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Dr. Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy &; Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Dr. Rajagopalan was the Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019). She was also a Non- Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre from April-December 2020. < Back Dr Rajeswari Rajagopalan Dr Rajagopalan is senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat and writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues. Dr. Rajagopalan joined ORF after a five-year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (2003-2007), Government of India, where she was an Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan in 2012. Dr. Rajagopalan has authored or edited nine books including Global Nuclear Security: Moving Beyond the NSS (2018), Space Policy 2.0 (2017), Nuclear Security in India (2015), Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity among Asian Great Powers (2012), The Dragon's Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Its Implications for Asia (2009). She has published research essays in edited volumes, and in peer reviewed journals such as India Review, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air and Space Power Journal, International Journal of Nuclear Law and Strategic Analysis. She has also contributed essays to newspapers such as The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Times of India, and The Economic Times. She has been invited to speak at international fora including the United Nations Disarmament Forum (New York), the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) (Vienna), Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the European Union.

Adm. Anil Kumar Chawla (Retd.) served as the 28th Flag Officer Commanding- in-Chief, of the Southern Naval Command. He also served as the Indian Navy’s Chief of Personnel in 2016-18. < Back Adm. Anil Kumar Chawla (Retd.) Vice Admiral Anil Kumar Chawla, PVSM, AVSM, NM, VSM, ADC is a retired Indian Navy officer, who served as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval Command.

521bf3ea-356d-419d-be92-ce5d50c6276b < All op-eds Explainable AI for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Abhivardhan In this article, it is proposed that while governments in the Indo-Pacific region including India focus on strengthening digital public infrastructure and emphasize on the need to develop Responsible AI ethics practices, shifting to develop Explainable AI ethical principles would become imperative within the scope of technology governance, which would widen the pivot of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Responsible AI and the Indo-Pacific’s Pivot for Critical Technologies Looking at the Quad ’s statements on critical technologies , and their commitment to establish standards for emerging and critical technologies along with unveiling an Expert Group on Critical and Emerging Technologies, it seems clear that the grouping intends to address shaping ethical, legal and industrial standards and the economic relationship behind technology transfer and innovation. It is necessary because many algorithmic activities & operations undergone through these sophisticated AI technologies, be it in through complex machine learning algorithms, analytics, automation or any sub-segment transcend geographies and can be used in a way, which could be intrusive for human environments, both physical and digital. Protecting knowledge and information is also a key priority because in an interconnected world, AI technologies are the beneficiaries of transnationally available data and their algorithmic practices & operations shape with time. Now, companies across Asia, due to the lack of relevant AI standards in several Indo-Pacific countries garner data which is not ethically guaranteed. If data is not fostered and used in an ethical way, which at the same is not explainable, then neither the consumer nor the regulator is aware of the method through which these technologies work. For example, the US Government already is concerned about the role of companies like TikTok whose recommendation algorithms are intrusive and could endanger data security. India has already banned TikTok through the security exceptions of General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) since mid 2020. This is why since 2020, countries across the Indo-Pacific are already developing regulations on AI technologies. The NITI Aayog in India came up with Responsible AI guidelines as Japan and Singapore came up with their AI governance frameworks. This is how Responsible AI guidelines became mainstream in the region. However, the disruptive and evolutionary use of AI technologies, is not possible to be covered under the Responsible AI guidelines due to the aspect of innovation in these technologies, which remains uninformed and inexplicable in most use cases. Now, many AI innovations are naturally, localized . When companies democratize the technology-based services and products, many of them ignore the lack of explainability of such generic narrow AI technologies. Also, when AI technologies fail to explain their steps, trends and missteps, companies fail to address issues surrounding trust building, knowledge management and data quality under the existing Responsible AI guidelines. These are some of the critical risks and issues that come up with the lack of AI explainability: AI technologies have use cases which are fungible There exist different stakeholders for different cases on AI-related disputes which are not taken into consideration Various classes of mainstream AI technologies exist and not all classes are dealt by every major country in Asia which develops and uses AI technologies The role of algorithms in shaping the economic and social value of digital public goods remains unclear and uneven within law These factors then affect the role of Responsible AI guidelines, when self-regulatory / oversight bodies are established to address algorithmic bias. Let us suppose that a technology company asserts that they would like to have oversight bodies to address issues as to how their AI technologies affect market conditions, then lack of market consensus / business-level standards regulatory / self-regulatory standards shows that the Responsible AI guidelines are not practical and merely symbolic. Even in the case of algorithmic bias, for every class of AI technologies, bias differs, and may be dealt better with a context and qualitative aspect (which again depends on data localisation issues). Even if data attribution is done, it is not possible to develop absolute considerations on the same because many machine learning-based models have explainability issues. This is where Responsible AI is a limited concept and consists of flaws, which is why, focusing on Explainable AI becomes necessary. Achieving Explainable AI Consensus Explainable AI, is very different from Responsible AI. In fact, the larger focus of this concept is to ensure that all possible technologies within the umbrella of “artificial intelligence” become explicit and explainable about their decision-making and implementation. The algorithmic operations & activities conducted by any AI technology, must be understandable and explainable for consumers. A lack of explainability for sure, is an ethical dilemma, which may be attributed to the black box problem and its legal implications. However, at the same time, Explainable AI may be helpful to find out the multi-sector policy repercussions that the “black box problem” (which means lack of explainability of algorithmic operations and activities) have. Explainable AI may also expand to the specificity of stakeholders beyond ethical statements and declarations on maintaining a status quo on AI governance, because having a consensus makes stakeholders, especially public and private actors, responsible to partner and opt for self-regulatory measures. Developing a regulatory sandbox, which India, for example, has already begun with, in the case of few AI technologies, can also be attributed to the idea of Explainable AI, clearly showing how explainability of AI technologies is necessary. To conclude, the Quad grouping and other minilateral forums in the Indo-Pacific region, including the I2U2 and others, may build consensus to shape AI explainability standards , which can be of much use to promote a safe, resilient and qualitative transmission of ethical data and safer AI-based products and services across Asia and Africa. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

5314c6dc-0958-499b-8d1b-dde248ee7e69 < All op-eds Malaysia's Foreign Policy under Anwar Ibrahim: Continuities and Prospects Dr Choong Pui Yee After years of being the prime minister-designate, Anwar Ibrahim finally became the Prime Minister of Malaysia after the 15th general election held in November 2022. Malaysia’s current Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim is no ordinary figure in the political scene in Malaysia. He began his political career as a founding leader of an Islamic Youth Organisation known as ABIM. Anwar was subsequently co-opted by former Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad to the political party of UMNO. During his years with the UMNO-led government in the 1990s, he served as a Finance Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia until his fallout with Mahathir during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Anwar was subsequently dismissed as Deputy Prime Minister, charged and jailed for corruption and sodomy. His dismissal and subsequent incarceration triggered the opposition movement, also known as the Reformasi movement. The Reformasi movement sowed the seeds of an alternative political movement in Malaysia and led to the formation of the Social Justice Party. After years of ups and downs, the Anwar-led Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition won the 2022 election and ushered in a new beginning for the country. In the international scene, Anwar’s tumultuous political career earned him some sympathizers if not ardent supporters. He is often viewed as a center-left-leaning political figure. Without compromising his Islamic religious credentials, he also embraced the progressive values of democracy and human rights. In sum, his credentials sealed him as a progressive Muslim leader. Expect Continuities As Malaysia opens a new chapter under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim, this new chapter also allows the country to redefine its stance on foreign policy. In his maiden press conference , Anwar highlighted the importance of China and called for enhanced bilateral relations with this regional power. At the same time, Anwar also did not leave out other key partners such as the United States, Europe, India as well as ASEAN and emphasized that relations with these countries are equally crucial. Such statements are most likely deliberate as Anwar has to signal to his foreign partners Malaysia’s stance on foreign policy. That he would not upset the status quo. The main reason for highlighting these few countries is simply because Malaysia could not ignore the importance of these key partners. China, in particular, is Malaysia’s largest trading partner . Investment from China has generated tens of thousands of working opportunities and has deepened the ties between these two countries. Naturally, Malaysia would only want to continue such economic ties with China. Besides economic ties, Malaysia simply could not disregard the growing influence of China in the region. But it is also because it would be natural for Malaysia to be wary of China’s growing influence. Despite China’s official stance of advocating for peaceful negotiations and co-existence with other countries, China has demonstrated its assertive foreign policy stance if not to Malaysia but to other countries such as Australia. At present, apart from the ongoing South China Sea dispute, Malaysia does not have an immediate reason that would put the bilateral relations between the two countries to the test. However, given how China outweighs Malaysia in terms of economic and political power, it is only prudent for Malaysia to maintain a cordial relationship with this regional power. At the same time, by underscoring the importance of other key power such as the United States and regional partners such as India and ASEAN, Anwar suggests that Malaysia is pursuing a policy of balancing. Although it may take some time for Anwar and his team to crystalize Malaysia’s foreign policy, some continuities should be expected. Specifically, non-alignment and inclusive cooperation would continue to guide Malaysia’s foreign policy. Malaysia would most likely not choose a side between the two great powers, namely China and the U.S., maintain cordial relations with existing partners, and played a key role within ASEAN. Malaysia and the Indo-Pacific Region Although continuity should be expected, Anwar also could not ignore the emerging importance of the regional construct of the Indo-Pacific. Conceived in 2007 by Japan, Indo-Pacific seeks constructive amalgamation of the wider Asia Pacific region and the Indian Ocean. The term has since been widely accepted. Under previous Prime Ministers, Malaysia has been rather silent when it comes to this emerging reality of the Indo-Pacific. Apart from the domestic instability, the vigilance against great power competition are reasons that explain Malaysia’s relative silence in the past two years. With the domestic political instability coupled with the ongoing pandemic, Malaysia’s two former Prime Ministers may not see the need to prioritize responding to the Indo-Pacific construct. Furthermore, a high-profile position could entrap the country in big power competition. Malaysia, a founding member of ASEAN also needs to consider that the Indo-Pacific construct would not replace ASEAN’s centrality. However, unlike the previous two Prime Ministers whose political mandate is void of an electoral mandate, Anwar has another five years that he could utilize to charter Malaysia’s position in the Indo-Pacific region. One that does not contradict Malaysia or ASEAN’s non-alignment approach. As argued cogently by Kwek , Malaysia could leverage its geographical centrality for wider connectivity-building in response to the Indo-Pacific construct. Anwar could take the lead and work with partners in ASEAN to operationalize the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), one which envisages ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. The AOIP is currently strong on aspiration but weak on the operational direction. Anwar who is adept in foreign policy should realize that putting structures and championing AOIP could help seal Malaysia as an important key player in the Indo-Pacific region. This may help strengthen Malaysia’s consistent approach to inclusivity and non-alignment. In doing so, Malaysia could simultaneously underscore ASEAN’s centrality, played an important role in setting the agenda of the Indo-Pacific, and hedge against uncertainties down the line. While the lack of collective will from regional partners would present its own challenges, the mere attempt should be explored. Should Anwar seek to elevate Malaysia’s status in the Indo-Pacific region, he may be able to help defend ASEAN’s centrality and position Malaysia as an aspiring middle power in the wider Indo-Pacific region. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

fea6ec0e-6c8f-4bb5-99aa-7c64031b0b3b < All op-eds Charting the Quad’s Bilateral Way Forward Ms. Eerishika Pankaj As the next Quad summit draws close – presently scheduled for May 2022 – the remarkable growth of the grouping in the past five years is worthy of recap. Its future, however, remains increasingly dependent on the strength of the bilateral ties between the four member powers, especially given recent events ranging from Afghanistan to AUKUS to Ukraine, all of which have shown divergences in interests and outlooks. In order to strengthen the Quad, it is important that the grouping not just expand its Indo-Pacific focus by looking at more areas to cover, but also find avenues to link already established individual, bilateral and trilateral ventures of its members to give a holistic boost to the grouping. The age of minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific has actively begun, with more trilaterals, ventures and partnerships emerging every month. The goal of such widespread engagement –with often overlapping aims –is to ultimately build trust. For the Quad, such confidence building was spearhead upon the grouping’s revitalization by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, supported by his approach of building personal camaraderie with leaders. At present, the Quad has evolved from a mere consultation framework to a critical Indo-Pacific security grouping with leadership summits, foreign ministerial and senior official level consultations, naval exercises like Malabar with all Quad partners and a widespread focus post-pandemic on sectors of interest ranging from vaccines to critical technology to rare minerals. Such growth culminated into a long-awaited joint statement titled ‘ Spirit of the Quad ’ released in 2021. A foundation of strong bilaterals? Building such multilateral synergy amongst four of the biggest and strongest Indo-Pacific democracies has been a herculean task that has cohesively spearheaded the evolution of their ties. Such foreign policy connect has however been ultimately founded on the basis of domestic policy building, with each of the four powers realising the importance of the Indo-Pacific in their individual capacity before connecting with partner states. Therein, as the Quad looks to prove its mettle and move forward with renewed focus, it is also equally important to remember –as seen with Japan and India on matters ranging from the G7 expansion to Ukraine –that partners do not have to always agree. Hence, drawing deeper roots by linking together initial domestic ventures –to both reinvigorate the initiatives and strengthen the linkages between the Quad countries –is a much-needed goal. Key initiatives to tap into are Australia’s Pacific Step-up; India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), SAGARMALA, Bharatmala, Cotton and Spice Routes as well as the notion of Security and Growth for All (SAGAR) cushioned within Delhi’s Act East Policy (AEP); Japan’s Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI) guided by its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) policy; and the US’ AsiaEDGE and the US-led Build Back Better World (B3W) which it launched with the G7. Trilateral avenues like the US-Japan-Australia led Blue Dot Network (BDN) and India-Japan-Australia led Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) are critical to such a compatibility building vision as well. As the number of ventures in the region continues to grow —the new creation of a Middle East Quad showing expansion of minilaterals beyond the Indo-Pacific geography led by US and India —the emphasis on quality over quantity must be remembered. Overlapping of goals of such ventures, it can be argued, aides stronger trust and confidence building. However, it is important that the funds and energy being invested in each initiative receive due diligence. For instance, despite the stir they caused in media and strategic circles upon their launch, initiatives like BDN, Sagarmala, SCRI, AsiaEDGE and B3W are yet to produce any quantifiable successes. All in all, beyond EPQI, few Indo-Pacific ventures of the four states have led to tangible outcomes that make a dent against the massive Chinese investments going into the Indo-Pacific region. Proving a vision beyond China The focus of the Quad powers on maintaining a rules based international order has many a times given rise to the label of being an anti-China body. Beijing itself has touted it an ‘exclusive clique’ reminiscent of ‘Cold War mentality’ and ‘bloc politics’. However, it is important to note that while the Quad’s ‘like-mindedness’ is bound together by a shared threat perception to a democratic, free and open Indo-Pacific due to China’s revolutionary revisionism , the grouping has never officially identified as an anti-China coalition. Considering the critical economic ties of the four powers to China —especially Australia, India and Japan —the grouping has maintained that its goal remains protection of the rules-based order . Hence, while it maintains focus on containing –rather than outrightly countering –China, its scope extends beyond the Beijing threat to emphasis on engaging with the region and each other better in their own capacities. By looking inwards into their own ventures, reinvigoration of the initiatives that they have already invested millions in can be done, so as to make them fruitful by direct bilateral engagements with each other under the Quad’s umbrella. Such a linkage would also further deter Chinese attempts at discrediting the Quad as an anti-China US-led bloc framework. For instance, Australia’s Pacific Step-up and the Quad (as a whole and individually with each of the other members) have immense and still unventured room for collaboration. Beginning of such collaborations would only strengthen the core of the Quad, and also make room for engagement with non-Quad partner states like the UK and European Union (EU), fuelling a potential rotational ‘ Quad Plus ’ mechanism dream. In lieu of the upcoming the Quad summit, there is no denying that we have see a maturation of the dialogue process with broader goals and varying degrees of engagement up to the national leader level. Still, a call for the Quad to look inwards and further cement ties between its foundational members by forming deeper, long-term and domestic ventures driven linkages is increasingly crucial. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

e86a2b53-a61e-48bd-9aad-9fd36b432865 < All op-eds China’s hostage diplomacy against India Dr. Sriparna Pathak As China’s economic and political clout increases at the international stage amidst a raging pandemic with origins in China, the various tools China uses in conducting international relations keeps constantly expanding. Hitherto unheard forms of conducting foreign relations like ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ and ‘weaponisation of trade’ have come to occupy centre stage of Chinese foreign policy. Outlining six diplomatic highlights for China in 2021, Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng spoke of Xi Jinping’s proposal of a Global Development Initiative at the UN, the extension of China- Russia friendship treaty, the virtual meeting between Xi and Biden, Meng Wanzhou’s return home, completion of the China-Laos railway and China’s vaccine diplomacy. Meng’s return home is tied to China’s hostage diplomacy as in its response to Meng’s arrest in Canada, China arrested two Canadian citizens- Michael Kovrig and Michale Spavor in 2018 on charges of espionage. Kovrig is a former diplomat while Spavor is a businessman. Even though charges of espionage were levied against the Canadian citizens, the two were released as soon as Meng’s release was secured! The espionage charges magically disappeared, making China’s motives behind taking the two Canadian citizens clear! China has often taken foreigners as hostages to use them as bargaining chips! Despite article 34 of the 1949 Geneva Convention stating that taking hostages is prohibited, China has often engaged in taking hostages to further its political goals. The latest case of taking hostages by China is that of the abduction of 17-year-old Miran Taron from the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Taron’s friend Hohny Yaiying who managed to escape informed authorities that Taron was abducted by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Taron and Yaiying are local hunters from Arunachal Pradesh’s Zido village and the abduction took place near where the Brahmaputra River, (known as Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet) enters India in Arunachal Pradesh. In September 2020, the PLA had kidnapped five boys from Arunachal Pradesh and had released them after about a week. Further back in May, a 21 year old man was abducted by the PLA from the same area, and he was released after the Indian Army’s intervention. India-China relations have hit their lowest since 1962, as the PLA, disrespecting all agreements on border control and management infiltrated into Indian territory in 2020 and killed 20 Indian soldiers in the most barbaric ways possible using batons and barbed wires. Both sides have since stepped up monitoring the 3488 kilometres border. Since April 2020, the PLA has blocked Indian troops from reaching at least 10 patrolling points (PP) in eastern Ladakh, running from Depsang Plains in the north to the Pangong Tso in the south. There are at least 65 PPSs from the base of Karakoram to Chumar. The 14 rounds of talks between the two sides have yielded no breakthrough. In order to ensure that locals do not get caught in the crossfire, India’s Ministry of Defence issued orders asking grazers to restrict their cattle movements. Nevertheless, because there is no earmarked line going through forests, it is difficult for grazers and hunters to determine which area falls into the disputed category. It is not just Indian grazers who tread into disputed territory, Chinese grazers do the same! The only difference is that they do not get abducted by the Indian side. A three-member delegation to India’s defence minister Rajnath Singh in January this year, stated how the PLA uses Chinese nomads in Ladakh to transgress into Indian territory while India has restricted its own nomads to pasture lands, severely impacting the lives of the locals. While the playbook remains largely the same for recipients of China’s hostage diplomacy, in India’s case there is an added element of psychological warfare to it. Taking locals hostages sends the message to India that China is in control of the territory and the territory is beyond negotiations or formal diplomacy. In the 1962 debacle, China undertook brainwashing techniques of the 3962 prisoners of war (POWs) as part of what Beijing calls ‘imparting correct ideological education’ to help understand the ‘territorial issues along the China-India border’. China maintains its narrative that Indian POWs enjoyed ‘extra-standard humane treatment’. However, as stated by the POWs themselves, to break their morale, Indian officers were sent to solitary confinement for weeks. Chinese account of the camps in which the Indian POWs were kept does not mention these constant indoctrination sessions or the torture POWs were put through. In the case of the current standoff, a photo showing an Indian Army personnel overpowering another man is being shared with the claim that the Indian army holds more than 150 Chinese soldiers hostage in Arunachal Pradesh. The photo was shared with different claims in Hindi, both of which implied that it showed a scene from the recent face-off in Tawang. However, as revealed by fact checkers, the photograph is a still from a film titled LAC, which was made in 2020! While China actually takes Indian locals hostage, it puts out the false narrative about India taking hostages, using false imagery and narratives in the digital domain. As China’s economic and political clout keeps increasing at the international stage, it becomes pertinent for India to take cognisance of the myriad tools China uses to influence and impact Indian public opinion, psyche and morale. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

37f26546-d6a1-4293-8141-07ae02627bf6 < All op-eds The Quad and Aggressive Chinese Military Threat Dr. Ladhu Ram Choudhary The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, popularly known as the Quad is becoming more vibrant and vocal to achieve shared vision of liberal international order – nurturing democratic political governance, strengthening market driven economies, and cherishing societal pluralism and diversity. The 4th Quad Foreign Ministerial level meeting held on 10-11 February 2022 in Australia has reinforced this commitment for strengthening the rules-based international order through advancing bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region. The thrust of this meeting has been consolidating cooperation on “Covid-19 vaccination delivery, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief [HADR], maritime security, counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, countering disinformation, climate change, and critical and emerging technologies” as stated by the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, while departing for the meeting and trip to the Indo-Pacific region. Novelty in Agenda and Approach A cursory survey of previously held foreign ministerial level meetings indicates that the Quad partners have been constantly devising mechanism to addresses non-military security threats from a human security centric approach. In fact, the origin of the Quad is grounded in tackling the non-traditional security threats. They have been equipping and preparing the Quad partners and the weaker states of the Indo-Pacific region to combat against the emerging threats ranging from the 2004 tsunami to the Covid-19 pandemic. The first-ever Quad Foreign Ministerial level meeting was held in September 2019 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Though, they have not issued a joint statement, but the individual statements of ministers reflects similarity in content and intent – institutionalizing network of like-minded Indo-Pacific partners for building shared values of open, prosperous and inclusive region. The 2nd meeting of foreign ministers of the quad partners was held on 6 October 2020 in Tokyo to follow up the earlier discussions and to outline a coordinated response strategy to the challenges of the Covid-19 pandemics and its socio-economic and political fallouts. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ statement underlines that they have discussed issues of mutual interest pertaining to regional connectivity, HADR, maritime security, and counter terrorism. They have reiterated their commitment to uphold the centrality of the ASEAN for building free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. Similarly, during the 3rd Quad foreign ministerial level meeting held on 18 February 2021, the Ministers have reaffirmed the Quad’s motto “upholdong a rules-based international order, underpinned by respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, rule of law, transparency, freedom of navigation in the international seas and peaceful resolution of disputes”. The regular annual meetings of foreign ministerial level have naturally elevated and institutionalized the role of the Quad partners to deliberate over the long-term as well as immediate security and strategic concerns. It has also given prominence to issues of so-called “low politics”. The agenda also reflects concern of the Quad members towards real and substantial problems of the small islands and the ASEAN countries of the Indo-Pacific region. The focus on these issues is also vital to bolster collective persona to vast and diverse Indo-Pacific. In short, continuity of these dialogues is indicative of the seriousness of the superpower (the US) and major powers (Japan, India, Australia) to deliver their global responsibilities and duties towards the international community. Thus, the reprioritization of the issues and approach of the Quad is certainly novel and necessary to counter the unpredictable and uncertain threats. However, some of military security concerns demands immediate attention. Heart of the Problem The shifting balance of power certainly relocates the epicenter of global politics from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. The emerging great power rivalry between China and the US has been steering this churn since the global financial crisis of 2008. Despite this, the US-led Quad has remained relatively implicit and ambiguous to contain China, rather they focuses on engaging China to socialize and integrate into the rules-based liberal international order. On the contrary, China has been explicitly alleging that the Quad is creating ‘exclusive blocs’ as Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian states, “We oppose exclusive blocs to create bloc confrontation” that reinforce the Cold War mentality and wedges between regional countries. However, a reading of the agenda of the Quad meetings suggests they have refrained and reluctant to address collectively the military threats posed by China. Simply put, some of the pertinent traditional security questions remain either undercover or intentionally kept of out of the agenda. Consider the following: Have the Quad pondered on the issues of aggressive military Threats from China? Then, how would the Quad constrain and undermines the military power of China through the existing Indo-Pacific strategy? How would the US facilitate its key allies, namely Japan, India, and Australia to catch up with China’s growing military capabilities and strategies? Why these concerns are critical? First, the geographical proximity and historical legacies of Japan and India vis-à-vis China increases possibility of direct military threat from China. The ongoing border skirmishes between India and China are early symptoms and constantly haunt India in multiple ways. Strategically, it limits India’s alignment with the West and Indo-Pacific. Economically, it complicates India’s commitments to invest and aid the countries of the Indo-Pacific. Politically, it resurfaces the territorial insecurity and threat to India’s relatively peaceful borderlands. To counter this, India needs firm political support and high-end military wherewithal/technology from the US and others, at concessional rate, if not free. As Brahma Chellaney puts it “China’s military buildup against India surpasses Russia’s buildup against Ukraine”. Similarly, the growing Chinese aggressive military strategies underline Japan’s strategic autonomy and poses existential threats . But, the 4th Quad ministerial meeting remains mum on China’s aggressive military build-up. Second, China uses “salami-slicing” strategy to control the territories and islands of the neighboring countries. It is China’s subtle, patient, and gradual approach to alter the status quo of the contested maritime waters and disputed territories. Through using this strategy China has controlled and started administrating more than 80 archipelagos and islands in the South China Sea and beyond. The PLA aircrafts have violated airspace of multiple countries ranging from Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and India. In the Himalayan region, China has upped the ante using the “salami-slicing” to derail the border dispute settlement negotiations and alter the existing status. In recent past, Beijing has promulgated assertive and provocative “Land Border Law (LBL)” to legitimize its “salami-slicing” strategy. The LBL rejuvenates the “Civil-Military Integration (CMI)” to empower the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese paramilitary forces to prevent the development of connectivity and infrastructure. This would lead to precarious military tensions along the Himalayan borderlands – not limited to China-India, but also threatens Nepal and Bhutan. Third, on 4 February 2022 at the opening ceremony of the Olympic Winter Games, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated, “China has just entered the Year of the Tiger according to the lunar calendar. Tiger is a symbol of strength, courage and fearlessness”. This reflects the geo-psychology the Chinese leadership to transfer its Wolf-warrior diplomacy towards Tiger-warrior diplomacy. It would endanger the agency and sovereignty of the weak and small countries of the Indo-Pacific regions. As China’s shifting approach, not only dictates neighbours through its economic robustness, rather becoming a political and military dictator in the region. This makes India and other partners more vulnerable vis-à-vis China. Therefore, the US soft balancing strategy through the Quad against China reflects certain limitations and lacunas on traditional security front. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

f5ad96bb-70f4-44d1-a8a1-8d28c207a279 < All op-eds How Could Russia’s War in Ukraine Intensify the Geopolitical Tussle in Myanmar? Mr Angshuman Choudhury How Russia’s War in Ukraine could intensify the geopolitical tussle in Myanmar The Russia-Ukraine crisis has given a whole new context to global affairs. As one of the most polarising events of this century so far, it has widened latent geopolitical fissures and possibly created new ones. Its knockdown effects on foreign policy behaviour in both international and regional contexts should not be underestimated. In Myanmar, the crisis seems to be intensifying pre-existing competitive tendencies between China and Russia – two major powers invested in the country for their own unique reasons. Greater competition between both for influence in junta-ruled Myanmar could have second-order effects on how India and Japan – two Indo-Pacific powers with longstanding interests in Myanmar – approach the junta. In many ways, Myanmar’s case may be seen as a reflection of the Russia-Ukraine crisis’ repercussions on geopolitics in the broader Indo-Pacific region. The China-Russia jostle Two recent developments are indicative of what big power politics could look like as the Russia-Ukraine crisis drags on. First, a little more than a month after Russia launched a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese foreign ministry announced that U Wunna Maung Lwin, the foreign minister of Myanmar’s junta, would be visiting China to meet his counterpart, Wang Yi. The in-person meeting took place on 1 April in Huangshan City, located in Anhui Province. This was the first time Yi was meeting Lwin in an one-on-one official meeting since the 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar. In no less than clear terms, it signalled Beijing’s intent to fully embrace the military regime next door. Until this meeting – during which China extended a 650 million RMB grant to Myanmar – Beijing had refrained from fully embracing the junta. Second, on 28 April, the President of the Russian republic of Tatarstan, Rustam Nurgaliyevich Minnikhanov, arrived on a working visit to Myanmar to meet the junta leadership, including Commander-in-Chief, Min Aung Hlaing. He brought along a coterie of industrialists from the republic, which is one of the most developed regions in Russia. Following the visit, media reports indicated high interest within the Tatarstan government and business lobbies to invest in Myanmar, including in the automobile and energy sectors. The Russian truck giant, Kamaz, which was part of the visiting delegation, is reportedly seeking to finalise an agreement with the junta to begin manufacturing in Myanmar soon. Notably, Kamaz also builds trucks that are used to mount the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile system, which the Myanmar military ordered one month before the February 2021 coup. Last June, Myanmar’s coup leader visited the Kazan Helicopter production facility in the Tatar capital in a show of growing intimacy between Russia and the junta. The Russia-Myanmar affair It is clear that Russia, even as it faces gruelling Western sanctions and unprecedented global isolation, is rushing in to plug the holes and protect its friendships (and customer base). The Myanmar junta is a natural target in this regard, and for good reasons. The junta has expressed unflinching support for the Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine. More importantly, it had already positioned itself as an eager buyer of Russian arms – a conscious move by the Burmese Generals to offset their own dependencies on China. Even before the coup, the Myanmar military seemed to have developed a growing appetite for Russian military hardware. For Moscow, the Burmese military became an important customer in the face of declining arms sales to the ASEAN region due to Western sanctions on Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. That the Myanmar military placed big-ticket orders of Russian platforms – from radars and SAMs to Sukhoi-30MK fighter jets and air defence systems – after 2014 gave a boost to this relationship. In order to expand its sales, Moscow wanted to familiarise the Burmese to Russian military systems, which was one of the reasons why in 2020, it allowed India to transfer a retrofitted Soviet-era Kilo-class submarine to the Myanmar navy. Just a week before the coup last year, Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, toured Myanmar to sign an agreement for the supply of various weapons to the military. After the coup, there was a dramatic uptick in mutual visits – including the participation of the Russian deputy defence minister in the 76th Armed Forces Day parade in March 2021 and a week-long visit by coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing, to Russia three months later. A week before Hlaing’s Russia visit, a 20-member Russian delegation led by the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy made a secret visit to Myanmar, showing how dearly Moscow valued the Burmese defence client base. In comparison, there has been sparse bilateral activity between China and Myanmar on the military-to-military side in recent times, especially after the coup. The Chinese, who are still the biggest arms suppliers to the Myanmar military, have been less than comfortable with the junta’s spirited outreach to the Russians (who are now Myanmar’s second-largest arms supplier). But, it hasn’t given up on the Burmese generals yet. Exactly a year after the Soviet-era Indian submarine sale to Myanmar, China transferred its own Ming-class diesel electric submarine to Myanmar. In Beijing’s Indian Ocean blueprint, Myanmar is an indispensable element, and investing in the latter’s defence ecosystem is a time-tested way to maintain strategic influence. Shifting sands Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing Western sanctions, as is clear by now, has thrown its Defence Industrial Sector (DIS) into an abyss of stalled deadlines and spare parts shortage. As a recent report by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute notes, this problem very much extends to Southeast Asia, where Vietnam and Myanmar are the two largest buyers of Russian military hardware. It also notes that as the war drags on, China is likely to provide greater economic and military assistance to Russia. This would, in turn, boost its leverage over Moscow and the Chinese will be in a position to secure greater concessions from the Russians on a host of issues pertaining to its regional and global interests. In Myanmar’s context, this would essentially mean greater legroom for Beijing to impose itself on the junta and in the process, offset any relative advantage that the Russians might have acquired over the last few years. In a situation where the Russian DIS fails to deliver on its promised timelines for both new weapons and upgrade packages, the Chinese will be able to step in and compensate. The junta will have little choice but to acquiesce, given the multi-front war that it is currently fighting inside Myanmar and the constant supply of weapons that such a conflict demands. Secondarily, China will be in a stronger position to ensure that its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects are expedited and its existing assets in Myanmar protected with greater vigour by the junta. As China tightens its grip around the junta under the shadow of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, its regional competitors who had so far maintained a neutral posture on the Myanmar coup, such as India and Japan, could shift their own positions and start engaging closely with the coup regime. Both New Delhi and Tokyo remain highly concerned about growing Chinese influence in Myanmar, which is why they have refrained from sanctioning or isolating the junta. A closer China-junta relationship would make them more nervous than ever. India, particularly, could ramp up its own defence sales to the Burmese military to offset the Chinese clout. In any case, Myanmar has emerged as one of New Delhi’s biggest arms buyers in recent times. According to some reports , India has transferred military platforms to Myanmar even after the coup. Hence, any uptick of Indian weapons sales in the months to come would not be surprising. Over the next few months, there is little doubt that Russia will go out on its limbs to retain its goodwill with its existing clients, including the Myanmar military. There is little doubt that this will push the Chinese to expand their own pitch with the junta. If India and Japan, both partners in the IPR and the Quad, respond along an equivalent track by normalising ties with the authoritarian junta, that could further dilute the core of the Indo-Pacific narrative and split it along the middle. In that sense, Myanmar could become a litmus test for the Indo-Pacific alliance in the post-Ukraine context. More importantly, it would create a broader legitimise a brutal regime that is currently at war with its own citizens. * Angshuman Choudhury is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Policy Research Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Amba is a Program Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research. Amba holds a Master’s in International Studies from Symbiosis International University, Pune. < Back Associate Editor: Amba Wattal Amba Wattal is a Program Associate for Indo-Pacific Affairs at CSDR, where she manages a diverse array of activities and initiatives within the Indo-Pacific Circle- a platform committed to advancing indigenous knowledge production and exchange across the region. Amba holds a Master’s degree in International Studies from Symbiosis International University, Pune, a Master’s degree in English Literature from Delhi University, and a Postgraduate Diploma in Human Rights.

a925d3c7-14c1-4cc4-ba22-d05c56ab86bf < All op-eds Quad Needs a More Near-Term, Outcomes-Focussed Approach Manoj Kewalramani Ever since its revitalisation, the Quad grouping, comprising India, the US, Japan and Australia, has evolved an ambitious agenda. Over the past two years, the Quad has established six leader-level working groups , covering domains like the COVID-19 Response and Global Health Security, Climate, Critical and Emerging Technologies, Cyber, Space, and Infrastructure. These are long-term agenda items that have primarily focussed on establishing frameworks and standards, boosting sharing of information and best practices, identifying vulnerabilities and discussing pathways to address them. The two most visible products of the Quad’s engagement so far have been the COVID-19 vaccine partnership and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA). These also underscore a desire to be near-term outcomes-focussed, while working on longer term challenges. Importantly, all these initiatives reflect a strategic congruence among the four countries in terms of the desire to shape a “free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific” region, address current challenges and shape the global governance agenda in key domains that will underpin future prosperity. This sense of purpose, however, does not imply the absence of disagreement over certain specific interests. For instance, member states have had clear differences in terms of their approaches to Russia’s war against Ukraine or the political developments in Myanmar. Complex Dynamics Some analysts tend to view these differences as fundamental contradictions that strike at the heart of the grouping. Such a view, however, is based in an archaic approach to international relations. It does not account for the impact of three decades of economic globalisation after the end of the Cold War, which created a web of networks and dependencies that cannot be immediately abandoned or transformed. Neither does it account for the changes in the dispersion of power across different countries around the world. The world today is not unipolar and neither is it moving in the direction of bipolarity. What is emerging is an uneven multipolarity. This is characterised by significant absolute power differentials in terms of comprehensive national power among the different poles. But this gap is far narrower when one takes into account relative power dispersion across different factors that constitute comprehensive national power. Invariably, such a situation engenders complexity in terms of any group’s dynamics. Moreover, such an old-world perspective on geopolitics misunderstands the nature and purpose of the Quad. The Quad is characterised by strategic congruence, political fluidity and diversity in terms of the geographies, capacities and specific interests of each member. Each of these are strengths rather than weaknesses. A strategic congruence among member states allows for clear and common agenda Fluidity provides for flexibility to accommodate differing interests. It creates room for domestic political manoeuvrability for each member state. It does not entail rigid commitments without necessarily limiting the scope and depth of cooperation. Ensuring that this situation remains an asset requires continued and frank engagement. Diversity in capabilities, experiences and interests ensures an inclusive approach and one that can leverage each other’s strengths The last of these three is perhaps the most critical to the Quad’s future success. This was amply evident in conceptualisation and execution of the Quad’s Vaccine Partnership, which saw each member state bringing a unique set of capabilities to the table. That said, there is something to be said about the need for the Quad to focus on outcomes and deliverables. For instance, the vaccine partnership was first announced at the leaders’ virtual summit in March 2021. Then, during the first in-person meeting between the Quad leaders in September 2021 , they committed to donating more than 1.2 billion COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022. As of May 2022, however, merely 257 million doses had been provided by the group. This number has since grown to around 670 million , informed the Assistant Australian Foreign Minister Tim Watts in a recent conversation. Nevertheless, it still falls well short of the original commitment. This underscores the importance of an outcomes-focussed approach that balances and long- and short-term objectives. IPMDA & Maritime Governance This is more so the case with the Quad’s maritime security and governance agenda. While the IPMDA was announced earlier this year during the May 2022 leaders’ summit in Tokyo , the roadmap for its implementation is rather unclear. Announcing the IPMDA, the Quad leaders had said that the initiative would “innovate upon existing maritime domain awareness efforts”, rely on “a combination of Automatic Identification System and radio-frequency technologies,” provide a “common operating picture” integrating “three critical regions—the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region,” and extend “support for information-sharing across existing regional fusion centers.” They envisioned a five-year window of investment in the initiative. The IPMDA is a significant agreement. It has the potential to go beyond merely domain awareness to not only provide a much needed boost to maritime governance, resource conservation and law enforcement, but also deepen potential intelligence cooperation. It is little surprise then that Chinese analysts have described it as a “rare” Quad initiative that “has teeth,” while also seeking to discredit it as an anti-China measure. The challenge, however, is that it has been six months since the announcement of the IPMDA, and there has been little information regarding the progress made in terms of the technologies that will be used, the process for tracking small fishing vessels, the methodology for sharing the data gathered and the consultations with partners with regard to implementation. It is important that these questions are addressed at the earliest. This is because domain awareness is merely the beginning of what should be a multi-pronged agenda for the Quad’s maritime security and governance effort. Closer coast guard cooperation among the Quad countries, maritime law enforcement equipment development and training support for littorals in the Indian Ocean Region and the use of shiprider agreements to boost law enforcement capacities of countries in the region is the way forward. In addition, Quad countries should engage in more active maritime health diplomacy, leveraging the strengths of partner states in geographies that are of primary interest to each of them. Such an approach can allow for expanded presence for each of them, while leveraging each other’s capabilities and social capital. For instance, the navies of India and Australia could work together to engage in health outreach and humanitarian and disaster management efforts in the South Pacific and the Western Indian Ocean region. Some of these initiatives can be operationalised rather easily and quickly. Doing so is important to ensure that the Quad is not just addressing the long-term challenges that countries in the Indo-Pacific face but is also seen as addressing immediate needs while building goodwill. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

ab30ce32-de14-46ad-9be7-d2bd9b7917a9 < All op-eds ASEAN: The Missing Piece in US’ Indo Pacific Strategy Aakriti Sethi During the Bush and Obama administration, ASEAN’s role in America’s Asia policy was elevated as the White House began recognizing its wider importance within and beyond the region. Apart from its strategic location compelling larger global players to acknowledge the importance of Southeast Asia, the region’s geopolitical role has had the ability to oscillate views critical to US-China rivalry. Since the Trump Presidency, American perception on China witnessed a sharp shift as anti-China sentiments crystallized. President Trump’s decision to launch a refurbished Asia policy (i.e. the Indo Pacific strategy in 2017) with renewed focus on harnessing a “free and open” rules-based order and strengthening US economic and defense ties with various partners and allies of the region met with bipartisan support. Viewed as one of the many ways to counter China’s influence within the region, President Trump ushered in an era of maximum competition with China that has had a far-reaching impact. Other major countries like Japan, Australia and India who have been long-time supporters of the Indo Pacific rather than the Asia-Pacific, welcomed this shift in the US policy. Being wary of this power struggle, ASEAN has time and again emphasized its centrality for maintaining an “inclusive regional architecture” and collective leadership which has been supported by the US. ASEAN centrality has been an important pillar for maintaining the regional status quo as it provided a means to form consensus within the region. However, understanding ASEAN’s possible role within the Indo-Pacific has received limited attention from the US. Southeast Asia is a region of significance that holds great economic value (and potential), located in the midst of key sea lanes of communication, and is home to dynamic yet politically diverse countries. Even as US officials have reiterated that ASEAN is “literally at the center of the Indo-Pacific , and plays a central role in the Indo-Pacific vision," American interaction with the region has been inconsistent. Since the Obama administration, there has been a perception gap about Southeast Asia not being a region of focus for the White House. The recent US-ASEAN summit can be seen as President Biden’s attempt at launching a “new era in the relations…guided by the complementary objectives of the Indo Pacific Strategy." By inviting all the member states to Washington DC, avoiding bilateral meetings on the sideline of the summit and engaging with the ASEAN platform to propagate a cohesive US-ASEAN message, there was an attempt at showcasing that the Southeast Asian regional organization reigns at the top of Biden administration’s foreign policy priority list. The American intention to build confidence in the US-ASEAN partnership and countering the growing Chinese influence was evident as new initiatives worth 150 million dollars for infrastructure, maritime security and healthcare were committed by President Biden. Unlike many parts of the world, Southeast Asia was not quick to embrace the concept of the Indo-Pacific. It was only in 2019 when ASEAN released the ASEAN Outlook of the Indo Pacific that the organization attempted to hesitantly navigate the new geopolitically-loaded construct. The ambivalent position of the group on the Indo-Pacific strategy has been due to China’s sustained influence over the region and a lack of concordance within member states. For America, countering this regional skepticism has been a challenge for multiple reasons. Firstly, the checkered diplomatic engagement with the region has posed questions about the role Southeast Asia plays in America’s larger Asia policy. The bare-minimum personal engagement of top US officials with their counterparts in Southeast Asia amidst the pandemic restrained the reception of the Indo Pacific strategy in Southeast Asia. Secondly, a lack of America-led economic framework(s) has weakened the appeal of the Indo-Pacific as a concept in the region. Even though the Biden administration launched the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), it lacks an active trade and investment plan for the ASEAN countries. During the recent summit, countries like Vietnam and Singapore claimed that the US lacks a clear plan, even though they are keen on possible economic prospects. Thirdly, on Russia, diverging opinions betweem the US and ASEAN countries addresses their differences in world view and foreign policy approaches. The cautious response to the Ukraine war by ASEAN showcased their unwillingness to weaken their relationship with Russia as countries like Myanmar, Vietnam and Indonesia depend on latter for defense equipments and weapons. Due to this, Russia was not mentioned in this year’s US-ASEAN joint statement. And fourthly, as the Quad has become more relevant in America’s strategic ambitions, the relevance of ASEAN centrality has come into question. The rise of this mini-lateral in the US policy discourse has triggered concerns about the role ASEAN could play in the region as the great power struggle intensifies. Within the context of brewing tensions with China over the South China Sea dispute, the Quad’s position in the evolving regional security architecture has been a puzzle for ASEAN countries. The 2022 summit was successful in displaying that America is ready to start afresh with ASEAN after a stagnation in ties over the past few years. However, the relationship has reached a juncture, where expectations from both sides need to be reevaluated. America’s desire to witness an ASEAN that is less reliant on China can only happen if the White House is able to incorporate ASEAN in its wider economic strategy. At the same time, as the competition between US and China hardens, seeking greater areas of convergence (like climate change) that quells the fear of binary choices for Southeast Asian countries will be ASEAN’s main challenge. The charm of the Indo-Pacific strategy for ASEAN countries lies in its economic and humanitarian aspect, rather than its geopolitical goals. Therefore, America presenting a vision for the Indo-Pacific that would help in achieving mutual benefits beyond the idea of balancing China would help in fostering greater consensus with the Southeast Asian countries. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More