Press, 2017), and Small States and the Changing Global Order: New Zealand Faces the Future (Springer, 2019). anne-marie.brady@canterbury.ac.nz

fd72283e-4414-460e-a18f-9d1dd898aa00 < All op-eds Electoral Targeting: Lessons Learned from Digital Campaign Trails in Southeast Asia Ms Munira Mustaffa Various pessimistic predictions have been made regarding the future of democracies in Southeast Asia as a result of the diverse governments and political regimes with transitioning democratic system issues. The experience of liberation struggles in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Laos, the abuse of constitutions by authoritarian governments in the Philippines, and the development of international legal standards and doctrines shaped their constitutional designs . While electoral integrity is frequently emphasised, the significance of election security preparedness in the region and the accompanying risks are not being addressed effectively because of existing challenges. Election security preparedness entails implementing measures to protect the electoral process and safeguard it from interference, hybrid threats, or other types of coordinated attacks in order to preserve its integrity and credibility. Finland is an example of a country that is actively working on implementing measures for election security preparedness. Common approaches to managing election security include validating and verifying voters, protecting ballots, and securely transmitting election results. However, these measures frequently prioritise safeguarding the voting infrastructure over addressing potential political vulnerabilities. Political vulnerabilities in the context of election security refer to potential weaknesses or vulnerabilities in the electoral process that could be exploited to interfere with or undermine the integrity of the election. These vulnerabilities may be related to the technology used in the electoral process, the rules and regulations governing the election, or the political environment in which the election takes place. The popularly accepted belief is that democratic nations hold elections to determine who will lead the government and make significant decisions. However, the often underappreciated nuance is that in the case of Southeast Asia, elections usually come after a process of democratisation has already begun. In other words, the election itself is not what causes democracy to happen; rather, it is the end result or culmination of other processes and events that precede it. Arguably, flawed elections are essential to the maintenance of authoritarian government because it is through elections that authoritarian regimes are able to collect information, pursue legitimacy, manage political elites, and preserve neo-patrimonial dominance, all of which enable them to sustain their rule over the people. Some specific examples of political vulnerabilities in the region may include: 1) lack of transparency and accountability in the electoral process, which can lead to suspicions of fraud or manipulation; and 2) political polarisation or instability that can create an environment conducive to election-related violence or post-election coup d’état , or 3) intimidation and manipulations such as the strategic use of conspiracy theories and hate speech . Electoral politics in Southeast Asia can be a complex and multifaceted affair with a history of political ritualism, democratic competition, electoral anomalies and abuse; some may qualify as free and fair but not necessarily clean, while others may be free but not fair. The relationship between elections and democracy in the region is likely to vary from country to country and can be influenced by a range of social, economic, and political factors, such as: 1. The strength of civil society organisations (CSOs) : Strong CSOs can help promote transparency and accountability in the electoral process and advocate for democratic rights. They can also mobilise voters and serve as a check on the actions of governments and other powerful political players. On the other hand, weak or suppressed CSOs may be unable to fulfil these roles, leading to less democratic and transparent elections. 2. Voter intimidation or coercion: Some individuals or groups may try to intimidate or coerce voters into supporting a particular candidate or political party, either through threats or incentives, or purging of voter rolls or the use of other tactics to prevent certain groups of people from voting. 3. Fraud or vote-rigging : There have been instances of fraudulent voting or vote-rigging in some elections in Southeast Asia, such as malapportionment and gerrymandering . 4. Disinformation or propaganda: The spread of false or misleading information, particularly through social media, can create confusion and sway public opinion in favour of certain candidates or parties. 5. Campaign finance irregularities : Elections can also be vulnerable to campaign finance violations, such as the use of illegal or undeclared funds to finance campaigns and digital astroturfing . 6. Inadequate election administration : Poorly administered elections, such as those with inadequate voter education or inadequate safeguards against fraud, can also contribute to election vulnerabilities. 7. Social media manipulation : Social media can play a significant role in shaping public opinion and influencing the outcome of elections. Given that elections serve as a vital instrument for upholding democratic values and holding officials accountable to the people, they may be subject to a variety of manipulations and interferences . Voters must be able to differentiate between legitimate political campaigns and malicious electoral interference, but they may have difficulties doing so. For this reason, electoral regulations and content moderation are needed to support voter education efforts. During election seasons, there are two key vulnerable points in which sophisticated information operators would look for to exploit or leverage to achieve their goals, and that would be: influencing voter turnout and influencing voter choices. Election interference refers to any attempt to influence or subvert the outcome of an election by illegal or illegitimate means. This can take many forms, including hacking into voting systems or tampering with ballots, spreading false or misleading information about candidates or the voting process, suppressing or bribing voters, or manipulating the media to sway public opinion. Election interference is a significant threat to the fairness and integrity of democratic elections. The rapidly changing and competitive nature of the cyberspace , where multiple actors compete to control information and narratives, makes it difficult for regional policymakers to understand and effectively address election disinformation. Election disinformation is defined as deliberate, organised dissemination of false or misleading information with the goal of influencing election outcomes. This can take many forms, including false or misleading news stories, provocative social media posts, or digital astroturfing to manipulate and create uncertainty among voters, and undermine trust in the electoral process by eroding the credibility of candidates or political parties. Savvy political actors would hire influence operators, troll farms , or digital armies to spread campaign messaging and carry out malign influence campaigns against their opponents in an attempt to gain an advantage. These strategies may include using social media for counter-mobilisation (organising people against the opposition), discourse framing (shaping public discussion) in their favour, preference divulgence (gathering information about false preferences), and elite coordination (consolidating) with other elites. In recent years, social media platforms have become a valuable tool for political campaigns because they enable political players to reach a large audience quickly and effectively. More specifically, social media manipulation has become an integral part of information wars and election rigging, and it poses the potential to undermine the integrity of elections and earn its instigators an electoral advantage. Incumbent state actors and adversarial political players routinely leverage social media to extend their hold on power and limit opposition candidates by spreading disinformation, propaganda, and other malicious messaging that aims to interfere with and undermine the electoral process. In Malaysia and the Philippines , CSOs play an important role in observing elections by monitoring and detecting electoral fraud and subversion tactics such as disinformation, polarising messages, or hate speech. Governments, civil society organisations (CSOs), and election officials must cooperate in reaffirming their commitment to democratic practices to safeguard their electoral process and guarantee that the elections are free, fair, and clean. It is crucial to realise that erosion of trust is the primary cause of people's susceptibility to disinformation, and that the public need to be better educated in order to be more informed. CSOs must be granted more autonomy in order to enhance political education and increase media literacy, critical thinking, and fact-checking among the general public. This can be accomplished by allowing CSOs to establish independent oversight bodies and granting journalists and the media the freedom to observe and cover the voting process. Additionally, policymakers must maintain a close working relationship with social media platforms and tech companies to ensure they adhere to their content moderation policies and ensure, and that false or misleading posts are removed from their platforms as quickly as possible to limit public exposure and prevent harm. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

23847be1-eec8-4342-bd9e-13e81f0d71a7 < All op-eds Indo-Pacific formulation and ‘sea-changes’ for India Ms. Shereen Sherif In the light of the Indo-Pacific gaining significance in geo-political conception governing strategic choices of countries within and beyond the geographical expanse of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it is no doubt that India has been gaining an increasing role in the security architecture involving the region. With its predominant maritime thrust, Indo-Pacific merits an analysis of its effects upon its eponymous ocean and the role of India. Growing salience of Indo-Pacific is a result of, among other things, the changing strategic, security and economic interactions in the region with a pivotal role accorded to India and the Indian Ocean. Historically, Indian Ocean has been a major site of competition and contestation among different stakeholder countries for political power and economic resources. During the colonial times, the Western imperial powers controlled vast majority of the Indian Ocean littoral, deciding much of the internal political and external defence policies of the colonies. A case in point is the role of the Royal Navy’s control of Indian Ocean and their extended influence on all the entry and exit points, reducing the Indian Ocean to a British lake. The end of the colonial era heralded a new geopolitical order resulting in the entry of new players in the field. The British withdrawal from the East of Suez in 1960s generated a debate about the supposed power vacuum in the region. The Afro-Asian countries’ call for maintaining the Indian Ocean as a peace zone was ineffective in restricting the entry of United States and Soviet Union’s into the Indian Ocean. Great power presence and their politics in the Indian Ocean during the cold war period assumed competitive dimensions, which may be considered a transformative event. The end of Cold War, the emerging multi polarity in Asia and the resultant power shift from West to East further pushed a reconsideration of geo-politics in the region with an initial focus on Asia-Pacific and a gradual shift to Indo-Pacific. While ostensibly, the reconfiguration of Asia-Pacific into Indo-Pacific accords India and the Indian Ocean a central role in global security, bringing India into the foreground is a direct outcome of the strategic calculus of different stakeholder countries’ with their security and economic interests tied to the region. The recent transformation is also reflective of India’s potential as a counterweight to a growing China. It is clear from the above that contingent on political, strategic and economic imperatives, geopolitical frameworks have undergone transformations throughout history and countries around the world resort to various mechanisms to strengthen their reach in a region of strategic prominence. While the nomenclature and general functioning within the framework of the Indo-Pacific points to a significant economic and military role played by India in the strategic grouping/theatre, the significance of the Indo-Pacific is also a function of domestic and international politics and economic considerations of other nations in the region. The responses of two major powers in the region, Russia and China, is crucial in determining the future course of action within the geo-strategic set up as any alterations in the balance of power in any sub region will have a direct bearing on the rest of the grouping. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Through most of his 40 year illustrious career General Hasnain has served in turbulent environment and hot spots. From Sri Lanka to Siachen Glacier, from the North East to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), and in UN operations from Mozambique to Rwanda, he has seen it all in crucial appointments. < Back Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) served seven tours in J&K, decorated in almost of them and knows the J&K conflict comprehensively. He commanded the Indian Army’s Srinagar based 15 Corps and is today one of the foremost writers and analysts on J&K, Pakistan, Middle East and transnational extremist violence. He is a much sought after speaker and writes for major Indian newspapers – The Times of India, The Indian Express, The Hindu, Deccan Chronicle and The Asian Age, besides being a regular participant in television debates on mainstream television. With a strong academic background from Sherwood College Nainital, St Stephen’s College Delhi, the Royal College of Defence Studies, Kings College London and the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, Hawaii, he has been at the forefront of encouraging the adoption of the US initiated Scholar Warrior concept in the Indian Army. He has spoken at the Lee Kwan Yu School for Public Policy, the Rajaratnam School for International Studies and the Indian Institute for South Asian Studies, all at Singapore. He has also spoken at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), London. He is associated with the Vivekanand International Foundation and Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, as Distinguished Fellow and is on the Governing Council of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS). He speaks on National Security at various military, civil services and corporate institutions with a view to enhance India’s strategic culture. He has recently visited Iran and was at the forefront of neutralizing Pakistani influence operations in that country. On 13 Jul 2018 The President of India appointed Lt Gen Hasnain as Chancellor of the Central University of Kashmir. Gen Hasnain has six decorations awarded by the President for India and two by the Army Chief. He superannuated from the Indian Army in Jul 2013 after 40 years of active service.

Dr. Bec Strating is the Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, in the Department of Politics, Media and Philosophy at La Trobe University in Melbourne. B.Strating@latrobe.edu.au < Back Dr. Bec Strating Dr. Bec Strating is the Director of La Trobe Asia and an Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations in the Department of Politics, Media and Philosophy. Her research focuses on maritime disputes in Asia and Australian foreign and defence policy. She has written three monographs, most recently "Defending the Maritime Rules-Based Order" (2020). In 2019, she was awarded an Asian Studies Visiting Fellowship to research at the East West Center in Washington DC for three months. She was also a visiting affiliate fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, an affiliated researcher at Georgetown University and is currently a non-visiting fellow at the Perth US Asia Centre. She has co-edited two special issues and multiple journal articles and book chapters. In 2019, her second monograph, The Post-Colonial Security Dilemma, was published with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in 2019. In 2018, she was awarded the prestigious Boyer Prize by the Australian Institute of International Affairs for best article published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs in 2017 for her paper ‘Timor-Leste’s Foreign Policy Approach to the Timor Sea: Pipeline or Pipedream?’ She has written over 70 commentary pieces for organisations such as Lowy Institute, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The Conversation, East Asia Forum, New Mandela, Asia Global Online and Australian Outlook. She regularly provides comment to media including the ABC, the Australian and Sydney Morning Herald. She has testified in Australian federal parliament as an expert witness. B.Strating@latrobe.edu.au

7b48db71-2f02-4ed3-ae3f-84088a3eccee < All op-eds Does India Need a New Indo-Pacific Strategy? Oorja Tapan The reception of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic construct adjoining the contiguous waters of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean has gained traction in recent years with the swing of the geopolitical centre of gravity towards this region. This has also overlapped with the noteworthy rise of China, it's territorial claims in the South China Sea, its belligerence in the East China Sea and its rapid advance into the Indian Ocean through strategic and economic initiatives like the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI). Throughout history, the maritime domain has played a vital role in creating global and regional powers and affecting the security “Supercomplex” of geographical regions. Pertinent examples corroborate this aspect like the UK Navy being a major factor contributing to “Pax-Britannica” (1815-1914) in 19th century or the U.S. establishing military (naval) bases throughout the Asia-Pacific in order to maintain its ‘Sphere of Influence’ for “Pax Americana” in 20th century. India had been distant from the strategic standing of Indo-Pacific region in the last century (for the most part) and thus, this region has not featured much in India’s security architecture. China’s military and economic expansion (‘String of Pearls’ strategy) in the Indo-Pacific region has forewarned India of the certainty of these fluctuating dynamics. India clearly needs a viable Indo-Pacific strategy to secure its maritime domain for a primary ‘balance of power’ in the region. With the shocks in international politics by the Afghanistan and Ukraine crises, the paradoxes in our strategic culture are being exposed. Our civilisational history has become so imperious that India has been repeatedly ignoring its geography and therefore overlooking the “geo” comes first being common in both geopolitics and geostrategy . The minds of Indian policymakers are preoccupied with Pakistan and China vis-a-vis ‘continentality’. This has been a distraction because we have not been conscious enough of our 7500 km of coastline engulfing major choke points and lines of commerce. Thus, India needs to look at Indo-Pacific as a more workable opportunity to extend its influence. Secondly, there is an opportunity for India to discover ‘plug points’ for integration in the supply chains, especially the more ‘organic’ global supply chain – as opposed to China’s state-driven chain – which could also act to strengthen Quad linkages through initiatives like Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF formed in 2022), Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI), Blue Dot Network, Asia-Africa growth Corridor, among others. Projected future trends for the Indian economy include further maritime connectivity, a multilateral approach for transition from the existing ‘Brown’ to a ‘Blue’ economy, and prospects and challenges ascending from the maritime impact of ‘Industry 4.0.’ India is not a weighty financial or military player east of the Malacca Straits , but to the west of the straits, its geography makes it the foremost anchor for any stratagem that connects the Pacific with the Indian Ocean. India shares maritime and land borders with four out of the ten ASEAN states. Extending out 2,000 kilometres into the Indian Ocean, India leads the western end of the Malacca Straits; thereby enhancing China’s “Malacca dilemma” while simultaneously creating opportunity for itself. India's Indo-Pacific strategy has now become, in the main, a subset of its China policy, with significant contradictions . The Indian government denies balancing China, while at the same time, its actions affirm that very interpretation when it seeks to build increasingly close strategic relationships with the United States and its allies, such as Japan and other regional powers in the maritime domain, specifically, the Indo-Pacific. Many scholars interpret this as “hedging” – not only by India, but by other smaller and middle powers in the region to offset the Chinese threat. Rajagopalan (2020) terms such a diplomatic tool as “evasive balancing”, which is neither pure balancing nor pure hedging- but a contradictory mixture of efforts to engage in balancing while trying to reassure the target. Being extremely cautious of its tedious relationship with China, India has shied away from several military exercises.From the economic standpoint, China is one of India’s largest and most significant trading partners. From a security outlook, the Doklam standoff brought the two countries to confrontation, and with India being the only QUAD state sharing continental borders with China, India was wary of outrightly antagonising China. This is also because China views the idea of Indo-Pacific from a containment logic. It calls out QUAD as an ’Asian NATO’ . However, LAC clashes between the two nations in 2020 made India reconsider its China Strategy, consequently allowing Australia to be a part of Malabar military exercises along with Japan and USA and thus acknowledging the need for a cohesive Indo-Pacific strategy. With access to Indonesia’s strategically located deep sea Sabang port, Oman’s Duqm port, Iran’s Chabahar port and INS Vikrant commissioned now, India has been pacing its maritime and naval doctrines to modernise its Navy and is strategically seeking to counter aggressive manoeuvres at the sea. As Ashley Tellis points out , the re-emergence of China as a global power fundamentally challenges the United States and India in different, but complementary, ways. America’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ involves rebalancing America’s global military weight to Asia, strengthening its traditional alliances in the region and building new partnerships, including with India. Yet, India finds itself hesitant to follow through the logic of “buck-passing by USA” to itself, along with other American allies in Asia. Self-doubt, fears about losing strategic autonomy, apprehensions about being a junior partner and domestic political concerns have significantly limited Delhi’s capacity for strategic cooperation with powers bigger than itself. Many of the Indo-Pacific regional responses to China’s rise, including India’s, are corroborated by different scholars as diplomatic tools of balancing (covert/internal or visible/external; soft or hard), reassurance strategies, hedging, appeasement, and “bandwagoning” in the balance of power literature . The balancing component of India's China strategy contains both internal and external balancing elements. India’s Indo-Pacific strategy is a subset of this whole. Other than normal economic, security or diplomatic intercourse, India involves itself in external balancing with China through partnerships with the United States, Japan, Australia, France, UAE, Bahrain, ASEAN, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, Seychelles, Mauritius, and other African states and SIDS along with multiple military exercises. On the internal balancing side, India is engaged in setting up a new army strike corps facing China, repositioning Indian air power to this border, building up Indian infrastructure along the joint border, and enhancing India's nuclear and space deterrence capabilities. However, the Indian government stresses on an inclusive, all-pervasive definition of Indo-Pacific, not directed against China (thus, reassuring) or any other actor in the maritime domain. India should analyse whether the aforementioned mix of internal, bilateral and regional responses of India in its China Policy, with Indo-Pacific as a subset, are proving helpful for it, specifically, in dealing with China or not. The members of Indo-Pacific Circle should further delve into question of ‘balancing’ in IR theories to explore the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), the conceptual problems of alliance and alliance/alignment formation. India’s meandering balancing strategies vis-à-vis China with a mix of cooperation and confrontation in the domain of Indo-Pacific become more problematic with rising Chinese aggression. India needs a solid and concrete positioning as well as an assertive posture in the Indo-Pacific. OORJA TAPAN is a PhD scholar and Junior Research Fellow in Diplomacy and Disarmament Division at Centre for International Politics, Organisation & Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

The Indo-Pacific Circle is a knowledge and networking platform that hosts early and mid-career scholars from India and ASEAN countries engaged in shaping emergent narratives in the region. The Indo-Pacific Circle is a curated network of early and mid-career scholars from the Indo-Pacific engaged in shaping the emergent narratives of the region. The Indo-Pacific Circle has three main objectives: Network & Build Community Co-Create & Define the Indo-Pacific Amplify Indo-Pacific Voices Around the Globe If you are an early, mid-career scholar (aged 25-45 years) based in the region and working on issues concerning the Indo-Pacific, and would like to: - Connect with other scholars from the region - Amplify your expertise among the international IR community - Get published on IPC’s platform JOIN THE CIRCLE. APPLY NOW OUR MENTORS Dr. BEC STRATING Dr. Bec Strating is the Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, in the Department of Politics, Media, and Philosophy at La Trobe University in Melbourne. KNOW MORE OUR HOST INSTITUTIONS Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR) is a New Delhi based think tank that combines rigorous academic research with policy advocacy and strategic consultancy. Read more STEERING COMMITTEE Dr. Happymon Jacob Dr. Happymon Jacob is the Founder and Honourary Director of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research. Dr Jacob is Associate Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). READ MORE Lt. Gen. Hooda (Retd) Lt. Gen. Hooda (Retd) is a Co-founder and Director of the Centre for Defense and Security of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research. Lt. Gen. Hooda was commissioned into the 4th Battalion of the 4th Gorkha Rifles in 1976 and initially served in Nagaland during the peak of insurgency. READ MORE OUR TEAM Gaurav Saini Read More Amba Wattal Read More Devika Makkat Read More

< Back PROF. JAGANNATH PANDA EDITOR-INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION jpanda@isdp.eu Prof. Jagannath Panda is the Head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA). He is also the Executive Editor for ISDP. Dr. Panda is a Professor at the Department of Regional and Global Studies at the University of Warsaw. He is also the Director for Europe-Asia Research Cooperation at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies ( YCAPS ); and a Senior Fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies ( HCSS ) in the Netherlands. He is the Series Editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia. Prof. Panda is a Contributing Editor for The National Interest (Washington DC) and an Author at The Diplomat . He is an Advisor to the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS), and is also the Member of the Editorial Board of various international journals such as the Journal of Asian Public Policy ( JAPP: Routledge ) and The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (KIDA). jpanda@isdp.eu 123-456-7890