96097172-78de-4e94-9d7a-fa004fe415e9 < All op-eds A Comparative Study Media Systems in India and Japan Lucy Alexander Media in every country is entwined with politics, international relations, culture, and history. Its functioning is primarily determined by the type of government, with different degrees of control or none at all. It acts as the bridge between the government and its citizens and plays a constructive and crucial role in shaping public opinion and forming political agendas. Mass media does not function in isolation; it is either state-owned or privately owned. The significance of media can vary with each government; in a democracy, it typically acts as the “watchdog of the government” or the “fourth pillar of democracy.” What determines the narrative of different media systems has been a long-held debate. Factors which include in governing mass media comprises politics, history, culture, and religion. India and Japan have varied approaches in terms of media regulations and the selection of the countries offer different dimensions for comparisons. There are democracies (India and Japan); developed countries (Japan) and developing countries (India and Japan); patriarchal and conservative societies (India and Japan). Indian media has both publicly owned and private-owned media houses. Due to the high commercialization of the Indian media, it has become a machinery of political propaganda and an instrument for industrialists for their interests. As a result of these ties, objective reporting of news becomes an issue as media houses would have biases and inclinations towards different parties. “Indian media is divided politically as well as ideologically. Some newspapers favor secular ideology while some support right-wing politics, a divide similar to nationalists and loyalists press before partition and this divide is further subdivided on different issues” (Kumar, 2011). While media systems in Japan are in line with the political framework within which they operate. Japan has had a single-party rule for most of its post-war period, where opposition parties have remained out of power for a considerable period. Therefore, media is very cautious when it comes to writing about the ruling political party. During the 1940s and 1950s a popular political satire; was suspended in 1954 soon after the end of the American occupation. This was the first instance when the freedom of expression was suppressed by the Japanese government. Both India and Japan are democracies, which guarantee freedom of expression in their constitution, however this freedom can be seen as restrained with biased and prejudiced reporting by the media. What can be seen in both the media is that though issues are discussed, there is no addressal of solutions or reforms. In turn media becomes a catalyst for reinforcing the stereotypes. In Japan, due to the culture of apology, the accused in any controversy will proceed with resigning from their positions as seen in the case of Yoshiro Mori; former Prime Minister of Japan made headlines in February 2021 for making sexist comments to a Japanese Olympic Committee meeting that women board members talked too much which eventually led to the resignation of Yoshiro Mori. This again does not initiate any change in policies, change by politicians or lead to a slowdown or lessening of such incidents happening in the future. While in case of India, it is a step back from Japan in terms of issuing apology, but both the countries don’t provide any redressal of the problems. Despite both the countries’ constitution being shaped by western ideals and features, and the influence of western media has only been increasing in the respective countries, the society in India and Japan is patriarchal and conservative in nature; therefore, it cannot be assumed that media in any democracy would guarantee freedom of expression. Media has an influencing role in changing perceptions but not enough for creating changes. If Indians and Japanese are asked to name the most influential group in their society, all may choose the media but when it comes to who is most influential in policymaking, the media is seen as less influential than bureaucrats, politicians, or big business. Therefore, because of strict legal rules on their use, they have played a very limited role in making policy changes in India and Japan than in the United States and some other democracies. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

c6a31e51-2b6c-4d61-b6b3-950156c75d74 < All op-eds Impact of India’s Leadership at G20 and SCO on the Indo-Pacific Mr Aditya Singh India’s rise in the global arena has been marked by a series of important engagements such as BRICS, SAGAR, QUAD, International Solar Alliance, and Disaster Resilient Infrastructure Coalition over the past decade. With India assuming the Presidency of G20 and Chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2022 , what does this mean for India's engagement with the Indo-Pacific? This article will explore how India's ascension to a leadership role at both G20 and SCO can influence its presence in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. We will also look at some of the potential effects of India's increased clout in terms of geopolitics and geoeconomics. With its growing economic clout, India is now in a position to shape global policy. As it takes up the leadership role at the G20 and SCO, India can use its influence to promote its own interests and those of other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. This could include pushing for greater trade and investment opportunities, advocating for increased regional connectivity, and providing diplomatic support for regional security initiatives. This could lead to stronger economic ties between all parties involved, engaging in dialogue with countries like Russia and Ukraine to de-escalate tensions, and greater peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. India's assumption of the presidency of the G20 in December 2022 is a significant moment for the country and for the Indo-Pacific region. As the world's largest democracy and a leading economic power, India's leadership will help to shape debates on critical issues such as economic governance, security, digitalisation, gender equality, sustainability, and climate change. There is no doubt that India's G20 presidency will have a big impact on the Indo-Pacific region. The Indian Ocean has always been crucial to India's economy and security, and this is likely to become even more important in the years ahead. With an increasingly assertive China seeking to extend its influence across the region, it is more important than ever for India to take a leading role in shaping its future. With its G20 presidency, India will have an opportunity to work closely with other major powers such as the USA, Japan, South Korea and Australia, to ensure that the Indo-Pacific is secure and prosperous. The country can use its G20 platform to promote initiatives such as free trade agreements and regional security dialogues. India's election as Chair of the SCO provides an opportunity to promote its art and culture, showcase its credentials as a responsible regional power, play a more active role in regional security issues such as energy security, counterterrorism efforts, and the fight against transnational crimes and further its interests in the Indo-Pacific. The impact of India's leadership at the SCO will be keenly felt in the Indo-Pacific, where the organization is seen as a key platform for promoting peace and stability. India has been at the forefront of pushing for closer cooperation among SCO members on issues related to terrorism and connectivity, and its election as Chair is likely to give a boost to these efforts. As Chair, India will also have an opportunity to engage with other major powers in the region, including China and Russia, on issues of shared interest. Furthermore, India and Russia could balance China’s aggressive expansionist policies and projects jointly . The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a key focus area for India's foreign policy in recent years, and the SCO provides an important forum for discussing regional issues. India's leadership of the SCO will also serve to strengthen its ties with other member countries, such as Afghanistan, Iran, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. This will have positive implications for India's economic and energy interests in the region, as well as help boost India's diplomatic influence. Ultimately, India's leadership of the SCO will help strengthen its ties with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region and could provide a platform for India to further its interests in the region. India is also likely to use its leadership role at the G20 and SCO to further its 'Act East' policy , which seeks to promote greater economic and security cooperation with the countries of Southeast Asia. The G20 and SCO engagements provide an important platform for India to engage with the region and could be a useful tool in boosting its diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific. As India takes on the leadership of the G20 and SCO, it is important to leverage its strategic, geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages in the Indo-Pacific region. The first step is to build on the existing strengths of the Indian economy. India is one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies and is expected to continue to grow at a robust pace in the coming years. This provides a strong base for India to work with other G20 and SCO nations to promote global economic growth. In addition, India’s vast population and young demographics are a major source of strength. India is home to nearly 1.4 billion people, making it the second most populous country in the world. Additionally, more than 60% of the population is below the age of 30, providing a large pool of potential workers and consumers. Finally, India’s geographic location also gives it a unique advantage in the Indo-Pacific region. India sits at the crossroads of Asia, making it well-positioned to play a leading role in promoting regional cooperation and integration. By leveraging these strengths, India can make a positive impact on both the G20 and SCO agendas and help shape the future of the Indo-Pacific region. To that end, India should look to expand its strategic partnerships with other countries in the region, work closely with international organizations to promote economic development, and actively engage in dialogue and cooperation on issues of security. By doing so, India will be able to maximize its influence and gain a greater presence in the global economy. To sum up, India's leadership of the G20 and SCO will provide it with new opportunities for economic engagement and political influence in the region, help cement its status as a major global power and allow it to be at the forefront of international efforts to tackle challenges like climate change. The impact of India's presence in these organizations will continue to be seen for years to come. India has already made its mark on the global stage, and its leadership of both organizations is a sign that it is now ready to take on a more prominent role in the international community. In doing so, India will be able to make a real difference for itself and for the Indo-Pacific region. The region is set to be one of the most significant arenas for international cooperation, and India's presence in the G20 and SCO will be key to ensuring its continued growth and stability. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

a8e981dc-8cb2-49da-a825-c8039b5fb4ea < All op-eds Understanding/Evaluating the Indo Pacific Economic Framework Purvaja Modak Understanding/Evaluating the Indo Pacific Economic Framework The Indo Pacific region is emerging as the new theatre of command today with countries coming together to ensure a free, open, fair, inclusive, interconnected, resilient, secure, and prosperous region. While geopolitical factors are at play in the region, an aggressive China is furthering its economic ambitions and uncertainties like the COVID-19 pandemic have caused massive disruptions to trade, commerce and livelihoods. Recent events have proven that the study of the region’s prospects and problems is incomplete without an assessment of the economic interlinkages between the countries of the region. These interlinkages will bring about economic growth and development in the region and create jobs. Economic competitiveness can be fostered by the sharing of technology, supporting innovation, strengthening the digital economy, promoting energy security and resolving the climate crisis. The need to evaluate the economic dimensions was felt by the leaders of the Indo Pacific countries and thus, the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity’’ was officially launched by United States President Joe Biden and leaders of 12 regional countries (namely Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) on May 23, 2022, in Tokyo, Japan. This framework also comes about five years after the United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and can be viewed as the US’ way of reasserting its economic engagement in the region to counter China’s economic manoeuvres. The four pillars of the IPEF are: 1) Fair and resilient trade; 2) Supply chain resilience; 3) Clean economy - Infrastructure, clean energy, and decarbonization; 4) Fair economy - Tax and anti-corruption The IPEF follows a decentralised approach by which countries can join and participate in negotiations for any number of the four pillars instead of the regular approach of signing on to all the clauses of an all-encompassing agreement. This approach brings flexibility to the process of negotiation allowing countries to be a part of such a robust framework while only accepting the rules they find appropriate. However, the countries must agree on all aspects covered by each pillar that they join. Another interesting fact about the IPEF that distinguishes itself from other geoeconomic instruments is that it is not a traditional trade agreement but will work as an Executive Order that does not need congressional approval in the United States. This may help avoid delays and political implications that accompany the domestic ratification of trade agreements. The Biden administration has indicated that it hopes to conclude the Executive Agreement by the end of 2023 when the United States will host APEC and before the stir of the US presidential election takes over. Thus, the IPEC will hopefully not fall prey to political ambitions, that often trump economic decision making. However, critics say that the nature of the framework will cause its progress to remain unchecked, leading to a tardy pace of negotiations along with a lack of appropriate enforcement mechanisms. There is also a scare that the next US president may pull out of the IPEF, leaving it without any credible leadership. After a few initial virtual meetings on the IPEF since May 2022, United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai and United States Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo co-hosted an in person IPEF Ministerial in Los Angeles, California on September 8-9, 2022 to flesh out the pillars of the framework and for countries to select the pillars on which they will enter negotiations. The detailed pillars of the framework are at the moment as follows: Trade Pillar : focusses on the provisions and initiatives related to nine key issues: labour, environment, digital economy, agriculture, transparency and good regulatory practices, competition policy, trade facilitation, inclusivity, and technical assistance and cooperation. Supply Chains Pillar : focusses on finding ways to forecast, withstand and recover from supply chain disruptions in the following ways: establishing criteria for critical sectors and goods, increasing resiliency and investment in critical sectors and goods, establishing an information-sharing and crisis response mechanism, strengthening supply chain logistics, enhancing the role of workers, and improving supply chain transparency. Clean Economy Pillar : focusses on working jointly to pursue provisions and initiatives as part of a future oriented effort that expands market opportunities, spurs innovation and growth, and improves livelihoods during the process of energy transition in the areas of : energy security and transition; greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions in priority sectors; sustainable land, water, and ocean solutions; innovative technologies for GHG removal; and incentives to enable the clean economy transition. Fair Economy Pillar : focusses on working jointly to pursue provisions and initiatives as part of individual and collective efforts to innovate and strengthen approaches to implementing anti-corruption and tax measures to boost flows of trade, commerce and investment in the areas of: anticorruption, tax, capacity building and innovation, and cooperation, inclusive collaboration, and transparency. India’s position With the exception of India, all IPEF participants joined all four pillars—a credible feat for any country leading global negotiations and also an indicator of interest from participating countries to engage with the United States on economic issues. India has indicated that it does not agree with the current provisions on trade, digital governance, data security and privacy, binding environment and labour provisions, that directly conflict with its stated position. While India is crafting its own digital framework and laws, it would like to wait for more information on commitments required on environment, labour, digital trade and public procurement as the negotiations progress. It has indicated that, while it will continue its engagement on the trade pillar, it may take a definitive view and may decide on signing on to it at a later stage. India, on environmental issues has always maintained that developed countries should pitch in their support to developing countries on funding, investment and clean technology, as they make climate related commitments. In the IPEF as well, India may wish to wait out and see how negotiations progress on this aspect. This was indicated by India’s Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal at a press briefing following the IPEF ministerial meeting where he also said, “We have to see what benefits member countries will derive and whether any conditionalities on aspects like environment may discriminate against developing countries who have the imperative to provide low cost and affordable energy to meet the needs of our growing economy”. As India is negotiating FTAs with partner countries like the UK, Canada and the EU, and hopes to renegotiate existing FTAs with South Korea, Japan, Singapore etc, in which these issues will also feature, India may want to ensure that commitments to the IPEF do not become a precedent for the negotiation and renegotiation of these other agreements and so prefers to wait it out. India should evaluate its position on the Trade pillar carefully especially since the international trade scenario is gaining momentum, with ongoing reforms at the WTO, the rethinking of India’s own FTA framework and India’s upcoming G20 presidency of 2023 where trade and economic discussions will take centre stage and some of these issues will come up for consideration under India’s leadership. Next steps for the IPEF Within six months of its launch, IPEF has shown considerable progress. The detailing of the four pillars has given it shape and character and the first round of negotiations on each pillar will take place soon, as indicated by Ambassador Katherine Tai in her official statements at the September ministerial meeting. The participating countries need to be clear on issues like financing, investment, technical knowhow and long-term commitment and leadership, required to make the IPEF a success. Whether IPEF’s informal nature will be an advantage or an impediment, is another issue to consider. While the US aims at concluding the IPEF negotiations by November 2023, ahead of its hosting of the APEC Leaders’ Meeting, this ambitious timeline could prove challenging. Following a promising launch and a successful Ministerial meeting, attention now turns to how effective the negotiations will be and how the US administration can entice participating countries in the region to remain engaged and make mutually agreeable commitments. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

< Back Dr Froilan Calilung Froilan C. Calilung is a Professor at the Faculty of Arts and Letters (Department of Political Science) in the University of Santo Tomas, Philippines, handling Politics and Governance courses. He is also a part time Political consultant for the Presidential Legislative Liaison Office, and a Campaign Strategist (Public Relations) both at the local and national levels. His research areas include Peace Processes, Political Dynamics and Local Government, and his most recent publication is titled, ‘Weighting in on the China Factor in the 2019 elections’ and ‘Investing in the Future , an assessment of Special Education Fund among LGUs’, funded by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Germany. Publications

Online Courses Regional Pedagogy For the Indo-Pacific: 10 Lecture Course "The Indo-Pacific—far beyond a term, and more than a “geopolitical construct”, as some might argue—is emerging as one of the most consequential regions shaping 21st-century geopolitics." and this course is your guide to understanding the region and exploring how it’s reshaping our world." Going Live Soon

Dr. Christian Wagner is a Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin. Formerly, he was also a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Development Research, University of Bonn. christian.wagner@swp-berlin.org < Back Dr. Christian Wagner Christian Wagner is Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. He obtained his M.A. and PhD from Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg. From 1996 to 2001 he was Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science and Administrative Studies at Rostock University. From 2001 to 2002 he was a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Development Research at the University of Bonn. He is a member of the European Association for South Asian Studies (EASAS) and the German Association for Asian Studies (DGA) where he was of the board of directors from 2007 to 2013. From 2007 to 2014 he was head of the Research Division Asia at SWP. In 2015/16 he was a Visiting Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), the Jawaharlal Nehru Institute for Advanced Studies (JNIAS) and at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in New Delhi. In 2019, he was Visiting Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore (NUS) in 2019. Since 2018 he is a member of the International Research Committee (IRC) of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) in Colombo. His main areas of interest are India, South Asia and the Indo-Pacific with a special focus on foreign policy and security issues. christian.wagner@swp-berlin.org

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8dec8e74-9ee5-402c-9624-5e2d38d1d2e3 < All op-eds Towards a Fragile State: Economic Crisis in Sri Lanka Dr Hasith Kandaudahewa Over the last 74 years, Sri Lanka, formerly known as the Pearl of the Indian Ocean, has governed through the principle of democracy while promoting non-alignment as the gravity of its foreign policy. During the President Mahinda Rajapaksa (2005-2015) era, Sri Lanka ended 30 years of long internal war. Nevertheless, the root causes of conflict were left untouched by the country's political administration. Meanwhile, Sri Lanka demonstrated a more enigmatic foreign policy than its previous practices - non-alignment and initiating strong ties with China while endangering the stability of the Indian Ocean Region. The people of Sri Lanka are typically considered a friendly and peaceful community who belong to a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious group Yet, two weeks ago, the people of Sri Lanka reached their threshold of patience. Why did this sudden change happen, and what caused it? This article will help to explore the pressing issues behind increasing public demands for the immediate resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa (known as Gota) and his close family members from the current political administration. In the recent past, Sri Lanka encountered a host of multifaceted issues due to a lack of efficient political decisions on the part of President Gotabaya Rajapaksae since his inauguration in 2019. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Sri Lanka lost its primary foreign revenue from labour service exports, tourism, and commodity exports. Thousands of migrant workers returned to Sri Lanka with shattered dreams and an uncertain future. To face the forex challenge, Sri Lanka imposed served import restrictions, which directly led to the shortage of essential commodities in the market. While incurring the loss of foreign revenue, Gota has granted tax haven to his top political cohorts, letting them gain massive income from day-to-day commodities while consumer inflation raised from 5.7% in September 2021 to 17.5% in March 2022. Additionally, his policy on organic fertiliser s has worsened the country's food insecurity. On the other hand, Sri Lanka has already taken massive loans without considering repayment abilities or sustainable applications. While a portion of the loans were spent on unsolicited projects across the island, the remaining was used for day-to-day consumption. In late August 2021, the Gota regime reached the point where there was no option but to seek foreign loans to manage the resettlement of existing debt and day-to-day activities. Not only that, Sri Lanka's foreign reserves have reached its lowest, nearly 1 billion USD in March 2022, where its debt liability is USD 7 billion for 2022. In short, Gota has left the country with the question of whether the government should prioritise debt repayments or essential commodities for the people. During the troubled period, President Gota reached out to the trio - the US, China and India – to overcome the financial turmoil. China came forward immediately, granting some debt restructuring opportunities and credit-lines, yet Sri Lanka’s strategic action called Hedging,* where resources were given to India and the US as well has angered China. India and US came forward later to offer the opportunity where India has granted the USD 1-2 billion for essential items, including rice and medicine, and a USD 500 million credit-line to import the fuel, urgent needs of the public. However, India’s aid and resources come with a cost for future Sri Lanka, where overnight drafted agreements were signed to hand over strategic resources, including Sampur Power Plant and the port of Trinco, a naturally sheltered harbour in the Indian Ocean Region. In March 2022, the public encountered hour-long power cuts that prolonged into 13-hours, day-long fuel, food, medicine, milk and gas queues where the survival of the public was threatened. Instead of resolving the public needs, President Gota has worsened the economic situation by neglecting his duties to the people by ignoring the early signs of the crisis and supporting corruption, nepotism and printing money. Using political and religious extremism to defend his action, Gota - a former military man, has pushed the general public beyond their threshold of tolerance. Peaceful public protests started with the famous slogan called #GoHomeGota quickly reached the hearts of millions of Sri Lankans. The non-partisan protestors demanded the immediate resignation of President Gota, which later extended to the resignation of his brother Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and close family members of Rajapaksa's in political power. The government has taken extreme measures to crush the public spirit of the protest by imposing a curfew, social media ban and emergency laws, yet all of those decisions were reversed (as Gota is famous for reversing his decisions). Supporting the great cause, the overseas Sri Lankan diaspora held peaceful protests in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the US, UK and France. Due to the domestic and international pressure on President Gota, except himself and his brother, all other cabinet members and top Rajapaksa supporters in government, including the Central Bank Governor, resigned. This reaction to public protests has energised the public, expanded protest slogans, and demanded a change in the political system in Sri Lanka. Even though President Gota’s regime was shattered, the main opposition in the Parliament failed to seize the political opportunity and bring a sustainable political solution through the Parliamentary democracy. Youth have taken the political revolution into their hands, deciding to camp outside the President's Secretariate, continuing to hold the protests, day and night, and renaming their campsite‘GoGotaGama’ (GoGotaVillage) to inspire the public revolution. Even though local and international specialists have proposed numerous ways to overcome the financial difficulties in Sri Lanka, the government is not ready to make political stability by resigning. Sri Lanka, a country without a Cabinet, has declared its inability to pay all external debt, including the USD 1 billion International Sovereign Bond repayment in July, a few days ago, which has further raised the uncertainty of the future of 22 million Sri Lankans. *When it comes to state foreign policy strategies, here is a term called hedging where states show a mix of cooperative and confrontational elements towards other states. This is a mixture of balancing and bandwagoning policies. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

a0defbd1-e7df-4987-91d0-e2473ad1ef26 < All op-eds "Seeing" the Indo-Pacific and Questions of Strategic Judgement Dr. Medha Bisht How does one ‘see’ the Indo-Pacific amidst the multiple strategic configurations that the Ocean is witnessing? This is a question that India is/will be grappling with, in the near future. Given the salience of the issue, which is dynamic and indeed wrought with competing narratives, interests, and versions, it is important that one reckons with some essential building blocks for debating the Indian approach. I offer three building blocks for revisiting the Indian strategic approach- which perhaps need some reflection. These are partnerships, principles, and purpose. Partnerships : It is increasingly clear that multiple network-based alliances are emerging in the Indo-Pacific. Termed as minilaterals and plurilaterals and driven by issue-based interests, India needs to focus on how these multiple issue-based alliances can be translated from mere declarations to substantive diplomatic action, both for itself and South Asia. New Delhi needs to go beyond the comfort-zone of believing that these partnerships alone will ensure stability in the region. On its part, the US perceives these as the building blocks as a part of its grand strategic design where the primary end goal of these partnerships is to build a deterrence against China. While India has shied away from endorsing this view, it nevertheless has accepted the idea of a broader Asia, which started from the narrative of bringing together the “seas of freedom and seas of prosperity”, but over a period of time has transformed into a broad Indo-Pacific partnership. While Ambassador Shivshankar Menon has emphasized on the term Asia-Pacific rather than Indo-Pacific, India needs to recognize that the costs for India and East Asian countries could be potentially high. Deterrence to China will be a tall order, given its well-entrenched economic networks in the region, particularly Southeast Asia. Besides, China will respond to this issue by distracting concerned partners in these alliances, as has been well evident in her claims around South and East China Sea and Northern borders of India. China can also open multiple fronts to exercise psychological pressure on ‘Asian states’, creating increased emphasis on bilateral engagements, which can impede multilateral spirit for cooperation in the region. Given that India is China’s immediate neighbour, it is important that it refrains from walking a tight rope and is flexible and adaptive in responding to the emerging situation. Facilitating its own interest demands that the principles around which it frames its position is aligned to its ideational values. Principles : One approach which India has chosen to respond to the uncertainty and unpredictability in the Indo-Pacific is the articulated position of Prime Minister Modi expressed through the Security and Growth for All (SAGAR) speech delivered in 2015 at Mauritius. In recent years this discussion has centred on order, rule of law and multilateralism - terms that are not alien to traditions associated with India’s strategic thought. Significantly, in the last two decades with the rise of Asia, academic debates on alternate ways of thinking have gained steam in IR. It would be useful to dwell on the meanings of ‘order’ and how it can be evolved/interpreted, particularly given the distinct insights from the cosmovision of ‘dharma,” a distinct aspect associated with the syncretic Indian tradition! Such ideational positioning and theoretical conceptualization have been clearly missing. If India wants to become an Asian power of some reckoning, it is high time that such ideational discourses are foregrounded in the vocabularies of not just academic journals but the broader International Relations & foreign policy communities. Purpose: John Lewis Gaddis has noted athat a strategist needs to be both a fox (a tactician who is opportunistic and pro-active) and a hedgehog (a grand strategist who is driven by achieving goals) – i.e., one who can see both the forest and the trees together. For India, the quintessential question is therefore, what is the purpose of our engagement and what implications does this have both for India and its neighbours? Is it just stability in the Indo-Pacific (or Asia Pacific), or is it strengthening its efforts towards climate diplomacy, sustainable development, preservation of marine resources and fight against piracy and terrorism? Some of these interests have found expression in its projects such as Project Mausam, Deep Ocean Mission amongst other. Given that these concerns overlap with other South Asian neighbours, India should see the imperative of taking the South Asian states along. There is perceptible shift from a land-centric understanding of South Asia to maritime South Asia. Within this understaning is an expressed desire to emphasise ‘connected histories’ of South Asian ports and strategic choke points. Given this, India should start investing in the idea of maritime South Asia, where ways of emancipating the agency of SAARC nations should be weaved into the Asian regional vision. India will have to walk through South Asia to become a power of diplomatic reckoning. The purpose of a maritime South Asia serves the Indian concerns well. South Asia is an interconnected ecological space, located at the networked confluence where the Himalayas meet the Ocean. James Alex Michel noted, perceptions (i.e., the way we see things) determine how we act. It is rather high time, as he points out, that we call ourselves islanders, and go beyond land-centricity. In fact, rather than ‘seeing the land bordered by sea, one should see the sea with land interspersed.’ This is a statement that resonates well with the idea of maritime South Asia. * Dr. Medha Bisht teaches International Relations at South Asian University, New Delhi, India Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

< Back Mr A.S.M. Tarek Hassan A.S.M. Tarek Hassan Semul is a Research Fellow at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). He has over nine years of research and policy analysis experience in foreign policy, international security and strategic studies. He has worked on power asymmetry among the great powers and small states in South and Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, particularly Bangladesh, Myanmar and other Bay of Bengal littorals. Mr Hassan is interested in understanding small states' dilemmas and responses to the brewing geostrategic rivalry among the great powers in the Indian Ocean region. Nationalism and populism’s reemergence as the response to the neoliberal and globalized world is another field of his research interest as he is interested to see if there are any common patterns or differences in such responses in the Western societies and the post-colonial states of South and Southeast Asia (i.e. Myanmar, India). With the rapid advancement in technology, both state and non-state actors are adapting to the evolving nature of warfare. Their coping strategies are another area of research interest for Mr Hassan. Before joining BIISS, Mr Hassan worked at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) as a Program Associate on a CPD-Christian Michelsen Institute, Norway research project on parliaments and political parties of Bangladesh. Before that, he completed his internship at the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) on Counter-Terrorism in Bangladesh. Mr Hassan obtained his MSS and BSS in International Relations from the University of Dhaka. He has participated in the Kautilya Fellowship program 2020, India, which was jointly organized by the India Foundation and India’s Ministry of External Affairs. He has participated in numerous conferences both at home and abroad as well as presented and published articles, and book chapters on topics related to international security, geopolitics, foreign policy, globalization and radicalization. Publications

3a876e67-e23f-4169-a908-d0b8533173d1 < All op-eds Indo-Pacific Framework: Bridging the divide between the Global South and Global North Dr Gazala Fareedi Since its independence, India with its meagre resources at that point in time rose to become a voice for the Global South as it focused on anti-colonialism, anti-racism, non-violence, Panchsheel and the Non-Aligned Movement. Since the last decade, its foreign policy has made a departure from the leader of third-world rhetoric to that of great power politics. However, with the recent transfer of the G20 Presidency from Indonesia to India, there has been a renewed focus on the Global South. On the 1 st of December, in an editorial published in many Indian newspapers, Prime Minister Narendra Modi wrote, “Our G20 priorities will be shaped in consultation with not just our G20 partners, but also our fellow travellers in the global South, whose voice often goes unheard.” Similar attention to the Global South was given in External Affairs Minister, Dr S Jaishankar’s speech at the G20 University Connect programme. With India having resumed the baton for being a voice for the developing countries, how does it seek to wield the Indo-Pacific platform to bridge the divide between the Global North and Global South? Can the Indo-Pacific framework create a future where such a divide becomes inconsequential? Contemporarily states hold membership in various organisations across the spectrum. Overlapping membership has become the new norm and convergence at the multilateral level, the new ethic, as no state wants to be left out. However often these organisations or frameworks might not have been founded on similar logic/principles and goals. The Global South nowadays broadly refers to those people who are impacted negatively by Neo-liberal policies. The concept historically underlines the core and periphery debate starting from colonialism and neo-imperialism leading to gross inequalities in the standards of living and underdevelopment. Based upon the typology of international orders as outlined by Kyle M. Lascurettes and Michael Poznansky (2021), the Global South framework is neither a hegemonic order nor a centralised order. Since power is dispersed, the order would come under the category of a negotiated order. At the same time, it does posit the developing countries in a state of friction with the developed countries, albeit for pertinent positive ends of economic and political justice. The Indo-Pacific Framework is in the process of setting a new narrative and building a new foundation. It is also not a hegemonic or centralised order where power is concentrated in the hands of a few actors. All countries have espoused their own understanding of the Indo-Pacific and there are certain shared foundational principles to all these visions. The common denominator is the standard of ‘rules-based international order’ and ‘free and open Indo Pacific’. Since it includes the members of both the developed and the developing countries, another common agenda for the framework should be to become a platform to bridge the divide between the Global North and Global South. The action plan should consciously focus on not only providing inclusive solutions to solve this state of friction on the ground but also creating a new narrative where the divide gets diminished. Concrete steps to reduce inequality should become the backbone for cooperation and friendship. The agenda of immediate concern and long-term issues for the developing countries in the Indo-Pacific vary in a number of ways from that of the developed countries. For example, as highlighted by Darshana M. Baruah , the small island states in the Indo-Pacific emphasise the importance of focusing on “non-traditional security threats” with climate change and the blue economy becoming one of the many areas of immediate concern. For these countries, these issues become life-threatening, unlike other countries. This is in contrast to the developed big countries-the great powers, who prioritize geo-strategic traditional security issues like the containment of Chinese power. The island states do not want to be part of the increasing great power competition between the United States and China. This is true for African states whose “leaders have continuously voiced apprehensions about getting caught in between great power contestations” ( Mishra 2021 ). At the same time, they respect the goal of a rules-based international order as they are most vulnerable to any other kind of anarchic order. Hence the Indo-Pacific framework should highlight and focus on the differing goals of both developing and developed countries in order to become a platform where everyone’s interests are given equal importance. An inclusive vision for sustainable economics should be the predominant operation and narrative in order to move beyond the ‘dependency’ [theory] in practice that is the bedrock for the division between the Global North and Global South. As a voice for the Global South as well as a member of the Indo-Pacific framework, India ought to up the ante regarding manoeuvring the structuring of the framework to suit not only its national interests but also to promote a more equitable international order. Concerns of geopolitics can hardly be divorced from sustainable economy and social development, especially for developing countries. As stated by Happymon Jacob , “the world still, albeit occasionally, looks up to us [India] for moral leadership or as a peace-builder”. With India starting its presidency for the G20, along with being the chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), it shares an even greater responsibility for steering the increasing geo-political tensions. Jacob has even called “India as a pole” and written that “India is a pivotal power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, with an ability to help tackle security, climate and other challenges of global consequence.” The Indo-Pacific framework should not be narrow and constrained to only the geo-strategic objectives of a few developed countries. Neither should it be hijacked as a pawn for the increasing rivalry between the United States and China. Rather its true success lies in promoting a shared platform and vision for implementing a just and economically equal world order. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Capt Sarabjeet S Parmar was commissioned into the Indian Navy on 01 July 1987 and retired on 30 June 2023. He has been a Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and worked in the Indian Navy’s strategic apex level offices. He has written and spoken extensively on maritime security and strategy issues at various national and international conferences and his main areas of research include national and maritime strategy and security related aspects in the Indo-Pacific, piracy, HADR, and international maritime law with a focus on lawfare. < Back Capt. Sarabjeet S Parmar Capt Sarabjeet S Parmar was commissioned into the Indian Navy on 01 July 1987 and retired on 30 June 2023. He has commanded two ships and a frontline anti-submarine warfare and anti-shipping helicopter squadron. He was member of the XI Indian Antarctic Summer Expedition in 1991, attended the Management Defence Course Conducted by the British Government at Colombo in 2005, and represented the Indian Navy in the first international HOSTAC (helicopter operations from ships other than aircraft carriers) conference held at Norfolk, USA in 2008. He has been a Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and worked in the Indian Navy’s strategic apex level offices where, as Director Strategy was part of the core team published the Indian Navy’s unclassified maritime security strategy document titled Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy in 2015, carried out regional maritime assessments and completed the doctrine development plan. He was the Executive Director and Senior Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation prior retirement. He has written and spoken extensively on maritime security and strategy issues at various national and international conferences and his main areas of research include national and maritime strategy and security related aspects in the Indo-Pacific, piracy, HADR, and international maritime law with a focus on lawfare. His writings can be accessed at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Captain-Sarabjeet-Parmar and https://independent.academia.edu/sarabjeetparmar