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749f5a1c-ebaa-4a45-8f3f-43364e9e4ee6 < All op-eds India’s G20 Presidency and the Future of Indian Leadership in International Affairs Don McLain Gill As the initial phase of the G20 continues to unfold, India has been demonstrating its deep understanding of the transitions taking place in the international power structure. While multipolarity has increasingly become a buzzword among commentators of international politics. It is crucial to conceptually decipher what it practically means for India’s leadership and the future of international geopolitical affairs. The most prominent characteristic of multipolarity rests on the nature of the dispersion of power in the international system. Accordingly, the potential emergence of new poles will not only significantly reorient the way states engage, but also how key regional and international issues are perceived and prioritized. Consequently, shifts in the distribution of power will also create shocks within traditional sources of power given the fluctuations of state influence and what they entail for the shaping of international narratives. However, today’s transition towards multipolarity should not only be analyzed through the lens of material power. Rather, the dynamism of state perception towards the established order also presents itself as an equally crucial determinant of what to expect in the years to come, particularly in line with inter-state cooperation and competition. This year’s G20 comes at a time of critical traditional and non-traditional security challenges that continue to plague the international system, albeit in varying degrees. Consequently, the finance and foreign ministers meeting at the G20 witnessed stark disagreements and divergences, particularly in line with the war in Ukraine. While such disagreements were expected, given the presence of ministers from the Western states and Russia, such an occurrence also reflected the rigid and binary approaches of particular states towards international affairs. Hence, the adamant nature of engagement between both sides has resulted in the inability of all members to maximize the potential of such a crucial platform, which seeks to provide solutions and address multi-dimensional challenges that are impacting the world today. It is this worrying international trend that highlights the need for an equitable voice. On the day of the foreign ministers' meeting, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a bold and pressing statement by emphasising how no group in the international system can claim leadership by side-lining and overlooking the plight, vulnerabilities, and sensitivity of the developing world. It is this difficult nature of political polarization at the expense of the interests of the silent majority, that the Indian Prime Minister seeks to rectify. India, under the Modi Government, has illustrated its steadfast commitment to play a bigger and more proactive role in translating its rise into a practical form of leadership. Being the world’s largest democracy, whose external engagements revolve around the centrality of international law, India’s growing accumulation of robust material capabilities will be grounded on its willingness to work within the established rules-based order. However, as a rising great power, India’s leadership will also draw on its history, principles, and experiences as a civilizational state. Such attributes will not only supplement the established order, but also pragmatically reform it. On the same day, External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar echoed this by indicating how the United Nations has become increasingly unable to address and represent contemporary realities. India seeks to draw on its pluralistic, inclusive, and democratically driven national attributes to project a kind of leadership that understands the complex yet necessary balance between diversity, development, and security. Moreover, India continues to endeavour to contribute equitable solutions to the plight of the developing world, given the increasingly worrying tendencies of marginalizing it due to the polarising dynamics of international geopolitics. Accordingly, the past few years witnessed more active participation by India in various political, security, and economic centered multilateral institutions across the world – including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), The Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Quad, and the G7 – to contribute towards a sustainable international political-economic outlook that banks on a people-centric, democratically motivated, and equitable approach. Furthermore, India has also spearheaded key initiatives such as the recent Voice of Global South Summit to provide a necessary platform for developing states to shape international narratives beyond the traditional locus of power. In addition, the establishment of a Global South Centre of Excellence will be India’s proactive contribution towards cultivating an avenue for engagement not only between state leaders but also members of civil society and epistemic communities to collectively pave a way forward for sustainable development, security, and stability. Furthermore, the way India continues to deal with various international security issues has also garnered the support of states across the developing world. Therefore, such examples, including the ongoing G20 presidency, provide a window to the future of India’s increasing leadership role in the world. However, several external and internal factors may continue to challenge or delay India’s rise. From the unwillingness of traditional sources of power to compromise to the parallel rise of an assertive China. However, such challenges also provide an opportunity for New Delhi to pragmatically recalibrate its policies to better position itself at the forefront of international affairs at a time of great geopolitical turbulence. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

e1dc05d7-3948-4a86-b220-e490949df3a4 < All op-eds The Indo-Pacific – a European Perspective Dr. Christian Wagner The Indo-Pacific will be the main theatre in the emerging systemic rivalry between the United States and China. This has also initiated a fundamental change in Europe’s perception of the region. For a long time, Europe - i.e. the European Union (EU) and its member states - have seen the region mostly as an economic opportunity. Europe is among the largest investors in the region and one of its most important trading partners. Germany conducts more than 20 percent of its trade with countries of the Indo-Pacific. The EU as the largest trading bloc has an overarching interest in the Indo-Pacific which will be shaped by multilateralism and a rules-based order rather than by great power competition. The Indo-Pacific strategy of the EU that builds on similar documents from France, Germany, and the Netherlands signals a geopolitical and geo-economic shift towards the region. Traditionally, the EU has its strength in the field of soft power rather than in hard power. Accordingly, the priority areas are: sustainable and inclusive prosperity, green transition, ocean governance, digital governance and partnerships, connectivity, human security, but also security and defence. The EU also aims at a stronger security role, for instance by coordinating future European naval presence in the region. European naval powers like France and the United Kingdom have traditionally been present in the Indo-Pacific. The mission of the German frigate Bayern underlines Germany’s new commitment to contribute to security in the region. Moreover, the EU plans to expand its CRIMARIO project in the Western Indian Ocean to other parts of the Indo-Pacific. Europe’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific will also be an important test case for its ambitions for sovereignty and strategic autonomy and its quest to become a global power. Europe faces various challenges. A first challenge will be to increase Europe’s visibility in the region. Countries like France, which is a resident power in the region, will follow different approaches compared to Germany or the Netherlands. So Europe’s approach to the region will be a differentiated rather than a unified one. Second, Europe has to provide proper resources. The EU’s Global Gateway strategy aims to mobilise 300 billion Euros until 2027. This would allow the EU to offer viable alternatives for infrastructure projects. Third, Europe and its member states will have to adapt to the emerging architecture in the region. Many regional organisations have lost importance in recent years whereas mini-lateral formats like Quad have gained importance. This is a challenge for the EU and countries like Germany which have traditionally been strong protagonists of regional organisations. The new connectivity agreements with established partners like India and Japan underline Europe’s ambitions to become a stronger player in the region. Europe’s economic strength will be an important contribution to the future of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. One of the main challenges will be to find a common, coherent and sustained approach among its members. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

9558cc4a-95d7-45a6-ac8c-9de09784136c < All op-eds 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year Purvaja Modak This blog has been republished from the Centre for Social and Economic Progress with permission. Brazil has taken over the presidency of the G20 from India on December 1, 2023, ushering in a troika with three member countries from the Global South (India, Brazil and South Africa) that also comprise of the IBSA. India was preceded by Indonesia in 2022, and beginning a four-year effort to prioritise the needs of the Global South at a time when the world faces difficult challenges like climate change, geopolitical turmoil, inequality and indebtedness. While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. The onus is now on Brazil to take forward the global development agenda in 2024. The country has declared a three-point agenda, namely combating hunger, poverty and inequality; focusing on three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, social, and environmental); and the reform of global governance (G20 Brasil 2024). These topics have been chosen keeping the objective of reducing inequalities at the heart of the reform effort as is reflected in the motto of the Brazilian presidency, ‘Building a Just World and a Sustainable Planet’. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva declared these priorities at the Leader’s summit in India in September 2023 when he took over the reins of the G20 presidency from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. He emphasised the country’s commitment to the fight against food shortages and nutritional insecurity. To that end, Brazil has proposed to launch a taskforce called Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty during its 2024 presidency. The task force will work on issues like low-carbon agricultural research and farming insurance reforms, especially in food-insecure countries, with financing support from other nations. Brazil hopes to leverage its experience from its flagship programme, Brazil Without Hunger Plan (Plano Brasil Sem Fome)—an initiative led by its Ministry of Development and Social Assistance, Family and the Fight Against Hunger (Ministério do Desenvolvimento e Assistência Social, Família e Combate à Fome/MDS). By focusing on sustainable development, the country hopes to convince the G20 member countries to increase their financial contributions to tackle climate change and wishes to leverage its own green energy potential for the world to invest in. To achieve this, Brazil has proposed a taskforce called Global Mobilization against Climate Change. The taskforce will promote a high-level dialogue among governments, financial institutions, and international organisations to enhance global macroeconomic and financial alignment to implement the goals of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement (G20 Brasil 2024). By making the reform of global governance its third priority, Brazil hopes to encourage greater participation by emerging countries in the decisions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) needs to be revitalised and its paralysed dispute settlement mechanism needs to start working again by reinstating a fully functional Appellate Body. The membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) needs to be restructured to include more developing countries. The eagerness from various countries, to join the expanded BRICS is an indication of their wish to join a grouping from the Global South re-emphasises their call for the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions. Brazil can leave its imprint on the G20 by stirring discussions on the reform of the global governance architecture towards implementable consensus. Brazil also hopes to advance the Indian G20 presidency’s work in strengthening MDBs, by following through with the roadmap laid out in the G20 Independent Expert Group’s (IEG) two volume- report , led by Lawrence Summers and NK Singh, that was aimed at creating ‘bigger, better and bolder MDBs’. Some of the recommendations of the report were: scaling up financial capacity, boosting joint action on climate, enhancing country-level collaboration, strengthening co-financing, and deepening MDBs’ ambition to cooperate to boost private capital mobilisation (World Bank, 2023). There is action on this agenda item already. At the IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in Marrakesh, Morocco, in October 2023, 10 leading MDBs supported the IEG’s report’s recommendation to explore ways to expand their lending capacity with “ an additional headroom of $300-400 billion in the next decade ”(African Development Bank Group, 2023). In a first-time global leadership role of this stature, Brazil plans to execute its development mandate by convening over 100 working group and task force meetings and over 20 ministerial meetings that will culminate in the Leader’s summit on November 18-19, 2024 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The National Commission for the Coordination of the Presidency of the G20 by Brazil has been set up to coordinate and oversee the smooth functioning of the G20 presidency and it is being chaired by Mauro Vieira, Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Fernando Haddad, Brazil’s Minister of Finance (G20 Brasil 2024). Brazil has also introduced the G20 Social to increase participation of non-governmental stakeholders in G20’s activities and decision-making processes. The G20 Social comprises of 13 engagement groups of the G20, namely C20 (Civil society); T20 (Think tanks); Y20 (Youth); W20 (Women); L20 (Labour); U20 (Cities); B20 (Business); S20 (Science); Startup20 (Startups); P20 (Parliaments); SAI20 (Supreme audit institutions); J20 (Supreme courts) and O20 (Oceans) (G20 Brasil 2024). The clock is ticking, and the stage is set for Brazil to make its mark on the G20 process by delivering outcomes brought about by multilateral consensus. Supporters of global governance are rooting for Brazil’s success on its three-point development agenda, especially at a time when the world is facing a polycrisis and global negotiations and consensus building seem more far fetched than ever. Brazil is faced with an ambitious agenda, and there are several challenges in its path. Brazil will need to manage the intense geopolitical divisions that currently exist in the G20’s membership if it hopes to release joint statements and end the year with a comprehensive Leader’s Declaration, a feat that India succeeded in achieving, despite acute scepticism from critics. The Brazilian presidency will have to keep the Israel–Hamas war, Russia’s war in Ukraine, global sanctions and the ongoing frictions between the United States (US) and China at the centre stage and manage sensitivities as it leads the G20 discourse. Other than governmental negotiations, Brazil will have to use back-channel diplomacy through its groupings like the expanded BRICS grouping (that previously only included Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and through its strategic partnerships with neighbouring countries in South America. The BRICS now also includes Argentina, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It will have to revitalise the IBSA to enable policy coordination between India, Brazil and South Africa. President Lula has an important role to play in balancing the powerplays emanating from these geopolitical interlinkages and divisions. The next two years are a unique time for President Lula to exhibit to the world his leadership potential and Brazil’s ability to lead the global governance discourse. It is interesting to note that Brazil’s G20 summit will be held in the same month (November 2024) as the US elections. The summit will also overlap with COP29. Negotiations at COP29 will pave way for COP30 in 2025 in Belem, Brazil. Brazil will also chair the BRICS grouping in 2025. This will overlap with South Africa’s G20 presidency in 2025, giving the troika of developing countries yet another chance to advance discussions on climate action, sustainability and development. But what the troika needs is a serious infusion of well researched, action oriented and implementable policy ideas that can be tabled for the consideration of the G20 leaders. That is where global think tanks come in, sharing solutions to the world’s most complex problems through one of the G20’s official engagement groups, the Think20 network. The Think20 (T20), often referred to as the ‘ideas bank’ for the G20 is tasked with a crucial mandate this year under the Brazilian presidency, and that comes out clearly in its tag line for the year – ‘Let’s rethink the world’. The T20 Brazil process will fulfil its task through six task forces, whose recommendations, put forth in the form of policy briefs, will comprehensively address the three themes that President Lula has declared: 1) Fighting inequalities, poverty, and hunger; 2) Sustainable climate action and inclusive just energy transitions; 3) Reforming the international financial architecture; 4) Trade and investment for sustainable and inclusive growth; 5) Inclusive digital transformation; 6) Strengthening multilateralism and global governance. The T20 Brazil process will then put forward policy recommendations to G20 officials involved in the Sherpa and Finance tracks and to the G20 leaders, in the form of a final T20 communiqué and the recommendations of the six taskforces. With the support of the Think20 and a development mandate based on the needs of the Global South, Brazil will have to ensure that there is policy connectivity at the G20, for the group to be taken seriously and for its efforts to bear fruit. Having four emerging market economies as leaders of the G20 in a row, will surely make it easier. Else, as critics often say, the G20 will become a ‘talk shop’ or merely a global gathering of policymakers with no concrete or enforceable outcomes. The stage is set, and an ambitious task has been laid out for Brazil. While the priorities for the year were released in 2023 when Brazil officially took on from India, action on the ground will unfurl in 2024. The G20 foreign ministers will meet in Rio de Janeiro on February 21-22, 2024, followed by G20 finance ministers in Sao Paulo on February 28-29, 2024. The statements coming out of these two meetings will indicate whether Brazil will be able to bring back the concept of sustainable development to the centre stage of international discussions, especially since geopolitics, wars and regional powerplays have overtaken its mandate over the last few years. The stakes are high and now Brazil must lead the way in showing critics that the G20 is, not a talk shop and is in fact, the economic steering committee for the world, as it was intended to be at its inception. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

6aaed066-270b-4b36-b146-307e46178468 < All op-eds Fighting disinformation with media literacy in Southeast Asia Dr Benjamin Yew Hoong Loh In early May 2022, Ferdinand “BongBong” Marcos Junior won the Philippines presidential election with an overwhelming victory. This was a shocking result as his father was responsible for plunging the country into a deep recession over his family’s plundering of the state’s finances during his term that ended in 1986 through a people’s revolution. Images of his mother’s shoe collection became infamous to highlight the family’s reckless and unashamed use of public funds. The return to power of one of the Philippines most notorious families has been attributed by journalists and analysts to the power of disinformation campaigns perpetuated by politically-linked agents. The Marcos family employed an effective and organized disinformation campaign which “revised” its family’s history to highlight that the country was in a golden age rather than a corrupt authoritarian regime. Social media has emerged as the new political battleground in the last decade as it is ripe for manipulation through these special political agents, often referred to as online trolls or cybertroopers. The role of these clandestine agents is to influence and distort political discourses in online spaces such as social media, comment sections and forums. According to the Oxford Internet Institute , at least 81 countries employed some form of cybertroopers to engage in information warfare on social media. These cybertroopers employ a variety of strategies to sow discord in digital political discursive spaces. They often masquerade as regular people with specific viewpoints to either artificially inflate public support or distort and misrepresent opposing viewpoints. In most countries, cybertroopers are often deployed internally either by local governments or political parties with some cases involving bigger countries like China and Russia seeking to manipulate international discourse to promote the interests of their respective countries. While social media platforms have tried to stop this indirectly through banning of suspicious troll accounts and more recently with labeling of state-affiliated accounts on Twitter , these actions are only effective to a certain degree. Once disinformation gets distributed it can start radicalizing people to believe these points and they in turn become “political diehards”. This was a tactic that was incredibly successful in President Duterte’s presidential campaign where he successfully indoctrinated large swathes of the Philippines public to support his bid (who became known as Diehard Duterte Supporters ). The Marcos campaign clearly learned from this and directed much resources and efforts to replicate its success. In Malaysia, a similar strategy was also employed by disgraced former Prime Minister Najib Razak. After his government lost the general election in 2018, largely in part due to his involvement with the now infamous 1MDB case , which was seen as the main cause behind rising costs of living in the country. With a new government in place, Najib was expected to fade in popularity once his corruption trial began. But in early 2019, he launched a social media campaign called Malu Apa Bossku (loosely translated to mean “What is there to be ashamed about, my boss”). The campaign’s goal was to rehabilitate Najib’s image in the most obnoxious and downright hypocritical way possible: Reframe his image as a man of the people. The campaign likened him to working class urban Malay youths to highlight that he is down to earth, approachable, hardworking and a victim of slander from the government. The yearlong campaign successfully reclaimed his narrative and manipulated a large segment of Malaysians that has all but restored the political clout of a deposed leader. Even after being convicted of corruption and after failing his first appeal (a final appeal is still pending), his popularity is at an all time high. There is a strong likelihood that he would be running in the country’s next general election and there is even a chance he may stand as a prime minister candidate. After Bong Bong’s win, this is entirely possible and his political resurrection would be complete. Similar disinformation campaigns are happening across Southeast Asia as Thailand and Cambodia head to the polls this year too. How do we fight this? Relying on the government to do this is fundamentally problematic as the reason many disinformation campaigns are so successful is simply because of great distrust amongst disenfranchised citizens in government structures and institutions. Relying on them to verify fake news will only entrench political diehards in their positions. Public trust in state institutions and the media is at an all time low and so many measures that predicate this will likely fail with those radicalized by disinformation campaigns. Aside from online platforms having to step up their efforts to block, identify and isolate disinformation and its agents, individual media literacy development is another step that is needed. When large numbers of the public no longer trust information institutions, it is necessary to at least provide them with the tools and critical thinking skills to properly assess and evaluate their media bubbles. Even if the majority of individuals lack critical thinking skills to properly do so, minimal media literacy should be inculcated so that they would be able to understand that they are being manipulated by political agents. Governments and civil society need to push for more media literacy programs that instill the means, tools and practices to protect people from information warfare efforts and bring some much needed stability to whatever is left of the digital public sphere. Democracy is at stake and extreme political polarization will become the norm unless we can prepare people to understand how to consume and process information in a healthy and protected manner. Dr Benjamin YH Loh is a media scholar that employs digital ethnography to study online communities and the digital public sphere in Malaysia and the region. He focuses much of his work on the confluence between technology and society, with a particular focus on minority and marginalized communities. He is the co-editor of “Sabah from the Ground: The 2020 Elections and the Politics of Survival'' (SIRD/ISEAS, 2021) and publishes Op-Eds with Malaysiakini, SCMP and Nikkei Asia Review. He is currently a senior lecturer at the School of Media and Communication at Taylor’s University and an Associate with the Asia Centre. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

47254e4c-9749-4c87-92a5-3f2e7c17703a < All op-eds An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Abhivardhan Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming the Indo-Pacific region, with the potential to revolutionize industries, enhance healthcare, and improve the lives of billions of people. However, as AI becomes more powerful and pervasive, it is important to ensure that it is used safely and responsibly. In April 2021, the Quad launched the Critical and Emerging Technologies Working Group (CETWG) to promote cooperation on critical technologies, including AI. The CETWG has identified several priority areas for collaboration, which include Developing principles for responsible development and use of AI Sharing information and expertise on AI Safety. Promoting research and development in AI Safety. The Quad's work on AI Safety is a welcome development, but it is important to recognize that a comprehensive approach is needed to address the complex and interconnected challenges of AI safety that are emerging from limited geographies. Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. The Chinese Approach to AI Regulation The three Chinese regulations on artificial intelligence (AI) are characterized by a strong emphasis on government control and data ownership. This is reflected in the following key features of these regulations: Maximality : The Chinese government takes a maximalist approach to regulating AI, seeking to cover all aspects of AI development and deployment. This is evident in the comprehensive scope of the regulations, which address everything from data privacy to algorithm ethics. Micromanagement : The Chinese government adopts a micromanaged approach to regulating AI, seeking to control the details of how AI systems are developed, deployed, and used. This is evident in the specific requirements imposed on AI service providers, such as the need to obtain licenses and implement specific technical measures. Public ownership : The Chinese government asserts public ownership over data and algorithms, treating them as public resources that must be managed and controlled by the government. This is reflected in the requirement for AI service providers to register with the government and obtain licenses, as well as the government's right to access and control AI data. The Biden Administration’s Executive Order on AI The United States Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a comprehensive and forward-looking document that outlines several important principles and requirements for the responsible development and use of AI. Here is a summary of the features of this Executive Order: The Executive Order emphasizes the need for robust and reliable evaluations of AI systems, including post-deployment performance monitoring. This is an important step in ensuring that AI systems are safe and effective in real-world settings. The legal instrument also calls for the development of effective labeling and content provenance mechanisms to track and flag AI-generated content. This is important for transparency and accountability, that could help prevent the misuse of AI-generated content. The Executive Order provides a flexible and technology-conscious definition of AI, which helps capture the ever-evolving nature of AI technologies. The definitions of "synthetic content," "testbed," and "watermarking" provided in the Executive Order are clear and concise. These definitions are important to ensure a common understanding of these key terms in the context of AI systems. The European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act The legislation represents a comprehensive pan-European regulatory framework for artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Key features of the Act include the classification of AI into risk-based levels, with stringent regulations applied to high-risk AI systems. The European Commission has adopted a horizontal approach with a proportionate risk-based methodology, choosing Option 3+ over Option 4, aligning with the need for a balanced regulatory environment conducive to AI innovation. The Act emphasizes the importance of human oversight, quality risk assessments for AI companies, and robust data governance practices. It addresses the intricate challenges associated with developing, testing, and monitoring high-risk AI systems, setting forth detailed criteria & procedures for compliance, and aims to ensure ethical and safe AI development, safeguarding fundamental rights and aligning with the unique requirements of the European AI landscape. The Indian AI Landscape India's rapidly evolving AI landscape presents opportunities and challenges that demand a thorough re-examination of the nation's regulatory capacity. The proliferation of AI applications across industries necessitates transparent, safe, and standardized regulations. AI technology use across various sectors raises concerns regarding transparency, safety, data processing, privacy, and consent. These challenges require attention and sector-specific standardization to drive policy interventions and innovations globally. India needs to reinvent its regulatory capacity and intelligence streams to enable technology-neutral regulation and governance of AI technologies. Transparency and safety in AI applications pose a primary concern for emerging markets. Many AI use cases lack transparency in commercial viability and safety, particularly in data processing, privacy, consent, and dark patterns. Sector-specific standardization for algorithmic activities and operations is absent, hindering regulatory interventions and innovations globally. Enforcing existing sector-specific regulations, starting with data protection and processing, is the solution to pave the way for effective AI regulation. Despite legislative advancements in digital sovereignty, digital connectivity, drones, and data protection, the AI and Law discourse in India shows limited transformation. Discussions mainly revolve around data protection rights and the civil and criminal liability of digital intermediaries. The government's proposed frameworks to regulate the use and processing of personal and non-personal data, including the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 , and the proposed Digital India Act, reflect the Council of Ministers' commitment to these discussions. However, the focus on AI regulation remains limited, even in frameworks like the one proposed for the National Data Management Office (NDMO) . The absence of self-regulatory Explainable AI or Responsible AI guidelines from key AI and tech market players across places also underscores the need for a comprehensive and distinctive approach to AI regulation that aligns with India's unique requirements and standards. A recently proposed Artificial Intelligence (Development & Regulation) Bill was suggested in line with such requirements poignant for the development of the Indo-Pacific as an AI hub for the Global South and Democratic Asia. Establishing a comprehensive Indo-Pacific perspective on AI safety requires collective effort. A shared understanding of AI risks and opportunities must be cultivated through open dialogue and collaboration across the region. Guiding principles, anchored in human dignity and rights, are essential for steering responsible AI development. The Chinese regulatory approach emphasizes government control and public ownership of data,contrasting with the Biden Administration's focus on robust evaluations and transparency. The European Union's AI Act introduces risk-based classification and emphasizes human oversight. India, amid a rapidly evolving AI landscape, requires focused regulatory re-evaluation. The proposed Artificial Intelligence Bill reflects private initiatives to position India as an AI hub. By synthesizing these diverse approaches, the Indo-Pacific region can collectively navigate AI challenges, ensuring ethical integration. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

02b9323d-d013-4da1-b1d8-3e08e63ed478 < All op-eds The Assertiveness of Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping Jay Maniyar The President of the Peoples’ Republic of China, PRC, is the incredibly powerful, assertive, uncompromising, and permanent Xi Jinping. China’s foreign policy has witnessed a noticeable climbing nationalist fervour since President Xi came to power. Across the board, there has been a remarkable shift in the way China sees the world. Inferring from the Indian foreign policy doyen, J. N. Dixit, it is understood that an assertive Chinese foreign policy stems from a historically nationalist mind-set of the Chinese peoples as a whole. On the face of it, the principles laid out by China are well-attuned to a peace-abiding, genuinely-intentioned, and internationally-responsible nation-state. Characteristic Chinese foreign policy ticks off all the boxes as far as what it seeks to achieve in Asia and the world is concerned. Maintaining world peace, friendly relations with neighbouring countries, a lasting cooperation policy with all countries, and an openness policy aimed at welcoming the world to China are all part of Beijing’s foreign policy agenda . These are an honest indication of a rising power that will perform much convincingly in seeking to establish its reign worldwide. Openness, in particular, is being innovatively handled through strategies such as ‘dual circulation’. However, President Xi does appear to be interpreting, at times, that these guidelines will be interpreted to what he perceives to be in pure Chinese interests. Jagannath Panda describes this ‘new era’ foreign policy as evolving from being focussed on Asia to competing on the global stage with the United States of America (US). From an economic perspective, Chinese foreign policy remains rabidly attuned to achieving maximum economic gains in any geography and this is even made apparent by China-led multilateralism through institutions such as Boao Forum and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China remains geared for resource hunts anywhere in the Indo-Pacific region, while it actively ‘debt trap’s countries through a vehement economic agenda of profiteering coupled with perennial entrapment. Sri Lanka, for example, has been most afflicted by this Chinese approach and finds itself continually subordinated to Chinese Indian Ocean interests. The Indian Ocean is also subject to a Chinese foreign policy that aims to establish maritime supremacy through Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), encircle its contemporary in India through a ‘String of Pearls’, and apply the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) paradigm to a large area in the western Indo-Pacific region. The latter aims to ascertain Chinese influence in Asia by tying down unsuspecting countries through joint infrastructural interests, ample connectivity initiatives, and several growth zones. Some of the manifest points of Xi’s foreign policy include: 1. There is, now, a newfound keenness on the resolution of all matters pertaining to territorial acquisition, tantamount to the use of force by Beijing wherever, whenever, and howsoever mandated by the ruling state. This is exemplified by how, at one end, China irks its neighbours through state-endorsed armed entities such as its maritime mafia and their relatively low-intensity transgressions, to threatening countries such as Japan with nuclear obliteration over Tokyo's interference in the Taiwan matter. 2. China exhibits a certain boldness in military actions and activity across the entire stretch of the Indo-Pacific region: The following data gives a brief idea about Chinese military assertiveness at the expense of noble ideals furthered in the foreign policy agenda: I. The Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) has engaged in vilification across borders, such as in Ladakh (India). The Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is rapidly modernizing and bulking its inventory to achieve blue-water status on an urgent basis. The Peoples' Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) routinely violates Japanese airspace in a show of territorial aggression. These are just a few examples. II. Chinese island-building takes place through extensive land reclamation in the South China Sea and military assets such as surface-to-air missiles are deployed in this strategically-challenging environment (for China, itself, and the world) III. Chinese military basing (Djibouti, East Africa), naval deployments (nuclear-capable submarines in the Indian Ocean), and intelligence-gathering missions (Bay of Bengal) are coupled with benevolent ventures such as anti-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa. 3. Since a while now, China has conveyed, more often than not, a tendency to want to unilaterally shape the regional and global status-quo entirely in Beijing’s favour. This is evinced from China’s outright rejection of the Indo-Pacific idea, its disregard for India’s Indian Ocean necessitation, and its desire to establish control over the South and East China Seas as also many other waters. A Rising Assertiveness in Plenty of Foreign Policy Avenues China’s growing foreign policy assertiveness is nothing but a crude display of firebrand realism in international relations. At present, no country epitomizes the realist diktat of the absolute centrality and primacy of a nation-nation-state as far as self-interest is concerned as does China. François Bougon says that Xi has even sought to bring China out of its ‘low profile’ abroad by tacitly encouraging young Chinese nationalists to mock and deride enemies such as Japan and the US. The Chinese self-impression, officially called Face (or mianzi , in Mandarin), is being increasingly threatened by its radical foreign policy. A time may come when China could prove to be too difficult to handle. Chinese diplomacy, too, has gained a ferocity unlike any other phase in contemporary history. Since diplomacy is linked to the conduct of foreign policy, The pursuit of a so-called Wolf Warrior diplomacy has made a particular impression of the way the world sees China and has made the country more aggressive in the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. Utilization of technology-oriented mechanisms such as informationization, targeted cyber espionage, and many others are integral to the Chinese agenda. Countries across Asia remain committed to the ‘One China policy even in the wake of Chinese excesses and its hardening national commitment concerning Taiwan. Any challenge presented to the contrary is met with disdain by Beijing and accompanied by impromptu reprimand and rebuke. Conclusion – Chinese Foreign Policy, a Rising Concern for the World If not moderated wherever required and not brought to a screeching halt if necessary, China’s foreign policy bears the potential to alter regional and global dynamics entirely on its own. Led by Xi Jinping’s authoritarian control, China’s power projection is scaling unprecedented heights in the modern era. However, tackling China to the point of overpowering it, at least, considerably is proving to be a taxing and time-consuming endeavour of herculean proportions. How the machinations and manipulations of Chinese foreign policy are effectively dealt with, remains to be seen. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

Dr. Sinderpal Singh Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at the Nanyang Technological University. He was formerly also a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University Singapore. issinderpal@ntu.edu.sgUniversity of Singapore. < Back Dr. Sinderpal Singh Sinderpal Singh is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research interests include the international relations of South Asia with a special focus on Indian foreign policy as well as the geo-politics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Before joining RSIS, Sinderpal was a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, and a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore. He has published articles in journals such as Asia Policy, Asian Security and Pacific Affairs; his single-authored book is entitled India in South Asia: Domestic Identity Politics and Foreign Policy from Nehru to the BJP (Routledge 2013; paperback version, 2015). He has also contributed book chapters on aspects of India’s Northeast, specifically in relation to India-ASEAN land connectivity and India’s broader ‘Look East Policy’. He is Associate Editor of the journal South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, published on behalf of the South Asian Studies Association of Australia (first published in 1971). He received his PhD from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, his MA from the Australian National University, and his BA from the National University of Singapore. issinderpal@ntu.edu.sg

fed3b486-2980-4a95-b805-abf32e80586a < All op-eds Do Maritime Policies Matter to Those Living at Sea? Dr. Vilashini Somiah In the study of Maritime Southeast Asia, scholars would unpack the historical and contemporary importance of water bodies from historical, sociological, cultural, political, and economic perspectives. Often these discourses and debates lead back to the issue of fluidity and porousness of seas and oceans throughout this uniquely archipelagic maritime region that is Indonesia, The Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore (ASEAN observer Timor-Leste should also be mentioned here). In policy studies, this is often equated with the current narratives of security, defense, territorial disputes and a list of potential crises, threats and criminal activities (human smuggling, trafficking, violent extremism, piracy, illegal fishing, and environmental devastations). Within the Indo-Pacific, maritime borders, diplomacy, and sea mobility is commonly associated with the Asian superpowers, specifically China , India , Australia, Japan , and at times ASEAN, and their individual and collective influences on the issue. There have been some challenges identified by policy experts in the development of maritime policies, namely the issue of differing mechanics of security, which are influenced by a nation's military practices, human and financial resources, and also one’s geographical terrain; this can result in different security, mobility and migratory outcomes overall. The maritime nations of ASEAN , for example, (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, The Philippines, Brunei, and land-locked members with considerable coastal areas like Vietnam and Myanmar) have each approached shared maritime concerns differently despite sharing intimate and interwoven maritime history, heritage, and borders with each other. As their maritime problems continue to expand and intensify with time, experts have recommended stronger and more direct communication between nation-states through the formation of regional councils, customizable security and economic frameworks, and the expansion of partnerships with other experienced maritime countries within the Indo Pacific like India and China, and with time the EU, The US and NATO. But for those who research the area from the ground up, these policies have been equated with rigid and sometimes archaic ways of understanding water bodies, which fail to capture very important nuances of identity, belonging, and the pre-territorial and pre-boundary movements of littoral (to mean along the shore of part of seas or lakes) communities. Communities living in the coast also feel that such land-centric policies for development and strategic ties continue to perpetuate their littoral way of life as being dangerous and threatening. The bottom line is that while governments continue to work on securing and strengthening their maritime issues, they also enable an old (and problematic) narrative of littoral communities and spaces only existing as problems to be solved. Borneo for example (also my area of research), is the largest island in Asia and the third largest in the world, and its political division between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei means that international, regional, and local maritime laws have been in place to ensure economic trading of goods and produce, and maritime boundaries are secured and protected. However, while international sea laws are in place to help foster more efficient diplomatic ties between neighbouring nation-states of these maritime spaces, local laws enacted can sometimes be in contradiction to them. An example of this is The Malaysian Territorial Sea Act 2012 (TSA), which sets out 12 nautical miles as the breadth of the territorial sea throughout Malaysia. The history leading to the enactment of the TSA is long and complicated but it is generally a response to international laws such as the (Alteration of Boundaries) Order in Council, 1954 (vis-à-vis the Colonial Boundaries Act, 1895), which determines the boundaries of a British colony and the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982 , a multilateral treaty governing the world's oceans. However, in the case of Sabah and Sarawak, the territory for the exploitation or exploration of the territorial sea is limited to only 3 nautical miles , which has been greatly contested by local activists and politicians and accused of being unconstitutional . The arguments made by those protesting the change have accused the Malaysian government of wanting to have complete control over the state’s rights to fisheries, marine, and mineral resources. The Malaysian government, however, has responded by explaining that while international law limits the Malaysian territorial waters to 12 nautical miles (22km) from the coast, the TSA had always limited the states’ waters to 3 nautical miles (5.5km) from the coast. Before 1963, Sabah and Sarawak, as independent nations, had sovereignty over waters up to the full 12 nautical miles from their shores, but this had to change as they became states under the federation of Malaysia. Regardless of ongoing debates, for those living on the coast, contradictory or overlapping international and domestic policy quandaries such as the above mentioned only translate to further inconveniences in their daily lives at sea, which eventually impact their access to work, social connectivity, and native practices. From this other social problems often ensues: specific to Malaysia, the rigid governing of water boundaries has also led to modern day migratory issues of epic proportions, mirroring the displacement of migrants and refugees coming from countries like Ukraine, Syria, Sub-Saharan Africa and Myanmar. Littoral communities from east Sabah in Malaysia, southern Philippines and eastern Kalimantan of Indonesia see their maritime movement between these nation states as fluid and natural. Non-legally recognised movements are considered illicit and in many cases, criminal, and when arrested they are eventually deported. For the children of these people, they are deemed stateless and undocumented. Further complicating this is the villainizing of local littoral populations who share similar cultural and ethnic identities to these nearby migrants , all of whom are often deemed as dangerous by authorities. While many littoral communities have expressed wanting to respect national laws and international boundaries, it becomes clear to many maritime communities that these policies have given very little consideration to their immediate needs and difficulties in place of the protection of sovereign borders. It cannot be denied that securing maritime borders are in fact important to national security and will continue to be the focus of countries in the Indo-Pacific, especially that of developing nations. However, it is important to recognise that for littoral communities, it is easy to understand how International maritime treaties and cooperation seem to have overlooked their everyday practices and relationships with their sacred water bodies. Their retaliation towards this comes in the form of a rejection of these maritime conventions; these communities are only concerned with their daily survival and will utilise their maritime space for the movements of goods, peoples and ideas indefinitely. Solving this quandary will require littoral and maritime communities to be invited to contribute to the building of more effective policies. With a potential shift on civil engagement, newer maritime laws and policies, both domestic and international, can not only help ensure security and economic stability, but also more important concerns in the 21st century such as Covid-19 healthcare and recovery , climate change and gender equality . Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

LAUNCH EVENT Event title: IPC Online Launch Date: 10th February 2022 Time: Washington D.C.: 0730 - 0900 hrs New Delhi: 1800 - 1930 hrs Singapore: 2030 - 2200 hrs WATCH VIDEO EVENT DETAILS SPECIAL ADDRESS Ambassador Kelly Keiderling Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Dept of State. KEYNOTE ADDRESS Prof. C. Raja Mohan Visiting Research Professor, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore INTRODUCTIONS TO THE CIRCLE Sushant Singh Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research Dr. Happymon Jacob Associate Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Founder, CSDR, New Delhi PANEL DISCUSSION: FRAMING THE INDO-PACIFIC: PATHWAYS TO THE FUTURE MODERATOR Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (Retd) PANELLISTS Ankit Panda Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr. Sana Hashmi Visiting Fellow, Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation Manoj Kewalramani Fellow - China Studies, Takshashila Institution, Bangalore. Dr. Kittipos Phuttivanich Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Ramkhamhaeng University, Thailand.

7a22a302-d74a-4fd1-bc84-657d51e1fde6 < All op-eds The Impact Of A Probable Iran-Israel War On the Maritime Security of West Asia and the Indo-Pacific Region Dr Shelly Johny V. The October 7 Hamas attack on southern Israel led to the death of 1400 Israelis and other nationals, and the kidnapping of 229 people. This resulted in a sustained bombing campaign of the Gaza Strip by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), further leading to a mounting number of Palestinian deaths. Israel has gathered more than 300,000 IDF reservists, armour, and artillery on the perimeter of the Gaza Strip in preparation for a ground invasion with the purported aim of wiping out Hamas. This has heightened tensions in the region with Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon threatening that an Israeli ground incursion into the Strip would result in a massive retaliation. The likelihood of a war between Iran and Israel is huge if IDF moves ahead with its plans of wiping out Hamas completely. It is clear that Iran’s lack of reaction would compromise its credibility in the ‘Axis of Resistance’ (that it built in the region including Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Ansar Allah or the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen). If Iran and Hezbollah fail to protect Hamas now, the Axis of Resistance that they built will be severely weakened, and affect their own deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis Israel West Asia is surrounded by some of the most important shipping lanes in the world including the Suez Canal, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Hormuz Strait. While a war in which Iran intervenes will have widespread consequences for the wider West Asian region, its impact will be felt as far as the Indo-Pacific region. The three important maritime theatres that can be affected by a war between Israel and Iran are the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. Each of these theatres can be affected by the conflict in their own unique ways because of their peculiar geopolitical challenges. For example, Iran is not part of the Eastern Mediterranean but has influence through its ally Syria and proxy Hezbollah. On the other hand, Israel has the capability to conduct its naval operations in this theatre and to a certain extent in the Red Sea, while it does not have that much access to the Persian Gulf area. At the same time, the U.S. because of its predominant naval capabilities will be able to play a domineering role in all these maritime theatres. There is no account of Israel having conducted any naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Israel also did not attack any of the ports of Syria during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, though it is a matter of conjecture if these ports were not attacked because of Soviet presence in them . The end of conventional warfare between states in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict (after 1973) changed the dynamics of naval warfare between the two sides. Israel launched Operation Litani in 1978 in response to a terrorist attack by PLO to destroy guerrilla bases in southern Lebanon and establish a security zone in that region adjoining Israel to prevent further attacks. During this operation, the Israeli Air Force struck at the port of Tyre, where the Palestinians were said to have received large deliveries of arms . When Palestinian guerrillas continued their operations against Israel even after Operation Litani, Israel conducted an invasion of Lebanon in 1982 going as far north as Beirut with the aim of expelling the PLO from Lebanon. Israel changed its tactics towards guerrillas operating in Lebanon during this war. The Israel Navy conducted a blockade of West Beirut, beginning in June 1982 to put pressure on the Lebanese to force the PLO to leave Lebanon. The blockade was maintained by a ring of patrol boats, gunboats, and missile boats supported by submarines. The siege lasted until August 1982 when a deal was reached for the withdrawal of the PLO leadership and fighters from Lebanon. The PLO was replaced by the Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah in conducting attacks against Israel and its proxy in southern Lebanon, the South Lebanon Army (SLA) headed by Maronite Christians from southern Lebanon allied with Israel. The attacks by Hezbollah continued in the years after Israel first withdrew from most of Lebanon except an area of southern Lebanon adjoining Israel in 1985 and then its complete withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. Israel conducted two military operations against Hezbollah in the 1990s when it still retained control of a part of southern Lebanon. During the seventeen-day Operation Grapes of Wrath conducted by Israel against Hezbollah in 1996, the Israel Navy blockaded the ports of Beirut, Sidon and Tyre in a repetition of the tactic that it used in 1982 . In the more devastating war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, Israel not only blockaded all Lebanese ports but even bombed the Beirut port and its lighthouse In the civil war that broke out in Syria in 2011 as part of the anti-government protests, Iran through the Quds force of its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah, and pro-Iranian Shia militias from other parts of the region provided support to the Syrian government which allowed the latter to survive. Iran has been using a supply corridor extending from Iraq to eastern Syria to transfer weapons to Hezbollah and other pro-Iran Shia militias in Syria and Lebanon. Israel, for years, has targeted airports and sea ports in the government-held parts of Syria in an apparent attempt to prevent arms shipments from Iran. However, the recent increase in Israeli attacks against Syrian seaports could be to counter Iranian attempts to transfer weapons by sea as the usual supply corridor extending from Iraq to eastern Syria was targeted by intensified Israeli strikes . In the event of the present Gaza War spreading to Lebanon through strong retaliations by Hezbollah, Israel is likely to repeat its tactic of blockading Lebanese ports or even bombing them. The war in Gaza has already begun impacting offshore production and exploration of natural gas in the Levantine basin off the shores of Syria, Lebanon, and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel stopped gas production at the offshore Tamar gas field located 25 kilometres off the shore of Ashkelon though it is unclear if Hamas has the capability to target the field. However, Lebanon has not halted its gas exploration in offshore Block 9, south of the Lebanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) It is not clear if Israel would target the drilling rig and other facilities in Lebanon’s Block 9 in the event of the conflict spreading. If it is seen that Syria-based Shia militias are actively intervening in the conflict, Israel might blockade ports in Syria as well. Israel has targeted ships bound for Syria carrying Iranian oil and military supplies. But in continuation of what it has been doing for some years, the Israeli priority would be to target pro-Iranian camps and installations in south-western Syria close to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Through an understanding with Russia, Israel has agreed not to target the Syrian regime in Damascus, which is adjacent to the area currently targeted by Israel. However, this policy could change if the conflict intensifies. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

6f82c91d-96b7-4c9e-a473-e7797779d187 < All op-eds Biden’s Healing Plan: Where is it? Anurag Mishra As Joe Biden ascended to the Presidency, he sent waves across America and the world that gave people “hope.” In the challenging times when the world faced the most devastating health crisis, America had more to cure from. In his victory speech, Biden announced healing a bitterly divided country and ending the pandemic as his two topmost priorities. Dubbing the electoral victory a moral triumph, Biden had undertaken to comfort America. The speech Biden made had landed well with the people, but how well-meaning his efforts have been to remove the chasm and provide the healing touch remains a matter of debate. While some believe that the differences and divisions have only grown since Biden took the reins, others see the continued marginalization of democratic radical leadership as a position sustained in the right earnest. Biden’s campaign had run on noble but ambiguous lines that left political pundits a lot to look for in the dark. This article inquires how successful or not Biden has been in embarking on a path of unity and restoring the soul of America. The Divergences The last presidential election was arguably the most divisive in the recent history of the US. Despite Biden’s call for unity, a report by USC shows that the country remains as divided as it was at the start of Biden’s Presidency. The issues that riled up the country during Trump’s Presidency have continued to drive wedges between the parties and the people. Among the more divisive are the issues relating to climate change, environment protection, gun laws, and immigration. According to a Pew survey , the parties have gone adrift more than ever in the past over climate change issues. Although the younger republican lot does see climate change as a crisis, the repeated onslaughts of President Trump and other Republicans over climate crisis have created divisions among the parties and the people. Biden’s prompt appointment of John Kerry as a special envoy for climate and an immediate return to the Paris accord made it clear where the parties stand on this issue. The Republican disregard for climate change reflects equally concerning environmental protection. While eight out of ten Democrats feel climate protection is of utmost importance, less than four Republicans out of ten seem to worry about it. Thus, the Biden Administration’s expenditure and the constraints it has put over American polluting enterprises and land-use changes have caused the Republicans and Democrats fiercely against each other. According to the latest Pew survey , the number of Americans who want stricter gun laws (even in the wake of numerous school shootings across the US) has decreased from 60 percent in 2019 to 53 percent today. The rift is even wider when we compare the number of people who see gun violence as a significant issue in American society; the republicans v democrats are pitted at 18 percent to 73. America also remains divided on the question of immigrants. As Trump’s border wall remains an object of fancy in the public imagination, the unpraiseworthy handling of the southern border is one of the most criticized actions of the Biden Administration. The troubles for the Biden administration concerning uniting the divided nation are far from over. With the overturning of Roe v Wade, the Supreme Court of the USA has let the genie out of the bottle. By a single judgment, the Supreme Court has made abortion illegal in more than eight states. Several other states are in the offing to either completely ban abortions or regulate them heavily. Prospects vis a vis bridging the divide seem not very promising. Convergences In his forthcoming book titled “The Fight of His Life: Inside Joe Biden’s White House,” Charles Whipple describes Biden’s ascendance to the Oval office as “He’s been dealt an extraordinarily bad hand.” To deliver the country from such bitter divisions is no mean task but has Biden done enough to bridge divides instead of widening them is a point worth discussing. In Biden’s Presidency, points of bipartisan consensus and convergences have not been very forthcoming. However, that is not to say that there have been no attempts or success to have consensus. Lately, the school shootings in Texas gave America a much-needed shock to lose its reluctance toward stricter gun laws. Despite most Americans supporting the right to own firearms, Gallup’s poll had suggested in the previous year that Americans are not opposed to a stricter legal regime for their guns and heirloom. Taking a cue from the outrage and riding on sentiments, the US Senate passed bipartisan gun-safety legislation with a considerable margin. Not only that, but Biden also secured a bipartisan victory with his $1.2 trillion infrastructure plan. Additionally, Biden’s steadfast support for Ukraine has also received bipartisan approval. Onwards? Yes. Upwards? Not sure! Biden’s miseries have also been aggravated due to an un-friendly Supreme Court. As Americans brace for more turnovers, and Biden may be compelled to pass executive orders to negate those rulings, the divisions only seem to grow from here. The going-after of Donald Trump, the unilateral executive orders on abortions, and the relentless pursuit of stricter gun laws have only added to the woes of the cause of unity and bipartisanship. It is not so that political divisions have marred only the United States. Of late, social and political divisions have seen a rise in many democracies, viz. India, Australia, and France, and tackling such divisions have been arduous for the respective governments and political communities worldwide. Thomas A. Bayliss, in his paper, suggests that to overcome political divisions, political blocks within a polity need to evolve an “elite consensus” to keep the democracy from becoming more fragmented. However, an effort to arrive at such a political consensus over the more divisive issues has been virtually missing on the part of the Biden administration. The priorities listed on the White House website mention seven priorities of the current administration. From mending the fraught race relations to restoring America’s global standing, the pursuit of unity and bipartisanship don’t find space. President Biden had done right in identifying the problems of American politics but has so far belied his promises of ushering in an era of healing. President Biden, despite several failings, has the time to salvage the cause of unity and do more than what his opponents dismiss as jawboning. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. Applying an intersectional framework is critical for developing a comprehensive understanding of varying vulnerabilities and capacities (that influence the agency of those affected) across societies. Read More Purvaja Modak 2024: Brazil’s G20 Year While Indonesia and India made some progress on negotiations on climate action, inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs), much more action is essential. Read More Abhivardhan An Indo-Pacific Perspective on AI Safety Analysing varied approaches to AI regulation in key countries, this article explores the challenges and opportunities of AI Safety in the Indo-Pacific region and discusses the need for a coordinated approach to addressing these issues. Read More

dd0e37b8-775f-4734-bbe5-eaeef5531dc5 < All op-eds Chinese campaigns increasingly targeting India’s Cyberspace Ms Kritika Roy China-nexus threat actors have been called out for their pertinent snooping and espionage campaigns that are aligned with the country’s national interest. Their espionage activities are global and are assumed to be at least state-directed or ordered, even if individuals might not be employees of the state. The frequency of China-linked malicious cyber operations has seen a gradual rise, with India frequently being targeted, among other nations and businesses. The major motivation for targeting India’s cyberspace includes commercial espionage, coercive tactics or attaining the Chinese strategic objectives. A Snippet of Recent Campaigns Recently, seven of India’s State Load Dispatch Centres (SLDC), which carries out real-time operations for grid control and electricity dispatch, were targeted by threat actors in a prolonged operation. The sustained campaign was intended to achieve the Chinese strategic objectives and the targeting was believed to have begun in September 2021. The threat activity group, dubbed TAG-38, has reportedly employed a modular backdoor named ShadowPad – a sophisticated remote access trojan (RAT) frequently used in Chinese espionage campaigns, to compromise the power grids. ShadowPad is a commonly used backdoor in varied cyber operations undertaken by groups linked to the People’s Liberation Army (P LA) and Ministry of State Security (MSS). With most of the SLDC situated in the northern part of India, one of them was in close proximity to the disputed India-China border in Ladakh which was noted to have been already targeted in a similar attack in February 2021. The hacking group identified as RedEcho was believed to have “strong overlaps” with a China-linked threat group. Indeed, further investigations indicated that in February China nexus threat launched a series of attacks against key Indian organizations including the Bennett Coleman and Co Ltd (BCCL) and the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) database that contains biometric information of billions of citizens. The breach was traced back to the threat activity group TAG-28, another China-linked group that focuses on gathering intelligence. In addition to India’s energy sector campaign, researchers have also observed the command and control (C2) infrastructure of the well-known Chinese malware PlugX heavily targeting the Indian military and public sector after May 2020. Persistence – A Long Running Strategy In considering what is currently known about the China-linked threat actors, a number of attributes stand out. First, the persistent nature of the campaigns, once the initial access is achieved most of the threat actors have been noted to build persistence within networks. This could be indicative of their constant effort of shoveling out sensitive information and user credentials. Second, the presence of malicious actors could also be seen as a possible prepositioning of a kill-switch that can be leveraged during conflict situations or escalations. Shying away from Proportionate Response? India on many occasions does acknowledge the attacks emerging from China but refrains from linking it to broader malicious Chinese campaigns. As seen in the recent power grid attack case wherein the Indian spokesperson pointed out that “We have seen reports. There is a mechanism to safeguard our critical infrastructure to keep it resilient. We haven't raised this issue with China,” indicating a posture of restraint. Understandably, the defensive posture may emanate from the willingness to not escalate the crisis, despite the attacks being traced to hackers operating from China. However, continuous restraint may, in long term, be seen as an inherent weakness and an opportunity for the adversary to continue its operations. Drawing parallels with the recent Russia-Ukraine war that has well indicated that cyberspace is an equally potent ground to unleash havoc on the adversary. The series of malware and data wipers deployed by Russia-linked threat actors in Ukraine, not only disrupted communications or sabotaged operations but also created chaos and confusion. Noteworthy is the fact that Ukraine has always been a testing ground for Russia-linked cyber threats, for instance, the power grid hack of 2015 that caused a power outage for several hours or the NotPetya attack of 2017 causing a massive supply chain nightmare. With respect to China-linked cyber campaigns against India it should be noted that in case of conflict or escalation, the China nexus threat actor may not only be called upon for reconnaissance or siphoning off credentials but also for launching a synchronized assault by the state. Hence, it is high time for India to be vocal about the attribution and simultaneously strengthen its cyberspace capabilities. India could also support or be at the forefront of multi-level initiatives to deter threats in cyberspace. Previous Next LATEST OP-EDS Dr Dhanasree Jayaram Intersectionality As The Key To Indo-Pacific Climate Action The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region that faces a multitude of climate vulnerabilities. These climate vulnerabilities intermingle with the region’s social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural fault lines, thereby exacerbating the systemic crisis that the region’s populations are currently facing and will be facing in the future. 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